THUCYDIDES

BOOK VII

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ

Z

I. Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Πυθὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος, ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὰς ναῦς, παρέπλευσαν ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους. καὶ πυνθανόμενοι σαφέστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς πω ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν, ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτ' ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἐσπλεῦσαι, εἴτ' ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἐς Ἱμέραν πρῶτον πλεύσαντες καὶ αὐτούς τε ἐκείνους καὶ στρατιὰν ἄλλην προσλαβόντες, οὓς ἂν πείθωσι, κατὰ γῆν ἔλθωσιν.
2 καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱμέρας πλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν οὔπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, ἃς ὁ Νικίας ὅμως, πυνθανόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι, ἀπέστειλεν. φθάσαντες δὲ τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην περαιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ, καὶ σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ἱμέραν.
3 ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄντες τούς τε Ἱμεραίους ἔπεισαν ξυμπολεμεῖν, καὶ αὐτούς τε ἕπεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν

THUCYDIDES

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I. Gylippus and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed from Tarentum along the coast to Epizephyrian Locri ; and receiving now more positive information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible to come with an army and enter it by way of Epipolae, they deliberated whether they should risk sailing into the harbour, keeping Sicily on the right, or, keeping it on the left, should first sail to Himera and then, after having added to their forces the Himeraeans themselves and such others as they might persuade, should proceed overland. They decided to sail to Himera, especially since the four Athenian ships—which Nicias did after all [1] despatch when he learned that the enemy's ships were at Locri—had not yet arrived at Rhegium. They succeeded in crossing the strait before the arrival of this watch-squadron, and after touching at Rhegium and Messene, arrived at Himera. While there they persuaded the Himeraeans to help them in the war, not only by going on the expedition themselves, but also by furnishing

[1] Nicias had paid little attention to the first reports of the approach of Gylippus, thinking that he was on a privateering mission rather than on one of war (vi. civ. 3).

τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν (τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν Ἰμέρᾳ), καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἀπ-
4 αντᾶν στρατιᾷ ἥς τι χωρίον. πέμψειν δέ τιν' αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν, καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ
5 Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως δοκοῦντος ἥκειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε σφετέρων ναυτῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν τοὺς ὡπλισμένους ἑπτακοσίους μάλιστα, Ἰμεραίους δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατὸν καὶ Σελινουντίων τέ τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας καὶ Γελῴων ὀλίγους, Σικελῶν τε ἐς χιλίους τοὺς πάντας, ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Συρακούσας.

II. Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι ταῖς τε ἄλλαις ναυσὶν ὡς εἶχον τάχους ἐβοήθουν καὶ Γογγύλος, εἷς τῶν Κορινθίων ἀρχόντων, μιᾷ νηὶ τελευταῖος ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς
2 τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου· καὶ καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆές τε ἄλλαι ἔτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος ὁ Κλεανδρίδου
3 Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλαντων ἄρχων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθὺς παυστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ᾐσθάνοντο

arms for such of the crews of their ships as had none (for their ships they had beached at Himera), and also sent a request to the Selinuntians to meet them at a certain place with all their forces. A small body of troops was also promised them by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now ready to join them with far greater alacrity, both because of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king of certain Sicel tribes of that region and a man of influence, had been a friend of the Athenians, and also because Gylippus had apparently come from Lacedaemon full of zeal. So Gylippus, taking of his own seamen and of the marines those that were equipped with arms, about seven hundred, of Himeraean hoplites and light-armed troops together one thousand and one hundred cavalry, of the Selinuntians some light-armed troops and cavalry, a few Geloans, and of the Sicels about one thousand in all, advanced against Syracuse.

II. Meanwhile the Corinthians had put to sea from Leucas with the rest of their ships and were bringing aid as fast as they could; indeed, Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though he had set out last with a single ship, was the first to arrive at Syracuse, being a little ahead of Gylippus. Finding the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to discuss the abandonment of the war, he prevented the meeting and encouraged them, saying that not only were still other ships about to arrive, but also Gylippus son of Cleandridas, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to assume the command. The Syracusans were encouraged, and at once went out with their whole army to meet Gylippus; for they were informed that he was already near. He, after

αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ Ἰετὰς[1] τότε τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν Σικελῶν ἑλὼν καὶ ξυνταξάμενος ὡς ἐς μάχην
4 ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς· καὶ ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων. ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἐπ-
5 ετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν· τοῦτο δ' ἔτι ᾠκοδόμουν. τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελείπετο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.

III. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίπ-που καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγὺς κήρυκα προσπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα
2 αὐτῶν, ἑτοῖμος εἶναι σπένδεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπαρεσκευά-
3 ζοντο ἀλλήλοις ὡς ἐς μάχην. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσομένους, ἐπανῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἡσύχαζε πρὸς τῷ

[1] Ἰετάς, Goeller's correction from Steph. Byz. of uncertain MS. readings.

taking on his way the Sicel fort of Ietae and marshalling his men in readiness for battle, reached Epipolae; and ascending it by way of Euryelus, where the Athenians also had made their ascent at first,[1] he formed a junction with the Syracusans and advanced against the wall of the Athenians. And he happened to have come at the critical moment when the double wall[2] of seven or eight stadia in extent had already been completed by the Athenians down to the Great Harbour, except for a short stretch next to the sea, where they were still building. As for the rest of the encircling line, stones had already been dumped along the greater part of the stretch which ran to Trogilus and the outer sea, and it was left so, some parts half finished, other parts quite finished. So close had Syracuse come to destruction.

III. The Athenians were at first thrown into a tumult by the sudden attack of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but drew up to meet them. But Gylippus halted near them under arms and sent forward a herald to say that if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce. They, however, treated the messenger with contempt and sent him back without any answer. After this they prepared for battle against one another. But Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in a state of confusion and could not readily get into line, led his troops back into the more open ground. And Nicias did not lead the Athenians against him, but kept

[1] *cf.* VI. xcvii. 2.
[2] *cf.* VI. ciii. 1.

ἑαυτοῦ τείχει. ὡς δ' ἔγνω ὁ Γύλιππος οὐ προσιόντας αὐτούς, ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν καλουμένην καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡὐλίσαντο. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἄγων τὴν μὲν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν ἄλλοσε, μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον αἱρεῖ, καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον. καὶ τριήρης τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἁλίσκεται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦσα τῷ λιμένι.

IV. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποτειχίσαι. καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ τεῖχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος (ἦν γάρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενές) νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπῆει πρὸς αὐτό. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι) ὡς ἤσθοντο, ἀντεπῆσαν· ὁ δὲ γνοὺς κατὰ τάχος ἀπήγαγε τοὺς σφετέρους πάλιν. ἐποικοδομήσαντες δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑψηλότερον αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτῃ ἐφύλασσον, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα ἤδη διέταξαν ἧπερ ἕμελλον ἕκαστοι φρουρεῖν.

Τῷ δὲ Νικίᾳ ἐδόκει τὸ Πλημμύριον[1] καλούμενον τειχίσαι· ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως,

[1] Hude writes Πλημύριον with C.

quiet near his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not coming up, he led his army off the field to the height called Temenites, and they bivouacked there. But on the next day he led out the main body of his army and stationed it opposite the walls of the Athenians, in order to prevent their sending reinforcements to any other point; then, sending a detachment against the fort at Labdalum, he captured it and put to death all whom he took in it; for the place (it should be explained) was not within sight of the Athenians. On the same day, too, an Athenian trireme that was keeping watch at the mouth of the Great Harbour was captured by the Syracusans.

IV. After this the Syracusans and their allies proceeded to build a single wall running upwards from the city across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian wall, in order that the Athenians, if they could not prevent its completion, might no longer be able to wall them off. By this time the Athenians had finished their wall next to the sea and had come up to the high ground; and Gylippus, since a certain part of the Athenian wall was weak, took his army by night and advanced against this. But the Athenians, who happened to be bivouacking outside the walls, perceived this movement and advanced against him; and he, on observing this, quickly led his men back again. The Athenians accordingly built this part of the wall higher and kept guard there themselves; but their allies they now disposed along the rest of the wall, at the points where they were each to keep guard.

Nicias determined also to fortify the place called Plemmyrium, a headland opposite the city, which

ἥπερ προύχουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθείη, ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι· δι' ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι, ἤν τι ναυτικῷ κινῶνται. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμῳ, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἦκεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα. διακομίσας οὖν στρατιὰν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐξετείχισε τρία φρούρια· καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τά τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ὥρμει καὶ αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες. ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο· τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο. τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ ἐτετάχατο. ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας ὁ Νικίας· καὶ πέμπει ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν εἴκοσι ναῦς, αἷς εἴρητο περί τε Λοκροὺς καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας ναυλοχεῖν αὐτάς.

V. Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσεν ἐξάγων αἰεὶ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος

juts out in front of the Great Harbour and makes its entrance narrow. If this were fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter; for the Athenians could keep watch upon the harbour of the Syracusans at nearer range, and would not, as now, be obliged to put out against the enemy from the inner bay of the Great Harbour, should they show any activity with their fleet. And in general from now on he gave his attention more to naval warfare, seeing that matters on land were less hopeful for themselves, now that Gylippus had come. Accordingly, taking over his ships and some troops he built three forts, in which most of the stores were deposited; and the large boats and the ships of war were now moored there. And it was especially in consequence of this that the condition of the crews then first began to decline. For their water supply was scanty and not near at hand, and at the same time, whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they suffered heavily at the hands of the Syracusan horsemen, who overran the country. For the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at the hamlet near the Olympieum on account of the troops at Plemmyrium, that these might not go out and commit depredations. Meanwhile Nicias, learning that the rest of the Corinthian ships were sailing up, sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to waylay them in the neighbourhood of Locri, Rhegium, or the approach to Sicily.

V. Gylippus, on the other hand, continued to build the wall across Epipolae, using the stones which the Athenians had previously dumped along the line for their own use, and at the same time he continually

τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους· καὶ οἱ
2 Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε
τῷ Γυλίππῳ καιρὸς εἶναι, ἦρχε τῆς ἐφόδου·
καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν
τειχισμάτων, ᾗ τῆς ἵππου τῶν Συρακοσίων
3 οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν. καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρα-
κοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ νεκροὺς ὑπο-
σπόνδους ἀνελομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τροπαῖον
στησάντων, ὁ Γύλιππος ξυγκαλέσας τὸ στρά-
τευμα οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ἁμάρτημα ἐκείνων, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ
γενέσθαι· τῆς γὰρ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν
τὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ τάξει, ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν
ποιήσας, ἀφελέσθαι· νῦν οὖν αὖθις ἐπάξειν.
4 καὶ διανοεῖσθαι οὕτως ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ὡς τῇ
μὲν παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔξοντας, τῇ δὲ
γνώμῃ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι
Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς Ἰώνων καὶ
νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες
ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

VI. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν, αὖθις
ἐπῆγεν αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
νομίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐθέλοιεν μάχης
ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι μὴ περιορᾶν
παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τεῖχος (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον
οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους
τελευτὴν ἡ ἐκείνων τείχισις, καὶ εἰ παρέλθοι, ταὐ-
τὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένους διὰ
παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι), ἀντεπῆσαν οὖν τοῖς
2 Συρακοσίοις. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας

led out the Syracusans and their allies and drew them up before the wall; and the Athenians would always draw up to meet them. But when it seemed to Gylippus that the right moment had come, he commenced the onset; and coming to close quarters they fought between the walls, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use. And when the Syracusans and their allies had been defeated and had taken up their dead under a truce, and the Athenians had set up a trophy, Gylippus called his troops together and said that the mistake was not theirs but his own, for by arranging his line of battle too much between the walls he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and javelin-men. He would therefore now lead them on again, and he urged them to make up their minds to this—that in point of men and equipment they would not be inferior; and as for their spirit, it was not to be endured if they, being Peloponnesians and Dorians, confronting Ionians and islanders and a mixed rabble, were not going to make it a point of honour to conquer them and drive them out of the country.

VI. After this, when there was a favourable opportunity, he led them on again. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought that, even if the Syracusans were unwilling to begin fighting, they themselves could not possibly look idly on while the wall was being built past their own—for already the enemy's wall had all but passed the end of the Athenians' wall, and if it once got by, from then on it would be all one to them whether they fought and conquered in every battle or did not fight at all—accordingly they advanced against the Syracusans. And Gylippus, leading forth his hoplites more outside

ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ' ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ᾗ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων
3 αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔλῃγον. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἱππῆς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπερ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν· καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα νικηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων
4 κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα. καὶ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι.

VII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαθοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις[1]
2 τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ᾤχετο καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζικὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν ἢ παντά-
3 πασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου. πρέσβεις τε ἄλλοι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπεστάλησαν, ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι περαιωθῇ τρόπῳ ᾧ ἂν ἐν ὁλκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλως ὁπωσοῦν προχωρῇ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
4 ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων. οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν

[1] μέχρι, before τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου in MSS., is deleted by Holm.

[1] *cf.* ch. ii. 7; iv. 7; also vi. civ. 1.

the walls than before, closed with the enemy, having his cavalry and javelin-men posted on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the work on both walls ended. And in the battle his cavalry attacked the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was beaten by the Syracusans and driven headlong within the fortifications. And the following night they succeeded in building their wall beyond the works of the Athenians and in getting past, so that they themselves were no longer hampered by them, and had altogether deprived the Athenians, even if they should be victorious, of the possibility of ever investing them.

VII. After this the remaining twelve ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians,[1] which were under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, sailed into the harbour, eluding the watch kept by the Athenians, and helped the Syracusans to build the rest of their cross-wall. And Gylippus went into the other districts of Sicily to collect reinforcements for both his army and his navy, and at the same time to win over any of the cities that were either not zealously supporting the war or still held altogether aloof from it. And another set of envoys representing the Syracusans and the Corinthians were despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth, in order that further troops might be sent across the sea in whatever way might be available—in merchant-ships, small craft, or in any other way whatever—in view of the fact that the Athenians also were sending home for fresh troops. Moreover, the Syracusans were manning a fleet and practising with

ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.

VIII. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν. 2 φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης[1] ἐλλιπεῖς γενόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγείλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 3 βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾤχοντο φέροντες οὓς[2] ἐπέστειλε τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι' ἐκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

IX. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν Θραξὶ πολλοῖς τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἷλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἰμεραίου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα τοῦτο.

X. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἥκοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νικίου ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο αὐτοῖς εἶπον καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα

[1] With BH, the other MSS. *γνώμης*.
[2] So MSS., Hude writes *ὡς*, with Stahl.

a view to trying their hand at sea also; and in general they were much encouraged.

VIII. Nicias, perceiving this and seeing the enemy's strength and his own perplexities increasing day by day, on his part also sent word to Athens on many occasions, giving detailed reports of what was happening, and especially now, because he thought that they were in a critical situation and that there was no hope of safety unless the Athenians, with all possible speed, should either recall them or send out reinforcements in no small numbers. But fearing that his messengers might not report the actual facts, either through inability to speak or from lapse of memory,[1] or because they wanted to please the crowd, wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own view, obscured in no way by any fault on the part of the messenger, and could thus deliberate about the true situation. So the messengers whom he sent departed, bearing the letter and the verbal reports which they were to deliver; but as regards the camp, the object of his care was now rather to keep on the defensive than to run voluntary risks.

IX. At the end of the same summer Euetion, an Athenian general, made in concert with Perdiccas an expedition against Amphipolis with a large force of Thracians, and though he failed to take the city, brought some triremes round into the Strymon and blockaded it from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. So the summer ended.

X. The following winter the messengers of Nicias, on reaching Athens, gave the messages which they had been ordered to give by word of mouth, answer-

[1] Or, reading *γνώμης*, "from want of intelligence."

ἀπεκρίνοντο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν. ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε.

XI. "Τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε· νῦν δὲ καιρὸς οὐχ ἧσσον μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν
2 βουλεύσασθαι. κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλείοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ' οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν καὶ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἵσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν, ἦλθε Γύλιππος Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν ἔχων ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν. καὶ μάχῃ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ νικᾶται ὑφ' ἡμῶν, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἱππεῦσί τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐς τὰ
3 τείχη. νῦν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ διὰ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ δυναίμεθ' ἂν χρήσασθαι ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ), οἱ δὲ παρῳκοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα
4 τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἕλῃ. ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.

XII. Πεπόμφασι δὲ καὶ ἐς Πελοπόννησον πρέσβεις ἐπ' ἄλλην στρατιάν, καὶ ἐς τὰς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεις Γύλιππος οἴχεται, τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων ξυμπολεμεῖν ὅσαι νῦν ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔτι καὶ στρατιὰν πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικοῦ παρασκευήν,

ing any questions that were asked, and delivered the letter. And the clerk of the city came before the Athenians and read them the letter, which ran as follows:

XI. "What has been done before this, Athenians, you have been informed in many earlier letters; but now it is more than ever the time for you to learn in what condition we are and then to take counsel. When in most of our battles we had beaten the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortifications in which we now are, there came Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian, with an army collected from the Peloponnesus and from some of the cities in Sicily. In the first battle he was defeated by us, but on the next day, under pressure from their numerous cavalry and javelin-men, we drew back within our walls. At the present time, then, we have discontinued our work of circumvallation on account of the superior numbers of the enemy and are keeping quiet; for we cannot use our whole army because the guarding of the walls has absorbed a part of our heavy-armed force. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-wall with a large force and take it. So it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are rather ourselves under siege, at least by land; for we cannot even go far into the country because of their cavalry.

XII. "And they have also sent envoys to the Peloponnesus for another army, and Gylippus has gone to the cities of Sicily, to persuade such of them as are now neutral to join them in the war, and to bring from other cities, if he can, still further reinforce-

2 ἢν δύνηται, ἄξων. διανοοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν
3 πειρᾶν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. καὶ δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ἥπερ κἀκεῖνοι πυνθάνονται, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤκμαζε καὶ τῶν νεῶν τῇ ξηρότητι καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων τῇ σωτηρίᾳ· νῦν δὲ αἵ τε νῆες διάβροχοι, τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἤδη θαλασσεύουσαι, καὶ τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται.
4 τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψῦξαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπάλους καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους τὰς τῶν πολεμίων οὔσας αἰεὶ προσδοκίαν
5 παρέχειν ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται. φανεραὶ δέ εἰσιν ἀναπειρώμεναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπ' ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀποξηρᾶναι τὰς σφετέρας μᾶλλον ἐξουσία· οὐ γὰρ ἐφορμοῦσιν ἄλλοις.

XIII. Ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις, ὥσπερ νῦν, πάσαις φυλάσσειν. εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ
2 νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν[1] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ

[1] *τῶν*, after *ναυτῶν* in MSS., deleted by Poppo.

[1] Lit. "dryness," as opposed to a water-logged condition (*διάβροχοι*).

ments for his army and navy. For they plan, as I hear, to make an attempt upon our walls with their land-force and at the same time to try their luck at sea also with their fleet. And let it not seem incredible to any of you that they will try also by sea. For our fleet, as the enemy also have learned, though at first it was in prime condition as regards both the soundness[1] of the ships and the unimpaired condition of the crews, is not so now; the ships are water-logged, from having been at sea for so long a time already, and the crews have wasted away. For it is not possible to draw the ships up on shore and dry them out, because the fleet of the enemy, which is quite a match for us and in number is even superior, keeps us in continual expectation that it will sail against us. They keep practising in plain view; the initiative to make attack lies with them; and they have a better opportunity to dry their ships than we, for they are not blockading others.

XIII. "We, on the contrary, could hardly enjoy this advantage even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled, as now, to use them all for guard-duty. For if we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp. And our crews have been and are still being wasted, for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry. And now that we have been reduced to equal terms with the enemy, our servants are deserting. Of the mercenaries also, some, who embarked on our ships under compulsion, go home to their cities on the first opportunity; others, who

δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται (πολλὴ δ' ἡ Σικελία), εἰσὶ δ' οἳ καί, αὐτοὶ[1] ἐμπορευόμενοι, ἀνδράποδα Ἑκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφῆρηνται.

XIV. Ἐπισταμένοις δ' ὑμῖν γράφω ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος καὶ ὀλίγοι τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν. 2 τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἐμοὶ κωλῦσαι τῷ στρατηγῷ (χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι) καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ὁπόθεν ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα τὰς ναῦς ἔχομεν, ὃ τοῖς πολεμίοις πολλαχόθεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀφ' ὧν ἔχοντες ἤλθομεν τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα γίγνεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ νῦν οὖσαι πόλεις ξύμμαχοι 3 ἀδύνατοι, Νάξος καὶ Κατάνη. εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεται ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ᾧ τε ἐσμὲν καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους χωρῆ-

[1] αὐτοί, Hude prefers αὐτοῦ, with most MSS.

[1] *i. e.* as they would profess after they had got within the enemy's lines. Or, "on any occasion for deserting," *i. e.* whenever the deserters thought themselves unobserved by the Athenians or found themselves in the neighbourhood of the Syracusan troops, πρόφασις being used not of a pretended, but of a real occasion, as in I. xxviii., xxiii. 5; cxviii. 1.

were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay and thought they were going to make money rather than to fight, now that, contrary to their expectation, they see on the enemy's side the fleet and everything else offering resistance, either go over as professed [1] deserters, or get away as best they can—for Sicily is large—and there are also some who, being themselves engaged in traffic, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, and thus have robbed our navy of its perfection of discipline.

XIV. "You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space,[2] and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time. But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses; [3] for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this. And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the

[2] Or, "the really efficient part of a crew is always small."

[3] Or, "the men we brought with us must serve for our present force as well as make up for our ever-recurring losses."

σαι, διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος.[1]

4 "Τούτων ἐγὼ ἡδίω μὲν ἂν εἶχον ὑμῖν ἕτερα ἐπιστέλλειν, οὐ μέντοι χρησιμώτερά γε, εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι. καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον, ἤν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοῖον ἐκβῇ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡγησάμην τὸ ἀληθὲς δηλῶσαι.

XV. Καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐφ' ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἥ Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται καὶ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς, βουλεύσασθε ἤδη ὡς τῶν γ' ἐνθάδε μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων, ἀλλ' ἢ τούτους μεταπέμπειν δέον ἢ ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν καὶ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικήν, καὶ χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα, ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι
2 διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν παραμένειν. ἀξιῶ δ' ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· καὶ γὰρ ὅτ' ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα. ὅ τι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε, ὡς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δι' ὀλίγου πορισμένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σχολαίτερον μέν, ὅμως δ', ἢν μὴ προσέχητε τὴν γνώμην, τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται."

XVI. Ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπιστολὴ τοσαῦτα

[1] ὁ πόλεμος omitted by Hude, as not read by the Scholiast.

war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender.

"I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course; and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.

XV. "And now I beg you to believe that neither your soldiers nor your generals have been blameworthy so far as concerns the original objects of our expedition; but since all Sicily is united and the enemy expects another army from the Peloponnesus, decide at once upon a course of action, knowing that the troops which are now here are not a match even for the enemy which at present confronts us, but that you must either recall these or send to reinforce it another armament equally large, both army and fleet, and no small amount of money; and you must send a general to relieve me, since I am unable to remain because of a disease of the kidneys. And I submit that I have a claim upon your indulgence, for when I was strong I served you well in many a position of command. But whatever you intend to do, do it promptly at the opening of spring and without postponements, knowing that the enemy will procure fresh resources, some near at hand in Sicily, and others from the Peloponnesus, and that these last, though they will arrive less promptly, nevertheless, if you do not take care, will either elude you as they did before, or else outstrip you."

XVI. Such were the disclosures made by the letter

ἐδήλου. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες αὐτῆς τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προσείλοντο, Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον, ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροίη· στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην ἐψηφίσαντο πέμπειν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζικὴν Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ ξυνάρχοντας αὐτῷ εἵλοντο Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ
2 Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους. καὶ τὸν μὲν Εὐρυμέδοντα εὐθὺς περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινὰς ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ δέκα νεῶν, ἄγοντα εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν[1] τάλαντα ἀργυρίου καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὅτι ἥξει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν ἔσται.

XVII. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν ἔκπλουν ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ποιησόμενος, στρατιάν τε ἐπαγγέλλων ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ χρήματα αὐτόθεν καὶ ναῦς καὶ
2 ὁπλίτας ἑτοιμάζων. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, ὅπως φυλάσσοιεν μηδένα ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Πελο-
3 ποννήσου ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν περαιοῦσθαι. οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἦκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίω ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, καὶ ἐν

[1] With H and Valla, the other MSS. omit καὶ ἑκατόν.

[1] Already mentioned as one of those who signed the treaty of Nicias, 422 B.C.; *cf.* v. xix. 2; xxiv. 1.

[2] Last mentioned in active service in iv. 66–69.

of Nicias. But when the Athenians heard it read, they did not relieve Nicias of his command, but in order that he might not to have to face his difficulties alone while in ill-health, they chose two men who were on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus,[1] to assist him until the arrival of the other two who should be chosen as his colleagues. And they voted to send another armament, both land-force and fleet, to be recruited from the Athenians on the muster-roll and from the allies. And as colleagues for Nicias they elected Demosthenes [2] son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon [3] son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched to Sicily immediately, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships; and he took with him one hundred and twenty talents of silver,[4] and at the same time bore a message to the army in Sicily that reinforcements would come and that care would be taken of them.

XVII. But Demosthenes remained behind and busied himself with preparations for his departure, which he planned to make at the opening of spring, sending to the allies requisitions for troops and getting ready at home money and ships and hoplites. And the Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, to see that no one should cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnesus to Sicily. For the Corinthians, when the Syracusan envoys arrived and reported that the situation in Sicily was more favourable, felt much greater confidence than before, thinking that their former despatch of the fleet had been well timed, and

[3] He had been fined after the unsuccessful expedition to Sicily in 424 B.C.; *cf.* IV. lxv. 3.

[4] £24,000; $116,640.

ὁλκάσι παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοί τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ
4 πέμψοντες. ναῦς τε οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ἐπλήρουν, ὅπως ναυμαχίας τε ἀποπειράσωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ φυλακήν, καὶ τὰς ὁλκάδας αὐτῶν ἧσσον οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι κωλύοιεν ἀπαίρειν, πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν ἀντίταξιν τῶν τριήρων τὴν φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι.

XVIII. Παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον.
2 μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς καί, εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι,

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[1] The Athenian squadron, generally twenty triremes, stationed on guard here during the whole war ; *cf.* II. lxix. 1. ; lxxx. 4.

[2] The Archidamian War, or the first decade of the Peloponnesian War. [3] *cf.* II. ii. 1.

[4] Referring to the Thirty Years' Truce ; *cf.* I. cxv. 1.

accordingly not only were they themselves preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant-ships, but also the Lacedaemonians were intending in the same manner to despatch troops from the rest of the Peloponnesus. The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships, in order that they might try an engagement with the squadron on watch at Naupactus[1] and that the Athenians at Naupactus might not find it so easy to prevent their merchant-vessels from putting to sea, since they would be busy keeping watch upon the triremes arrayed against them.

XVIII. The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their previous resolution and because the Syracusans and Corinthians urged it, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, so that, as they said, these might be wholly prevented by the invasion. And Alcibiades was likewise insistently telling them that they should fortify Deceleia and not relax their efforts in the war. But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lacedaemonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war—with themselves and with the Siceliots—would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former war[2] they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce,[3] and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreements[4] that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν
'Αθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε
ἐνόμιζον καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμ-
3 φορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς γένοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ
οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους
ὁρμώμενοι 'Επιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ
ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐληστεύοντο,
καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ
τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλου-
μένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν,
τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανό-
μημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις
ἐς τοὺς 'Αθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι
4 ἦσαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ
σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχι-
σμόν. καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἅμα ὡς ἀπο-
πέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε
ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσ-
ηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον
καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν
Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

XIX. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχο-
μένου πρώτατα δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι ἐς τὴν 'Αττικὴν ἐσέβαλον· ἡγεῖτο δὲ
'Αγις ὁ 'Αρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς.
καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον
ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις

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[1] iv. 26–41. [2] *cf.* VI. cv. 1.
[3] March, 413 B.C.
[4] Situated almost due north of Athens, at the highest

to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylos[1] and any other that had befallen them. But now the Athenians, setting out from Argos with thirty ships,[2] had ravaged a part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos; and as often as differences arose about any of the points of dispute in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, they were unwilling to resort to it; at this time, therefore, the Lacedaemonians, considering that the unlawful conduct, of which they had themselves formerly been guilty, had shifted round and now rested upon the Athenians, were zealous for the war. And during this winter they sent out requisitions for iron to their allies, and in general were making ready the tools needed in the fortification of Deceleia. And at the same time they were not only devising on their own part ways and means for sending reinforcements in merchant-ships to the army in Sicily, but were also compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do likewise. So the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

XIX. At the very beginning of the next spring,[3] earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And at first they ravaged the plain of Attica and then proceeded to fortify Deceleia,[4]

point of the pass where the road to Boeotia cuts through the eastern Parnes, the site of the present village of Tatoï.

2 διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, παραπλήσιον δὲ οὐ πολλῷ πλέον[1] καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ πεδίῳ καὶ τῆς χώρας τοῖς κρατίστοις ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν[2] ᾠκοδομεῖτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς τῶν
3 Ἀθηναίων πόλεως. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐτείχιζον· οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὁλκάσι τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε Εἱλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμώδων, ξυναμφοτέρων ἑξακοσίους ὁπλίτας καὶ Ἔκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ
4 Ἡγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Ταινάρου τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφεῖσαν· μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κορίνθιοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμισθωσάμενοι Ἀρκάδων, ἄρχοντα[3] Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον προστάξαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι διακοσίους ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ τοῖς Κορινθίοις, ὧν ἦρχε Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος.
5 αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ τοῦ χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι ἀνθώρμουν ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ εἴκοσι Ἀττικαῖς, ἔωσπερ αὐτοῖς οἱ ὁπλῖται ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπῆραν· οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπληρώθησαν,

[1] οὐ πολλῷ πλέον deleted by Hude.
[2] ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν deleted by Hude with Krüger and Stahl.
[3] καί, before ἄρχοντα in the MSS., deleted by Hude.

apportioning the work to the several allied states. Deceleia is distant from the city of Athens about one hundred and twenty stadia, and about the same distance, or not much more, from Boeotia. The purpose of the fort they were building was to dominate the plain and the most fertile parts of the country, with a view to devastating them, and it was visible as far as the city of Athens. And while the Peloponnesians in Attica and their allies were building this fort, those in the Peloponnesus were at the same time despatching the hoplites in merchant-ships to Sicily, the Lacedaemonians having picked out the best of the Helots and Neodamodes,[1] of both together about six hundred hoplites, with Eccritus the Spartan as commander, and the Boeotians having selected three hundred hoplites, in command of whom were Xenon and Nicon, both Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. Now these set out in the first contingent from Taenarus in Laconia and made for the open sea; and following them, but not long afterwards, the Corinthians sent out five hundred hoplites, some from Corinth itself, others being Arcadians whom they had taken on for hire, appointing in command of them Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also despatched at the same time as the Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meanwhile the twenty-five Corinthian ships, which had been manned during the winter, lay opposite the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus, until their hoplites in the merchant-ships had got well on their voyage from the Peloponnesus; it was for this purpose, indeed, that

[1] *cf.* v. xxxiv. 1. These were clans of new citizens made up of Helots emancipated for service in war.

ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὁλκάδας μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν.

XX. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ καὶ τοῦ ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν καὶ Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα, ᾧ εἴρητο καὶ ἐς Ἄργος ἀφικομένῳ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων[1] ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς
2 ναῦς, καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ἀπέστελλον ἑξήκοντα μὲν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πέντε Χίαις, ὁπλίταις δὲ ἐκ καταλόγου Ἀθηναίων διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις, καὶ νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἑκασταχόθεν οἷόν τ' ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες. εἴρητο δ' αὐτῷ πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ξυστρατεύεσθαι
3 περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Αἴγιναν προσπλεύσας τοῦ στρατεύματός τε εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν.

XXI. Ἐν δὲ τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἦρος καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἦκεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν
2 ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο. καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἔφη χρῆναι πληροῦν ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν· ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατ-
3 εργάσεσθαι. ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης

[1] τε, after Ἀργείων in MSS., deleted by Reiske, followed by Hude.

they had been manned in the first place—that the Athenians might not give their attention so much to the merchant-ships as to the triremes.

XX. Meanwhile the Athenians, simultaneously with the fortification of Deceleia and at the very beginning of spring, sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, whose orders were on reaching Argos to summon to the ships Argive hoplites, in accordance with the terms of their alliance. And they also were setting Demosthenes on his way to Sicily, as they had planned to do, with fifty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as it was possible to get into their service from each place; and from their other allies who were subjects they collected whatever these had anywhere that was serviceable for the war. But Demosthenes had received instructions first of all, as he was sailing round, to co-operate with Charicles in his operations on the coast of Laconia. So he sailed to Aegina and waited there for any part of the armament that had been left behind, and also until Charicles should take on board the Argive hoplites.

XXI. In Sicily, during the same spring and at about the same time, Gylippus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had prevailed upon as large a body of troops as he could secure. And calling together the Syracusans, he told them that they should man as many ships as possible and try their luck in fighting at sea; for he hoped thereby to accomplish something for the furtherance of the war that would be worth the risk. And Hermocrates most of all joined in urging them

οὐχ ἥκιστα[1] ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδὲ ἐκείνους πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδὲ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους αὐτοῖς[2] φαίνεσθαι· ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε προύχοντες, τῷ δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες, καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς ἂν τὸ
4 αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν. καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη τῷ τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι, διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν, περιεσομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας· ἰέναι οὖν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ
5 ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν. καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου πειθόντων, ὥρμηντό τε ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν.

XXII. Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος, ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο τὸ ναυτικόν, ἀγαγὼν ὑπὸ νύκτα πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν πεζὴν αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχεσι κατὰ γῆν ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν, αἱ δὲ τριήρεις τῶν Συρακοσίων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος πέντε μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπέπλεον, αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς,

[1] τοῦ, after ἥκιστα in MSS., deleted by Hude with GM.
[2] For ἂν αὐτοῖς of the Vulgate.

not to be faint-hearted about attacking the Athenians with their ships, saying that with the Athenians also their maritime skill was not a legacy from their fathers or a possession for all time, but that on the contrary they were originally more landsmen than the Syracusans, and had only taken to the sea when forced to do so by the Persians. He added that those who with daring confront daring men like the Athenians appear most formidable to them ; for that quality which enables the Athenians to terrorize their neighbours, to whom they are sometimes not superior in power, though they always attack them with confidence—this very quality the Syracusans would likewise exhibit to their opponents. And he said that he was well aware that the Syracusans, by daring unexpectedly to make a stand against the Athenian fleet, would have an advantage over them, dismayed as they would be on that account, which would more than outweigh the damage which the Athenians might inflict by their skill on the inexperience of the Syracusans. He urged them, therefore, to proceed to the trial of their fleet and not to shrink from it. So the Syracusans, under the persuasions of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and perhaps others, were eager for the sea-fight and began to man the ships.

XXII. When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out his whole land-force under cover of night, intending in person to make an assault by land upon the forts of Plemmyrium, and at the same time, on a preconcerted signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the Great Harbour, while forty-five sailed round from the lesser harbour, where their ship-yard was, purposing to form a junction

περιέπλεον,[1] βουλόμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἐντὸς προσμεῖξαι καὶ ἅμα ἐπιπλεῖν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθη-
2 ναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβῶνται. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τάχους ἀντιπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ταῖς μὲν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι πρὸς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τῶν Συρακοσίων τὰς ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ἐναυμάχουν, ταῖς δ' ἐπιλοίποις ἀπήντων ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νεωρίου περιπλεούσας. καὶ εὐθὺς πρὸ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐναυμάχουν, καὶ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ πολύ, οἱ μὲν βιάσασθαι βουλόμενοι τὸν ἔσπλουν, οἱ δὲ κωλύειν.

XXIII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Γύλιππος, τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπικαταβάντων καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τὴν γνώμην προσεχόντων, φθάνει προσπεσὼν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ αἰφνιδίως τοῖς τείχεσι, καὶ αἱρεῖ τὸ μέγιστον πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω δύο, οὐχ ὑπομεινάντων τῶν φυλάκων, ὡς εἶδον τὸ μέγιστον ῥᾳδίως ληφθέν.
2 καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ἁλόντος χαλεπῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδα τινὰ κατέφυγον, ἐξεκομίζοντο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον· τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων ταῖς ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυσὶ κρατούντων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ὑπὸ τριήρους μιᾶς καὶ εὖ πλεούσης ἐπεδιώκοντο· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ δύο τειχίσματα ἡλίσκετο, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον ἤδη νικώμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν
3 φεύγοντες ῥᾷον παρέπλευσαν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι βιασάμεναι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς

[1] καὶ before περιέπλεον, omitted with H and Valla.

with those inside the harbour and simultaneously attack Plemmyrium, so that the Athenians, thus assailed from both directions, might be thrown into confusion. But the Athenians, hastily manning sixty ships to oppose them, with twenty-five engaged the thirty-five Syracusan ships that were in the Great Harbour, and with the rest went to meet the squadron that was sailing round from the ship-yard. And so they at once engaged in battle in front of the mouth of the Great Harbour, and for a long time held out against one another, one side wishing to force the entrance, the other to prevent this.

XXIII. Meanwhile Gylippus, noticing that the Athenians on Plemmyrium had gone down to the sea and were giving their attention to the sea-fight, surprised them by making a sudden attack at daybreak upon the forts; and first he captured the largest, and afterwards the two smaller ones also, their garrisons not awaiting the attack when they saw the largest so easily taken. Of the garrison of the fort that was taken first, all that succeeded in escaping to the boats and to a certain merchant-ship were rescued and brought to camp, but it was with difficulty; for the Syracusans were at the time having the best of the fight with their ships in the Great Harbour, and a trireme, and that a fast sailer, was sent in pursuit. But when the other two forts were taken, the Syracusans, as it chanced, were by this time losing the fight, and those who fled from these forts had less difficulty in sailing past them. For the Syracusan ships that were fighting in front of the entrance, after they had forced back the Athenian ships, sailed into the harbour in disorder, and falling foul of one another made a present of

οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσέπλεον καὶ ταραχθεῖσαι περὶ ἀλλήλας παρέδοσαν τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. ταύτας τε γὰρ ἔτρεψαν καὶ ὑφ' ὧν τὸ πρῶτον
4 ἐνικῶντο ἐν τῷ λιμένι. καὶ ἔνδεκα μὲν ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων κατέδυσαν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέκτειναν, πλὴν ὅσον ἐκ τριῶν νεῶν, οὓς ἐζώγρησαν· τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τρεῖς νῆες διεφθάρησαν. τὰ δὲ ναυάγια ἀνελκύσαντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῷ νησιδίῳ στήσαντες τῷ πρὸ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

XXIV. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχη εἶχον καὶ τροπαῖα ἔστησαν αὐτῶν τρία. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τοῖν δυοῖν τειχοῖν τοῖν ὕστερον ληφθέντοιν κατέβαλον, τὰ δὲ δύο ἐπισκευάσαντες
2 ἐφρούρουν. ἄνθρωποι δ' ἐν τῶν τειχῶν τῇ ἁλώσει ἀπέθανον καὶ ἐζωγρήθησαν πολλοί, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ τὰ ξύμπαντα ἑάλω· ὥστε γὰρ ταμιείῳ χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ
3 τριήρεις ἀνειλκυσμέναι τρεῖς. μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ' οἱ ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων (οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο
40

their victory to the Athenians, who routed not only this squadron but also the ships by which they were at first being beaten inside the harbour. And they sank eleven of the Syracusan ships, slaying most of the men, except only the crews of three ships, whom they took alive; but of their own ships three were destroyed. And drawing up on shore the wrecks of the Syracusan ships and setting up a trophy on the little island that faces Plemmyrium, they withdrew to their own camp.

XXIV. The Syracusans had fared thus in the sea-fight, but they held possession of the forts on Plemmyrium and set up three trophies for these. One of the two forts last taken they demolished, but the other two they repaired and garrisoned. In the capture of the forts many men were killed or made prisoners, and much property in all was taken; for since the Athenians used the forts as a warehouse, there were in them many wares belonging to merchants as well as food, and also much property belonging to the trierarchs[1]—in fact the sails and other tackle of forty triremes were taken there, as well as three triremes that had been drawn up on shore. But the greatest and most serious blow suffered by the Athenian army was the taking of Plemmyrium; for the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbour could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait there with ships hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make their

[1] The trierarchs, appointed yearly from a selected list of well-to-do citizens, received from the state at the beginning of their year of service the bare ship, without rigging or equipment, which each had to provide for himself.

αἱ ἐσκομιδαί), ἔς τε τὰ ἄλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ ἀθυμίαν τῷ στρατεύματι.

XXV. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ναῦς τε ἐκπέμπουσι δώδεκα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Ἀγάθαρχον ἐπ' αὐτῶν Συρακόσιον ἄρχοντα. καὶ αὐτῶν μία μὲν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ᾤχετο, πρέσβεις ἄγουσα, οἵπερ τά τε σφέτερα φράσουσιν ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐποτρυνοῦσι γίγνεσθαι· αἱ δὲ ἕνδεκα νῆες πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔπλευσαν, πυνθανόμενοι πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις
2 γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν. καὶ τῶν τε πλοίων ἐπιτυχοῦσαι τὰ πολλὰ διέφθειραν καὶ ξύλα ναυπηγήσιμα ἐν τῇ Καυλωνιάτιδι κατέ-
3 καυσαν, ἃ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἑτοῖμα ἦν. ἔς τε Λοκροὺς μετὰ ταῦτα ἦλθον, καὶ ὁρμουσῶν αὐτῶν κατέπλευσε μία τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοπον-
4 νήσου ἄγουσα Θεσπιῶν ὁπλίτας· καὶ ἀναλαβόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρέπλεον ἐπ' οἶκου. φυλάξαντες δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶ πρὸς τοῖς Μεγάροις, μίαν μὲν ναῦν λαμβάνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν, ἀλλ' ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας.

5 Ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι, οὓς οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς αἱ νῆες ἐντὸς ὁρμοῖεν καὶ οἱ Ἀθη-
6 ναῖοι ἐπιπλέοντες μὴ βλάπτοιεν ἐμβάλλοντες. προσαγαγόντες γὰρ ναῦν μυριοφόρον αὐτοῖς ὁ'

entrance by fighting), and in general this event brought consternation and discouragement to the army.

XXV. After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these headed for the Peloponnesus, having on board some envoys who were to explain the situation in Sicily, that they were full of hope, and to urge the still more vigorous prosecution of the war on the continent of Greece. The other eleven ships sailed to Italy,[1] since they heard that boats laden with supplies for the Athenians were approaching. And falling in with these boats, they destroyed most of them; and they also burned some timber in the territory of Caulonia, which was lying there ready for the Athenians to use in ship-building. After this they went to Locri, and while they were lying there at anchor, one of the merchant-ships that had sailed from the Peloponnesus arrived in port, bringing some Thespian hoplites. Taking these on board their ships, the Syracusans sailed along the coast toward home. But the Athenians, who were watching for them at Megara with twenty ships, captured one ship together with its crew, but they could not take the rest, which escaped to Syracuse.

Skirmishing also occurred in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans drove down in the sea in front of their old dockyards with the object that the ships might lie moored inside the piles and the Athenians might not sail up and ram their ships. The Athenians brought up against the piles a ship

[1] In Thucydides the term is used only of the part of the peninsula south of the river Laüs and Metapontum.

Ἀθηναῖοι, πύργους τε ξυλίνους ἔχουσαν καὶ παραφράγματα, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀκάτων ὤνευον ἀναδούμενοι τοὺς σταυροὺς καὶ ἀνέκλων καὶ κατακολυμβῶντες ἐξέπριον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπὸ τῶν νεωσοίκων ἔβαλλον· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἀντέβαλλον· καὶ τέλος τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν σταυ-
7 ρῶν ἀνεῖλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. χαλεπωτάτη δ' ἦν τῆς σταυρώσεως ἡ κρύφιος· ἦσαν γὰρ τῶν σταυρῶν οὓς οὐχ ὑπερέχοντας τῆς θαλάσσης κατέπηξαν, ὥστε δεινὸν ἦν προσπλεῦσαι, μὴ οὐ προϊδών τις ὥσπερ περὶ ἕρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους κολυμβηταὶ δυόμενοι ἐξέπριον μισθοῦ.
8 ὅμως δ' αὖθις οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐσταύρωσαν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οἷον εἰκὸς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγγὺς ὄντων καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων, ἐμηχανῶντο καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοίαις ἐχρῶντο.

9 Ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς πόλεις πρέσβεις οἱ Συρακόσιοι Κορινθίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀγγέλλοντας τήν τε τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψιν καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας πέρι ὡς οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ταραχῇ ἡσσηθεῖεν, τά τε ἄλλα δηλώσοντας ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ἀξιώσοντας ξυμβοηθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων ὄντων ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ καί, ἢν φθάσωσιν αὐτοὶ πρότερον διαφθείραντες τὸ

[1] About 250 tons.

of ten thousand talents[1] burden on whose deck were wooden towers and bulwarks; then from small boats they attached ropes to the piles and pulled them up with windlasses or broke them off, or else they dived down and sawed them off. Meanwhile the Syracusans kept hurling missiles at them from the dockyards, and they returned the fire from the merchant-ship; and finally the Athenians destroyed most of the piles. But the most troublesome part of the stockade was that which was out of sight; for there were some of the piles which they had driven down so that they did not project above the surface of the water, and consequently it was dangerous to approach the stockade, for any one if he did not look out might impale his ship as on a sunken rock. But these also were disposed of by divers, who dived down and sawed them off for pay. But nevertheless the Syracusans drove their piles down again. And they contrived many other devices against one another, as might be expected when the two armies were in hostile array so near to each other; and they resorted to skirmishing and to stratagems of every sort.

The Syracusans also sent to the Sicilian cities Corinthian, Ambraciot and Lacedaemonian envoys, to report the capture of Plemmyrium and to explain in regard to the sea-fight that they had been defeated, not so much by the strength of the enemy, as by their own confusion; and in general they were to declare that they were full of hope and to beg the cities to give them aid against the enemy with both ships and land-forces, seeing that the Athenians on their part were expecting another army, and, if the Syracusans could forestall them by de-

παρὸν στράτευμα αὐτῶν, διαπεπολεμησόμενον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

XXVI. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης, ἐπεὶ ξυνελέγη αὐτῷ τὸ στράτευμα ὃ ἔδει ἔχοντα ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν βοηθεῖν, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης καὶ πλεύσας πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον τῷ τε Χαρικλεῖ καὶ ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμίσγει, καὶ παραλαβόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς
2 ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν Λακωνικήν· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου τι τῆς Λιμηρᾶς ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα σχόντες ἐς τὰ καταντικρὺ Κυθήρων τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἔνθα τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι, τῆς τε γῆς ἔστιν ἃ ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐτείχισαν ἰσθμῷδές τι χωρίον, ἵνα δὴ οἵ τε Εἵλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι καὶ ἅμα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται.
3 καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ξυγκατέλαβε τὸ χωρίον παρέπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ὅπως καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν ὅτι τάχιστα ποιῆται· ὁ δὲ Χαρικλῆς περιμείνας ἕως τὸ χωρίον ἐξετείχισε καὶ καταλιπὼν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπεκομίζετο καὶ αὐτὸς ὕστερον ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἅμα.

XXVII. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πελτασταὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ τριακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι, οὓς ἔδει τῷ Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικε-
2 λίαν ξυμπλεῖν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστερον ἦκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς

stroying the present army before the new one came, the war would be at an end. The forces in Sicily were thus occupied.

XXVI. But as for Demosthenes,[1] when the army was collected with which he was to bring aid to Sicily, he set out from Aegina, and sailing to the Peloponnesus effected a junction with Charicles and the Athenian fleet of thirty ships. Then taking on board some Argive hoplites, they sailed against Laconia, ravaging first a part of Epidaurus Limera; then landing on the coast of Laconia opposite Cythera, where the sanctuary of Apollo is, they ravaged portions of the land and fortified a place shaped like an isthmus, in order that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert thither and that at the same time marauders might make it, as they had made Pylos, a base for their operations. Immediately afterwards, when he had taken part in occupying this place, Demosthenes sailed on toward Corcyra, in order that he might first take aboard some allied troops there, and then make the voyage to Sicily as quickly as possible. As for Charicles, he waited until he had completed the fortification of the place, and then, leaving a garrison there, sailed back home with his thirty ships, as did the Argives also at the same time.

XXVII. During this same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred peltasts of the dirk-bearing Thracians of the tribe of Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes. But since they came too late, the Athenians were disposed to send them back to Thrace whence they had come. To keep them for the war that was being carried on

[1] Resuming the narrative at ch. xx. 3.

Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο· δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν. 3 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ τειχισθεῖσα, ὕστερον δὲ φρουραῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ διαδοχὴν χρόνου ἐπιούσαις τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπῳκεῖτο, πολλὰ ἔβλαπτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον χρημάτων τ' ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ἐκά- 4 κωσε τὰ πράγματα. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ βραχεῖαι γιγνόμεναι αἱ ἐσβολαὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύειν οὐκ ἐκώλυον· τότε δὲ ξυνεχῶς ἐπικαθημένων, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν καὶ πλεόνων ἐπιόντων, ὁτὲ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἴσης φρουρᾶς καταθεούσης τε τὴν χώραν καὶ λῃστείας ποιουμένης, βασιλέως τε παρόντος τοῦ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἄγιδος, ὃς οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιεῖτο, μεγάλα 5 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβλάπτοντο. τῆς τε γὰρ χώρας ἁπάσης ἐστέρηντο καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων πολὺ μέρος χειροτέχναι, πρόβατά τε πάντα ἀπολώλει καὶ ὑποζύγια· ἵπποι τε, ὁσημέραι ἐξελαυνόντων τῶν ἱππέων, πρός τε τὴν Δεκέλειαν καταδρομὰς ποιουμένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλασσόντων, οἱ μὲν ἀπεχωλοῦντο ἐν γῇ ἀποκρότῳ τε καὶ ξυνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦντες, οἱ δ' ἐτιτρώσκοντο.

XXVIII. Ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν

from Deceleia seemed too expensive, since each received as pay a drachma a day. It should be explained regarding Deceleia that, from the time when it was first fortified during this summer by the entire army and was then regularly occupied for the annoyance of the country by garrisons furnished by the several allied states and succeeding each other at fixed intervals of time, its occupation did much harm to the Athenians, and by destruction of property and wastage of men was one of the chief causes that brought ruin to their cause. For before this summer the enemy's invasions, being of short duration, did not prevent the Athenians from making full use of the land during the rest of the year; but at this time, the occupation being continuous, the enemy sometimes invading the country with a larger force and at others the regular garrison overrunning the country, as it was compelled to do, and carrying off booty, while Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was present in person, carried on the war in no desultory fashion, the Athenians were suffering great damage. For they were deprived of their whole territory, more than twenty thousand slaves had already deserted, a large proportion of these being artisans, and all their small cattle and beasts of burden were lost; and now that the cavalry were sallying forth every day, making demonstrations against Deceleia and keeping guard throughout the country, some horses were constantly going lame because of the rocky ground and the incessant hardships they had to endure, and some were continually being wounded.

XXVIII. There was this further disadvantage: the bringing in of provisions from Euboea, which had

διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὖσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελὴς ἐγίγνετο· τῶν δὲ πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ
2 τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη. πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους, καὶ θέρους
3 καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο. μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον, καὶ ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἣν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας, τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ' ὡς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖ Συρακούσας τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω αὐτήν γε καθ' αὑτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑβδόμῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν, ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου.

formerly been managed more expeditiously by way of Oropus overland through Deceleia, now became expensive, the route being by sea round Sunium. Everything alike which the city needed had to be imported, and Athens ceased to be a city and became a garrisoned fortress. For the Athenians had to keep guard at the battlements, during the day by relays, but at night everybody except the cavalry, some doing duty at the watch-posts, others upon the wall, both summer and winter, and so suffered great hardships. But what weighed most heavily upon them was that they had two wars on their hands at the same time; and yet they had been brought to such a pitch of determination as no one would have credited before it happened, if he had heard of it. That they, who were themselves being besieged by the Peloponnesians by means of a fortress in their country, should not even thus abandon Sicily, but should in turn be there besieging Syracuse in the same manner, a city which taken by itself is not smaller than the city of Athens; and that they should have caused the Hellenic world to make so amazing a miscalculation of their power and daring —inasmuch as at the beginning of the war some thought that they could hold out one year, others two years, others longer but never more than three years, if the Peloponnesians should invade their country—that in the seventeenth year after the first invasion of Attica they should have gone to Sicily, when already war-worn in all respects, and should have undertaken another war no whit less serious than that which was already being waged with the Peloponnesus—this, I say, was incredible. For all these reasons, and because at that time

4 δι' ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασι, καὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι· αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν, ὅσῳ καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν, αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο.

XXIX. Τοὺς οὖν Θρᾳκας τοὺς τῷ Δημοσθένει ὑστερήσαντας, διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν χρημάτων οὐ βουλόμενοι δαπανᾶν, εὐθὺς ἀπέπεμπον, προστάξαντες κομίσαι αὐτοὺς Διειτρέφει καὶ εἰπόντες ἅμα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ (ἐπορεύοντο γὰρ δι' Εὐρίπου) καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἤν τι
2 δύνηται, ἀπ' αὐτῶν βλάψαι. ὁ δὲ ἐς τε τὴν Ταναγραίαν ἀπεβίβασεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἁρπαγήν τινα ἐποιήσατο διὰ τάχους, καὶ ἐκ Χαλκίδος τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀφ' ἑσπέρας διέπλευσε τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ ἀποβιβάσας ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἦγεν αὐτοὺς
3 ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν. καὶ τὴν μὲν νύκτα λαθὼν πρὸς τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ ηὐλίζετο (ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Μυκαλησσοῦ ἑκκαίδεκα μάλιστα σταδίους), ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ πόλει προσέκειτο οὔσῃ οὐ μεγάλῃ, καὶ αἱρεῖ ἀφυλάκτοις τε ἐπιπεσὼν καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις μὴ ἄν ποτέ τινα σφίσιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντα ἐπιθέσθαι, τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πεπτωκότος, τοῦ δὲ βραχέος ᾠκοδομημένου, καὶ πυλῶν ἅμα διὰ τὴν

[1] *cf.* xxvii. 1.

Deceleia was doing them much injury and the general expenses which were accruing were very great, they became crippled in the matter of money; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead of a tribute, a duty of five per cent. on all commodities imported or exported by sea, thinking that in this way they should derive more revenue. For their expenses were not on the same scale as before, but had become far heavier, in proportion as the war had become greater, and their revenues were steadily failing.

XXIX. As for the Thracians,[1] then, who had come too late for Demosthenes, the Athenians immediately sent them back, being unwilling on account of the present shortage of money to incur expense; and they commissioned Dieitrephes to conduct them, giving him instructions to use them, as he sailed along the coast (for they would go by way of the Euripus), in doing whatever damage he could to the enemy. So he disembarked them in the territory of Tanagra and made a hasty raid; then he sailed immediately after nightfall from Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus and landing the Thracians in Boeotian territory led them against Mycalessus. During the night he bivouacked unobserved near the sanctuary of Hermes, about sixteen stadia distant from Mycalessus, but at daybreak assaulted the town, which was not large, and took it; for he fell upon the people off their guard and not expecting that anybody would ever march so far inland from the sea and attack them; furthermore, their wall was weak, and at some points had even fallen down, while elsewhere it had been built low, and at the same time the gates were open because of their

4 ἄδειαν ἀνεῳγμένων. ἐσπεσόντες δὲ οἱ Θρᾷκες
ἐς τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ
ἐπόρθουν, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφόνευον φειδόμε-
νοι οὔτε πρεσβυτέρας οὔτε νεωτέρας ἡλικίας,
ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξῆς, ὅτῳ ἐντύχοιεν, καὶ παῖδας
καὶ γυναῖκας κτείνοντες, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ὑπο-
ζυγια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔμψυχα ἴδοιεν. τὸ γὰρ γένος
τὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρ-
βαρικοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσήσῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστιν.
5 καὶ τότε ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ οὐκ ὀλίγη καὶ ἰδέα
πᾶσα καθειστήκει ὀλέθρου, καὶ ἐπιπεσόντες
διδασκαλείῳ παίδων, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι
καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες, κατέ-
κοψαν πάντας· καὶ ξυμφορὰ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ
οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἀδόκητός τε
ἐπέπεσεν αὕτη καὶ δεινή.

XXX. Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθουν,
καὶ καταλαβόντες προκεχωρηκότας ἤδη τοὺς
Θρᾷκας οὐ πολὺ τήν τε λείαν ἀφείλοντο καὶ
αὐτοὺς φοβήσαντες καταδιώκουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Εὔρι-
2 πον,[1] οὗ αὐτοῖς τὰ πλοῖα ἃ ἦγαγεν ὥρμει. καὶ ἀπο-
κτείνουσιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ἐσβάσει τοὺς πλείστους,
οὔτε ἐπισταμένους νεῖν, τῶν τε ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις,
ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁρμισάντων ἔξω τοξ-
εύματος τὰ πλοῖα· ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνα-
χωρήσει οὐκ ἀτόπως οἱ Θρᾷκες πρὸς τὸ τῶν
Θηβαίων ἱππικόν, ὅπερ πρῶτον προσέκειτο,
προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ
τάξει τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν
ἐν τούτῳ διεφθάρησαν. μέρος δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῇ

[1] καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν after Εὔριπον in the MSS., deleted by Badham; Stahl deletes τὸν Εὔριπον καί.

feeling of security. So the Thracians burst into Mycalessus and fell to plundering the houses and the temples and butchering the people, sparing neither old nor young, but killing all whom they met just as they came, even children and women, aye, pack-animals also and whatever other living things they saw. For the Thracian race, like the worst barbarians, is most bloodthirsty whenever it has nothing to fear. And so on this occasion: in addition to the general confusion, which was great, every form of destruction ensued, and in particular they fell upon a boys' school, the largest in the town, which the children had just entered, and cut down all of them. And this was a calamity inferior to none that had ever fallen upon a whole city, and beyond any other unexpected and terrible.

XXX. When the Thebans heard of this event they hastened to the rescue, and overtaking the Thracians before they had advanced far they took away their booty and putting them to flight pursued them to the Euripus, where the boats which had brought them lay at anchor. And most of those who fell were slain by the Thebans during the embarkation, for they could not swim, and the crews of the boats, when they saw what was happening on shore, anchored the boats beyond bowshot; for elsewhere as they were retreating[1] the Thracians made their defence against the Theban cavalry, which was the first to attack them, not unskilfully, dashing out against them and closing up their ranks again after the manner of fighting peculiar to their country, and in this few of them perished. And a certain number

[1] Thucydides explains why their chief loss was "during the embarkation."

πόλει αὐτῇ δι' ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν ἀπώλετο. οἱ δὲ ξύμπαντες τῶν Θρᾳκῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἀπέθανον. 3 διέφθειραν δὲ καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἳ ξυνεβοήθησαν ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἱππέας τε καὶ ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ καὶ Θηβαίων τῶν βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν· τῶν δὲ Μυκαλησσίων μέρος τι 4 ἀπανηλώθη. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν πάθει χρησαμένην οὐδενὸς ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἧσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίῳ τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη.

XXXI. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης τότε ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τείχισιν, ὁλκάδα ὁρμοῦσαν ἐν Φειᾷ τῇ Ἠλείων, ἐν ᾗ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὁπλῖται ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἔμελλον περαιοῦσθαι, αὐτὴν μὲν διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄνδρες ἀποφυγόντες ὕστερον λαβόντες ἄλλην 2 ἔπλεον. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀφικόμενος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν ὁπλίτας τε παρέλαβε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τῶν Μεσσηνίων μετεπέμψατο, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας διέβη, ἐς Ἀλύζειάν 3 τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ αὐτοὶ εἶχον. ὄντι δ' αὐτῷ περὶ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ἀποπλέων, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι πύθοιτο κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὢν τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ τῶν Συρα-

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[1] *cf.* ch. xxvi. 3. [2] The port of Olympia.
[3] *cf.* ch. xvii. 3; xix. 4.

also were slain in the town itself, being caught there while engaged in plundering. All together there were slain of the Thracians two hundred and fifty out of thirteen hundred. Of the Thebans and the others who took part in the rescue, in all about twenty horsemen and hoplites perished, and among them Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs; and of the population of Mycalessus a considerable portion lost their lives. Such was the fate of Mycalessus, which suffered a calamity that, for the size of the city, was not less deplorable than any of the events of this war.

XXXI. At this time Demosthenes had finished building the fort in Laconia and was on his way to Corcyra;[1] at Pheia[2] in Elis he found lying at anchor a merchant-ship in which the Corinthian hoplites[3] were about to be carried across to Sicily, and destroyed it; but the crew and the hoplites, having escaped, afterwards found another vessel, and continued their voyage. After this Demosthenes arrived at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he then crossed over to the opposite mainland of Acarnania,[4] to the ports of Alyzeia and Anactorium, which the Athenians held. While he was attending to these matters, he was met by Eurymedon, who was returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent during the preceding winter[5] with the money for the army; and he reported, among other things, that when he was already on his return voyage he had heard of the capture of Plemmyrium by the

[4] The scene of his campaign in the summer of 426 B.C. (iii. 94 ff.). [5] *cf.* ch. xvi. 2.

4 κοσίων ἑαλωκός. ἀφικνεῖται δὲ καὶ Κόνων παρ' αὐτούς, ὃς ἦρχε Ναυπάκτου, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι αἱ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ σφίσιν ἀνθορμοῦσαι οὔτε καταλύουσι τὸν πόλεμον[1] ναυμαχεῖν τε μέλλουσιν· πέμπειν οὖν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ναῦς, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὰς οὔσας δυοῖν δεούσας εἴκοσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων πέντε
5 καὶ εἴκοσι ναυμαχεῖν. τῷ μὲν οὖν Κόνωνι δέκα ναῦς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων τὰς ἄριστα σφίσι πλεούσας ἀφ' ὧν αὐτοὶ εἶχον[2] ξυμπέμπουσι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ· αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν ξύλλογον ἡτοιμάζοντο, Εὐρυμέδων μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεύσας καὶ πεντεκαίδεκά τε ναῦς πληροῦν κελεύσας αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁπλίτας καταλεγόμενος (ξυνῆρχε γὰρ ἤδη Δημοσθένει ἀποτραπόμενος, ὥσπερ καὶ ῥηθη), Δημοσθένης δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν χωρίων σφενδονήτας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ξυναγείρων.

XXXII. Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν τότε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλημμυρίου ἅλωσιν πρέσβεις οἰχόμενοι ἐς τὰς πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἔπεισάν τε καὶ ξυναγείραντες ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸν στρατόν, ὁ Νικίας προπυθόμενος πέμπει ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς τὴν δίοδον ἔχοντας καὶ ξυμμάχους, Κεντόριπάς τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους καὶ ἄλλους, ὅπως μὴ διαφρή-

[1] τὸν πόλεμον deleted by Hude, following Madvig.
[2] ἀφ' ὧν αὐτοὶ εἶχον deleted by Hude.

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[1] Prominent toward the end of the Peloponnesian War and, later, restorer of the walls of Athens.
[2] *cf.* ch. xvii. 4; xix. 5. [3] *cf.* ch. xxv. 9.

Syracusans. These two were joined by Conon,[1] who was in command at Naupactus and brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships[2] which were lying at anchor opposite them did not abandon their hostile attitude, but were intending to fight. He therefore begged them to send him some ships, on the ground that his own eighteen ships were too few to contend against the twenty-five of the enemy. Accordingly Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent with Conon ten ships, the best sailers of all their fleet, to reinforce the ships at Naupactus. They then directed their own attention to the preparations for collecting troops for the expedition, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, where he made levies of hoplites and directed the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships—he was now exercising the joint command with Demosthenes, to which he had been elected, and turned his face again toward Sicily—while Demosthenes gathered slingers and javelin-men from the region of Acarnania.

XXXII. Meanwhile the envoys, who after the capture of Plemmyrium had gone from Syracuse to visit the cities of Sicily,[3] had succeeded in their mission, and having raised a body of troops were about to bring them home, when, Nicias, hearing of this in time, sent word to the Sicels[4] who were allies of the Athenians and controlled the territory through which the troops would have to pass—and these were the Centoripes,[5] Alicyaeans and others—that

[4] Sicels, aboriginal inhabitants of Sicily ; Siceliots, Hellenic colonists of Sicily.

[5] Centoripa was situated on the Symaethus above Catana and about twenty-five miles south-west of Aetna. It is now Centorbi (Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* i. 68). A town Alicyae in this region is unknown.

σουσι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ξυστραφέντες κωλύσουσι διελθεῖν· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ πειράσειν· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν
2 ὁδόν. πορευομένων δ' ἤδη τῶν Σικελιωτῶν οἱ Σικελοί, καθάπερ ἐδέοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνέδραν τινὰ ποιησάμενοι ἀφυλάκτοις τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιγενόμενοι διέφθειραν ἐς ὀκτακοσίους μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ Κορινθίου πάντας· οὗτος δὲ τοὺς διαφυγόντας, ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, ἐκόμισεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας.

XXXIII. Καὶ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας καὶ οἱ Καμαριναῖοι ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦντες, πεντακόσιοι μὲν ὁπλῖται, τριακόσιοι δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται τριακόσιοι. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι ναυτικόν τε, ἐς πέντε ναῦς, καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἱππέας διακοσίους.
2 σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία, πλὴν Ἀκραγαντίνων, οὗτοι δ' οὐδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων ἦσαν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πρότερον περιορώμενοι ξυστάντες ἐβοήθουν.

3 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐν τοῖς Σικελοῖς πάθος ἐγένετο, ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἑτοίμης ἤδη τῆς στρατιᾶς οὔσης ἔκ τε τῆς Κερκύρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐπεραιώθησαν ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐπ'
4 ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν· καὶ ὁρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν κατίσχουσιν ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας, καὶ

they should not allow the enemy to pass, but should get together and prevent their coming through; they would not, he said, attempt it by any other route, since the Agrigentines had refused to give them passage through their territory. And when the Siceliots were already on the march, the Sicels did as the Athenians requested, and setting an ambush and falling suddenly upon the Siceliots while they were off their guard, destroyed about eight hundred of them and all the envoys except one, the Corinthian; and he conducted those who made their escape, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.

XXXIII. About the same time the Camarinaeans [1] also arrived with reinforcements, consisting of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin-men, and three hundred bowmen. The Geloans [2] also sent a squadron of five ships and four hundred javelin-men and two hundred cavalry. For already almost the whole of Sicily—except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but the rest without exception who had before been watching the course of events—had united with the Syracusans and was giving them aid against the Athenians.

As for the Syracusans, after the disaster that happened to them in the country of the Sicels they put off their project of attacking the Athenians immediately; but Demosthenes and Eurymedon, the army being now ready which they had gathered from Corcyra and the mainland, sailed with all their forces across the Ionian Sea to the Iapygian promontory. Proceeding from there, they touched at the Choerades, which are islands of Iapygia, and took

[1] *cf.* vi. lxxxviii. 1, 2. [2] *cf.* vi. lxvii. 2; vii. i. 4.

ἀκοντιστάς τέ τινας τῶν Ἰαπύγων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τοῦ Μεσσαπίου ἔθνους ἀναβιβάζονται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τῷ Ἄρτᾳ, ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς δυνάστης ὢν παρέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἀνανεωσάμενοί τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ τοὺς Μεταποντίους πείσαντες κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν ἀκοντιστάς τε ξυμπέμπειν τριακοσίους καὶ τριήρεις δύο καὶ ἀναλαβόντες ταῦτα παρέπλευσαν ἐς Θουρίαν. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι νεωστὶ στάσει τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίους ἐκπεπτωκότας· καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτόθι πᾶσαν ἀθροίσαντες εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πεῖσαι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα καί, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τούτῳ τύχης εἰσί, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν, περιέμενον ἐν τῇ Θουρίᾳ καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα.

XXXIV. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ ἐν ταῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν, αἵπερ τῶν ὁλκάδων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Σικελίαν κομιδῆς ἀνθώρμουν πρὸς τὰς ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς, παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ καὶ προσπληρώσαντες ἔτι ναῦς, ὥστε ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν, ὁρμίζονται κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἐν τῇ Ῥυπικῇ. καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ' ᾧ ὥρμουν, ὁ μὲν πεζὸς ἑκατέρωθεν προσβεβοηθη-

on board their ships some Iapygian javelin-men, one hundred and fifty in number, belonging to the Messapian tribe; and after they had renewed an old alliance of friendship with Artas, who being a chieftain there had furnished them with the javelin-men, they arrived at Metapontum in Italy. There they persuaded the Metapontines to send with them, in accordance with the terms of their alliance, three hundred javelin-men and two triremes, and taking up these they sailed along the coast to Thuria.[1] At Thuria they found that the faction opposed to the Athenians had recently been expelled in a revolution; and as they were desirous, after collecting their whole armament at that place, to hold a review of it, on the chance that anyone had been left behind, and also to persuade the Thurians both to take part with them in the expedition with all zeal and, in view of the Athenians' present good fortune, to regard the same persons foes and friends as the Athenians did, they waited at Thuria and dealt with these matters.

XXXIV. About this same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships which lay facing the Athenian fleet at Naupactus in order to cover the passage of the merchant-ships to Sicily, having made preparations for a fight and having manned some additional ships, so that theirs were now but a little fewer than the Athenian ships, anchored off Erineus[2] in Achaea in the district of Rhypae. The place where they were anchored was crescent-shaped, and the land army, consisting of the

[1] The city, not the country. Steph. Byz. says that the name of the city was written *Θουρία* and *Θούριον* as well as *Θούριοι*.

[2] A small place east of Rhium.

κότες τῶν τε Κορινθίων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀνεχούσαις ἄκραις παρετέτακτο, αἱ δὲ νῆες τὸ μεταξὺ εἶχον ἐμφάρξασαι· ἦρχε
3 δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ Πολυάνθης Κορίνθιος. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τρισίν (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Δίφιλος) ἐπέπλευ-
4 σαν αὐτοῖς. καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ἀρθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ σημείου, ἐπεὶ καιρὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ χρόνον ἀντεῖ-
5 χον πολὺν ἀλλήλοις. καὶ τῶν μὲν Κορινθίων τρεῖς νῆες διαφθείρονται, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων κατέδυ μὲν οὐδεμία ἁπλῶς, ἑπτὰ δέ τινες ἄπλοι ἐγένοντο, ἀντίπρῳροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι καὶ ἀναρραγεῖσαι τὰς παρεξειρεσίας ὑπὸ τῶν Κορινθίων νεῶν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο παχυτέρας τὰς ἐπωτίδας
6 ἐχουσῶν. ναυμαχήσαντες δὲ ἀντίπαλα μὲν καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρους ἀξιοῦν νικᾶν, ὅμως δὲ τῶν ναυαγίων κρατησάντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διά τε τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγήν, διεκρίθησαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ δίωξις οὐδεμία ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἄνδρες οὐδετέρων ἑάλωσαν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ ναυμαχοῦντες ῥᾳδίως[1] διεσῴζοντο, τῶν δὲ Ἀθη-
7 ναίων οὐδεμία κατέδυ ναῦς. ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ὡς νικῶντες, ὅτι

[1] ῥᾳδίως with Vat. Hude reads καὶ διεσῴζοντο with most MSS.

Corinthians and the allies from the neighbourhood, having come to their support, was drawn up on either side of them on the projecting headlands, while the ships held the intervening space blocking the entrance; and the commander of the fleet was Polyanthes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians sailed out from Naupactus with thirty-three ships under the command of Diphilus.[1] At first the Corinthians kept quiet; then the signal was raised, when the moment seemed favourable, and advancing against the Athenians they engaged them. And for a long time they withstood one another. Three ships of the Corinthians were destroyed; of the Athenian ships, none was sunk outright, but some seven were rendered unseaworthy, being struck full in front and having their foreships stove in by the Corinthian galleys, which had their catheads[2] thicker for this very purpose. The fight was undecided, so that either side claimed the victory—although the Athenians got possession of the wrecks because the wind drove these out to sea and the Corinthians no longer advanced against them—and they drew apart from one another. And no pursuit was made, nor were prisoners taken on either side; for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians were fighting near the shore and thus easily saved themselves, and on the side of the Athenians no ship was sunk. But when the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians at once set up a trophy in token of victory, because a larger number of the

[1] He seems to have brought a reinforcement of fifteen ships and to have superseded Conon (*cf.* ch. xxxi. 4).

[2] Beams projecting on either side of the beak and serving to strengthen it. The anchors hung from them.

πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων ναῦς ἄπλους ἐποίησαν καὶ νομίσαντες δι' αὐτὸ οὐχ ἡσσᾶσθαι δι' ὅπερ οὐδ' οἱ ἕτεροι νικᾶν· οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἠγήσαντο κρατεῖν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο, οἵ τ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνόμιζον ἡσσᾶσθαι, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἐνίκων.

8 ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ διαλυθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔστησαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ ὡς νικήσαντες, ἀπέχον τοῦ Ἐρινεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους. καὶ ἡ μὲν ναυμαχία οὕτως ἐτελεύτα.

XXXV. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἐπειδὴ ξυστρατεύειν αὐτοῖς οἱ Θούριοι παρεσκευάσθησαν ἑπτακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις, τριακοσίοις δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς, τὰς μὲν ναῦς παραπλεῖν ἐκέλευον ἐπὶ τῆς Κροτωνιάτιδος, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν πεζὸν πάντα ἐξετάσαντες πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ Συβάρει ποταμῷ ἦγον

2 διὰ τῆς Θουριάδος γῆς· καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ Τλίᾳ ποταμῷ καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Κροτωνιᾶται προσπέμψαντες εἶπον οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι διὰ τῆς γῆς σφῶν τὸν στρατὸν ἰέναι, ἐπικαταβάντες ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ Τλίου· καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπήντων. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναβιβασάμενοι παρέπλεον, ἴσχοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεσι πλὴν Λοκρῶν, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης.

XXXVI. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ πυνθανόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὖθις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν

[1] *cf.* ch. xxxiii. 6.

enemy's ships had been disabled by them, and they considered that they had not been beaten for the very reason that made the other side consider themselves not victorious. For the Corinthians regarded themselves as conquerors if they were not decisively beaten, and the Athenians considered themselves defeated if they were not decisively victorious. When, however, the Peloponnesians had sailed away and their army on land had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy in token of victory, in Achaea at a distance of about twenty stadia from Erineus, where the Corinthians were formerly stationed. And so the sea-fight ended.

XXXV. Demosthenes and Eurymedon,[1] when the Thurians had been induced to join in the campaign with them with seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, gave orders that the ships should sail along the coast toward the territory of Croton, while they themselves, after first reviewing all their land forces at the river Sybaris, advanced through the territory of Thuria. And when they came to the river Hylias and the Crotoniates sent word to them that their army could not go through their territory with their consent, they went down and bivouacked near the sea at the mouth of the Hylias; and their ships met them at that point. On the next day they embarked their army and proceeded along the coast, touching at the various cities, with the exception of Locri, until they reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

XXXVI. The Syracusans, meanwhile, hearing of their approach, wished to make another trial with their fleet, and also with their land-force, which they had been collecting for the very purpose of striking

2 αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι, ξυνέλεγον. παρεσκευάσαντο δὲ τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας τι πλέον ἐνεῖδον σχήσοντες, καὶ τὰς πρῴρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρῴραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἓξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν· ᾧπερ τρόπῳ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς
3 ἐπεσκευασμένοι πρῴραθεν ἐναυμάχουν· ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρῴραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῴροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι· ἀντιπρῴροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρῴραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες
4 τοῖς ἐμβόλοις. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔσεσθαι σφῶν ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ οὔτε περίπλουν οὔτε διέκπλουν, ᾧπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον· αὐτοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ μὲν οὐ δώσειν διεκπλεῖν,[1] τὸ δὲ τὴν στενοχωρίαν κωλύσειν

[1] Deleted by Hude, following Cobet, as probably not read by the Schol.

[1] *i.e.* did not attack front to front with the prow, but sailed round (περίπλους) and struck the hostile ship in the

a blow before the Athenian reinforcements came. They had prepared the fleet generally in such a way as, after the experience of the former sea-fight, seemed likely to offer some advantage, and in particular had shortened the prows of the ships, and had made them stouter by attaching to them thick catheads and stretching underneath stay-beams extending from them to the ships' sides for the length of six cubits both inside and outside the vessel, adopting the same plan as that followed by the Corinthians when they reconstructed their ships at the prows for the battle fought against the Athenian fleet at Naupactus. For the Syracusans thought that, in a contest with the ships of the Athenians which had not been built in the same manner for defence against their own, but were of light structure about the prows, inasmuch as the Athenians did not use prow-to-prow attacks so much as deploying and ramming the sides[1]—they themselves would not be at a disadvantage, and that the fighting in the Great Harbour, where there would be many ships in a narrow space, would be favourable to them; for by employing prow-to-prow attacks they would crush the prows of the enemy's ships, striking as they would with beaks stout and solid against hollow and weak ones. The Athenians, on the other hand, would not find it possible in the narrow space to use either the deploying or the breaking-through manœuvre, on their skilled use of which they depended most; for they themselves would as far as possible give them no opportunity of using the latter, and the narrow space would prevent

[1] side. The διέκπλους was breaking through the line so as to ram the enemy's ship in the flank or astern.

ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν. τῇ τε πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τῷ ἀντίπρῳρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν· τὴν γὰρ ἀνάκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξωθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑαυτῶν· 6 τοῦ δ' ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσειν. καὶ ξυμφερομένους αὐτούς, ἤν πῃ βιάζωνται, ἐς ὀλίγον τε καὶ πάντας ἐς τὸ αὐτό, προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις ταράξεσθαι (ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐς πάντα τὸν λιμένα τῆς ἀνακρούσεως, ὥσπερ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις)· περιπλεῦσαι δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, σφῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἐπίπλευσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους τε καὶ ἀνάκρουσιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθαι αὐτούς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ στόματος οὐ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ λιμένος.

XXXVII. Τοιαῦτα οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν ἐπινοήσαντες καὶ ἅμα τεθαρσηκότες μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας ἐπεχείρουν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν. καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Γύλιππος 70

them from deploying. But on the other hand they themselves would chiefly employ that method of crashing into their opponents prow to prow which had formerly been imputed to the ignorance of their pilots, because they would find it greatly to their advantage to do so; for it would not be possible for the Athenians, if forced out of line, to back water in any other direction than towards the land, and that, too, for only a short distance and to a short stretch of shore—the space in front of their own camp—inasmuch as the Syracusans would command the rest of the harbour. And the enemy, if they were forced to yield at any point, would be driven together into a small space and all to the same point, so that they would fall foul of each other and be thrown into confusion—the very thing that caused the Athenians most damage in all the fighting there, since it was not possible for them, as it was for the Syracusans, to back water to any part of the harbour. The Syracusans saw, moreover, that the Athenians would not be able to sail round into open water, since they themselves would control not only their entrance into the harbour from the sea outside, but also their backing out of the harbour into the sea, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

XXXVII. Such were the devices adopted by the Syracusans as appropriate to their own skill and strength, and at the same time they had now gained greater confidence as the result of the former sea-fight; so they made their preparations to attack simultaneously by land and by sea. And a short time before the fleet left its station Gylippus led

προεξαγαγὼν προσῆγε τῷ τείχει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καθ' ὅσον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα· καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου, οἵ τε ὁπλῖται ὅσοι ἐκεῖ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ἡ γυμνητεία τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσῄει τῷ τείχει· αἱ δὲ νῆες μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐπεξέπλεον τῶν
3 Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι τῷ πεζῷ μόνῳ πειράσειν, ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπιφερομένας ἄφνω, ἐθορυβοῦντο, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου καὶ τῶν ἔξω κατὰ τάχος χωροῦντας ἱππέας τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ἀντεπεξῆσαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις ἦσαν, ἀντανῆγον πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναῦς· καὶ αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα. XXXVIII. Τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας ἐπὶ πολὺ προσπλέοντες καὶ ἀνακρουόμενοι[1] πειράσαντες ἀλλήλων καὶ οὐδέτεροι δυνάμενοι ἄξιόν τι λόγου παραλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ ναῦν μίαν ἢ δύο τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καταδύσαντες, διεκρίθησαν· καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀπῆλθεν.
2 Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἡσύχαζον, οὐδὲν δηλοῦντες ὁποῖόν τι τὸ μέλλον ποιήσουσιν· ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἰδὼν ἀντίπαλα τὰ[2] τῆς ναυμαχίας γενόμενα καὶ ἐλπίζων αὐτοὺς αὖθις ἐπιχειρήσειν, τούς τε τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζεν ἐπισκευάζειν τὰς ναῦς, εἴ τίς τι ἐπεπονήκει, καὶ ὁλκάδας προ-

[1] καὶ before πειράσαντες in the MSS., deleted by Classen.
[2] τὰ τῆς with BH, Hude τῆς.

out the land-force from the city and brought it up against that part of the Athenians' wall that faced the city; and the troops stationed at the Olympieium —all the hoplites that were there and the cavalry and the light-armed forces of the Syracusans— advanced against the wall from the other side; and immediately after this the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out against the Athenian fleet. The Athenians, who at first thought that the enemy would make an attempt with his land-forces only, were thrown into confusion when they saw the ships also suddenly bearing down upon them. Some arrayed themselves upon the walls and in front of them to meet their assailants there; others went out to confront the forces that were rapidly advancing from the Olympieium and the country outside, consisting of cavalry in large numbers and javelin-men; and still others began to man the ships or to run down to the beach to give aid. And when the vessels were manned they put out to meet the Syracusans with seventy-five ships; the ships of the Syracusans numbering about eighty. XXXVIII. But after they had skirmished with one another for a great part of the day, advancing and backing away, and neither side was able to win any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian ships, they separated; and the land-force at the same time withdrew from the walls.

On the next day the Syracusans kept quiet, giving no indication of what they would do next. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the issue of the sea-fight had been a draw and expecting the enemy to attack again, compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships, in case any had suffered damage,

ὥρμισε πρὸ τοῦ σφετέρου σταυρώματος, ὃ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀντὶ λιμένος κληστοῦ ἐν τῇ
3 θαλάσσῃ ἐπεπήγει. διαλειπούσας δὲ τὰς ὁλκάδας ὅσον δύο πλέθρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κατέστησεν, ὅπως, εἴ τις βιάζοιτο ναῦς, εἴη κατάφευξις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ πάλιν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἔκπλους. παρασκευαζόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν διετέλεσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μέχρι νυκτός.

XXXIX. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῆς μὲν ὥρας πρώτερον, τῇ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσει τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ τε πεζοῦ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσέμισγον
2 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀντικαταστάντες ταῖς ναυσὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον αὖθις ἐπὶ πολὺ διῆγον τῆς ἡμέρας πειρώμενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων ὁ Πυρρίχου Κορίνθιος, ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης τῶν μετὰ Συρακοσίων, πείθει τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας, πέμψαντας ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμελομένους κελεύειν ὅτι τάχιστα τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν μεταστῆσαι κομίσαντας, καὶ ὅσα τις ἔχει ἐδώδιμα, πάντας ἐκεῖσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν, ὅπως αὐτοῦ ἐκβιβάσαντες τοὺς ναύτας εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς ἀριστοποιήσωνται καὶ δι' ὀλίγου αὖθις καὶ αὐθημερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν.

XL. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πεισθέντες ἔπεμψαν ἄγγελον, καὶ ἡ ἀγορὰ παρεσκευάσθη, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐξαίφνης πρύμναν κρουσάμενοι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔπλευσαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκβάντες αὐτοῦ
2 ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο· οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν

and anchored merchant-ships in front of the Athenian stockade, which had been planted in the sea in front of their ships to serve in place of an enclosed harbour. These merchant-ships he placed at intervals of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ships which should be hard pressed might find safe refuge inside and again sail out at leisure. In these preparations the Athenians spent the whole day until nightfall.

XXXIX. On the day following the Syracusans came into conflict with the Athenians at an earlier hour, but using the same offensive as before both by land and by sea. The two fleets faced one another in the same fashion and again spent a great part of the day in skirmishing, until at last Ariston son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the best pilot of the Syracusan fleet, persuaded the commanders of the Syracusan naval forces to send word to the officers in control in the city and request them to move down to the shore as quickly as possible the market in which goods are offered for sale, forcing all the hucksters to bring there whatever food supplies they had and sell them, in order that the crews might land and at once take dinner close to the ships, and then after a short interval on the same day make a second attack on the Athenians when they were not expecting it.

XL. The Syracusan commanders accordingly, being won over to this plan, sent a messenger, and the market was prepared. Then the Syracusans, suddenly rowing astern, sailed back to the city, where they disembarked and at once made their dinner on the spot. But the Athenians, thinking that the enemy had withdrawn to the city because

ἀνακρούσασθαι, καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τά τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς τῆς γε ἡμέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόμενοι ἂν ναυμα-
3 χῆσαι. ἐξαίφνης δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πληρώσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐπέπλεον αὖθις· οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσβάντες
4 μόλις ποτὲ ἀντανήγοντο. καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ἀπέσχοντο ἀλλήλων φυλασσόμενοι· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν διαμέλλοντας κόπῳ ἀναλίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα, καὶ ἐπιφερόμενοι ἐκ παρακελεύσεως
5 ἐναυμάχουν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι δεξάμενοι καὶ[1] ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις χρώμενοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, τῶν ἐμβόλων τῇ παρασκευῇ ἀνερρήγνυσαν τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς παρεξειρεσίας, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἀκοντίζοντες μεγάλα ἔβλαπτον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πολὺ δ' ἔτι μείζω οἱ ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς τοὺς ναύτας ἀκοντίζοντες.

XLI. Τέλος δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ κατὰ κράτος ναυμαχοῦντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνίκησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τραπόμενοι διὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων τὴν
2 κατάφευξιν ἐποιοῦντο ἐς τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὅρμον. αἱ δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων νῆες μέχρι μὲν τῶν ὁλκάδων

[1] καὶ deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

[1] Doubtless through the port-holes through which the oars passed.

they believed themselves to be outmatched, disembarked at their leisure and busied themselves with various other duties as well as with their dinner, in the belief that for that day at least there would be no more fighting at sea. But suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again sailed against them; whereupon the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them without food, embarked in disorder and at last with much ado got under weigh. For some time they held off from one another, keeping on their guard; but after a while the Athenians thought it unwise, by further delay, to exhaust themselves with fatigue by their own act, and decided to attack as quickly as possible, and accordingly bore down upon the enemy and with a cheer began the fight. The Syracusans received them, and employing their ships in prow-to-prow attacks, as they had planned to do, with their specially prepared beaks stove in the forward parts of the Athenian vessels for a considerable distance, while the men on the decks hurled their javelins at the Athenians and inflicted great damage upon them. But far greater damage was done by the Syracusans who rowed around in light boats, darted under the oar-banks of the hostile ships, and running up alongside hurled javelins from their boats in among the sailors.[1]

XLI. Finally, by pursuing this manner of fighting with all their strength, the Syracusans won, and the Athenians took to flight, endeavouring to make their escape through the line of merchant-ships[2] into their own place of anchorage. The Syracusan ships pursued them hotly as far as the merchant-

[2] *cf.* ch. xxxviii. 2.

ἐπεδίωκον· ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς αἱ κεραῖαι ὑπὲρ τῶν
ἔσπλων αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλκάδων δελφινοφόροι
3 ἠρμέναι ἐκώλυον. δύο δὲ νῆες τῶν Συρακοσίων
ἐπαιρόμεναι τῇ νίκῃ προσέμειξαν αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς
καὶ διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν
4 ἑάλω. καταδύσαντες δ' οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς καὶ κατατραυματίσαντες πολ-
λάς, ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ζωγρήσαντες,
τοὺς δὲ ἀποκτείναντες ἀπεχώρησαν, καὶ τροπαῖά
τε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἔστησαν καὶ τὴν
ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἐχυρὰν εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ πολὺ
κρείσσους εἶναι, ἐδόκουν δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζὸν χει-
5 ρώσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ'
ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις.

XLII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων
ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν παρα-
γίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα
ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντα-
κισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων,
ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ
ὀλίγους καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν
2 ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρα-
κοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα
οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ
ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ
τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν
ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθοτα
τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν

men, but there the dolphin-bearing cranes[1] that were suspended from the merchantmen over the channels between the vessels checked them. Two Syracusan ships, however, elated by their victory, approached too close to the cranes and were destroyed, one of them being captured together with its crew. The Syracusans, having sunk seven of the Athenian ships and damaged many others, and having taken prisoner most of the men upon them and killed the rest, then withdrew and set up a trophy for both the sea-fights. They now cherished the confident belief that they were far superior to the Athenians on the sea, and they thought that they should get the better of the army on land as well. So they, on their part, proceeded to make preparations to attack the enemy again on both elements.

XLII. At this juncture, however, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreign vessels, and nearly five thousand hoplites, both Athenian and allied, and not a few Barbarian and Hellenic javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, together with an adequate supply of other equipment. The Syracusans and their allies were seized with no little consternation at the moment, wondering if they were never to have any final deliverance from their peril; for they saw that in spite of the fortification of Deceleia an army equal or nearly equal to the first one had come to reinforce it, and that the power of the Athenians

[1] Projecting beams of a crane supporting heavy metal weights in the shape of dolphins, ready to be dropped upon hostile vessels passing near.

φαινομένην· τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν
3 Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν (ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλ' ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾷ ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἣν οὐδ' ἂν μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα τ' ἂν ἔμαθον ἧσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ' εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν), ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅ τι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι
4 τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει. καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν τε ὂν καί, εἰ κρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα), ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ, καὶ ξυντομωτάτην[1] ἡγεῖτο

[1] ταύτην, after ξυντομωτάτην, inserted by Madvig, followed by Hude.

[1] Or, "by a natural rebound after their misfortunes."

was apparently great in all directions. The first Athenian army, on the other hand, had, considering their past misfortunes,[1] recovered a certain confidence. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, was of the opinion that it would not do to waste time and thus invite the same experience that Nicias had met with. For Nicias when he first came inspired terror; but as he did not immediately attack Syracuse but spent the winter at Catana, he came to be despised, and Gylippus forestalled him by coming from the Peloponnesus with an army. This force the Syracusans would not even have sent for if he had attacked without delay; for they would have supposed that they could cope with him unaided, and would not, therefore, have discovered that they were too weak until they had been completely walled in, so that, even if they had sent for reinforcements then, these would no longer have availed them to the same extent. Demosthenes, therefore, taking these facts into consideration and realizing that he also at the present time was most formidable to his opponents on the very first day after his arrival, wished at the earliest possible moment to reap the full benefit of their present consternation at his army. Accordingly, seeing that the Syracusan cross-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from completing their investment, was a single one, and that, if one should get control of the ascent to Epipolae and after that of the camp upon it, the wall itself could easily be taken—for the enemy would not then stand his ground against them—he was eager to make the attempt. He thought this to be the shortest way to end the war; for he would either

διαπολέμησιν· ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἕξειν Συρακούσας ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν.

6 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἔτεμνον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον καὶ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν (οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ' ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῆσαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου)·

XLIII. Ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῷ Δημοσθένει πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ προσαγαγόντι κατεκαύθησάν τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀμυνομένων αἱ μηχαναὶ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ πολλαχῇ προσβάλλοντες ἀπεκρούοντο, οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν
2 Ἐπιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας τε καὶ ἀναβάντας, παραγγείλας δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σιτία καὶ τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας πάντας λαβὼν καὶ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν τοξευμάτων τε καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ἢν κρατῶσι, τειχίζοντας ἔχειν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Μένανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς, Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπε-
3 λέλειπτο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς

be successful and take Syracuse, or else would lead his army home and not wear out to no purpose both the Athenians who took part in the expedition and the entire state.

In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and proceeded to ravage the land of the Syracusans in the region of the Anapus river, and at this time, as at first, they had the upper hand with their army both by land and by sea; for on neither element did the Syracusans come out to meet them except with their cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieium.

XLIII. Afterwards it seemed best to Demosthenes, before going further, to make an attempt with engines upon the cross-wall. But when he brought his engines up they were burned by the enemy, who defended themselves from the wall, and the assaults which he made at many points with the rest of his army were regularly repulsed; it therefore seemed best not to waste more time, and so with the consent of Nicias and his other colleagues he undertook, as he had planned, the attack upon Epipolae. Now it seemed impossible to approach the heights in the daytime and make the ascent without being observed; he accordingly ordered provisions for five days, took with him all the stonemasons and carpenters, and also a supply of arrows, and whatever things they would need while building a wall, in case they should succeed in their undertaking, and after the first watch, accompanied by Eurymedon and Menander, led out the entire army and advanced to Epipolae, leaving Nicias behind in the fortifications. When they had reached Epipolae, taking the route

κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἥπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη, λανθάνουσί τε τοὺς φύλακας τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχισμα ὃ
4 ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱροῦσι καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν φυλάκων ἀποκτείνουσιν· οἱ δὲ πλείους διαφυγόντες εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία, ἓν μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἓν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἓν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀγγέλλουσι τὴν ἔφοδον καὶ τοῖς ἑξακοσίοις τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
5 τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν φύλακες ἦσαν, ἔφραζον. οἱ δ' ἐβοήθουν τε εὐθύς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐντυχόντες ἀμυνομένους προθύμως ἔτρεψαν. καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅπως τῇ παρούσῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ περαίνεσθαι ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον μὴ βραδεῖς γένωνται· ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, οὐχ ὑπομενόντων τῶν φυλάκων, ᾕρουν τε
6 καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπέσυρον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων, καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος ἐν νυκτὶ σφίσι γενομένου προσέβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεπληγμένοι καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον
7 ὑπεχώρησαν. προϊόντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ἀταξίᾳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὡς κεκρατηκότων καὶ βουλομένων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μήπω μεμαχημένου τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς τάχιστα διελθεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου αὖθις ξυστραφῶσιν, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ

by Euryelus, which had been followed by the former army in the first ascent, they got by the Syracusan guards without being observed, and advancing to the Syracusan fort at that point captured it and killed some of the guards; most of these, however, fled at once to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae—one belonging to the Syracusans, one to the other Siceliots, and one to the allies—and brought word of the attack, informing also the six hundred Syracusans who were posted as an advanced guard on that part of Epipolae. These hastened at once to the rescue, but Demosthenes and the Athenians met them and put them to rout despite their vigorous resistance. This body of Athenians then straightway pressed forward, in order that, taking advantage of their present impulse, they might not be too late to accomplish the purpose for which they had come; while another party at the very first proceeded to seize the cross-wall of the Syracusans, where the guards did not wait to receive them, and to lay low the battlements. But the Syracusans and their allies, as well as Gylippus with his own troops, came up from the outworks; yet, since this daring attempt had been made upon them unexpectedly at night, they were still dazed as they attacked the Athenians and were at first forced back by them. But while the Athenians were by now going forward, in some disorder, considering themselves victorious and wishing as quickly as possible to push their way through all the enemy's forces that had not yet been engaged, in order that they might not rally again when they themselves relaxed their onset, it was the Boeotians who first made a stand against

πρῶτοι αὐτοῖς ἀντέσχον καὶ προσβαλόντες ἔτρεψάν τε καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν.

XLIV. Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ ἐγίγνοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἣν οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι ῥᾴδιον ἦν οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑτέρων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστα ξυνηνέχθη. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ σαφέστερα μέν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν· ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ, ἣ μόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων μεγάλων ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐγένετο, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ἴδοι; 2 ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι. ὁπλῖται δὲ ἀμφοτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγοι 3 ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ ἀνεστρέφοντο. καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ μὲν ἤδη ἐνικῶντο, οἱ δὲ ἔτι τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ ἀήσσητοι ἐχώρουν· πολὺ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄρτι ἀνεβεβήκει, τὸ δ' ἔτι προσανῄει, ὥστ' οὐκ ἠπίσταντο πρὸς ὅ τι χρὴ χωρῆσαι. ἤδη γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν τῆς τροπῆς γεγενημένης ἐτετάρακτο πάντα καὶ χαλεπὰ ἦν 4 ὑπὸ τῆς βοῆς διαγνῶναι. οἵ τε γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κρατοῦντες παρεκελεύοντό τε κραυγῇ οὐκ ὀλίγῃ χρώμενοι, ἀδύνατον ὂν ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ σημῆναι, καὶ ἅμα τοὺς προσφερομένους ἐδέχοντο· οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἐζήτουν τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας, καὶ εἰ φίλιον εἴη τῶν ἤδη

them, and by making a charge routed and put them to flight.

XLIV. By this time the Athenians were getting into a state of so great confusion and perplexity that it has not been easy to learn from either side just how the several events occurred. In the daytime things are clearer, of course, yet even so those who are present do not know everything that happens, but each man barely knows what happens near himself; but in a battle by night—the only one that took place in this war between large armies—how could anyone know anything clearly? For though there was a bright moon, they could only see one another, as it is natural to do in moonlight—seeing before them the vision of a person but mistrusting their recognition of their own friends. There were, besides, large numbers of hoplites belonging to both sides moving about in a narrow space. And on the Athenian side, some were already being defeated, while others, still in their first onset, were advancing unchecked; but of the rest of their army a large portion had only just finished the ascent and others were still coming up, so that they did not know which body to join. For the front lines were already all in confusion in consequence of the rout that had taken place, and the two sides were difficult to distinguish by reason of the outcries. The Syracusans and their allies, as they were winning, were cheering one another and indulging in no little shouting—it being impossible in the night to communicate in any other way—while at the same time they held their ground against their assailants; the Athenians were trying to find their own comrades, and regarded as hostile what-

πάλιν φευγόντων, πολέμιον ἐνόμιζον, καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι τοῦ ξυνθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλῳ τῳ γνωρίσαι, σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς θόρυβον πολὺν παρεῖχον ἅμα πάντες ἐρωτῶντες, 5 καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις σαφὲς αὐτὸ κατέστησαν· τὸ δ' ἐκείνων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠπίσταντο, διὰ τὸ κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ διεσπασμένους ἧσσον ἀγνοεῖσθαι, ὥστ', εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιέν τισι κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν πολεμίων, διέφευγον αὐτοὺς ἅτε ἐκείνων ἐπισταμένων τὸ ξύνθημα, εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ μὴ ὑπο- 6 κρίνοιντο, διεφθείροντο. μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔβλαψε καὶ ὁ παιανισμός· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσιος ὢν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχεν. οἵ τε γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ ὅσον Δωρικὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἦν ὁπότε παιανίσειαν, φόβον παρεῖχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἵ τε πολέμιοι 7 ὁμοίως. ὥστε τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὐτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλή- 8 λοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο. καὶ διωκόμενοι κατά τε τῶν κρημνῶν πολλοὶ[1] ῥίπτοντες ἑαυτοὺς

[1] οἱ πολλοὶ MSS., Krüger deletes οἱ.

ever came from the opposite direction, even though it might be a party of friends belonging to the troops already in flight, and as they were constantly calling out the demand for the watchword, the only means they had of distinguishing friend from foe, they not only caused much confusion in their own ranks, everybody making the demand at the same time, but also made their watchword known to the enemy. They had not the same opportunity, however, of learning the enemy's watchword, because the Syracusans, who were winning the day and had not become scattered, had less difficulty in recognizing one another. The result was that if a body of Athenians, even though superior in number, fell in with a party of the enemy, these would make their escape, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword, whereas if they on their part could not give the answer they were put to the sword. But that which put the Athenians at the greatest disadvantage and did them most harm was the singing of the paean; for the song of both armies was very similar and caused perplexity. Whenever, that is, the Argives or the Corcyraeans or any Dorian contingent of the Athenian army would raise the paean, the Athenians were just as much terrified thereby as when the enemy sang. And so finally, when once they had been thrown into confusion, coming into collision with their own comrades in many different parts of the army, friends with friends and citizens with fellow-citizens, they not only became panic-stricken but came to blows with one another and were with difficulty separated. And as they were being pursued by the enemy many hurled themselves down from the bluffs and perished; for the

ἀπώλλυντο, στενῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν πάλιν καταβάσεως, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν οἱ σῳζόμενοι ἄνωθεν καταβαῖεν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῶν προτέρων στρατιωτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χώρας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον διεφύγγανον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἥκοντες εἰσὶν οἳ διαμαρτόντες τῶν ὁδῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλανήθησαν· οὓς, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων περιελάσαντες διέφθειραν.

XLV. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι δύο τροπαῖα ἔστησαν, ἐπί τε ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ᾗ ἡ πρόσβασις καὶ κατὰ τὸ χωρίον ᾗ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτον ἀντέστησαν, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς νεκροὺς
2 ὑποσπόνδους ἐκομίσαντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅπλα μέντοι ἔτι πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐλήφθη· οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν βιασθέντες ἄλλεσθαι ψιλοὶ[1] οἱ μὲν ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' ἐσώθησαν.

XLVI. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ εὐπραγίᾳ πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα στασιάζοντα πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ἐπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο· Γύλιππος δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ᾤχετο αὖθις, ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι, ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὢν καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱρήσειν βίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυνέβη.

XLVII. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ

way down from Epipolae was narrow; and of those who in their attempt to escape got down to the level ground, the greater part, and especially those who belonged to the first expedition and therefore had a better acquaintance with the country, got through to the camp, but of those who had come later, some missed the roads and wandered about over the country, and these when day came were destroyed by the Syracusan cavalry, which were scouring the fields.

XLV. On the next day the Syracusans set up two trophies on Epipolae, one where the Athenian ascent was made, the other at the place where the Boeotians made the first resistance; and the Athenians recovered their dead under truce. Not a few were killed, both of the Athenians and their allies; the arms taken, however, were out of all proportion to the dead, for while some of those who were forced to leap down the bluffs perished, some escaped.

XLVI. After this the Syracusans, their earlier confidence now being restored as a result of their unexpected good fortune, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, which was in a state of revolution, in order that he might if possible win over that city; and Gylippus went out once more by land to the other parts of Sicily to secure additional troops, being in hope that he could even carry the walls of the Athenians by storm, now that the engagement on Epipolae had turned out thus.

XLVII. Meanwhile the Athenian generals were deliberating about the situation in view both of the calamity that had happened and of the utter dis-

[1] ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων, in the MSS. after ψιλοί, rejected by Pluygers.

στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἐώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ
2 τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ. νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο κατ' ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ταύτης οὔσης ἐν ᾗ ἀσθενοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν· τά τε ἄλλα
3 ὅτι ἀνελπιστότατα αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο. τῷ οὖν Δημοσθένει οὐκ ἐδόκει ἔτι χρῆναι μένειν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν, ἐπειδὴ ἔσφαλτο, ἐξιέναι ἐψηφίζετο καὶ μὴ διατρίβειν, ἕως ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος ταῖς γοῦν
4 ἐπελθούσαις ναυσὶ κρατεῖν. καὶ τῇ πόλει ὠφελιμώτερον ἔφη εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι ἢ Συρακοσίους, οὓς οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χειρώσασθαι· οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι.

XLVIII. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης τοιαῦτα ἐγίγνωσκεν· ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πόνηρα σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο
2 ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧσσον. τὸ δέ τι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ᾐσθάνετο αὐτῶν, ἐλπίδος τι ἔτι παρεῖχε πονηρότερα τῶν

couragement that now prevailed in the army. They saw that they were not succeeding in their undertaking, and that the soldiers were finding their stay burdensome. For they were distressed by sickness for a double cause, the season of the year being that in which men are most liable to illness, while at the same time the place in which they were encamped was marshy and unhealthy; and the situation in general appeared to them to be utterly hopeless. Demosthenes, therefore, was of the opinion that they should not remain there any longer, but since the plan which had induced him to risk the attack upon Epipolae had failed, his vote was for going away without loss of time, while it was still possible to cross the sea and to have some superiority over the enemy with at any rate the ships of the armament which had come to reinforce them. From the point of view of the State, also, he said, it was more profitable to carry on the war against the enemy who were building a hostile fortress in their own territory than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to conquer; and furthermore, it was not right that they should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no purpose.

XLVIII. Such was the judgment of Demosthenes. Nicias, however, although he also thought that their situation was bad, did not wish expressly to reveal their weakness, or that they should be reported to the enemy as openly voting in full council for the retreat; for, he urged, they would be far less likely, when they should wish to retreat, to do this unobserved. Besides, the affairs of the enemy, from such information as he had beyond the rest, still afforded some hope that they would turn out to be

σφετέρων ἔσεσθαι, ἢν καρτερῶσι προσκαθήμενοι· χρημάτων γὰρ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτοὺς ἐκτρυχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων· καὶ ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι, ἐπεκηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ
3 οὐκ εἴα ἀπανίστασθαι. ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν. εὖ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαί τε περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων ἐπιτιμήσει ἀκούσαντας γνώσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι.
4 τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένους τἀναντία βοήσεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον. οὔκουν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ.
5 τά τε Συρακοσίων ἔφη ὅμως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν

[1] The mental thought to be supplied is: "And it would involve them in personal danger if they did, for . . . ."

worse than their own, if they persisted in the siege; for they would wear the enemy out by cutting off his supplies, especially since now with their present fleet they were to a greater extent than before the masters of the sea. And, in fact, there was a party in Syracuse that favoured submitting to the Athenians, and it was secretly sending proposals to him and urging him not to withdraw. Having knowledge of these things, although in reality he still wavered between the two alternatives and kept pondering them, yet in the speech which he openly made at that time he refused to lead the army away. For he knew well, he said, that the Athenians would not approve of the generals withdrawing without any vote of their own to that effect. For[1] those who would vote on their case would not be men who would form their judgments from seeing the facts with their own eyes, as they themselves had seen them, and not from listening to the harsh criticisms of others; on the contrary, whatever calumnies any clever speaker might utter, by these the Athenians would be persuaded. And of the soldiers now present in Sicily, many, he said—aye, the majority—who were now crying out that they were in a desperate plight, as soon as they arrived in Athens would cry out just the reverse, that their generals had been bribed to betray them and withdraw. Accordingly, he at any rate did not wish, knowing as he did the character of the Athenians, to be put to death on a shameful charge and unjustly at the hands of the Athenians, but rather to fight and die, if so he must, his own death at the hands of the foe. And bad as their own situation was, that of the Syracusans, he said, was still worse; for

σφετέρων εἶναι· καὶ χρήμασι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ξενοτροφοῦντας καὶ ἐν περιπολίοις ἅμα ἀναλίσκοντας καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας τὰ μὲν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ δ' ἔτι ἀμηχανήσειν· δισχίλιά τε γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσοφείλειν, ἥν τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἐκλίπωσι τῆς νῦν παρασκευῆς τῷ μὴ διδόναι τροφήν, φθερεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα, ἐπικουρικὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δι'
6 ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ τὰ σφέτερα ὄντα. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους καὶ μὴ χρήμασιν, οἷς[1] πολὺ κρείσσους εἰσί, νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι.

XLIX. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα λέγων ἰσχυρίζετο, αἰσθόμενος τὰ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἀκριβῶς, καὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν καὶ ὅτι ἦν αὐτόθι τὸ[2] βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἐπικηρυκευόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι, καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν ναυσίν, ᾗ[3]
2 πρότερον, ἐθάρσει[4] κρατηθείς.[5] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο· εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος, ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτοῦ,[6] ἔφη χρῆναι ἢ ἐς τὴν Θάψον ἀναστάντας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ὅθεν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἐπὶ

[1] Conjecture of Coraes for ὡς of most MSS.

[2] τό, with all MSS., except BH που τό. Linwood conjectures πολὺ for που, which many editors adopt.

[3] Stahl's correction for ἤ of the MSS.

[4] Gertz's conjecture for θαρσήσει of most MSS., ἐθάρσησε B.

[5] καὶ before κρατηθείς is inserted by Classen, followed by Hude.

[6] Krüger's correction for αὐτοὺς of the MSS.

in point of money, since they were supporting a mercenary force and at the same time bearing the expense of patrol guard-posts, and had now for a year been maintaining a large fleet besides, they were already embarrassed, and hereafter would be quite without resources;[1] indeed, they had spent two thousand talents already and were in debt for many talents more, and if they should lose any portion whatsoever of their present force by not being able to pay for its maintenance, their cause would be ruined, since it depended upon mercenary troops and had not, like their own, the backing of necessity.[2] They ought, therefore, he concluded, to stay on and continue the siege, and not go back home beaten by money, in which they had by far the greater resources.

XLIX. To such effect Nicias spoke with confidence, because he had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, both of their lack of money and that a party existed there that wished the government to come under the control of the Athenians and was constantly making overtures to him to keep him from withdrawing; and at the same time, though beaten in the field, he had as much confidence as ever in the fleet at any rate. Demosthenes, however, would not consent on any consideration whatever to continue the siege; if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus or to Catana.

[1] Or, "were in some respects already ill-provided, and in still others would be utterly at a loss what to do."

[2] *i. e.* mercenary troops had to be bribed, but the Athenians were compelled to fight.

πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες θρέψονται πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ, ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων μᾶλλόν ἐστι, τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται, ἀλλ' ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ τά τε τῆς ἐμπειρίας χρήσιμα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγράπτου
3 ὁρμώμενοί τε καὶ καταίροντες ἔξουσιν. τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν. καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ
4 ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν. ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον.

L. Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανὸς ἐν τούτῳ παρῆσαν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὁ μὲν Σικανὸς ἁμαρτὼν τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος (ἐν Γέλᾳ γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις φιλία[1] ἐξεπεπτώκει)· ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἄλλην τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἔχων ἦλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ ἦρος ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ὁπλίτας ἀποσταλέντας, ἀφικομένους ἀπὸ τῆς
2 Λιβύης ἐς Σελινοῦντα. ἀπενεχθέντες γὰρ ἐς Λιβύην, καὶ δόντων Κυρηναίων τριήρεις δύο καὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ἡγεμόνας, καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ Εὐε-

[1] Bauer's correction for ἐς φιλια, ἐς φίλια, ἐς φιλίαν, ἐς φιλία (B) of the MSS.

[1] *cf.* ch. xlvi. [2] *cf.* ch. xix. 3.

From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of the country and support themselves by ravaging the enemy's property, and at the same time do him damage; and as for the fleet, they would thenceforth do their fighting, not in a narrow space, which was more in the enemy's favour, but in the open sea, where there was plenty of room and the advantages of skill would be on their side, and they would not have to make their retreats and advances setting out from and falling back into a scant and circumscribed base. To sum up his position in a word, he said that he did not at all approve of remaining any longer in the same place, but urged that they should now as quickly as possible move to another place and make no delay. And Eurymedon concurred with him in these views. But since Nicias objected, some hesitation and delay ensued; and at the same time there was a suspicion that it was because of some superior knowledge that he insisted. And so in this way the Athenians delayed to the end and continued to remain where they were.

L. Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus[1] had returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to win over Agrigentum, for while he was still at Gela the party at Agrigentum that was friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out; but Gylippus brought with him a large additional force from Sicily as well as the hoplites that had been sent on board the merchant-ships from the Peloponnesus the preceding spring,[2] and had reached Selinus on their way from Libya. It seems that they had been driven out of their course to Libya, where the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and pilots for their voyage; as they sailed along the shore of

σπερίταις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Λιβύων ξυμμαχήσαντες καὶ νικήσαντες τοὺς Λίβυς, καὶ αὐτόθεν παραπλεύσαντες ἐς Νέαν πόλιν, Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον, ὅθενπερ Σικελία ἐλάχιστον δύο ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτὸς πλοῦν ἀπέχει, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ περαιω-
3 θέντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς Σελινοῦντα. καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ἐλθόντων παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ' ἀμφότερα αὖθις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ· οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὁρῶντες στρατιάν τε ἄλλην προσγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἅμα οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον χωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡμέραν τοῖς πᾶσι χαλεπώτερον ἴσχοντα, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πιεζόμενα, μετεμέλοντό τε πρότερον οὐκ ἀναστάντες, καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἠναντιοῦτο ἄλλ' ἢ[1] μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι,[2] προεῖπον ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα ἔκπλουν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου
4 πᾶσι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι ὅταν τις σημήνῃ. καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει· ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πανσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος) οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη, πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο.

[1] Hude's correction for ἄλλο εἰ of the MSS.; Vulg. ἀλλ' ἤ.
[2] μὴ in the MSS. before ψηφίζεσθαι, omitted by Steph.

Libya they had joined forces with the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and had defeated the latter; and sailing thence along the coast to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which place the distance to Sicily is shortest—two days and one night—and from there crossing to Sicily, they arrived at Selinus. As soon as these reinforcements arrived, the Syracusans began their preparations to attack the Athenians again on both elements—by sea and by land. The Athenian generals, on the other hand, seeing that the enemy had been reinforced by a fresh army, while their own situation was not only not improving, but on the contrary was daily growing worse in all respects, and especially through the distress caused by the sickness among the troops, repented that they had not moved away before. And since even Nicias no longer opposed as earnestly as before, but only urged that the matter be not openly put to a vote, they sent out word as secretly as possible to all the officers for a departure by sea from the camp, and that they should be ready whenever the signal should be given. But after all was ready and when they were about to make their departure, the moon, which happened then to be at the full, was eclipsed.[1] And most of the Athenians, taking the incident to heart, urged the generals to wait. Nicias also, who was somewhat too much given to divination and the like, refused even to discuss further the question of their removal until they should have waited thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. Such, then, was the reason why the Athenians delayed and stayed on.

[1] August 27, 413 B.C.

LI. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πυθόμενοι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐγηγερμένοι ἦσαν μὴ ἀνιέναι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρεισσόνων εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ναυσὶ μήτε πεζῷ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι), καὶ ἅμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῆς Σικελίας καθεζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ὡς τάχιστα καὶ ἐν ᾧ σφίσι ξυμφέρει ἀναγκάσαι αὐτοὺς ναυμαχεῖν. 2 τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον, καὶ ἐπεξελθόντος μέρους τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων κατά τινας πύλας, ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινας καὶ τρεψάμενοι καταδιώκουσιν· οὔσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἐσόδου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἵππους τε ἑβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύουσι καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς.

LII. Καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπεχώρησεν ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων· τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐκπλέουσιν οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα πρὸς τὰ τείχη ἐχώρουν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντανῆγον ναυσὶν ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα 2 καὶ προσμείξαντες ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα, ἔχοντα τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενον περικλῆσασθαι τὰς ναῦς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἐπεξάγοντα τῷ πλῷ πρὸς τὴν γῆν μᾶλλον, νικήσαντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μέσον πρῶτον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπολαμβάνουσι κἀκεῖνον ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ καὶ μυχῷ[1] τοῦ λιμένος καὶ

[1] *ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ καὶ μυχῷ*, Hude omits *καὶ* with C and brackets *μυχῷ* with Bothe.

LI. The Syracusans on their part, on learning about this, were far more aroused than before and determined not to give the Athenians any respite, seeing that these had now of their own act confessed themselves no longer superior either with their fleet or with their land-force, for otherwise they would not have laid plans for their departure; and at the same time, because they did not want them to settle down somewhere else in Sicily where it would be more difficult to carry on war against them, they were determined to force them to fight a sea-battle as quickly as possible on the spot, in a place that suited themselves. Accordingly they regularly manned their ships and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. Then, when the favourable moment came, they assaulted on the first day the Athenian walls, and when a small body of hoplites and of horsemen came out against them by certain gates, they cut off a number of the hoplites, and putting them to flight followed in pursuit; and as the entrance to the camp was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few of the hoplites.

LII. So on this first day the Syracusan army withdrew; but on the following day they sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their land-force against the walls. The Athenians put out to sea to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closing with them commenced the battle. Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, wished to surround the ships of the enemy, and had therefore steered his ships out from the line rather too near the shore, when the Syracusans and their allies, after they had defeated the Athenian centre, cut off him also in a recess

αὐτόν τε διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὰς μετ' αὐτοῦς ναῦς ἐπισπομένας· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς πάσας ναῦς ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατεδίωκόν τε καὶ ἐξεώθουν ἐς τὴν γῆν.

LIII. Ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας καὶ ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφερομένας, βουλόμενος διαφθείρειν τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ῥᾷον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀφέλκειν τῆς γῆς φιλίας οὔσης, παρεβοήθει ἐπὶ τὴν χηλὴν μέρος
2 τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Τυρσηνοί (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις) ὁρῶντες ἀτάκτως προσφερομένους, ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες καὶ προσπεσόντες τοῖς πρώτοις τρέπουσι καὶ ἐσβάλ-λουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλου-
3 μένην. ὕστερον δὲ πλείονος ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος παρόντος τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιβοηθήσαντες καὶ δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς μάχην τε κατέστησαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ νικήσαντες ἐπεδίωξαν καὶ ὁπλίτας τε οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μὲν πολλὰς διέσωσάν τε καὶ ξυνήγαγον κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον, δυοῖν δὲ δεούσας εἴκοσι οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔλαβον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας πάντας ἀπέκτειναν.
4 καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐμπρῆσαι βουλόμενοι ὁλκάδα παλαιὰν κληματίδων καὶ δᾳδὸς γεμίσαντες (ἦν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὁ ἄνεμος οὔριος) ἀφεῖσαν τὴν ναῦν[1] πῦρ ἐμβαλόντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντεμηχανήσαντό τε σβεστήρια κωλύματα καὶ παύσαντες τὴν φλόγα

[1] τὴν ναῦν deleted by Bothe, followed by Hude.

of the inner bay of the harbour and destroyed both him and the ships that followed him; and after that they set about pursuing the entire Athenian fleet and driving them ashore.

LIII. Now Gylippus, when he saw the ships of the enemy being defeated and driven ashore at a point beyond the stockades and their own camp, wishing to destroy the men as they landed, and also that the Syracusans might more easily tow the ships away from a shore that would be friendly to them, came down to the causeway [1] with part of his army to assist them. The Tyrrhenians, however, who were guarding the causeway for the Athenians, saw these troops rushing to the attack in disorder and went out against them, and falling upon the first comers put them to flight and drove them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. But afterwards, when a larger force of the Syracusans and their allies had now arrived, the Athenian troops also went out against them and, fearing for their ships, engaged in battle with the enemy, whom they defeated and pursued, killing a few hoplites; and as for the ships, they saved most of them and assembled them at their camp, but eighteen were captured by the Syracusans and their allies and their crews slain to a man. Against the ships also that remained the Syracusans, wishing to set them afire, turned loose an old merchant-ship which they had filled with faggots and pine-wood, after casting fire into it, the wind being in the direction of the Athenians. And the Athenians, alarmed for their ships, devised in their turn means for hindering and quenching the flames,

[1] A quay which ran along by the swamp Lysimeleia toward the Athenian camp.

καὶ τὸ μὴ προσελθεῖν ἐγγὺς τὴν ὁλκάδα τοῦ κινδύνου ἀπηλλάγησαν. LIV. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Συρακόσιοι μὲν τῆς τε ναυμαχίας τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τῆς ἄνω τῆς πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἔλαβον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἧς τε οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ τροπῆς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν πεζῶν ἐς τὴν λίμνην καὶ ἧς αὐτοὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ.

LV. Γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ (πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας), οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος. 2 πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ μεγέθει [1] ἰσχυούσαις,[2] οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ' ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν, οὔτ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῷ κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾤοντο, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι.

LVI. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς

[1] ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ μεγέθει, so most MSS. except B, which has ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις.

[2] ἰσχυούσαις, Duker's correction for ἐχούσαις of the MSS.

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[1] *cf.* ch. li. 2.

[2] It was the usual policy of Athens to overthrow oligarchies and establish democracies as a means of extending their

and having stopped the fire and prevented the ship from coming near, escaped the danger. LIV. After this the Syracusans set up a trophy, both for the sea-fight and for the cutting off of the hoplites at the wall—the engagement in which they had captured the horses;[1] and the Athenians set up a trophy for the fight in which the Tyrrhenians drove the Syracusan infantry into the marsh, and also for their own victory with the main body of the army.

LV. The victory of the Syracusans having now proved decisive by sea also—for before this they had always been afraid of the new fleet that had come with Demosthenes—the Athenians were in utter despondency. Great had been their miscalculation, and far greater still was their regret at having made the expedition. For of all the cities with which they had gone to war, these alone were at that time similar in character to their own, democratic in constitution like themselves, and strong in ships, cavalry and size. And so, finding themselves unable either to bring about a change in their form of government,[2] and thus introduce among them that element of discord by which they might have brought them over to the Athenian side, or to subdue them by means of a military force that was greatly superior, and having failed in most of their undertakings, they had even before this been at their wits' end, and now that they had suffered defeat even with their fleet, a thing that they could never have anticipated, they were in far greater perplexity still.

LVI. The Syracusans, on the other hand, began

empire; but this resource was not open to them in democratic Syracuse.

παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ διενοοῦντο κλῆσειν, ὅπως μηκέτι, μηδ' εἰ βούλοιντο, λάθοιεν
2 αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπλεύσαντες. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοὶ σωθῆναι μόνον ἔτι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνους κωλύσουσι, νομίζοντες, ὅπερ ἦν, ἀπό τε τῶν παρόντων πολὺ σφῶν καθυπέρτερα τὰ πράγματα εἶναι καί, εἰ δύναιντο κρατῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι· τούς τε γὰρ ἄλλους Ἕλληνας εὐθὺς τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φόβου ἀπολύεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατὴν ἔσεσθαι τὴν ὑπόλοιπον Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθησόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεγκεῖν), καὶ αὐτοὶ δόξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι ὑπό τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔπειτα
3 πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι. καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιος ὁ ἀγὼν κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνων περιεγίγνοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ αὖ μόνοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυμβοηθησάντων σφίσιν, ἡγεμόνες τε γενόμενοι μετὰ Κορινθίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐμπαρασχόντες προκινδυνεῦσαί τε[1] καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ μέγα μέρος[2]
4 προκόψαντες. ἔθνη γὰρ πλεῖστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν ταύτην ξυνῆλθε, πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου[3] τοῦ ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίων τε πόλιν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

[1] τε, deleted by Krüger, followed by Hude.
[2] μέρος, deleted by Krüger, followed by Hude.
[3] Krüger's emendation for λόγου of the MSS.

at once to sail fearlessly about the harbour and determined to close up the entrance to it, in order that the Athenians might no longer be able, even if they wished, to sail out unobserved. For the Syracusans were no longer concerned with merely saving themselves, but also with preventing the Athenians from being saved, thinking, as indeed was the case, that in the present circumstances their own position was much superior, and that if they could defeat the Athenians and their allies both by land and by sea the achievement would appear a glorious one for them in the eyes of the Hellenes. All the other Hellenes, they reflected, would immediately be either liberated from subjection or relieved from fear, since the military forces that would remain to the Athenians would not be strong enough to sustain the war that would afterwards be brought against them; and they themselves, being regarded as the authors of all this, would be greatly admired not only by the world at large but also by posterity. And indeed the struggle was a worthy one, both in these respects and because they were showing themselves superior, not to the Athenians only, but to their numerous allies as well, and that too not standing alone but associated with the friends who had come to their aid, thus taking their place as leaders along with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having also given their own city to bear the brunt of the danger and taken a great step forward in sea-power. Indeed, a larger number of nations than ever before had gathered together at this one city, if one except the vast throng of those who in this war rallied to the support of the city of Athens and the city of the Lacedaemonians.

LVII. Τοσοίδε γὰρ ἑκάτεροι ἐπὶ Σικελίαν[1] τε καὶ περὶ Σικελίας, τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι τὴν χώραν ἐλθόντες, τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσοντες, ἐπὶ Συρακούσαις[2] ἐπολέμησαν, οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν μετ' ἀλλήλων στάντες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἑκάστοις τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ
2 τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκη ἔσχεν. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν αὐτοὶ Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους ἑκόντες ἦλθον, καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινῆται, οἳ τότε Αἴγιναν εἶχον, καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαιῆς οἱ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ Ἑστίαιαν οἰκοῦντες,[3] ἄποικοι ὄντες,
3 ξυνεστράτευσαν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἳ
4 μισθοφόροι ξυνεστράτευον. καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν Ἐρετριῆς καὶ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Στυρῆς καὶ Καρύστιοι ἀπ' Εὐβοίας ἦσαν, ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων Κεῖοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι, ἐκ δ' Ἰωνίας Μιλήσιοι καὶ Σάμιοι καὶ Χῖοι. τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες αὐτόνομοι ξυνείποντο. καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον Ἴωνες ὄντες οὗτοι πάντες καὶ ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων πλὴν Καρυστίων (οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶ Δρύοπες), ὑπήκοοι

[1] Krüger Σικελίᾳ, followed by Hude.
[2] Bauer's correction for Συρακούσας of the MSS.
[3] Ἑστίαιαν οἰκοῦντες, deleted by Hude, following Krüger.

[1] Or, by adopting Heilmann's and Boehme's conjecture ὡς ἕκαστοι τῆς ξυντυχίας . . . εἶχον, "severally choosing their side, not so much from a sense of right or from obligations of kinship, as from the accident of compulsion or their own interest."

LVII. For the following nations on either side had entered the war at Syracuse, coming against Sicily or in behalf of Sicily, to aid the Athenians to win the country or the Syracusans to save it; and they chose sides, not so much on the ground of right or even of kinship, but either out of regard for their own advantage or from necessity, according to the circumstances in which they each happened to be placed.[1] The Athenians themselves, as Ionians, went of their own free will against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and with them went as members of the expedition the Lemnians, the Imbrians,[2] and the Aeginetans, who at this time held Aegina, as also the Hestiaeans who inhabit Hestiaea in Euboea, all these being colonists of the Athenians and having the same language and institutions as they had. Of the rest, some took part in the expedition as subjects, others in consequence of an alliance, although independent, and some were mercenaries. The peoples that were subjects and tributaries were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styreans and Carystians from Euboea; from the islands the Ceans, Andrians and Tenians; and from Ionia the Milesians, Samians and Chians. Of these last, however, the Chians followed as independent allies, not subject to the payment of tribute but furnishing ships instead.[3] Of the above-mentioned almost all were Ionians and colonists of Athens—except the Carystians, who are Dry-

[2] *cf.* IV. XXVIII. 4. The occupation of Lemnos was effected by Miltiades a few years after the battle of Marathon (Herodt. VI. 137–140), that of Imbros probably about the same time; of Aegina in 431 B.C. (II. XXVII. 1); of Hestiaea in 446 B.C. (I. CXIV. 5).

[3] *cf.* VI. LXXXV. 2.

δ' ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ὅμως Ἴωνές γε ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς
5 ἠκολούθουν. πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς Αἰολῆς, Μηθυμναῖοι
μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι, Τενέδιοι δὲ καὶ
Αἴνιοι ὑποτελεῖς. οὗτοι δὲ Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσι
τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς τοῖς[1] μετὰ Συρακοσίων
κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο, Πλαταιῆς δὲ καὶ[2]
ἄντικρυς Βοιωτοὶ Βοιωτοῖς μόνοι εἰκότως κατὰ
6 τὸ ἔχθος. Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Κυθήριοι Δωριῆς
ἀμφότεροι, οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι, Κυ-
θήριοι, ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς ἅμα Γυλίππῳ
μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ὅπλα ἔφερον, Ῥόδιοι δέ, Ἀργεῖοι
γένος, Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι, Γελῴοις δὲ
καὶ ἀποίκοις ἑαυτῶν οὖσι, μετὰ Συρακοσίων
7 στρατευομένοις, ἠναγκάζοντο πολεμεῖν. τῶν τε
περὶ Πελοπόννησον νησιωτῶν Κεφαλλῆνες μὲν
καὶ Ζακύνθιοι αὐτόνομοι μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτι-
κὸν μᾶλλον κατειργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκρά-
τουν Ἀθηναῖοι, ξυνείποντο· Κερκυραῖοι δὲ οὐ
μόνον Δωριῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς ἐπὶ
Κορινθίους τε καὶ Συρακοσίους, τῶν μὲν ἄποικοι
ὄντες, τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, ἀνάγκῃ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ
εὐπρεποῦς, βουλήσει δὲ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων
8 οὐχ ἧσσον εἵποντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν καλού-

[1] τοῖς, Lindau's conjecture confirmed by M.
[2] καὶ ἄντικρυς, Boehme's correction for καταντικρὺ of the MSS.

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[1] An aboriginal people, dwelling near Mount Oeta; *cf.* Herodt. VIII. 43.
[2] *cf.* III. l. 2; VI. lxxxv. 2.
[3] Those who had escaped to Athens at the siege of Plataea (III. xxiv. 3), or those who had settled in Scione (V. xxxii. 1).

opians[1]—and although they followed as subjects and under compulsion, nevertheless they were Ionians going against Dorians. Besides these there were Aeolians: the Methymnaeans,[2] who paid service with ships and not with tribute, and as tributaries the Tenedians and Aenians. These, though Aeolians, were constrained to fight against Aeolians, that is, the Boeotians, their founders, who were on the side of the Syracusans; while the Plataeans[3] were the only outright Boeotians who were opposed to Boeotians—as was natural considering their hatred. And there were the Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians; the Cytherians, although colonists of the Lacedaemonians, bore arms with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians who were with Gylippus, while the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were compelled to make war not only upon the Syracusans, who were Dorians, but also upon the Geloans, their own colonists,[4] who were serving with the Syracusans. Of the inhabitants of the islands off the shores of the Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians[5] went with the Athenians as independent allies, it is true, but on account of their insular position were under a measure of restraint, because the Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but confessedly Corinthians, were serving against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the former and kinsmen of the latter, under the specious pretext indeed of compulsion, but really quite as much from choice, on account of their hatred of the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, as they are now called, who live in

[4] *cf.* VI. iv. 3. [5] *cf.* II. vii. 3; VII. xxxi. 2.

μενοι ἐκ Ναυπάκτου[1] καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐχομένης ἐς τὸν πόλεμον παρελήφθησαν. καὶ ἔτι Μεγαρέων φυγάδες οὐ πολλοὶ Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουντίοις οὖσι κατὰ ξυμφορὰν
9 ἐμάχοντο. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἑκούσιος μᾶλλον ἡ στρατεία ἐγίγνετο ἤδη· Ἀργεῖοι μὲν οὐ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς παραυτίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίας ὠφελίας Δωριῆς ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων Ἰώνων ἠκολούθουν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι, ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθότες, καὶ τότε τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας οὐδὲν ἧσσον διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίους, Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες· ξυνέβη δὲ τοῖς Κρησὶ τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ξυγκτίσαντας μὴ ξὺν τοῖς ἀποίκοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς
10 ἀποίκους ἑκόντας μετὰ μισθοῦ ἐλθεῖν. καὶ Ἀκαρνάνων τινὲς ἅμα μὲν κέρδει, τὸ δὲ πλέον Δημοσθένους φιλίᾳ καὶ Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίᾳ ξύμ-
11 μαχοι ὄντες ἐπεκούρησαν· καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ ὁριζόμενοι· Ἰταλιωτῶν δὲ Θούριοι καὶ Μεταπόντιοι, ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε

[1] Hude reads ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ ἐκ Ναυπάκτου.

[1] Settled by the Athenians at Naupactus since 462 B.C. (I. ciii. 3). Some of them were employed in garrison duty at Pylos in 425 B.C. (IV. xli. 2).
[2] IV. lxxiv. 2; VI. 43. [3] VI. iv. 2.
[4] Five hundred according to VI. 43.

Naupactus,[1] as well as the Messenians at Pylos, which was now in the possession of the Athenians, were taken along as participants in the war. Furthermore, there were a few exiles from Megara[2] who, because of their misfortune, were fighting against the Selinuntians,[3] who were Megarians. So far as the rest were concerned, their part in the expedition was, as compared with the others, of a more voluntary character. The Argives,[4] on the one hand, were led to take part, not so much by their alliance, as by their hatred of the Lacedaemonians, and out of regard each for his own immediate advantage, associating themselves, Dorians against Dorians, with the Athenians who were Ionians; the Mantineans, on the other hand, and other Arcadians went as mercenaries, for they were accustomed to go against any who at any time were pointed out to them as enemies, and at this time were led by desire of gain to regard as enemies the Arcadians who were with the Corinthians.[5] The Cretans and the Aetolians were also induced by pay; and in the case of the Cretans it so fell out that, although they had assisted the Rhodians in the founding of Gela,[6] they went, not with their colonists, but against them, and of their own free will, for hire. Some of the Acarnanians served, it is true, for gain, but the greater portion were moved by friendship for Demosthenes and goodwill[7] toward the Athenians, whose allies they were, to come to their aid. All these were within the boundary of the Ionian Gulf; but of the Italiots the Thurians and Metapontians took part in the expedition, being reduced at this

[5] *cf.* ch. xix. 4.
[6] *cf.* VI. iv. 3.
[7] *cf.* III. vii. 1, xciv. 2, cv. 3, cvii. 2, cxiv. 1.

στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατειλημμένοι,[1] ξυνεστράτευον καὶ Σικελιωτῶν Νάξιοι καὶ Καταναῖοι, βαρβάρων δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοί τε, οἵπερ ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλέον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Σικελίας Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων καὶ Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι. τοσάδε μὲν μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἔθνη ἐστράτευον.

LVIII. Συρακοσίοις δὲ ἀντεβοήθησαν Καμαριναῖοι μὲν ὅμοροι ὄντες καὶ Γελῷοι οἰκοῦντες μετ' αὐτούς, ἔπειτα Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχαζόντων ἐν
2 τῷ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἱδρυμένοι Σελινούντιοι. καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην μέρος τετραμμένον νεμόμενοι, Ἱμεραῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν πόντον μορίου, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν· οὗτοι δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνοι
3 ἐβοήθησαν. καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ μὲν ἔθνη τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τοσάδε, Δωριῆς τε καὶ[2] αὐτόνομοι πάντες, ξυνεμάχουν, βαρβάρων δὲ Σικελοὶ μόνοι ὅσοι μὴ ἀφέστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· τῶν δ' ἔξω Σικελίας Ἑλλήνων Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην παρεχόμενοι, νεοδαμώδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ Εἵλωτας,[3] Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ μόνοι παραγενόμενοι καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές, ἐκ δὲ

[1] κατειλημμένοι Reiske's emendation for κατειλημμένων of the MSS.

[2] αὐτόνομοι, οἱ preceding deleted by Bekker.

[3] After Εἵλωτας the MSS. give δύναται δὲ τὸ νεωδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι, "Neodamodes means 'being now free.'" The words are generally deleted, as not read by the Schol.

time to such straits by party crises that they could not do otherwise; and of the Siceliots the Naxians and the Catanaeans. Of Barbarians there were the Egestaeans, who had brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the greater part of the Sicels; and of those outside of Sicily a certain number of Tyrrhenians,[1] who had a quarrel with the Syracusans, and some Iapygian mercenaries.[2] So many were the peoples who took part in the struggle on the side of the Athenians.

LVIII. The Syracusans, on the other hand, were aided by the Camarinaeans,[3] who were their next neighbours, and the Geloans, who lived next to the Camarinaeans; then, since the Agrigentines were neutral,[4] by the Selinuntians,[5] who were settled in the country beyond. All these occupied that part of Sicily which faces Libya, but the Himeraeans[6] came from the part which faces the Tyrrhenian Sea, where they were the only Hellenic inhabitants; and they alone from that region came to the aid of the Syracusans. Such were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily, all Dorians and independent, that fought on their side; but of Barbarians, the Sicels alone—those, that is, that had not gone over to the side of the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside of Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who furnished a Spartan as commander-in-chief, but no troops except Neodamodes[7] and Helots; the Corinthians, who alone were at hand with both a fleet and a land-force; the Leucadians and Ambraciots, both induced by the tie

[1] *cf.* VI. lxxxviii. 6, ciii. 2.
[2] *cf.* ch. xxxiii. 4.
[3] *cf.* VI. lxvii. 2; VII. xxxiii. 1.
[4] *cf.* ch. xxxiii. 2.
[5] *cf.* VI. vi. 2, lxv. 1, lxvii. 2.
[6] *cf.* VI. lxii. 2; VII. i. 3.
[7] See on ch. xix. 3.

'Αρκαδίας μισθοφόροι ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀποσταλέντες καὶ Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου Βοιωτοί.
4 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας τούτους οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ πλῆθος πλέον κατὰ πάντα παρέσχοντο, ἅτε μεγάλας πόλεις οἰκοῦντες· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλῖται πολλοὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἄφθονος ξυνελέγη. καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας αὖθις ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ πλείω ἐπορίσαντο διὰ μέγεθός τε πόλεως καὶ ὅτι ἐν μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ἦσαν.

LIX. Καὶ αἱ μὲν ἑκατέρων ἐπικουρίαι τοσαίδε ξυνελέγησαν, καὶ τότε ἤδη πᾶσαι ἀμφοτέροις παρῆσαν καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδὲν οὐδετέροις ἐπῆλθεν.
2 Οἱ δ' οὖν Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐνόμισαν καλὸν ἀγῶνα σφίσιν εἶναι ἐπὶ τῇ γεγενημένῃ νίκῃ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐλεῖν τε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἅπαν τῶν 'Αθηναίων τοσοῦτον ὄν, καὶ μηδὲ καθ' ἕτερα αὐτούς, μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῷ πεζῷ, δια-
3 φυγεῖν. ἔκλῃον οὖν τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς τὸν μέγαν, ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα, τριήρεσι πλαγίαις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις ἐπ' ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμίζοντες, καὶ τἆλλα, ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγου οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν.

LX. Τοῖς δὲ 'Αθηναίοις τήν τε ἀπόκλῃσιν

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[1] Syracuse (VI. iii. 2), Leucas (I. xxx. 2) and Ambracia (II. lxxx. 3) were sister states having Corinth as μητρόπολις.

[2] *cf.* ch. xix. 4.

[3] Because since 418 B.C. an oligarchic constitution had been forced upon them (V. lxxxi. 2).

of kinship;[1] from Arcadia[2] mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; the Sicyonians, who served under compulsion;[3] and, from outside the Peloponnesus, the Boeotians.[4] As compared with all these, who came from abroad, the Siceliots themselves supplied a greater number of troops of every kind, inasmuch as the cities they inhabited were large; and in fact the forces they collected comprised hoplites in large numbers, as well as ships, horses, and a miscellaneous horde of vast numbers. And again, in comparison with all the rest, speaking roughly, the Syracusans themselves provided the larger number, both on account of the greatness of their city and because they were in the greatest danger.

LIX. Such were the forces that had been brought together for the assistance of either side, and at this time[5] both had all their contingents at hand, and no further reinforcements came to either.

The Syracusans and their allies, then, naturally conceived the thought that it would be a glorious achievement for them to crown the victory which they had won in the sea-fight by taking the whole vast armament of the Athenians and preventing their escape in either way, either by sea or by land. Accordingly, they began at once to close the entrance to the Great Harbour, which was about eight stadia wide, with triremes ranged broadside and with large and small boats, mooring them at anchor; and they made other preparations in case the Athenians should still venture to fight at sea, and there was nothing small about any of the designs they formed.

LX. But the Athenians, observing the closing of

[4] *cf.* ch. xix. 3.

[5] The latter part of the summer of 413 B.C.

ὁρῶσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν αἰσθομένοις
2 βουλευτέα ἐδόκει. καὶ ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον (προπέμψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν) οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμελλον ἕξειν, εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν, ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δὲ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἁπλοώτεραι, πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι, καὶ διαναυμαχήσαντες, ἢν μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι, ἢν δὲ μή, ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς πεζῇ ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν ᾗ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσί τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς ἔδοξεν
3 αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας, ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι.
4 καὶ ξυνεπληρώθησαν νῆες αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν· τοξότας τε ἐπ' αὐτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐσεβίβαζον καὶ τἆλλα ὡς οἷόν τ' ἦν ἐξ

[1] *i.e.* the upper extremity of their lines, under the bluffs of Epipolae and furthest from the harbour.

[2] The reference is to contingents from peoples who, like the Acarnanians, were not under the Athenian empire but served for pay; *cf.* ch. lvii. 10.

the harbour and being aware of the general plans of the enemy, thought it desirable to hold a council. So the generals and the taxiarchs came together and took counsel with reference to the difficulties which now confronted them both in other ways, and especially owing to the fact that they no longer had supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions—and were not likely to have them in the future, unless they should hold the mastery at sea. They determined, therefore, to abandon their upper walls,[1] and cutting off by means of a cross-wall the smallest possible space, close to the ships, that would suffice for the stores and for the sick, to put a garrison in this: they would then take the rest of their land-force and man all their ships, not only those which were fit for service, but also the less seaworthy, putting aboard every available man, and fight the issue out at sea; if they won, they would proceed to Catana, but if not, they would burn their ships, and, forming in line of battle, make their retreat by land, taking whatever route would enable them soonest to reach some friendly place, whether Barbarian or Hellenic. These plans having once been determined upon, they acted accordingly: they descended stealthily from the upper walls and manned all their ships, compelling everyone to embark who, provided he was of military age, seemed to be at all fit for service. So there were manned altogether about one hundred and ten ships; and they put on board a large number of archers and javelin-men, both of the Acarnanians and of the other foreigners,[2] and in general they made such provision

ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης διανοίας ἐπορίσαντο. ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ὁρῶν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τῷ τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς τάχιστα βουλομένους διακινδυνεύειν, ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας παρεκελεύσατό τε πρῶτον καὶ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

LXI. "Ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, ὁ μὲν ἀγὼν ὁ μέλλων ὁμοίως κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἔσται περί τε σωτηρίας καὶ πατρίδος ἑκάστοις οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις·[1] ἢν γὰρ κρατήσωμεν νῦν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἔστι τῳ τὴν ὑπάρχουσάν που οἰκείαν πόλιν ἐπιδεῖν. ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρὴ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες ἔπειτα διὰ παντὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου ὁμοίαν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὅσοι τε Ἀθηναίων πάρεστε, πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειροι ὄντες, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ξυστρατευόμενοι αἰεί, μνήσθητε τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις παραλόγων, καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης κἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στῆναι καὶ ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι ἀξίως τοῦδε τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον αὐτοὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐφορᾶτε, παρασκευάζεσθε.

LXII. Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευήν, οἷς πρότερον

[1] *οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις*, deleted by Stahl, followed by Hude.

as was possible under the stress of necessity and with the object they had in view. But when almost all their preparations were ready, Nicias, seeing that the soldiers were not only discouraged, because contrary to their wont they had been badly beaten at sea, but that they also, on account of the scarcity of provisions, were anxious to risk a battle as soon as possible, called them all together before giving the order for battle and exhorted them, speaking as follows:

LXI. "Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, the impending contest will concern you all alike—a contest both for salvation and for fatherland for each of you no less than for the enemy; for if we win the present battle with our fleet, it is possible for everyone to live to see his own city, wherever it may be. And we ought not to be discouraged, much less feel as do the rawest recruits, who, when they have been defeated in their first contests, cherish ever afterwards a foreboding, inspired of their fear, that takes on the colour of their disasters. But as many of you here present as are Athenians, and have already had experience in many wars, and you our allies, who always take part in our campaigns, remember the unexpected turns in war, and in hope that fortune may take her stand on our side also, and with the resolve to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of this vast multitude of your army that you see before you, make ready for battle.

LXII. "But as regards anything that could be helpful to us, in view of the narrowness of the harbour, in combating such a throng of ships as will fill it and the forces which the enemy has placed on their decks—conditions which injured us before

ἐβλαπτόμεθα, πάντα καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μετὰ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἐσκεμμένα ἡτοί-
2 μασται. καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὄχλος ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένῃ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν
3 πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται. ηὕρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅσα χρὴ ἀντιναυπηγεῖσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας, ᾧπερ δὴ μάλιστα ἐβλαπτόμεθα, χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς, ἢν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται
4 ὑπουργῶσιν. ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι μήτ' ἐκείνους ἐᾶν ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχῃ πολεμίας οὔσης.

LXIII. Ὧν χρὴ μεμνημένους διαμάχεσθαι ὅσον ἂν δύνησθε, καὶ μὴ ἐξωθεῖσθαι ἐς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὼς μὴ πρότερον ἀξιοῦν ἀπολύεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου καταστρώματος
2 ὁπλίτας ἀπαράξητε. καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ὁπλίταις οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν ναυτῶν παρακελεύομαι, ὅσῳ τῶν ἄνωθεν μᾶλλον τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο· ὑπάρχει δ' ἡμῖν
3 ἔτι νῦν γε τὰ πλείω τῷ πεζῷ ἐπικρατεῖν. τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ

[1] *i.e.* if they board the hostile ships and fight hand to hand.

—all this has now been made ready by us also, as far as our circumstances permit, after consultation with our pilots. Indeed, many bowmen and javelin-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not use if we were making a fight in the open sea, because they would hamper our skill by increasing the weight of our ships, whereas in the land-battle that we are forced to fight here from the decks of our ships they will be of advantage. And we have contrived whatever counter-devices were necessary in the construction of our ships, and especially to combat the thickness of the enemy's catheads, a device from which we suffered most injury, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent the ship that has rammed us from backing off again, if the marines perform the service that will then devolve upon them.[1] For we have been forced to the extremity of having to fight a land-battle on shipboard, and it is manifestly to our interest neither to back water ourselves nor to suffer them to do so, especially since the whole shore, except the small part of it that our land-force holds, is hostile.

LXIII. "Remembering these things, you must fight to the last with all your strength and not allow yourselves to be driven ashore, but when ship collides with ship be resolved never to separate until you have swept into the sea the hoplites on the enemy's decks. And these things I urge upon the hoplites not less than upon the sailors, inasmuch as such work belongs rather to those on deck; and, besides, we still have the better of the enemy in most points with our land-force. As for the sailors, I exhort them, and at the same time I even implore

δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους, ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι, καὶ μὴ ὄντες, ἡμῶν[1] τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ[2] ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον,[3] μετείχετε. ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως ἂν[4] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κορινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ' ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἕως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτοὺς καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.

LXIV. Τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν πάλιν αὖ καὶ τάδε ὑπομιμνήσκω, ὅτι οὔτε ναῦς ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἄλλας ὁμοίας ταῖσδε οὔτε ὁπλιτῶν ἡλικίαν ὑπελίπετε, εἴ τε ξυμβήσεταί τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ κρατεῖν ὑμῖν, τούς τε ἐνθάδε πολεμίους εὐθὺς ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα πλευσουμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπολοίπους ἡμῶν ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους τούς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας ἀμύνασθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν

[1] With Codex Paris: all the best MSS. ὑμῶν.
[2] Hude omits μή, which is found only in B of the better MSS.
[3] Hude rejects πολὺ πλεῖον, after Krüger.

them, not to be overmuch dismayed by our calamities, since the forces we now have on the decks are better and our ships more numerous; and I would have you—those of you that is who have hitherto been accounted Athenians without being so[1]—reflect how well worth preserving is the proud feeling that because of your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our ways you have been admired throughout Hellas, and in point of advantage have had no less a share in our empire than ourselves, while as regards the fear you inspired in our subjects and the freedom from injury you enjoyed you have had a much greater share. Do you, therefore, who alone are partners with us in our empire as free men, be just and do not utterly betray it; but with scorn both for the Corinthians, whom you have frequently beaten, and for the Siceliots, not one of whom, when our navy was at its best, ever presumed even to stand up against us, ward them off, and show that even amid weakness and misfortune your skill is more than a match for the strength and good fortune of your opponents.

LXIV. "As to those of you who are Athenians, I remind you once more that you left behind you in your docks at home no other ships like these nor hoplites of military age, and if the outcome shall be aught else but victory for you, your enemies here will straightway sail yonder, and our fellow-citizens who are left at home will be unable to ward off both the enemies there and the new invaders. Those of

[1] Referring to the resident aliens; *cf.* Schol. *τοὺς μετοίκους λέγει.*

[4] The text is corrupt; most editors bracket *ἄν.*

ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις εὐθὺς γίγνοισθε, οἷς αὐτοὶ ἴστε οἵᾳ γνώμῃ ἐπήλθετε, οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις.
2 ὥστε ἐν ἑνὶ τῷδε ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγῶνι καθεστῶτες καρτερήσατε, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι καὶ πεζοὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, περὶ ὧν, εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ εὐψυχίᾳ, οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἀποδειξάμενος αὐτός τε αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι σωτήριος."

LXV. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος εὐθὺς ἐκέλευε πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς. τῷ δὲ Γυλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρῆν μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁρῶσι καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν παρασκευήν, ὅτι ναυμαχήσουσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, προηγγέλθη δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν σιδηρῶν χειρῶν, καὶ πρός τε τἆλλα ἐξηρτύσαντο ὡς ἕκαστα καὶ πρὸς
2 τοῦτο· τὰς γὰρ πρῴρας καὶ τῆς νεὼς ἄνω ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀπολισθάνοι καὶ
3 μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβὴν ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιβαλλομένη. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ἑτοῖμα ἦν, παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

LXVI. "Ὅτι μὲν καλὰ τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν τῶν μελλόντων ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται, ὦ Συρακόσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, οἵ τε πολλοὶ δοκεῖτε

you who are here would at once come under the power of the Syracusans—and you yourselves know with what purpose you came against them—and those who are there under the power of the Lacedaemonians. So, therefore, since you are constrained to fight this one battle on behalf of both yourselves and them, be steadfast now, if ever you were, and remember, one and all, that those of you who will now be aboard the ships are for the Athenians both army and navy, and all that is left of the State and the great name of Athens. For her sake, if anyone surpasses another in skill or in courage, he will never find a better occasion for displaying them, at once for his own advantage and for the salvation of us all."

LXV. After making this exhortation Nicias immediately gave orders to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans, on the other hand, observing the actual preparations which they were making, could easily perceive that the Athenians were going to fight at sea; furthermore, the device of the grappling-irons had already been reported to them, and while they were equipping their ships to meet every other contingency, they also took precautions against this. For they stretched hides over the prows and a considerable portion of the upper works of the ships, in order that when the grapnel was thrown it might slip off and not get hold. And when all was ready, Gylippus and his generals exhorted their men as follows:

LXVI. "That the deeds which have already been achieved are glorious and that the contest will be for glories still to come, you, Syracusans and allies, seem to us most of you to be aware—otherwise you

ἡμῖν εἰδέναι (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως αὐτῶν προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε), καὶ εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ ὅσον δεῖ ἤσθηται, σημανοῦμεν. Ἀθηναίους γὰρ ἐς τὴν χώραν τήνδε ἐλθόντας πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας καταδουλώσει, ἔπειτ', εἰ κατορθώσειαν, καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὴν ἥδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κεκτημένους, πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάντες τῷ ναυτικῷ, ᾧπερ πάντα κατέσχον, τὰς μὲν νενικήκατε ναυμαχίας, τὴν δ' ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος
3 νῦν νικήσετε. ἄνδρες γὰρ ἐπειδὰν ᾧ ἀξιοῦσι προύχειν κολουσθῶσι, τό γ' ὑπόλοιπον αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν ἢ εἰ μηδ' ᾠήθησαν τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα τοῦ αὐχήματος σφαλλόμενοι καὶ παρὰ ἰσχὺν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνδιδόασιν· ὃ νῦν Ἀθηναίους εἰκὸς πεπονθέναι.

LXVII. Ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως προσγεγενημένης αὐτῷ κρατίστους εἶναι,[1] εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς. τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς
2 μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν παρέχεται. τά τε τῆς ἀντιμιμήσεως αὐτῶν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἡμῶν τῷ μὲν ἡμετέρῳ τρόπῳ ξυνήθη τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνάρμοστοι πρὸς ἕκαστον[2] αὐτῶν ἐσόμεθα· οἱ δ',

[1] τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι MSS., Hude τοῦ, following Krüger; most editors delete τό.

[2] ἕκαστον, B, most MSS. τὴν ἑκάστην. Hude reads τὴν τέχνην ἑκάστην.

[1] Or "unexpectedly deceived in their self-confidence."

would not have laid your hands to the task so zealously; but if anyone has not perceived this as clearly as he should, we will make it plain. The Athenians came against this country in the first place for the enslavement of Sicily, and after that, if they should be successful, for that of the Peloponnesus also and the rest of Hellas, having already acquired a dominion greater than that of any Hellenes either of the past or of the present time; but you, the first men who ever withstood their fleet, with which they had obtained the mastery everywhere, have already defeated them on the sea and in all probability will defeat them in this present battle. For when men have once suffered abatement just where they claim to be superior, what is left of their self-esteem is weaker than it ever was —than if they had never thought themselves superior at all—and their pride being mortified by the disappointment,[1] they give way out of all proportion to their actual strength. And at the present moment this is what the Athenians have probably suffered.

LXVII. "With us, however, the feeling that before animated us, which led us, even though we were inexperienced, to venture our all, is now more fully confirmed; and since there has been added to it the conviction that we are strongest, because we have defeated the strongest, the hope of each man is doubled. And, generally speaking, the greatest hope inspires in men the greatest zeal for their undertakings. Furthermore, as regards their imitation of our arrangements, whereas these are familiar to us as a part of our manner of fighting and we shall be able to adapt ourselves to meet each one of

ἐπειδὰν πολλοὶ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ὦσι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀκοντισταί, χερσαῖοι ὡς εἰπεῖν Ἀκαρνᾶνές τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ναῦς ἀναβάντες, οἳ οὐδ' ὅπως καθεζομένους χρὴ τὸ βέλος ἀφεῖναι εὑρήσουσι, πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πάντες οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ κινούμενοι
3 ταράξονται; ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ὠφελήσονται, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ὑμῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσαις ναυμαχήσει, πεφόβηται· ἐν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ πολλαὶ ἀργότεραι μὲν ἐς τὸ δρᾶν τι ὧν βούλονται ἔσονται, ῥᾷσται δὲ ἐς τὸ βλάπτεσθαι ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν
4 παρεσκεύασται. τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον γνῶτε, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα σαφῶς πεπύσθαι· ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται, ἵν' ἢ βιασάμενοι ἐκπλεύσωσιν ἢ κατὰ γῆν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ποιῶνται, ὡς τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξαντες χεῖρον.

LXVIII. Πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων ὀργῇ προσμείξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ

[1] For such men would not be able to stand up on deck.

them, yet from their point of view, as soon as they find many hoplites upon their decks, contrary to their established usage, and many javelin-men also, landlubbers so to speak—Acarnanians and others—put aboard ships, men who will not even know how to discharge their darts sitting down,[1] will they not inevitably imperil their ships and all be in confusion among themselves, as they move about in a fashion not their own? Even by the superior number of their ships they will not be profited—in case any one among you has become afraid from the fact that he will have to fight against an unequal number; for in a small space a large number of ships will be slower to carry out any action they may plan, but very easily damaged by the devices which we have adopted. But if you seek the absolute truth, learn it from intelligence which we consider certain: it is through the overwhelming character of their misfortunes and because they are compelled by their present difficulties, that they have reached the desperate resolution—trusting more to fortune than to their own preparation—of risking a battle in whatever way they can, in order that they may either force their way out and sail away, or after defeat may make their retreat by land; for they know that in any case they could not fare worse than at present.

LXVIII. "Against a disorderly array like this, therefore, and against the fortune of our bitterest foes that has surrendered itself into our hands, let us give battle with fury; and let us consider that against enemies it is a most lawful act if for the punishment of the aggressor anyone thinks fit to glut his heart's animosity; and again, that vengeance

ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, τὸ[1]
2 λεγόμενόν που ἥδιστον εἶναι. ὡς δὲ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἔχθιστοι, πάντες ἴστε, οἵ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι, ἐν ᾧ, εἰ κατώρθωσαν, ἀνδράσι μὲν ἂν τὰ ἄλγιστα προσέθεσαν, παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶ τὰ ἀπρεπέστατα, πόλει δὲ τῇ πάσῃ
3 τὴν αἰσχίστην ἐπίκλησιν. ἀνθ' ὧν μὴ μαλακισθῆναί τινα πρέπει, μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι. τοῦτο μὲν γάρ, καὶ ἐὰν κρατήσωσιν, ὁμοίως δράσουσιν· τὸ δὲ πραξάντων ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος ἃ βουλόμεθα τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι καὶ τῇ πάσῃ Σικελίᾳ καρπουμένῃ καὶ πρὶν ἐλευθερίαν βεβαιοτέραν παραδοῦναι, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών. καὶ κινδύνων οὗτοι σπανιώτατοι οἷ ἂν ἐλάχιστα ἐκ τοῦ σφαλῆναι βλάπτοντες πλεῖστα διὰ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ὠφελῶσιν."

LXIX. Καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς σφετέροις στρατιώταις παρακελευσάμενοι ἀντεπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ᾐσθάνοντο.
2 ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνάγεσθαι, καὶ νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα τε ἔργῳ ἔτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι καὶ λόγῳ αὐτοῖς οὔπω ἱκανὰ εἰρῆσθαι, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ

[1] καὶ before τὸ λεγόμενον, omitted by one inferior MS. and Valla, is deleted by most editors.

on foes will be within our power—and that, as the proverb has it, is of all things the sweetest. And that they are enemies, and the worst of enemies, you all know; since they came against our land to enslave it, and, if they had succeeded in that, would have inflicted upon our men all that is most painful, upon our women and children the worst indignities, and upon the city as a whole the most shameful of appellations.[1] Wherefore it is fitting that no one of us should be soft-hearted, or count it a gain that they should depart without risk to us. For this, even if they win the victory, they will do all the same; whereas if we accomplish, as it is likely we shall, that which we wish—that these men be punished, and that we hand over to Sicily, which enjoyed it before, a liberty still more secure—how glorious the prize! And of all hazards those are rarest which harm least in consequence of failure but benefit most because of success."

LXIX. Gylippus and the Syracusan generals also, after they in their turn had thus exhorted their soldiers, began immediately to man their ships as soon as they saw that the Athenians were doing so. But Nicias, dismayed by the situation that confronted him and realizing the nature of the struggle and how near at hand it was now, since in a moment more they would put to sea, and thinking, as men usually do on the eve of great battles, that everything that had been done on their side was still incomplete, and what had been said by the generals was not yet adequate to the occasion, again called up the trierarchs one by one, addressing them by their father's name, their own name, and that of

[1] That of subject or slave.

αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τό τε καθ' ἑαυτόν, ᾧ ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινὰ καὶ τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετάς, ὧν ἐπιφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινι ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαξάμενοι εἶποιεν ἄν, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων παραπλήσια ἔς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρῴους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ παρούσῃ
3 ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶνται. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐχ ἱκανὰ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα νομίσας παρῃνῆσθαι, ἀποχωρήσας ἦγε τὸν πεζὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ παρέταξεν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐδύνατο, ὅπως ὅτι μεγίστη τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν
4 ὠφελία ἐς τὸ θαρσεῖν γίγνοιτο. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν) ἅραντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος καὶ τὸν παραλειφθέντα διέκπλουν, βουλόμενοι βιάσασθαι ἐς τὸ ἔξω.

LXX. Προεξαγαγόμενοι δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶ παραπλησίαις τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον, κατά τε τὸν ἔκπλουν μέρει αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον κύκλῳ λιμένα, ὅπως πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοιεν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις,

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[1] In this fashion, *e.g.* Θησεὺς Αἰγέως Αἰγείδης. There were ten Attic tribes at that time.

[2] *cf.* ch. lix. 2.

their tribe,[1] and admonished them: if anyone had any claim to distinction, he urged him not to prove false to his own reputation; if any had illustrious ancestors, they should not dim the glory of their fathers' deeds of valour; he also reminded them of their fatherland, the freest in the world, and of the uncontrolled liberty in daily life that all possessed in it; and then went on to add whatever else men would be likely to say at so critical a moment, when they do not guard themselves against uttering what might to some seem trite and commonplace—appeals to wives and children and ancestral gods such as are put forward in almost the same words in support of every cause—but in the dismay of the moment, thinking that these sentiments will be useful, shout them at the top of their voices. And when he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he withdrew, and leading the infantry down to the sea drew them up so as to cover as large a space as possible, in order that they might render the greatest possible service in inspiring courage in the men on board the ships. But Demosthenes and Menander and Euthydemus—for these went on board to take command—putting off from the Athenian camp, sailed at once to the barrier[2] of the harbour and the outlet that had been left in it, wishing to force their way to the outer sea.

LXX. But the Syracusans and their allies, who had already put out with about the same number of ships as before, were now on guard at the exit with a squadron of them and also round the rest of the harbour, their purpose being to fall upon the Athenians simultaneously from all directions; and at

καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα αὐτοῖς παρεβοήθει ἥπερ καὶ αἱ νῆες κατίσχοιεν. ἦρχον δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις Σικανὸς μὲν καὶ Ἀγάθαρχος, κέρας ἑκάτερος τοῦ παντὸς ἔχων, Πυθὴν δὲ καὶ οἱ
2 Κορίνθιοι τὸ μέσον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι[1] προσέμισγον τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες ἐκράτουν τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπειρῶντο λύειν τὰς κλήσεις· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν σφίσι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων ἐπιφερομένων οὐ πρὸς τῷ ζεύγματι ἔτι μόνον ἡ ναυμαχία ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἦν καρτερὰ καὶ οἵα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν
3 προτέρων. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἑκατέροις προθυμία ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐς τὸ ἐπιπλεῖν ὁπότε κελευσθείη ἐγίγνετο, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· οἵ τε ἐπιβάται ἐθεράπευον, ὁπότε προσπέσοι ναῦς νηί, μὴ λείπεσθαι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης· πᾶς τέ τις ἐν ᾧ προσετέτακτο αὐτὸς
4 ἕκαστος ἠπείγετο πρῶτος φαίνεσθαι. ξυμπεσουσῶν δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλῶν νεῶν (πλεῖσται γὰρ δὴ αὗται ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ ἐναυμάχησαν· βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι), αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους ὀλίγαι ἐγίγνοντο, αἱ δὲ προσβολαί, ὡς τύχοι ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα ἢ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν ἢ
5 ἄλλῃ ἐπιπλέουσα, πυκνότεραι ἦσαν. καὶ ὅσον μὲν χρόνον προσφέροιτο ναῦς, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κατα-

[1] οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, with B; Hude reads οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀ. with most of the MSS. and Dion. Hal.

the same time their troops on land came up to help them wherever the Athenians' ships put to shore. In command of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each having a wing of the main fleet, while Pythen and the Corinthians held the centre. Now when the Athenian fleet drew near the barrier they charged and in the first onset had the better of the ships stationed there, and they set about trying to break the chains which fastened the boats together; but afterwards, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from all directions, the battle no longer raged next to the barrier only, but was becoming general all over the harbour. And it was obstinately fought, beyond any of the battles that had gone before. For on both sides much zeal was shown on the part of the sailors to make the charge whenever the order was given, and on the part of the pilots much pitting of skill against skill and mutual rivalry; and the marines took good care, whenever ship collided with ship, that the service on deck should not fall short of the skill of the rest; and everyone was eager to show himself foremost at the post of duty to which he had himself been assigned. And since many ships had come into conflict in a small space—for never did so many ships fight in so small a space, both sides together falling little short of two hundred—attacks with the beak were few because it was not possible to back water or to break through the line.[1] But chance collisions were more frequent, as ship fell foul of ship in the attempt to flee or in making a charge upon another ship. And as long as a ship was bearing down, the men on the

[1] On the manœuvre διέκπλους, see note on ch. xxxvi. 4.

στρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις ἀφθόνοις ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο· ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσμείξειαν, οἱ ἐπιβάται ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντες ἐπει-
6 ρῶντο ταῖς ἀλλήλων ναυσὶν ἐπιβαίνειν. ξυνετύγχανέ τε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πλείους ναῦς κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ξυνηρτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῖς κυβερνήταις τῶν μὲν φυλακὴν τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιβουλήν, μὴ καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον, κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν, περιεστάναι, καὶ τὸν κτύπον μέγαν ἀπὸ πολλῶν νεῶν ξυμπιπτουσῶν ἔκπληξίν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποστέρησιν τῆς ἀκοῆς ὧν οἱ κελευσταὶ φθέγγοιντο παρέχειν.
7 πολλὴ γὰρ δὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις καλὸν εἶναι κωλῦσαί τε αὐτοὺς διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστους
8 πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξῆσαι. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ προσέτι ἑκατέρων, εἴ τινά που ὁρῷεν μὴ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πρύμναν κρουόμενον, ἀνακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστὶ τὸν τριήραρχον ἠρώτων, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὴν πολεμιωτάτην γῆν οἰκειοτέραν ἤδη τῆς οὐ δι᾽ ὀλίγου πόνου κεκτημένης θαλάσσης

decks of the opposing ship used against it javelins and arrows and stones without stint; but when they came to close quarters, the marines fought hand to hand in the attempt of each side to board the ships of the other. And it happened in many places, on account of the narrowness of the space, that while the ships of one side were ramming the enemy they were also being rammed themselves, and that two ships, sometimes even more, had unavoidably got entangled about one; it also devolved upon the pilots to make defence on one side and plan attack on the other, not at one point at a time, but at many points and in every direction; and the great din arising from the collision of many ships not only caused consternation, but also prevented the men from hearing the orders of their boatswains. For there was constant exhortation and shouting on the part of the boatswains on either side, both in carrying out their duties and as the rivalry of the moment inspired them; on the Athenian side they shouted to their men to force the passage out, and, if they would win a safe return to their fatherland, now, if ever hereafter, to set themselves zealously to the task; on the side of the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the enemy's escape, and, by winning the victory, to exalt the honour each of his own native land. Moreover, the generals on each side, if they saw any ship in any part of the field drawing back when it was not absolutely necessary to do so, would call out the name of the trierarch and demand, the Athenian generals whether they were withdrawing because they considered the land of bitterest foes to be now more their own than the sea which Athens had

ἡγούμενοι ὑποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ οὓς σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους [1] παντὶ τρόπῳ διαφυγεῖν, τούτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν.

LXXI. Ὅ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας πολὺν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης εἶχε, φιλονικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλείονος ἤδη καλοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι
2 χείρω πράξωσιν. πάντων γὰρ δὴ ἀνακειμένων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὅ τε φόβος ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδενὶ ἐοικὼς καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον τῆς τάξεως [2] ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν τῆς ναυ-
3 μαχίας ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. δι' ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων, εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο· οἱ δ' ἐπί τι ἡσσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐδουλοῦντο· ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀπιδόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχὲς τῆς ἀμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν

[1] Ἀθηναίους, after προθυμουμένους, deleted by Duker.
[2] ἀνώμαλον τῆς τάξεως, added by Classen.

[1] Classen's emendation of the incomprehensible Vulgate seems to have the support of the Schol. διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς χώρας ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἐθεώρουν τὴν ναυμαχίαν. Bekker's emendation, δι' αὐτὸ ἀνώμαλον . . . for διὰ τὸ . . ., is confirmed by one MS. (a_2) and makes good sense if we take αὐτὸ to refer either to the idea that *their fear was unparalleled* or that *the stake was so great*: "For since the Athenians had

acquired with no little toil, and the Syracusan, whether, when they knew clearly that the Athenians were eager to escape no matter how, they would themselves flee before men who were in flight.

LXXI. And the armies on the shore on both sides, so long as the fighting at sea was evenly balanced, underwent a mighty conflict and tension of mind, the men of Sicily being ambitious to enhance the glory they had already won, while the invaders were afraid that they might fare even worse than at present. For the Athenians their all was staked upon their fleet, and their fear for the outcome like unto none they had ever felt before; and on account of the different positions which they occupied on the shore they necessarily had different views of the fighting.[1] For since the spectacle they were witnessing was near at hand and not all were looking at the same point at the same time, if one group saw the Athenians prevailing anywhere, they would take heart and fall to invoking the gods not to rob them of their safe return; while those whose eyes fell upon a portion that was being defeated uttered shrieks of lamentation, and by the mere sight of what was going on were more cowed in spirit than the men who were actually fighting. Others, again, whose gaze was fixed on some part of the field where the battle was evenly balanced, on account of the long-drawn uncertainty of the conflict were in a continual state of most distressing suspense, their very bodies swaying, in the extremity of their fear, in accord with their opinion

their all staked upon the ships, there was fear for the outcome like to none they had ever felt, and on this account they necessarily had different views of the sea-fight."

τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διῆγον· αἰεὶ γὰρ παρ' ὀλίγον
4 ἢ διέφευγον ἢ ἀπώλλυντο. ἦν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἕως ἀγχώμαλα ἐναυμάχουν, πάντα ὁμοῦ ἀκοῦσαι, ὀλοφυρμός, βοή, νικῶντες, κρατούμενοι, ἄλλα ὅσ' ἂν ἐν μεγάλῳ κινδύνῳ μέγα στρατόπεδον πολυειδῆ ἀναγκάζοιτο
5 φθέγγεσθαι. παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντισχούσης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπικείμενοι λαμπρῶς, πολλῇ κραυγῇ καὶ διακε-
6 λευσμῷ χρώμενοι, κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατός, ἄλλοι ἄλλῃ, ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι ἐάλωσαν, κατενεχθέντες ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον· ὁ δὲ πεζὸς οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁρμῆς οἰμωγῇ τε καὶ στόνῳ πάντες, δυσανασχετοῦντες τὰ γιγνόμενα, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους ἐς φυλακήν, ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἤδη περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅπῃ σωθήσονται διε-
7 σκόπουν. ἦν τε ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα οὐδεμιᾶς δὴ τῶν ξυμπασῶν ἐλάσσων ἔκπληξις. παραπλήσιά τε ἐπεπόνθεσαν καὶ ἔδρασαν αὐτοὶ ἐν Πύλῳ· διαφθαρεισῶν γὰρ τῶν νεῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις προσαπώλλυντο αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρες διαβεβηκότες, καὶ τότε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀνέλπι-

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[1] *cf.* iv. 14.

of the battle; for always they were within a hair's breadth of escaping or of perishing. And in the same Athenian army one might hear, so long as the combatants were fighting on equal terms, every kind of cry at the same time—wailing, shouting, "We are winning," "We are beaten," and all the divers kinds of cries that a great army in great danger would be constrained to utter. The men also on board the Athenian ships were affected in a similar way, until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the fighting had been maintained a long time, routed the Athenians and pressing on triumphantly, with loud cries and exhortations, pursued them to the land. Thereupon as regards the naval force such ships as had not been captured in the deep water were driven to shore, some to one place, some to another, and the men tumbled out of the ships and rushed for the camp; as for the army on land, their emotions were no longer at variance, but with one impulse all broke forth into wailing and groaning, being scarcely able to bear what was happening, and ran along the shore, some to the ships, in order to help their comrades, some to what remained of their wall, in order to guard it; while still others, and these the greater number, were now concerned only about themselves and how they might be saved. And at the moment there reigned a consternation greater than any fear felt before. These men had now suffered a fate not unlike that which they had themselves inflicted upon the Lacedaemonians at Pylos; for when their fleet had been destroyed there, the men who had crossed over to the island were also as good as lost to them.[1] And so at the present time the Athenians could have no hope of

στον ἦν τὸ κατὰ γῆν σωθήσεσθαι, ἢν μή τι παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται.

LXXII. Γενομένης δ' ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ πολλῶν νεῶν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολομένων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπικρατήσαντες τά τε ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τροπαῖον
2 ἔστησαν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ μεγέθους τῶν παρόντων κακῶν νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐβου-
3 λεύοντο εὐθὺς ἀναχωρεῖν. Δημοσθένης δὲ Νικίᾳ προσελθὼν γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο πληρώσαντας ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν νεῶν βιάσασθαι, ἢν δύνωνται, ἅμα ἕῳ τὸν ἔκπλουν, λέγων ὅτι πλείους ἔτι αἱ λοιπαί εἰσι νῆες χρήσιμαι σφίσιν ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις· ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις περίλοιποι ὡς ἑξήκοντα, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντή-
4 κοντα. καὶ ξυγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ βουλομένων πληροῦν αὐτῶν οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπλῆχθαι τῇ ἥσσῃ καὶ μὴ
5 ἂν ἔτι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον.

LXXIII. Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νομίσας δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ἀποχωρήσασα καὶ καθεζομένη ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐσηγεῖται ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν ὡς οὐ χρεὼν ἀποχωρῆσαι τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοὺς περιδεῖν, λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ἐξελθόντας ἤδη πάντας

getting safely away by land unless something quite extraordinary should happen.

LXXII. The battle having been thus stubbornly fought and many men and ships lost on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies were victorious and gathered up their wrecks and their dead and after that sailed home and set up a trophy. The Athenians, however, were so affected by the magnitude of their present ills that they did not even give a thought to wrecks or dead, or ask leave to take them up, but were planning an immediate retreat during the night. But Demosthenes went to Nicias and proposed that they should man once more what remained of their fleet and force their way out, if they could, at daybreak, saying that a larger number of seaworthy ships still were left to them than to the enemy; for there yet remained to the Athenians about sixty, but to their opponents less than fifty. Nicias agreed to this proposal, and the generals desired to man the ships at once; but the sailors refused to embark, because they were utterly dejected by their defeat and felt that it was no longer possible for them to win. So they were now unanimously of the opinion that they must make their retreat by land.

LXXIII. But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their intention and thinking that it would be a serious matter if so large an army, retreating overland, should settle somewhere in Sicily and be disposed to renew the war upon Syracuse, went to those in authority and explained that they ought not to permit the Athenians to withdraw during the night—giving the reason which led him to this opinion—but that the Syracusans and their allies

Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τάς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομῆσαι καὶ τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων
2 προφθάσαντας φυλάσσειν. οἱ δὲ ξυνεγίγνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ταῦτα ἐκείνου καὶ ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄρτι ἀσμένους ἀπὸ ναυμαχίας τε μεγάλης ἀναπεπαυμένους καὶ ἅμα ἑορτῆς οὔσης (ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα) οὐ δοκεῖν ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐθελῆσαι ὑπακοῦσαι· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ περιχαροῦς τῆς νίκης πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἐλπίζειν ἂν σφῶν πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅπλα λαβόντας ἐν
3 τῷ παρόντι ἐξελθεῖν. ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ταῦτα λογιζομένοις ἐφαίνετο ἄπορα καὶ οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε μηχανᾶται, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθ' ἡσυχίαν προφθάσωσιν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ διελθόντες τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χωρίων· πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ἡνίκα ξυνεσκόταζεν· οἳ προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσου τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας ὡς ὄντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτήδειοι (ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῷ Νικίᾳ διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν) ἐκέλευον φράζειν Νικίᾳ μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα, ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡσυχίαν τῆς
4 ἡμέρας παρασκευασάμενον ἀποχωρεῖν. καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες διήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων·

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[1] *cf.* ch. xlviii. 2.

should immediately march out in full force and build barricades across the roads and forestall the enemy by guarding the narrow passes. Now the officials were as firmly of this opinion as Hermocrates and thought that these steps should be taken, but since the soldiers had as yet hardly had the rest they so eagerly desired after the great battle and, besides, there was a festival—for the Syracusans happened on this day to be offering a sacrifice to Heracles—they believed it would be no easy matter to induce the men to answer the summons; for in their great joy over the victory most of them had taken to drinking at the festival; and "We expect," they said, "that they would obey any orders from us rather than to take up arms and march out." So when it was clear to the officials, considering all these things, that the plan was impracticable, and Hermocrates was no longer making any impression upon them, he himself thereupon devised the following plan: fearing that the Athenians might leave quietly during the night and get through the most difficult places before they could prevent this, he sent certain of his own friends with some horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. These rode up close enough to be heard and called upon certain persons by name, as though they were friends of the Athenians—for there were some who regularly reported to Nicias all that went on in Syracuse[1]—and bade them tell Nicias not to lead his army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to withdraw at his leisure, in the daytime, after having made full preparations. After saying this these men departed, and those who had heard reported it to the Athenian generals.

LXXIV. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄγγελμα ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάτην εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν περιμεῖναι, ὅπως ξυσκευάσαιντο ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν οἱ στρατιῶται ὅτι χρησιμώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα καταλιπεῖν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν
2 ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια ἀφορμᾶσθαι. Συρακόσιοι δὲ καὶ Γύλιππος τῷ μὲν πεζῷ προεξελθόντες τάς τε ὁδοὺς τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν ᾗ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι ἀπεφάργνυσαν καὶ τῶν ῥείθρων καὶ ποταμῶν τὰς διαβάσεις ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος ὡς κωλύσοντες ᾗ ἐδόκει ἐτάσσοντο· ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον· ἐνέπρησαν δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰς δ' ἄλλας καθ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

LXXV. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῷ Δημοσθένει ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ
2 ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐγίγνετο. δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ' ἓν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅτι τάς τε ναῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀπεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης

[1] *i.e.*, though an immediate departure seemed forced on them by the circumstances.

[2] *cf.* ch. lx. 2.

LXXIV. So the Athenians, in view of the announcement, in which they saw no trickery, stayed on for that night. And since, even as things were,[1] they had not set out immediately, it seemed to them best to wait during the following day also, in order that the soldiers might pack up what was most useful, as well as they could in the circumstances, and then be off, leaving everything else behind and taking along only such of the supplies on hand as would serve for the sustenance of the body. But the Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead of them with their infantry and blocked up the roads in the country by which it was likely that the Athenians would travel, set guards at the fords across the streams and rivers, and posted themselves, at such points as seemed favourable, for the reception of the Athenian army, with the intention of opposing its progress. They also sailed up with their ships and began to haul down the Athenian ships from the beach and tow them away; the Athenians themselves had already, it is true, burned some few of their ships, as had been their purpose with the whole fleet,[2] but all the rest the Syracusans, at their leisure and without opposition, taking them one at a time according as they happened to have run aground, lashed to their own ships and brought to the city.

LXXV. After this, when it seemed to Nicias and Demosthenes that adequate preparations had been made, the departure of the army at last took place —on the third day following the sea-fight. And it was terrible, not in one aspect only of their fortunes, in that they were going away after losing all their ships, and, in place of high hopes, with

ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων
3 ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο, καὶ οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς πολὺ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι[1] λυπηρότεροι
4 ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι. πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ἀπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν
5 ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν. κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ· μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων

[1] ζῶσι, Classen's suggestion; ὁρῶσι is adopted by Hude.

[1] "Faint" is Classen's interpretation of ὀλίγων, as used of the weak, scarcely audible voice of the dying, in their last complaints and appeals to the gods. *Cf. Od.* xiv. 492, φθεγξάμενος ὀλίγῃ ὀπί, *speaking with faint voice.* On the other hand, μέγας is often used of a *loud* shout. But most editors object to ὀλίγων. Arnold thinks that the negative

danger threatening both themselves and their State, but also in that, on the abandonment of their camp, it fell to the lot of each man to see things that were painful both to sight and mind. The corpses were still unburied, and whenever a man saw one of his own friends lying dead, he was plunged into grief commingled with fear; and the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, far more than the dead seemed piteous to the living, and were more wretched than those that had perished. For turning to entreaty and lamentation, they drove the men to distraction; begging to be taken along and calling aloud upon each one if they saw anywhere a comrade or a kinsman, clinging to their tent-mates now going away and following after them as long as they were able, and then, when the bodily strength of one or another failed, falling behind, though not without faint[1] appeals to the gods and lamentations; so that the whole army, being filled with grief and in such perplexity, found it hard to depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had endured already sufferings too great for tears and feared for the future what they might still have to suffer. There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-condemnation. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city; for in the entire throng no fewer than four myriads

must be repeated, as if we had *οὐκ ἄνευ οὐκ ὀλίγων*, and Valla translates, *non sine multis obtestationibus ac ploratibus.* Various conjectures have been offered as substitutes, *e.g.* *λυγρῶν* (Heilmann), *συχνῶν* (Poppo), *οἰκτρῶν* (van Herwerden), *ἀλόγων* (Madvig). Stahl deletes *ὀλίγων* as arising from a gloss, *ὀλολυγῶν.*

ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο. καὶ τούτων οἵ τε ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφερον ὅ τι τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος[1] χρήσιμον, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοί γε καὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία,[2] οἱ μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ· ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα. ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ
6 στρατοπέδῳ. καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ[3] ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν[4] κούφισιν, οὐδ' ὡς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ
7 ταπεινότητα ἀφίκατο. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ' εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ' ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι, πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ. ὅμως δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

LXXVI. Ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Νικίας τὸ στράτευμα ἀθυμοῦν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ ὄν, ἐπιπαριὼν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῇ τε χρώμενος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθ'

[1] ἕκαστος B, all other MSS. κατὰ τό.

[2] All MSS. except C read, after σιτία, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, "under their arms."

[3] ἡ ἰσομοιρία, Hude deletes ἡ, with Dobree, and reads ἰσομοιρίᾳ with B.

were on the march together. And of these, the rest all bore whatever each could that was useful, while the hoplites and the horsemen, contrary[1] to their wont, carried their own food, some for want of attendants, others through distrust of them; for there had been desertions all along and in greatest numbers immediately on their defeat. But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp. Furthermore, the rest of their misery and the equal sharing of their ills—although there was in this very sharing with many some alleviation—did not even so seem easy at the moment, especially when one considered from what splendour and boastfulness at first to what a humiliating end they had now come. For this was indeed the very greatest reversal that had ever happened to an Hellenic armament; for it so fell out that in place of having come to enslave others, they were now going away in fear lest they might rather themselves suffer this, and instead of prayers and pæans, with which they had sailed forth, were now departing for home with imprecations quite the reverse of these; going too as foot-soldiers instead of seamen, and relying upon hoplites rather than a fleet. And yet, by reason of the magnitude of the danger still impending, all these things seemed to them tolerable.

LXXVI. But Nicias, seeing the despondency of the army and the great change it had undergone, passed along the ranks and endeavoured to encourage and cheer the soldiers as well as the circumstances permitted, shouting still louder in his zeal as he came to each contingent, and being

[1] τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν, deleted by Hude, as probably not read by the Schol.

οὓς γίγνοιτο ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν.

LXXVII. "Ἔτι καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἐλπίδα χρὴ ἔχειν (ἤδη τινὲς καὶ ἐκ δεινοτέρων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσώθησαν), μηδὲ καταμέμφεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτοὺς μήτε ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μήτε ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν νῦν κακο-
2 παθίαις. κἀγώ τοι οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε ῥώμῃ προφέρων (ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) οὔτ' εὐτυχίᾳ δοκῶν που ὕστερός του εἶναι κατά τε τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, νῦν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινδύνῳ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις αἰωροῦμαι· καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα.
3 ἀνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύ-
4 σαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ' ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἕξειν (οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου), καὶ ὁρῶντες ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἷοι ὁπλῖται ἅμα καὶ ὅσοι ξυντεταγμένοι χωρεῖτε μὴ κατα-πέπληχθε ἄγαν, λογίζεσθε δὲ ὅτι αὐτοί τε πόλις

desirous, by making his voice heard as far as possible, to do some good:

LXXVII. "Even in your present condition, Athenians and allies, you should still have hope—in the past men have been saved from even worse straits than these—and not blame yourselves too much either for your reverses or for your present unmerited miseries. I myself, who have the advantage of none of you in strength of body—nay, you see how I am afflicted by my disease—and who was once thought, perhaps, to be inferior to no one in good fortune as regards both my private life and my career in general, am now involved in the same danger as the meanest among you. And yet my life has been spent in the performance of many a religious duty toward the gods and many a just and blameless action towards men. Wherefore, in spite of all, my hope for the future is still confident, and our calamities do not frighten me as much as they might well have done. Perhaps they may even abate; for our enemies have had good fortune enough, and if we have roused the jealousy of any of the gods by our expedition we have already been punished sufficiently. Others have ere now, we know, gone against their neighbours, and after acting as men will act, have suffered what men can bear. It is therefore reasonable that we also should now hope that the divine dispensations will be more kindly towards us—for we are now more deserving of the gods' pity than of their jealousy—and, furthermore you should, when you look upon yourselves and see what fine hoplites you are and what a multitude you are when marching in battle array, not be too greatly dismayed; nay, remember that

εὐθύς ἐστε ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε, καὶ ἄλλη οὐδεμία ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιόντας δέξαιτο ῥαδίως οὔτ' ἂν ἱδρυθέντας που ἐξαναστήσειεν. 5 τὴν δὲ πορείαν ὥστ' ἀσφαλῆ καὶ εὔτακτον εἶναι αὐτοὶ φυλάξατε, μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡγησάμενος ἕκαστος ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ χωρίῳ μάχεσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ 6 πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἔξειν. σπουδὴ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ἔσται τῆς ὁδοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτήδεια βραχέα ἔχομεν, καὶ ἢν ἀντιλαβώμεθά του φιλίου χωρίου τῶν Σικελῶν (οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ Συρακοσίων δέος ἔτι βέβαιοι εἰσιν), ἤδη νομίζετε ἐν τῷ ἐχυρῷ εἶναι. προπέπεμπται δ' ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰρημένον καὶ 7 σιτία ἅμα κομίζειν. τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι, ὡς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθεῖτε, καὶ ἢν νῦν διαφύγητε τοὺς πολεμίους, οἵ τε ἄλλοι τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν μεγάλην δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως καίπερ πεπτωκυῖαν ἐπανορθώσοντες· ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί."

LXXVIII. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιάδε παρακελευόμενος ἅμα ἐπῄει τὸ στράτευμα καί, εἴ πῃ ὁρᾴη διεσπασμένον καὶ μὴ ἐν τάξει χωροῦν, ξυνάγων καὶ καθιστάς, καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐδὲν ἧσσον τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὸν τοιαῦτά τε καὶ παραπλήσια λέγων. 2 τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν διπλαισίῳ τεταγμένον, πρῶτον

[1] For the sentiment, *cf.* Alcaeus, frg. 22 ἄνδρες πόλιος πύργος ἀρεύιοι ; Soph. *O. T.* 56 ; Aesch. *Pers.* 349 ; Eur. frg. 825 ; Plut. *Lycurg.* 19 ; Dem. xviii. 299 ; Dio C. LVI. v. 3 ; Cic. *ad. Att.* vii. 11.

wherever you establish yourselves you are at once a city, and that in all Sicily there is no other city which could either sustain an attack from you or drive you out if you once made a settlement anywhere. And as to the march, you yourselves must see to it that it is safe and orderly, and each one of you must have no other thought than this—that the place, wherever it may be, in which you will be forced to fight, will be, if you conquer, both your country and your fortress. And we must make haste upon our journey both night and day alike, for such supplies as we have are scanty; and if we reach some friendly place in the country of the Sicels—and we can still depend upon them because of their fear of the Syracusans—then only you may consider that you are in security. Directions have been sent ahead to the Sicels that they are to meet us and bring provisions with them. Know the whole truth, fellow-soldiers: you must of necessity be brave men, since there is no place near at hand which you can reach in safety if you are cowards; and if you escape your enemies now, the rest of you will win all that you surely long to see once more, and those who are Athenians will raise up again, however fallen, the great power of their State; for it is men that make a State, not walls nor ships devoid of men." [1]

LXXVIII. Such were the words of exhortation which Nicias uttered as he passed along the ranks; and if he saw any part of the army straggling or not marching in line, he brought them together and into order; and Demosthenes did likewise, speaking in much the same terms to the soldiers under him. And now the army began the march, arrayed in a

μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ Νικίου, ἐφεπόμενον δὲ τὸ Δημοσθένους· τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον
3 ὄχλον ἐντὸς εἶχον οἱ ὁπλῖται. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διαβάσει τοῦ Ἀνάπου ποταμοῦ, ηὗρον ἐπ' αὐτῷ παρατεταγμένους τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων, καὶ τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν· οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι παριππεύοντές τε προσέκειντο καὶ ἐσα-
4 κοντίζοντες οἱ ψιλοί. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ προελθόντες σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς λόφῳ τινὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι· τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ πρῳ ἐπορεύοντο καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδώδιμον (ᾠκεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος) καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ᾗ ἔμελλον ἰέναι, οὐκ ἄφθονον
5 ἦν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ προελθόντες τὴν δίοδον τὴν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπετείχιζον· ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερὸς καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ χαράδρα
6 κρημνώδης, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀκραῖον λέπας. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκώλυον καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν
7 τε καὶ παρίππευον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

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[1] Second day of the retreat.

[2] "Bald" is a term applied to several bare (unwooded) summits in the Appalachian range in the United States.

hollow square, first the division of Nicias leading the way, then that of Demosthenes following. The baggage-carriers and most of the miscellaneous throng were enclosed inside the ranks of the hoplites. When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found some of the Syracusans and their allies drawn up there, and after routing these and securing the passage they went forward; but the Syracusan cavalry rode alongside and kept attacking them, while their light-armed troops showered javelins upon them. On this day the Athenians advanced about forty stadia and bivouacked at a hill; but on the next day [1] they began the march early and after proceeding about twenty stadia descended into a level place, where they encamped; for they wished to get something to eat from the houses, the place being inhabited, and to get there a supply of water to take with them, since for many stadia ahead in the direction in which they were to go water was not plentiful. Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone ahead and were engaged in making a wall across the pass in front; and this was over a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side, called the Acraean Bald.[2] On the next day [3] the Athenians went forward, and the cavalry and javelin-men of the Syracusans and their allies, being in considerable force, sought to impede their march on either side by hurling javelins and riding alongside. For a long time the Athenians kept up the fight, but at length returned to the camp of the day preceding. And they no longer had provisions as before, for by reason of the enemy's cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body.

[3] Third day of the retreat.

LXXIX. Πρῲ δὲ ἄραντες ἐπορεύοντο αὖθις, καὶ ἐβιάσαντο πρὸς τὸν λόφον ἐλθεῖν τὸν ἀποτετειχισμένον, καὶ ἦρον πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποτειχίσματος τὴν πεζὴν στρατιὰν παρατεταγ-
2 μένην οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων· στενὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἐπάντους ὄντος (διικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾷον οἱ ἄνωθεν) καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι βιάσασθαι ἀνεχώρουν
3 πάλιν καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ἀφ' ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι.
4 ἀναπαυομένων δ' αὐτῶν ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πέμπουσι μέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀποτειχιοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ ὄπισθεν αὐτοὺς ᾗ προεληλύθεσαν· ἀντιπέμψαντες δὲ κἀκεῖνοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τινας
5 διεκώλυσαν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀναχωρήσαντες πρὸς τὸ πεδίον μᾶλλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ηὐλίσαντο. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ προυχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι προσέβαλλόν τε πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς κύκλῳ καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπεχώρουν, εἰ δ' ἀναχωροῖεν, ἐπέκειντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἴ πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεψάμενοι
6 πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα φοβήσειαν. καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀντεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα προελθόντες πέντε ἢ ἓξ σταδίους ἀνεπαύοντο ἐν

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[1] Fourth day of the retreat. [2] *cf.* VI. lxx. 1. [3] Fifth day of the retreat.

LXXIX. Early the next morning[1] they set out again upon their march, and forced their way through to the hill where a wall had been built across the pass; there they found in front of them the enemy's infantry drawn up behind the wall, not a few shields deep, for the place was narrow. The Athenians attacked and tried to storm the wall; but when they found themselves targets for the missiles of large numbers of the enemy on the hill, which was steep—and of course the men up above them could reach them more easily—and were unable to force their way through, they drew back and rested. It so happened, furthermore, that at this same time there was some thunder and rain,[2] as is apt to be the case toward the fall of the year; and this caused the Athenians to be still more despondent, for they believed that all these things too were conspiring for their destruction. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to build a wall across the line of march in their rear, at a point on the road by which they had come; but the Athenians sent a detachment of their own men and prevented it. After that the Athenians moved their whole army back into the more level country and bivouacked. On the next day[3] they advanced again, and the Syracusans surrounded them and attacked them on every side, wounding many; if the Athenians attacked they retreated, but if they retreated they would charge, falling chiefly upon the rearmost in the hope that by routing them a few at a time they might put the whole army in a panic. Now for a long time, fighting in this fashion, the Athenians resisted, then after they had advanced five or six stadia they

τῷ πεδίῳ· ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

LXXX. Τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ Δημοσθένει ἐδόκει, ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίᾳ ἤδη καὶ κατατετραυματισμένοι ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεμίων γεγενημέναις, πυρὰ καύσαντες ὡς πλεῖστα ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ᾗ διενοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἢ οἱ Συρα-
2 κόσιοι ἐτήρουν, πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν· ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ
3 πόλεις καὶ Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. καύσαντες οὖν πυρὰ πολλὰ ἐχώρουν ἐν τῇ νυκτί. καὶ αὐτοῖς, οἷον φιλεῖ καὶ πᾶσι στρατοπέδοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς μεγίστοις, φόβοι καὶ δείματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ διὰ πολεμίας καὶ πολεμίων[1] οὐ πολὺ ἀπεχόντων ἰοῦσιν, ἐμπίπτει
4 ταραχή· καὶ τὸ μὲν Νικίου στράτευμα, ὥσπερ[2] ἡγεῖτο, ξυνέμενέ τε καὶ προύλαβε πολλῷ, τὸ δὲ Δημοσθένους, τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ πλέον,
5 ἀπεσπάσθη τε καὶ ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει. ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ὅμως πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἑλωρίνην καλουμένην ἐπορεύοντο, ὅπως, ἐπειδὴ γένοιντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Κακυπάρει, παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἴοιεν ἄνω διὰ μεσογείας· ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ταύτῃ
6 οὓς μετέπεμψαν ἀπαντήσεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ, ηὗρον καὶ ἐνταῦθα φυλακὴν

[1] ἀπὸ before πολεμίων deleted by Reiske.
[2] Hude adopts Dobree's conjecture, ὅσπερ.

rested in the plain; and the Syracusans on their part left them and went back to their own camp.

LXXX. During the night, finding their army in wretched plight, since by now they were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults made by the enemy, it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes to kindle as many fires as possible and then withdraw the army, not now by the route which they had at first planned, but in the opposite direction to that in which the Syracusans were watching for them—that is, towards the sea. (But previously the line of march which I have been describing had not been toward Catana,[1] but toward the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela and the cities in that region both Hellenic and Barbarian.) So they kindled many fires and then set out during the night. And just as in all armies, and most of all in the largest, terrors and panics are apt to arise, especially at night and when they are marching through a hostile country with the enemy not far away, so confusion fell upon them also. The army of Nicias, as it was in the van,[2] kept together and got a long distance ahead, but that of Demosthenes, about half or more of the whole, became separated and proceeded in considerable disorder. Nevertheless at dawn they reached the sea, and taking the road called Elorine marched on, intending when they reached the river Cacyparis [3] to follow this stream up into the interior of the island; for they hoped that the Sicels, whom they had sent for, would meet them in that region. But when they came to the river, there also they found a Syracusan

[1] *i.e.* towards the sea. [2] *cf.* ch. lxxviii. 2.
[3] Modern Cassibili.

τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποτειχίζουσάν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦσαν τὸν πόρον. καὶ βιασάμενοι αὐτὴν διέβησάν τε τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ἐχώρουν αὖθις
7 πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμόν, τὸν Ἐρινέον· ταύτῃ γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκέλευον.

LXXXI. Ἐν τούτῳ δ' οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ὡς ἥ τε ἡμέρα ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνωσαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπεληλυθότας, ἐν αἰτίᾳ τε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Γύλιππον εἶχον ἑκόντα ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ κατὰ τάχος διώκοντες, ᾗ οὐ χαλεπῶς ᾐσθάνοντο κεχωρηκότας, καταλαμβά-
2 νουσι περὶ ἄριστου ὥραν. καὶ ὥσπερ προσέμειξαν τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους, ὑστέροις τ' οὖσι καὶ σχολαίτερον καὶ ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν, ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, εὐθὺς προσπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκυκλοῦντό τε ῥᾷον αὐτοὺς δίχα δὴ ὄντας καὶ ξυνῆγον
3 ἐς ταὐτό. τὸ δὲ Νικίου στράτευμα ἀπεῖχεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους· θᾶσσόν τε γὰρ ὁ Νικίας ἦγε, νομίζων οὐ τὸ ὑπομένειν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑκόντας εἶναι καὶ μάχεσθαι σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς τάχιστα ὑποχωρεῖν, τοσαῦτα μαχο-
4 μένους ὅσ' ἂν ἀναγκάζωνται. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐτύγχανε τε[1] τὰ πλείω ἐν πόνῳ ξυνεχεστέρῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ ὑστέρῳ ἀναχωροῦντι αὐτῷ πρώτῳ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τότε γνοὺς τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προυχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν κἀν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ'

[1] τε deleted by Dobree, followed by Hude.

[1] Modern Cavallata.

guard blocking the way with a wall and a palisade. Forcing their way past them, they crossed the river and advanced again towards another river, the Erineus;[1] for their guides bade them take that route.

LXXXI. Meanwhile, when day came[2] and the Syracusans and their allies realized that the Athenians had gone away, most of them blamed Gylippus, saying that he purposely had let the Athenians get away; and pursuing them in hot haste, following the road which they could readily see that the enemy had taken, they overtook them about dinner-time. And when they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were far in the rear and proceeding in a rather leisurely and disorderly fashion, due to the confusion into which they had fallen the night before, they fell upon them at once and began a battle; and since they were separated from the others the Syracusan cavalry found it easier to surround them and drive them together. The division of Nicias was about fifty stadia ahead; for Nicias marched his men more rapidly, thinking that in the circumstances safety lay, not in standing firm and fighting of their own choice, but in retreating as rapidly as possible, fighting only as they were forced to do so. But it was the fortune of Demosthenes to be for the most part in more continual trouble because, being far in the rear on the retreat, the enemy pressed upon him first, and now also, when he saw the Syracusans in pursuit, he was more taken up with ordering his troops for battle than with pressing forward, and so wasted time until he was surrounded by the enemy and both he and his men

[2] Sixth day of the retreat.

αὐτοῦ[1] ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. τοιαύταις δὲ προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ ξυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκινδυνεύειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀπονενοημένους οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνων μᾶλλον ἦν ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἅμα φειδώ τέ τις ἐγίγνετο ἐπ' εὐπραγίᾳ ἤδη σαφεῖ μὴ προαναλωθῆναί τῳ καὶ ἐνόμιζον καὶ ὡς ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέᾳ καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς.

LXXXII. Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν [2] δι' ἡμέρας βάλλοντες πανταχόθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυμμάχους ἑώρων ἤδη τεταλαιπωρημένους τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κακώσει, κήρυγμα ποιοῦνται Γύλιππος καὶ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νησιωτῶν εἴ τις βούλεται ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι· καὶ ἀπεχώρησάν τινες πόλεις οὐ πολλαί. ἔπειτα δ' ὕστερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ὁμολογία γίγνεται ὥστε ὅπλα τε παραδοῦναι καὶ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα μήτε βιαίως μήτε δεσμοῖς μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης ἐνδείᾳ διαίτης. καὶ παρέδοσαν οἱ πάντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑξακισχίλιοι, καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ εἶχον ἅπαν κατέθεσαν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς ἀσπίδας ὑπτίας, καὶ ἐνέπλησαν ἀσπίδας τέσσαρας. καὶ τούτους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν· Νικίας δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀφικνοῦνται τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπὶ τὸν

[1] Ἀθηναῖοι, after μετ' αὐτοῦ, Krüger deletes.
[2] Dobree's correction for γοῦν of the MSS.

[1] *cf.* ch. lvii. 4, ὑπήκοοι ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκη . . . ἠκολούθουν.

were in a state of utter confusion. For huddled together in a plot of ground surrounded by a wall, on either side of which a road passed, there being inside the wall a considerable number of olive trees, they were pelted with missiles from every side. And the Syracusans had good reason to adopt attacks of this kind rather than contests at close quarters; for to risk their lives against men in despair was not now to their advantage, so much as to that of the Athenians. Besides, they considered that success was already assured; therefore everyone spared himself somewhat, not wishing to throw away his life before the end, and they all thought that even as it was, and following this manner of fighting, they would subdue and capture the enemy.

LXXXII. And so when they had assailed the Athenians and their allies with missiles from all sides throughout the day and saw that they were at length worn out by reason of their wounds and general misery, Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made proclamation, first, that any of the islanders [1] who so wished might come over to their side on a guarantee of freedom; and some states, but only a few, came over. Afterwards, however, an agreement was made with all the rest of the troops under Demosthenes that if they would surrender their arms no one should suffer death either by violence or by imprisonment or by deprivation of the bare necessities of life. So they all surrendered, six thousand in number; and they gave up all the money they had, casting it into upturned shields; and four of these were filled. These captives the Syracusans immediately took to the city; as for Nicias and his men, they reached the

ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινέον, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρόν τι καθῖσε τὴν στρατιάν.

LXXXIII. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οἱ μετὰ Δημοσθένους παραδεδώκοιεν σφᾶς αὐτούς, κελεύοντες κἀκεῖνον τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶν· ὁ δ' ἀπιστῶν σπένδεται ἱππέα
2 πέμψαι σκεψόμενον. ὡς δ' οἰχόμενος ἀπήγγειλε πάλιν παραδεδωκότας, ἐπικηρυκεύεται Γυλίππῳ καὶ Συρακοσίοις εἶναι ἑτοῖμος ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ξυμβῆναι ὅσα ἀνήλωσαν χρήματα Συρακόσιοι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε τὴν μετ' αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἀφεῖναι αὐτούς· μέχρι οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα ἀποδοθῇ, ἄνδρας δώσειν Ἀθηναίων ὁμήρους, ἕνα κατὰ τάλαντον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Γύλιππος οὐ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ προσπεσόντες καὶ περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλ-
3 λον καὶ τούτους μέχρι ὀψέ. εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πονήρως σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίᾳ.
4 ὅμως δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς φυλάξαντες τὸ ἡσυχάζον ἔμελλον πορεύσεσθαι. καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσί τε τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαιά-
5 νισαν. γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οὐ λανθάνουσι, κατέθεντο πάλιν πλὴν τριακοσίων μάλιστα ἀνδρῶν· οὗτοι δὲ διὰ τῶν φυλάκων βιασάμενοι ἐχώρουν τῆς νυκτὸς ᾗ ἐδύναντο.

LXXXIV. Νικίας δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο ἦγε τὴν στρατιάν· οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι προσέκειντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πανταχόθεν βάλ-
2 λοντές τε καὶ κατακοντίζοντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι

[1] Seventh day of the retreat.
[2] Eighth day of the retreat.

river Erineus that same day, and after crossing it Nicias encamped his army on a height.

LXXXIII. The next day[1] the Syracusans overtook Nicias and told him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, bidding him do likewise; but Nicias was incredulous, and obtained a truce that he might send a horseman and find out. And when the horseman had gone and brought back word that they had indeed surrendered, Nicias announced by herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans that he was ready to agree, on behalf of the Athenians, to repay to the Syracusans all the money which they had spent upon the war, on condition that they should let his army go; and until the money should be paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one man for each talent. Gylippus and the Syracusans, however, would not accept these terms, but renewing the attack and surrounding the Athenian army plied these men also with their missiles until evening. And they were in a wretched plight through want of food and of all necessaries. Nevertheless they waited for the quiet time of night and intended then to proceed. But no sooner had they taken up their arms than the Syracusans perceived it and raised the paean. So the Athenians, seeing that their movements were detected, again put down their arms—all except about three hundred men, who forced their way through the guards and proceeded during the night by whatever way they could.

LXXXIV. When day came[2] Nicias led his army forward; but the Syracusans and their allies kept attacking in the same fashion, hurling missiles and striking them down with javelins on all sides. The

ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἱππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾷόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπι-
3 θυμίᾳ. ὡς δὲ γίγνονται ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τέ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπικείμενοι χαλεπὴν ἤδη τὴν διάβασιν ἐποίουν· ἀθρόοι γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ κατεπάτουν, περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι
4 κατέρρεον. ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι (ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες) ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ
5 ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετο ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

LXXXV. Τέλος δὲ νεκρῶν τε πολλῶν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ἤδη κειμένων ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ διεφθαρμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν, τοῦ δὲ καί, εἴ τι διαφύγοι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων, Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν χρῆσθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους

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[1] The modern Falconara, called also Fiume di Noto.

[2] Thucydides is silent as to the number of the slain. Diodorus (xiii. 19) puts the loss at the river at 18,000 and

Athenians pushed on to the river Assinarus,[1] partly because they thought, hard pressed as they were on all sides by the attack of numerous horsemen and of the miscellaneous troops, that they would be somewhat better off if they crossed the river, and partly by reason of their weariness and desire for water. And when they reached it, they rushed in, no longer preserving order, but everyone eager to be himself the first to cross; and at the same time the pressure of the enemy now made the crossing difficult. For since they were obliged to move in a dense mass, they fell upon and trod one another down, and some perished at once, run through by their own spears, while others became entangled in their trappings and were carried away by the current. The Syracusans stood along the other bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles down upon the Athenians, most of whom were drinking greedily and were all huddled in confusion in the hollow bed of the river. Moreover, the Peloponnesians went down to the water's edge and butchered them, especially those in the river. The water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and indeed was fought for by most of them.

LXXXV. At length, when the dead[2] now lay in heaps one upon the other in the river, and the army had perished utterly, part in the river, and part—if any got safely across—at the hands of the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, having more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and he bade him and the Lacedaemonians do with himself

the captured at 7000; but it is evident that he includes the army of Demosthenes.

ὅ τι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσα-
2 σθαι φονεύοντας. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος μετὰ τοῦτο
ζωγρεῖν ἤδη ἐκέλευεν· καὶ τούς τε λοιπούς, ὅσους
μὴ ἀπεκρύψαντο (πολλοὶ δὲ οὗτοι ἐγένοντο), ξυνε-
κόμισαν ζῶντας, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους, οἳ τὴν
φυλακὴν διεξῆλθον τῆς νυκτός, πέμψαντες τοὺς
3 διωξομένους ξυνέλαβον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁθροισθὲν
τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο,
τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικε-
λία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν
4 μετὰ Δημοσθένους ληφθέντων. μέρος δέ τι οὐκ
ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν· πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος
οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν ἐν τῷ Σικελικῷ[1]
πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσ-
βολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς γενομέ-
ναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως
καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ
δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον· τού-
τοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.

LXXXVI. Ξυναθροισθέντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, τῶν τε αἰχμαλώτων ὅσους ἐδύ-
ναντο πλείστους καὶ τὰ σκῦλα ἀναλαβόντες,
2 ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὁπόσους ἔλαβον
κατεβίβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην
εἶναι νομίσαντες τήρησιν, Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημο-

[1] Σικελικῷ deleted by Dobree, followed by Hude.

[1] Not more than 1000; for the total number of the captives was about 7000 (ch. lxxxvii. 4), and of these 6000 had belonged to the division of Demosthenes (ch. lxxxii. 3). But the full magnitude of the catastrophe is seen in the fact

whatever they pleased, but to stop slaughtering the rest of the soldiers. Whereupon Gylippus at last gave orders to make prisoners; and those of the survivors who had not been secretly appropriated by the Syracusan soldiers—and these were many—were brought in a body to Syracuse alive. They also sent men in pursuit of the three hundred, who had got through the guards the night before, and captured them. Now that part of the army which was collected into the common stock was not large,[1] but that which was secretly taken by the soldiers was large, and all Sicily was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken by capitulation, as had the force under Demosthenes. Besides, no small number had been killed; for the slaughter at the river had been very great—in fact, not inferior to any in this Sicilian war. And in the other frequent encounters which occurred on the march not a few had lost their lives. Notwithstanding all this, many escaped, some at the time, others afterwards, having become slaves and then making their escape; and the refuge for these was Catana.

LXXXVI. When the forces of the Syracusans and their allies had been brought together, they took with them as many of the captives as they could and the booty and returned to the city. All the rest of the prisoners they had taken of the Athenians and their allies they sent down into the stone-quarries, thinking it the safest way to keep them; but Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, though against

[1] that eight days before the final surrender the Athenian army numbered 40,000.

σθένη ἄκοντος Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν. ὁ γὰρ Γύλιππος καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἐνόμιζέν οἱ εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους κομίσαι
3 Λακεδαιμονίοις. ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένη, διὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ Πύλῳ, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδειότατον· τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας προυθυμήθη, σπονδὰς πείσας
4 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι. ἀνθ' ὧν οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἦσαν αὐτῷ προσφιλεῖς κἀκεῖνος οὐχ ἥκιστα[1] διὰ τοῦτο πιστεύσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ Γυλίππῳ παρέδωκεν. ἀλλὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων τινές, ὡς ἐλέγετο, οἱ μὲν δείσαντες, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκεκοινολόγηντο, μὴ βασανιζόμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ταραχὴν σφίσιν ἐν εὐπραγίᾳ ποιήσῃ, ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, μὴ χρήμασι δὴ πείσας τινάς, ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν, ἀποδρᾷ καὶ αὖθις σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται, πείσαντες
5 τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

LXXXVII. Τοὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχεί-

[1] διὰ τοῦτο, with B; Hude omits.

[1] *cf.* v. xvi. 1.

the wish of Gylippus. For he thought that it would be a glorious achievement if, in addition to his other successes, he could also bring the generals of the enemy home to the Lacedaemonians. And it so happened that the one, Demosthenes, was regarded by the Lacedaemonians as their bitterest foe, on account of what had taken place on the island of Sphacteria and at Pylos; the other, for the same reason, as a very good friend; for Nicias had eagerly desired[1] that the Lacedaemonian prisoners taken on the island should be released, when he urged the Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the Lacedaemonians were friendly towards him, and it was not least on that account that he trusted in Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But it was said that some of the Syracusans were afraid, seeing that they had been in communication with him, lest, if he were subjected to torture on that account, he might make trouble for them in the midst of their success; and others, especially the Corinthians, were afraid, lest, as he was wealthy,[2] he might by means of bribes make his escape and cause them fresh difficulties; they therefore persuaded their allies and put him to death. For this reason, then, or for a reason very near to this, Nicias was put to death—a man who, of all the Hellenes of my time, least deserved to meet with such a calamity, because of his course of life that had been wholly regulated in accordance with virtue.

LXXXVII. The prisoners in the stone-quarries were at first treated harshly by the Syracusans.

[2] He was worth 100 talents, according to Lysias, xix. 47. His property was chiefly in silver mines. He employed 1000 slaves in the mines at Laurium (Xen., *De Vect.* iv. 14).

ρισαν. ἐν γὰρ κοίλῳ χωρίῳ ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγῳ πολλοὺς οἵ τε ἥλιοι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἔτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ ἀστέγαστον, καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τοὐναντίον μετοπωριναὶ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ
2 μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον, πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν διὰ στενοχωρίαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ προσέτι τῶν νεκρῶν ὁμοῦ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ξυννενημένων, οἵ ἔκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέθνῃσκον, καὶ ὀσμαὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῷ ἅμα καὶ δίψῃ ἐπιέζοντο (ἐδίδοσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ μῆνας κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου), ἄλλα τε ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ ἐμπεπτωκότας κακοπαθῆσαι, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο
3 αὐτοῖς. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινας οὕτω διῃτήθησαν ἀθρόοι· ἔπειτα πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν,
4 τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδοντο. ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων.

5 Ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [1] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέ-
6 στατον· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ

[1] Ἑλληνικόν, after τοῦτο, deleted by Krüger.

Crowded as they were in large numbers in a deep and narrow place, at first the sun and the suffocating heat caused them distress, there being no roof; while the nights that followed were, on the contrary, autumnal and cold, so that the sudden change engendered illness. Besides, they were so cramped for space that they had to do everything in the same place; moreover, the dead were heaped together upon one another, some having died from wounds or because of the change in temperature or like causes, so that there was a stench that was intolerable. At the same time they were oppressed by both hunger and thirst—the Syracusans having for eight months given them each only a half-pint of water and a pint of food a day[1]; and of all the other ills which men thrown into such a place would be likely to suffer there was none that did not befall them. Now for some seventy days they lived in this way all together; then all the rest, except the Athenians and any Siceliots and Italiots that had joined the expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken, though it is difficult to speak with accuracy, was nevertheless not fewer than seven thousand.

This event proved to be the greatest of all that had happened in the course of this war, and, as it seems to me, of all Hellenic events of which we have record —for the victors most splendid, for the vanquished most disastrous. For the vanquished, beaten utterly

[1] The scantiness of this allowance—only half the amount of food given to slaves—is best seen by a comparison with that which was allowed the Lacedaemonians taken on the island of Sphacteria, namely, "two quarts of barley-meal for each man and a pint of wine" (v. xvi. 1).

οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες, πανωλεθρίᾳ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα.

[1] According to Plutarch (*Nicias*, 29), many of the Athenians obtained their freedom, others who had already escaped got food and shelter by repeating verses from Euripides, who

at every point and having suffered no slight ill in any respect—having met, as the saying goes, with utter destruction—land-force and fleet and everything perished, and few out of many came back home.[1] Such was the course of events in Sicily.

was more popular with the Sicilians than any other foreign author. The thanks of these survivors, many of whom on their return expressed their gratitude to him, were doubtless the sweetest praise the poet ever heard.

BOOK VIII

INTRODUCTION

THE article on the life and style of Thucydides, which goes by the name of Marcellinus, contains the following passage:

"Some say that the eighth book is spurious and not the work of Thucydides, while others say that it is his daughter's work, others Xenophon's. To these we say that it is clearly not his daughter's, for it is not in woman's nature to imitate such excellence in art. Besides, if she were so gifted, she would not have taken pains to conceal her identity, nor would she have written the eighth book only, but would have left many other things betraying her own sex. And that it is not Xenophon's work, the style all but cries aloud; for there is a wide interval between the plain and the lofty style. Nor indeed is it the work of Theopompus, as some have maintained; but to some, and especially the more accomplished, it seems to be indeed the work of Thucydides, but unadorned, written in rough outline and full of many matters in summary form, and admitting of embellishment and amplification. Wherefore we say further, that the exposition is rather weak and feeble, inasmuch as he apparently

composed it while ailing. And when the body is a little sick, the reasoning power also is wont to be rather languid."[1]

The genuineness of Book VIII has been the object of attack in modern as well as in ancient times, but it may now be regarded as an accepted fact. Probably no scholar really doubts it. Ancient writers quote the book just as they do the other seven. The general characteristics are the same as in the other books. "There is," as Arnold rightly claims, "the same impartiality, the same clear and calm view of political transactions." And Jowett eloquently says: "The love of truth, the power of thought, the absence of moral approbation or disapprobation, the irony, the perception of character, the moderation of statement, the general excellence

[1] λέγουσι δέ τινες τὴν ὀγδόην ἱστορίαν νοθεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἶναι Θουκιδίδου· ἀλλ' οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ Ξενοφῶντος. πρὸς οὓς λέγομεν ὅτι τῆς μὲν θυγατρὸς ὡς οὔκ ἐστι δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ γυναικείας ἦν φύσεως τοιαύτην ἀρετήν τε καὶ τέχνην μιμήσασθαι. ἔπειτα, εἰ τοιαύτη τις ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπούδασε λαθεῖν, οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ὀγδόην ἔγραψε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ κατέλιπεν ἄν, τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκφαίνουσα φύσιν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ Ξενοφῶντός ἐστιν, ὁ χαρακτὴρ μόνον οὐχὶ βοᾷ· πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον ἰσχνοῦ χαρακτῆρος καὶ ὑψηλοῦ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ Θεοπόμπου, καθά τινες ἠξίωσαν· τισὶ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς χαριεστέροις Θουκυδίδου μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἄλλως δ' ἀκαλλώπιστος, δι' ἐκτύπων γεγραμμένη καὶ πολλῶν πλήρης ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πραγμάτων καλλωπισθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἕκτασιν δυναμένων. ἔνθεν καὶ λέγομεν ὡς ἀσθενέστερον πέφρασται καὶ ὀλίγον καθότι ἀρρωστῶν αὐτὴν φαίνεται συντεθεικώς. ἀσθενοῦντος δὲ σώματος βραχύ τι καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ἀτονώτερος εἶναι φιλεῖ.

. . . 'cry aloud'" for Thucydides. The vigour and terseness of style are as marked as ever. There is, it is true, occasional roughness and inaccuracy of expression to a greater extent than in the other books; but one who may have read criticisms before reading the book itself is sure to be astonished to find comparatively so few traces of the unfinished, either in style or content. The argument against the genuineness on the score of alleged "un-Thucydidean" words, phrases, or constructions falls to the ground on close examination. When the number of *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*, of unusual adverbs and of new-coined verbal substantives found in Book VIII is compared with similar forms in the other books, as for example Goodhart has done in his Introduction, the conclusion in favour of genuineness is unavoidable. Even the suggestion that the book was edited and revised by Xenophon rests on no better basis than the fact that his Hellenica is a continuation of it.

The most striking thing about the book is the omission of direct speeches, so marked a feature of all the preceding books (except V). The statement attributed to Cratippus, a contemporary of Thucydides (Dionysius, *de Thuc. Iud.* p. 847), that speeches were omitted in Book VIII because the author realized that they interfered with the narrative and bored the reader, is so absurd as to be amusing. It has been plausibly argued that the

omission does not necessarily imply either a deliberate change of practice on the part of the historian or even lack of revision. Any view on these points will doubtless always remain a matter of private judgment. My own view is that, if the historian had not been suddenly cut down, either by assassination at the hands of a robber, as one tradition has it, or by disease, the book would have received fuller revision, and the indirect speeches at several important points would have been turned into direct discourse.

Professor Goodhart well expresses the feeling of the reader in turning the pages of Book viii. :

"The war enters upon a new phase after the defeat of the Sicilian expedition. The scene changes from Greece to Asia. But there is something more than a mere change of scene. Athens herself appears under new conditions, fallen greatly from her high estate, but appealing more than ever to our interest and sympathy. We have seen her before in the full blaze of Periclean splendour. But perhaps our admiration has been qualified by some feeling of aloofness. The people of Pallas Athene seem to dwell upon sunlit heights too far removed from the darkling ways of humanity. The picture of their life is like the fabric of a vision, and they themselves partake of its unreality. But the feeling vanishes when we see them in the grip of fate. Pity, akin to love, takes the place of admiration,

and we follow their fortunes with sympathy as keen and active as that which swayed the spectators of the final battle in the great harbour of Syracuse. So it may be that we get nearer to them in the closing scene than we have ever been before."

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ Η

I. Ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη, ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστουν καὶ τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ οὕτω γε ἂν πανσυδὶ διεφθάρθαι· ἐπειδή τε ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, ὠργίζοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται
2 Σικελίαν. πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο· ἅμα δὲ ναῦς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ' ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τούς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόθεν πολεμίους τότε δὴ καὶ διπλασίως πάντα παρεσκευασμένους κατὰ κράτος ἤδη καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐπικείσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν μετ' αὐτῶν

BOOK VIII

I. When the news reached Athens, even though the actual soldiers who had escaped from the action itself gave a clear report, they for long refused to believe that the armament could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced, they were angry with the orators who had taken part in promoting the expedition—as though they had not voted for it themselves—and they were also enraged at the oracle-mongers and soothsayers and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had led them to hope that they would conquer Sicily. Everything indeed on every side distressed them, and after what had happened they were beset with fear and utmost consternation. For having lost, both each man separately and as a state, many hoplites and horsemen and the flower of the youth, while they saw none like it left them, they were heavy of heart; and again, seeing no ships in the docks in sufficient number nor money in the treasury nor crews for the ships, they were at the moment hopeless of safety. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would sail with their fleet straight for the Peiraeus, especially as they had won so great a victory, and that their foes at home, now doubly prepared in all respects, would attack them at once with all their might both by land and by sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join them.

3 ἀποστάντας. ὅμως δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐδόκει χρῆναι μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισαμένους καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς ἀσφάλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Εὔβοιαν, τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς
4 ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν. πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

II. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεγάλην κακοπραγίαν εὐθὺς οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν μηδετέρων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι, ὡς, ἤν τις καὶ μὴ παρακαλῇ σφᾶς, οὐκ ἀποστατέον ἔτι τοῦ πολέμου εἴη, ἀλλ' ἐθελοντὶ ἰτέον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, νομίσαντες κἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἕκαστοι ἐλθεῖν αὐτούς, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ κατώρθωσαν, καὶ ἅμα βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι τὸν λοιπὸν πόλεμον, οὗ μετασχεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οἱ δ' αὖ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ξυμπροθυμηθέντες ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ πρὶν ἀπαλλά-
2 ξεσθαι διὰ τάχους πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἀφίστασθαι διὰ τὸ ὀργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ μηδ' ὑπολείπειν λόγον αὐτοῖς ὡς τό γ' ἐπιὸν θέρος οἷοί

Nevertheless it was their opinion that, as far as their present circumstances permitted, they should not give up, but should both make ready a fleet, providing timber and money from whatever source they could, and put their relations with their allies, and especially with Euboea, on a safe footing; moreover, that they should reduce the expenses of the city to an economical basis, and should select a board of elderly men who should prepare measures with reference to the present situation as there might be occasion. In the panic of the moment they were ready, as is the way with a democracy, to observe discipline in everything. And as they had determined, so they proceeded to act; and the summer ended.

II. The following winter, in view of the great disaster that had befallen the Athenians in Sicily, there was at once excitement among all the Hellenes. Some, who were allies of neither party, thought that, even if they were not called upon for aid, they should no longer hold aloof from the war, but should go of their own accord against the Athenians; for they believed, one and all, that the Athenians would have come against them if they had succeeded in Sicily; they also believed that the rest of the war would be short and that it would be glorious to have a part in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were more than ever animated by a common eagerness quickly to be relieved of their great hardships. But most of all the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them, because they judged of the situation under the influence of passion and would not even leave them the plea that they would be able to hold

Nov., 413 B.C.

3 τ' ἔσονται περιγενέσθαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις πᾶσί τε τούτοις ἐθάρσει καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας αὐτοῖς ξύμμαχοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγενημένου, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ὡς εἰκὸς παρέσεσθαι
4 ἔμελλον. πανταχόθεν τε εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀπροφασίστως ἅπτεσθαι διενοοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου, λογιζόμενοι καλῶς τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ κινδύνων τε τοιούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν οἷος καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων περιέστη ἂν αὐτούς, εἰ τὸ Σικελικὸν προσέλαβον, καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

III. Εὐθὺς οὖν Ἄγις μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ ὁρμηθεὶς στρατῷ τινι ἐκ Δεκελείας τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων ἠργυρολόγησεν ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ τραπόμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου Οἰταίων τε κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν τῆς λείας τὴν πολλὴν ἀπολαβὼν χρήματα ἐπράξατο, καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτῃ Θεσσαλῶν ὑπηκόους, μεμφομένων καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, ὁμήρους τέ τινας ἠνάγκασε δοῦναι καὶ χρήματα, καὶ κατέθετο τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐς Κόρινθον, ἔς τε τὴν
2 ξυμμαχίαν ἐπειρᾶτο προσάγειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ἑαυτοῖς μὲν καὶ Βοιωτοῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ἑκατέροις ἔταξαν, Φωκεῦσι δὲ

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[1] *cf.* iii, 92 ff. The enmity was due to the establishment of Heracleia. The Trachinians being harassed by their neighbours, the Oetaeans, had appealed to Sparta for aid and

out through the following summer. The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and especially because their allies in Sicily would in all probability be present to help them with a large force as soon as spring came, since necessity had now compelled them to acquire a navy. Being hopeful, then, in every way, they determined to set their hands to the war wholeheartedly, reckoning that when it should have ended successfully they would thereafter be free from such dangers as would have beset them from the side of the Athenians if these had acquired the resources of Sicily in addition to their own; and that, having overthrown them, they would themselves now hold securely the hegemony of all Hellas.

III. Accordingly Agis their king set out with an army at once during this same winter from Deceleia, and levied money from the allies for the maintenance of the fleet; then turning toward the Malian Gulf, he carried off from the Oetaeans, in pursuance of a long-standing enmity,[1] the greater part of their cattle and exacted money from them. Furthermore, he compelled the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in that region—though the Thessalians were unwilling and remonstrated—to give him hostages and money; then he deposited the hostages at Corinth and tried to bring their countrymen into the alliance. The Lacedaemonians, moreover, made requisition upon the states for the building of one hundred ships, fixing the levy for themselves and the Boeotians at twenty-five each,

[1] the Spartans had colonized Heracleia to protect them. The colony fell owing to the hostility of the Thessalians and the bad conduct of Spartan governors.

καὶ Λοκροῖς πέντε καὶ δέκα, καὶ Κορινθίοις πέντε καὶ δέκα, Ἀρκάσι δὲ καὶ Πελληνεῦσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις δέκα, Μεγαρεῦσι δὲ καὶ Τροζηνίοις καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἑρμιονεῦσι δέκα· τά τε ἄλλα παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

IV. Παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν, ξύλα ξυμπορισάμενοι, καὶ Σούνιον τειχίσαντες, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλεια ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ναυσὶν εἴη τοῦ περίπλου, καὶ τό τε ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τείχισμα ἐκλιπόντες ὃ ἐνῳκοδόμησαν παραπλέοντες ἐς Σικελίαν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴ πού τι ἐδόκει ἀχρεῖον ἀναλίσκεσθαι, ξυστελλόμενοι ἐς εὐτέλειαν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων διασκοποῦντες ὅπως μὴ σφῶν ἀποστήσονται.

V. Πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου, πρῶτοι Εὐβοῆς ὡς [1]Ἄγιν περὶ ἀποστάσεως τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπρεσβεύσαντο ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ. ὁ δὲ προσδεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν μεταπέμπεται ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος Ἀλκαμένη τὸν Σθενελάδου καὶ Μέλανθον ἄρχοντας ὡς ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν· οἱ δ' ἦλθον ἔχοντες τῶν νεοδαμώδων ὡς τριακοσίους, καὶ
2 παρεσκεύαζεν αὐτοῖς τὴν διάβασιν. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Λέσβιοι ἦλθον, βουλόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀποστῆναι· καὶ ξυμπρασσόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀναπείθεται [2]Ἄγις ὥστε Εὐβοίας μὲν

[1] *cf.* VII. xxvi. 2.

[2] The clans of new citizens formed of Helots emancipated for service in war. *Cf.* V. xxxiv. 1; VII. xix. 3.

for the Phocians and Locrians at fifteen, for the Corinthians at fifteen, for the Arcadians, Pellenians and Sicyonians at ten, and for the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians and Hermionians at ten. And they went on with their other preparations with the expectation of beginning the war promptly with the opening of spring.

IV. During this same winter the Athenians also were making their preparations to build ships, in accordance with their decision, and for this they had collected timber; and they fortified Sunium, in order that there might be protection for their grain-ships as they rounded the promontory. Furthermore, they abandoned the fortress in Laconia[1] which they had built as they sailed along the Peloponnesian coast toward Sicily; and in general, if there seemed to be any useless expenditure anywhere, they retrenched in order to save money; but above all they kept an eye on their allies, that they might not revolt from them.

V. While both sides were carrying out these measures and busily equipping themselves for the war precisely as if they were just beginning it, first of all the Euboeans in the course of this winter sent envoys to Agis to discuss revolting from Athens. Receiving their proposals, he summoned from Lacedaemon Alcamenes son of Sthenelaïdas and Melanthus to take command in Euboea, and they came with about three hundred neodamodes,[2] while Agis began arranging for their crossing. But in the meantime the Lesbians also came, they also desiring to revolt; and as the Boeotians assisted them in their negotiations, Agis was persuaded to delay matters so far as the Euboeans were concerned and began arranging

πέρι ἐπισχεῖν, τοῖς δὲ Λεσβίοις παρεσκεύαζε
τὴν ἀπόστασιν, Ἀλκαμένη τε ἁρμοστὴν διδούς,
ὃς ἐς Εὔβοιαν πλεῖν ἔμελλε, καὶ δέκα μὲν
3 Βοιωτοὶ ναῦς ὑπέσχοντο, δέκα δὲ Ἄγις. καὶ
ταῦτα ἄνευ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεως ἐπράσ-
σετο· ὁ γὰρ Ἄγις ὅσον χρόνον ἦν περὶ Δεκέ-
λειαν ἔχων τὴν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, κύριος
ἦν καὶ ἀποστέλλειν εἴ ποί τινα ἐβούλετο στρα-
τιὰν καὶ ξυναγείρειν καὶ χρήματα πράσσειν,
καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
καιρὸν αὐτοῦ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὑπήκουον ἢ τῶν
ἐν τῇ πόλει Λακεδαιμονίων· δύναμιν γὰρ ἔχων
4 αὐτὸς εὐθὺς ἐκασταχόσε δεινὸς παρῆν. καὶ ὁ
μὲν τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χῖοι δὲ καὶ Ἐρυ-
θραῖοι, ἀποστῆναι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες,
πρὸς μὲν Ἄγιν οὐκ ἐτράποντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν Λακε-
δαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς βασιλεῖ
Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν
κάτω, πρεσβευτὴς ἅμα μετ' αὐτῶν παρῆν.
5 ἐπήγετο γὰρ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοπον-
νησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. ὑπὸ
βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος
τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθη-
ναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος
πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησεν· τούς τε οὖν φόρους
μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθη-
ναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμο-
νίους ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀμόργην, τὸν Πισσούθνου

[1] The oligarchs, as shown by chs. ix and xiv. Chios had hitherto been noted for its loyalty to Athens.
[2] Darius II reigned 423–404.
[3] Mentioned as satrap at Sardis in 440 B.C. (i. 115) and

their revolt for the Lesbians, giving them as harmost Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea; furthermore, the Boeotians promised them ten ships and Agis the same number. These negotiations were carried on without the authority of the Lacedaemonian state; for so long as he was stationed at Deceleia with his own force Agis possessed full power to send troops anywhere he wished as well as to levy them and to exact money. And at that time the allies hearkened to him far more, one might say, than to the Lacedaemonians in Sparta; for he had a force at his own disposal and his appearance anywhere instantly inspired fear. So he was working in the interest of the Lesbians, but the Chians[1] and Erythraeans, who also were ready to revolt, betook themselves, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon. And with them went an envoy from Tissaphernes, who was military governor of the coast-lands for King Darius[2] son of Artaxerxes. For Tissaphernes was also trying to induce the Peloponnesians to come over to Asia, promising to furnish them maintenance. For the King, as it chanced, had lately demanded of him the tribute from his own province, for which he had fallen into arrears, since he was not able to exact it from the Hellenic cities because of the Athenians. He therefore thought that if he should weaken the Athenians he would be better able to collect his tribute; he also intended at the same time to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and, in accordance with the King's command, either to take alive or to kill Amorges, bastard son of Pissuthnes,[3] who

again in 428 (iii. 31). Soon after the latter date he revolted. Tissaphernes was sent to suppress the revolt and, succeeding, became satrap himself.

υἱὸν νόθον, ἀφεστῶτα περὶ Καρίαν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε βασιλεύς, ἢ ζῶντα ἄξειν ἢ ἀποκτενεῖν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Χῖοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνης κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπρασσον.

VI. Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφῶντος, Μεγαρεύς, καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου, Κυζικηνός, φυγάδες τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες, ἀφικνοῦνται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμψαντος Φαρναβάζου, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους, καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν
2 τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειεν. πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἑκατέρων, τῶν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, πολλὴ ἄμιλλα ἐγίγνετο τῶν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Χίον, οἱ δ' ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πρότερον ναῦς καὶ στρατιὰν πείσουσι
3 πέμπειν. οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ τῶν Χίων καὶ Τισσαφέρνους παρὰ πολὺ προσεδέξαντο μᾶλλον. ξυνέπρασσε γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ἐνδίῳ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ξένος ὤν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν[1] ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἑκα-

[1] κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν deleted by Krüger and van Herwerden as gloss to ὅθεν, followed by Hude.

was in revolt in Caria. Accordingly the Chians and Tissaphernes were negotiating in common for the same object.

VI. About the same time Calligeitus son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both being fugitives from their own countries and living at the court of Pharnabazus[1] son of Pharnaces, came to Lacedaemon. They had been sent by Pharnabazus to bring ships to the Hellespont, in order that he too, just as Tissaphernes was eager to do, might, if possible, cause the cities in his own province to revolt from the Athenians on account of the tribute, and by his own efforts secure for the King the alliance of the Lacedaemonians. As the two sets of envoys, those from Pharnabazus and those from Tissaphernes, were negotiating these matters separately, there was much rivalry among the people of Lacedaemon, one side trying to persuade the people to send ships and troops to Ionia and Chios first, the other to the Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians, however, were by far more inclined to accept the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades was co-operating with them, being an hereditary friend of the ephor Endius and on the most intimate terms with him. (This was, in fact, the reason why their house had acquired its Laconian name; for Endius was called Endius son of Alcibiades).[2] But in spite of

[1] Satrap of the territory along the Hellespont.

[2] The proof that Alcibiades was a Laconian name: it was borne by alternate generations in the family of Endius. Cleinias, Alcibiades' great-grandfather, determined that in his family also the name Alcibiades should alternate with his own name.

4 λεῖτο. ὅμως δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρῶτον κατάσκοπον ἐς τὴν Χίον πέμψαντες Φρῦνιν, ἄνδρα περίοικον, εἰ αἵ τε νῆες αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ὅσασπερ ἔλεγον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἡ πόλις ἱκανή ἐστι πρὸς τὴν λεγομένην δόξαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἅπερ ἤκουον, τούς τε Χίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐρυθραίους εὐθὺς ξυμμάχους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐψηφίσαντο αὐτοῖς πέμπειν, ὡς ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ ἑξήκοντα ἀφ' ὧν οἱ
5 Χῖοι ἔλεγον ὑπαρχουσῶν. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δέκα τούτων αὐτοῖς ἔμελλον πέμψειν καὶ Μελαγχρίδαν, ὃς αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος ἦν· ἔπειτα σεισμοῦ γενομένου ἀντὶ τοῦ Μελαγχρίδου Χαλκιδέα ἔπεμπον καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δέκα νεῶν πέντε παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἐνὸς δέον εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

VII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐπειγομένων τῶν Χίων ἀποστεῖλαι τὰς ναῦς καὶ δεδιότων μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ πρασσόμενα αἴσθωνται (πάντες γὰρ κρύφα αὐτῶν ἐπρεσβεύοντο), ἀποπέμπουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄνδρας Σπαρτιάτας ἐς Κόρινθον τρεῖς, ὅπως ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας θαλάσσης ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας ὑπερενεγκόντες τὰς ναῦς τὸν ἰσθμὸν κελεύσωσι πλεῖν ἐς Χίον πάσας, καὶ ἃς ὁ Ἀγις παρεσκεύαζεν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ξύμπασαι τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν νῆες αὐτόθι μιᾶς δέουσαι τεσσαράκοντα.

VIII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Καλλίγειτος καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὑπὲρ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου οὐκ ἐκοινοῦντο τὸν στόλον ἐς τὴν Χίον, οὐδὲ τὰ χρήματα ἐδίδοσαν ἃ ἦλθον

their inclination, the Lacedaemonians first sent Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to Chios to see whether the Chians had as many ships as they claimed, and whether in other respects the power of the city was equal to the representations made. When he brought back word that what they had heard was true, they at once made the Chians and the Erythraeans allies, and voted to send them forty ships, there being, from what the Chians said, no fewer than sixty already there. And at first they were going to send them ten of these under the command of Melanchridas, who was their admiral; but afterwards, when an earthquake occurred, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten ships they made ready five in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year of the war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

VII. At the beginning of the following summer, as the Chians pressed them to send the ships, and were afraid that the Athenians might become aware of their negotiations—for all these embassies were kept secret from them—the Lacedaemonians sent to Corinth three Spartans, that they might as quickly as possible haul the ships over the Isthmus from the Corinthian Gulf to the sea on the side toward Athens, and give orders for the whole fleet to sail to Chios—the ships which Agis was getting ready for Lesbos as well as the rest. And the number of ships of the allied contingents at that place was all together thirty-nine. March, 412 B.C.

VIII. Accordingly, Calligeitus and Timagoras, who were acting on behalf of Pharnabazus, did not join in the expedition to Chios, nor did they give

ἔχοντες ἐς τὴν ἀποστολήν, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα, ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν διενοοῦντο
2 ἄλλῳ στόλῳ πλεῖν. ὁ δὲ Ἄγις ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς τὴν Χίον πρῶτον ὡρμημένους, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι ἐγίγνωσκεν, ἀλλὰ ξυνελθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐβουλεύοντο, καὶ ἔδοξε πρῶτον ἐς Χίον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ἄρχοντα ἔχοντας Χαλκιδέα, ὃς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τὰς πέντε ναῦς παρεσκεύαζεν, ἔπειτα ἐς Λέσβον καὶ Ἀλκαμένη ἄρχοντα, ὅνπερ καὶ Ἄγις διενοεῖτο, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀφικέσθαι (προσετέτακτο δὲ ἐς αὐτὸν
3 ἄρχων Κλέαρχος ὁ Ῥαμφίου), διαφέρειν δὲ τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς ἡμισέας τῶν νεῶν πρῶτον, καὶ εὐθὺς ταύτας ἀποπλεῖν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ἀφορμωμένας μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν ἢ τὰς
4 ὕστερον διαφερομένας. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦν ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐποιοῦντο, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνασίαν, ὅτι ναυτικὸν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν πολύ πω ἐφαίνετο. ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ διεκόμισαν εὐθὺς μίαν καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς.

IX. Οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειγομένων αὐτῶν τὸν πλοῦν, οὐ προυθυμήθησαν ξυμπλεῖν πρὶν τὰ Ἴσθμια, ἃ τότε ἦν, διεορτάσωσιν. Ἄγις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἑτοῖμος ἦν ἐκείνους μὲν μὴ λύειν δὴ τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδάς, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ τὸν στόλον ἴδιον
2 ποιήσασθαι. οὐ ξυγχωρούντων δὲ τῶν Κορινν-

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[1] £5000, $23,900.

[2] The Isthmian Games were held in Corinthian territory, and under the presidency of Corinth. They were a *τριετηρίς*, *i. e.* held every two years, in early spring or summer.

the money—twenty-five talents [1]—which they had brought with them for the despatching of the ships, but intended to sail later with another armament by themselves. Agis, on the other hand, when he saw the Lacedaemonians eager for the expedition to Chios first, did not himself maintain a different view; but when the allies came together at Corinth and deliberated, they decided: in the first place, to sail to Chios with Chalcideus in command, he being in charge of the equipping of the five ships in Laconia; then to proceed to Lesbos with Alcamenes as commander—the one whom Agis was intending to send; and, finally, to go to the Hellespont, Clearchus son of Ramphias having already been assigned to command in this region. Furthermore, they decided to carry across the Isthmus half of the ships at first, and that these were to set sail immediately, in order that the attention of the Athenians might not be directed toward the ships that were setting out more than toward those that were afterwards being carried across the Isthmus. For they proposed to make the voyage from here to Chios openly, despising the impotence of the Athenians, because no considerable fleet of theirs was as yet making its appearance. And in accordance with their decision they at once conveyed twenty-one ships across.

IX. The Corinthians, however, although the others were impatient for the voyage, were not disposed to sail with them until they should have celebrated the Isthmian Games, which were held at that time. And Agis was quite ready to allow them to preserve inviolate the Isthmian truce [2] while he made the expedition an affair of his own. But as

θίων, ἀλλὰ διατριβῆς ἐγγιγνομένης, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ᾤοθοντο τὰ τῶν Χίων μᾶλλον, καὶ πέμψαντες ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀριστοκράτη ἐπῃτιῶντο αὐτούς, καὶ ἀρνουμένων τῶν Χίων, τὸ πιστὸν ναῦς σφίσι ξυμπέμπειν ἐκέλευον ἐς τὸ ξυμμα-
3 χικόν· οἱ δ' ἔπεμψαν ἑπτά. αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες[1] τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.

X. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά, καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, παρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς ὅπως μὴ λήσουσιν αὐτοὺς αἱ νῆες ἐκ τῶν
2 Κεγχρειῶν ἀφορμηθεῖσαι. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀνήγοντο μιᾷ καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἔχοντες. καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον ἴσαις ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες ὑπῆγον ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. ὡς δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθησαν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀλλ' ἀπετρά-
3 ποντο, ἐπανεχώρησαν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι· τὰς γὰρ τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ μετὰ σφῶν ἔχοντες οὐ πιστὰς ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἄλλας προσπληρώσαντες ἐς[2] ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, παρα-

[1] καὶ ξυνειδότες B, the other MSS. omitting καί; Hude inserts οἱ.

[2] ἐς added by Westermann.

[1] During the truce, states which were at war with each other were allowed to send contestants and deputies to the

the Corinthians did not agree and delay ensued, the Athenians became more aware of the designs of the Chians, and sending Aristocrates, one of their generals, they charged them with the plot, and when they denied it, bade them, as their guarantee of good faith, send some ships along with the Athenian fleet as a contribution to the allied force; and they sent seven. Their reason for sending these ships was that most of the Chians had no knowledge of the negotiations, and the oligarchs, who were in the plot, were not only unwilling as yet to incur the hostility of the populace, before they had acquired any strength, but also because of the delay of the Peloponnesians no longer expected them to come.

X. In the meantime the Isthmian Games were celebrated, and the Athenians, since the truce had been proclaimed,[1] sent deputies to them; and so the designs of the Chians became more manifest to them. And when they returned they immediately made arrangements that the ships should not set sail from Cenchreiae without their knowledge. But the Peloponnesians, after the festival, put to sea for Chios with twenty-one ships under the command of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first sailed up to them with an equal number of ships, and tried to draw them out into the open sea. But when the Peloponnesians did not follow them very far but turned back, the Athenians also withdrew; for they had the seven Chian ships in the ranks of their fleet and did not consider them trustworthy. But they afterwards manned additional ships, bringing their number up to thirty-seven, and then pursued the

[1] common games, these having a safe pass to and from the celebration.

πλέοντας αὐτοὺς καταδιώκουσιν ἐς Πειραιὸν τῆς Κορινθίας· ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν ἐρῆμος καὶ ἔσχατος πρὸς τὰ μεθόρια τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. καὶ μίαν μὲν ναῦν ἀπολλύασι μετέωρον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, τὰς δὲ
4 ἄλλας ξυναγαγόντες ὁρμίζουσιν. καὶ προσβαλόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀποβάντων θόρυβός τε ἐγένετο πολὺς καὶ ἄτακτος, καὶ τῶν τε νεῶν τὰς πλείους κατατραυματίζουσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἀποκτείνουσιν· καὶ αὐτῶν τινες ἀπέθανον.

XI. Διακριθέντες δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰς πολεμίας ναῦς ἐπέταξαν ἐφορμεῖν ἱκανάς, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἔς τι[1] νησίδιον ὁρμίζονται, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πολὺ ἀπ-
2 έχοντι ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἔπεμπον. παρῆσαν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πρόσχωροι. καὶ ὁρῶντες τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ἐπίπονον οὖσαν ἠπόρουν· καὶ ἐπενόησαν μὲν κατακαῦσαι τὰς ναῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἀνελκύσαι καὶ τῷ πεζῷ προσκαθημένους φυλακὴν ἔχειν, ἕως ἄν τις παρατύχῃ διαφυγὴ ἐπιτηδεία. ἔπεμψε δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἄγις
3 αἰσθόμενος ταῦτα ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην Θέρμωνα. τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρῶτον μὲν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἀνηγμέναι εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ (εἴρητο γάρ, ὅταν γένηται τοῦτο, Ἀλκαμένει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἱππέα πέμψαι), καὶ εὐθὺς τὰς παρὰ σφῶν πέντε

[1] τι, for τὸ of the MSS., Stahl's correction.

enemy as they sailed along the coast, until they put in at Peiraeum in Corinthian territory. This is a deserted port, the last toward the borders of Epidauria. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but brought the rest together and cast anchor. And now, when the Athenians attacked them, both by sea with their fleet and on land, having put men ashore, there was great confusion and disorder; and most of the Peloponnesian ships were disabled by the Athenians on the beach and their commander Alcamenes was slain. And some Athenians also were killed.

XI. After drawing off, the Athenians posted a sufficient number of ships to keep watch upon those of the enemy, but with the rest cast anchor at an islet not far distant, on which they proceeded to make their camp; and they also sent to Athens for reinforcements. For the Corinthians had joined the Peloponnesians the day after the battle, bringing reinforcements to their fleet, and not long afterward the peoples of the neighbourhood also came. And the Peloponnesians, seeing the difficulty of guarding the ships in a desert place, were in perplexity; and they even thought of burning the ships, but afterwards determined to draw them up on shore and, settling down there with their land-force, to keep guard over them until some favourable opportunity of escape should offer. And Agis, hearing of their predicament, sent to them Thermon, a Spartan. Now the first news that came to the Lacedaemonians was that the ships had put to sea from the Isthmus—for orders had been given to Alcamenes by the ephors to despatch a horseman as soon as that should happen—and they were planning to send

ναῦς καὶ Χαλκιδέα ἄρχοντα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐβούλοντο πέμπειν· ἔπειτα ὡρμημένων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ τῶν νεῶν καταφυγὴν ἠγγέλθη, καὶ ἀθυμήσαντες, ὅτι πρῶτον ἁπτόμενοι τοῦ Ἰωνικοῦ πολέμου ἔπταισαν, τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐκέτι διενοοῦντο πέμπειν, ἀλλὰ καί τινας προαναγμένας μετακαλεῖν.

XII. Γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πείθει αὖθις[1] Ἔνδιον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐφόρους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι τὸν πλοῦν, λέγων ὅτι φθήσονταί τε πλεύσαντες πρὶν τὴν τῶν νεῶν ξυμφορὰν Χίους αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτός, ὅταν προσβάλῃ Ἰωνίᾳ, ῥᾳδίως πείσειν τὰς πόλεις ἀφίστασθαι, τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων λέγων ἀσθένειαν καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων προθυμίαν. πιστότερος 2 γὰρ ἄλλων φανεῖσθαι. Ἐνδίῳ τε αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ ἔλεγε καλὸν εἶναι δι' ἐκείνου ἀποστῆσαί τε Ἰωνίαν καὶ βασιλέα ξύμμαχον ποιῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ μὴ Ἄγιδος τὸ ἀγώνισμα τοῦτο γενέσθαι· ἐτύγχανε 3 γὰρ τῷ Ἄγιδι αὐτὸς διάφορος ὤν. καὶ ὁ μὲν πείσας τούς τε ἄλλους ἐφόρους καὶ Ἔνδιον ἀνήγετο ταῖς πέντε ναυσὶ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου καὶ διὰ τάχους τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιοῦντο.

XIII. Ἀνεκομίζοντο δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας Πελοποννησίων ἑκκαίδεκα νῆες αἱ μετὰ Γυλίππου ξυμπολεμήσασαι· καὶ περὶ τὴν Λευκαδίαν ἀποληφθεῖσαι καὶ κοπεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι

[1] He was suspected of an intrigue with the wife of Agis (Plutarch, *Alcib.* 23).

immediately their own five ships under the command of Chalcideus, and Alcibiades with him; afterwards, when they were eager to sail, word came to them about their ships having taken refuge at Peiraeum; and they were so discouraged, because in this their first undertaking in the Ionian war they had failed, that they from that time on ceased planning to send out the ships that were in home waters, but on the contrary even thought of recalling some that had previously gone out to sea.

XII. Now when Alcibiades learned of this, he again urged Endius and the other ephors not to shrink from the expedition, saying that their fleet would have completed the voyage before the Chians could hear of the disaster to their ships, and that he himself, when he reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt by telling them of the weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of the Lacedaemonians; for he would be more readily believed than others. And to Endius he said privately that it would be an honour for him, through the agency of Alcibiades, to cause Ionia to revolt and to make the King an ally to the Lacedaemonians, urging him not to let this become the achievement of Agis; for he happened himself to be at variance with Agis.[1] So having persuaded Endius and the other ephors, he put to sea with the five ships in company with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and they made the voyage with all speed.

XIII. About the same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships, which had served with Gylippus in Sicily throughout the war, were on their way home; and as they were off Leucadia they were intercepted and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian

νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἱπποκλῆς Μενίππου, φυλακὴν ἔχων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας νεῶν, αἱ λοιπαὶ πλὴν μιᾶς διαφυγοῦσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον.

XIV. Ὁ δὲ Χαλκιδεὺς καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλέοντες ὅσοις τε ἐπιτύχοιεν ξυνελάμβανον τοῦ μὴ ἐξάγγελτοι γενέσθαι, καὶ προσβαλόντες πρῶτον Κωρύκῳ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ ἀφέντες ἐνταῦθα αὐτούς, αὐτοὶ μὲν προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς
2 Χίοις. καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δ' ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὥστε βουλὴν[1] τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Χαλκιδέως καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου ὡς ἄλλαι νῆες πολλαὶ προσπλέουσι καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι Ἀθη-
3 ναίων. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τρισὶ ναυσὶ πλεύσαντες καὶ Κλαζομενὰς ἀφιστᾶσιν. διαβάντες δὲ οἱ Κλαζομένιοι εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν Πολίχνην ἐτείχιζον, εἴ τι δέοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς νησῖδος ἐν ᾗ οἰκοῦσι πρὸς ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀφεστῶτες ἐν τειχισμῷ τε πάντες ἦσαν καὶ παρασκευῇ πολέμου.

XV. Ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ταχὺ ἀγγελία τῆς Χίου

[1] τε after βουλὴν deleted by Krüger; so also after ἄλλαι below.

[1] There were several places called Corycus. This one was the southernmost point of the Erythraean peninsula, about forty miles from Chios. *Cf.* Livy xxxvii. 12, *Corycum Teiorum promonturium.*

ships under the command of Hippocles son of Menippus, who was on the look-out for the ships from Sicily; but all except one escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

XIV. Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades as they sailed for Chios seized all whom they encountered, that their coming might not be reported. The first point on the mainland at which they touched was Corycus,[1] where they released their captives; then after a conference with some Chians who were co-operating with them and who urged them to sail to Chios without giving any notice, they arrived at Chios suddenly. Now the people at large were in a state of wonderment and consternation, but the oligarchs had arranged that the council should chance to have just assembled; speeches were accordingly made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who announced that many additional ships were on the way, but did not disclose the fact of the blockade of their fleet at Peiraeum, and then the Chians revolted from Athens, and so later on did the Erythraeans. After this three ships were detached from the fleet and brought about the revolt of Clazomenae. And the Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the mainland and fortified Polichne, on the chance that they themselves might have need of it in case they should withdraw from the island[2] on which they lived. These peoples, then, being in revolt, were all engaged in fortifying and preparing for war.

XV. News of the revolt of Chios came quickly

[2] According to Pausanias (VII. iii. 9), the Clazomenians had removed to the island through fear of the Persians.

ἀφικνεῖται· καὶ νομίσαντες μέγαν ἤδη καὶ σαφῆ τὸν κίνδυνον σφᾶς περιεστάναι, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ξυμμάχους οὐκ ἐθελήσειν τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως μεθεστηκυίας ἡσυχάζειν, τά τε χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἅψασθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς[1] ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν καὶ ναῦς πληροῦν μὴ ὀλίγας, τῶν τε ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ ἐφορμουσῶν τὰς μὲν ὀκτὼ ἤδη πέμπειν, αἳ ἀπολιποῦσαι τὴν φυλακὴν τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως διώξασαι καὶ οὐ καταλαβοῦσαι ἀνεκεχωρήκεσαν (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Στρομβιχίδης Διοτίμου), ἄλλας δὲ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον βοηθεῖν δώδεκα μετὰ Θρασυκλέους, ἀπολιπούσας καὶ ταύ-
2 τας τὴν ἐφόρμησιν. τάς τε τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς, αἳ αὐτοῖς ξυνεπολιόρκουν τὰς ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ, ἀπαγαγόντες τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἠλευθέρωσαν, τοὺς δ' ἐλευθέρους κατέδησαν. ἑτέρας δ' ἀντὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀπελθουσῶν νεῶν ἐς τὴν ἐφόρμησιν τῶν Πελοποννησίων διὰ τάχους πληρώσαντες ἀντέπεμψαν καὶ ἄλλας διενοοῦντο τριάκοντα πληροῦν. καὶ πολλὴ ἦν ἡ προθυμία καὶ ὀλίγου ἐπράσσετο οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον.

XVI. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ὀκτὼ

[1] *τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας* deleted by Widmann, followed by Hude.

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[1] *cf.* ii. 24. Pericles had set this fund aside in the first year of the war, to be touched only in case a hostile fleet threatened the Peiraeus.

to Athens, and they felt that the danger which encompassed them was by now great and manifest, and that the rest of their allies would not be inclined to keep quiet when the greatest state of all had seceded. And so they took up the question of the fund of a thousand talents,[1] which during the whole war they had jealously refrained from touching, and under the influence of their consternation immediately rescinded the penalties which had been imposed upon any speaker who should propose to touch this money, or any presiding officer who should put such a proposal to a vote, and then voted to use this fund and man a considerable number of ships. They also voted that of the ships which were employed in the blockade at Peiraeum there should be sent at once the eight that, leaving guard-duty, had gone in pursuit of the fleet under Chalcideus, but after failing to overtake it had returned to their post—the commander of these eight being Strombichides son of Diotimus—and that soon afterwards twelve others under Thrasycles should leave the blockade and go to the rescue. As for the seven Chian ships that were assisting them in the blockade of the vessels at Peiraeum, they withdrew them, freeing the slaves aboard them and putting the freemen in fetters. And in place of all the ships that had gone away they speedily manned others and sent them to continue the blockade of the Peloponnesians, and it was their intention to man thirty more. Great indeed was their ardour, and there was nothing trivial in their efforts to send out reinforcements against Chios.

XVI. Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight

ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Σάμον, καὶ προσλαβὼν Σαμίαν μίαν ἔπλευσεν ἐς Τέων καὶ ἡσυχάζειν ἠξίου αὐτούς. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Χίου ἐς τὴν Τέων καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς μετὰ τριῶν καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἐπέπλει, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ὁ Κλαζομενίων καὶ Ἐρυθραίων παρῆει. 2 προαισθόμενος δὲ ὁ Στρομβιχίδης προανήγετο, καὶ μετεωρισθεὶς ἐν τῷ πελάγει ὡς ἑώρα τὰς ναῦς πολλὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Χίου, φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο ἐπὶ τῆς 3 Σάμου· αἱ δὲ ἐδίωκον. τὸν δὲ πεζὸν οἱ Τήιοι τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ ἐσδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἔφυγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐσηγάγοντο. καὶ ἐπέσχον μὲν οἱ πεζοὶ καὶ [1] Χαλκιδέα ἐκ τῆς διώξεως περιμένοντες· ὡς δὲ ἐχρόνιζε, καθῄρουν αὐτοὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὃ ἐνῳκοδόμησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Τηίων πόλεως πρὸς ἤπειρον, ξυγκαθῄρουν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπελθόντες οὐ πολλοί, ὧν ἦρχε Στάγης, ὕπαρχος Τισσαφέρνους.

XVII. Χαλκιδεὺς δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὡς κατεδίωξαν ἐς Σάμον Στρομβιχίδην, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσιν, ἀντιπληρώσαντες δὲ ταύτας τε ἐκ Χίου καὶ ἄλλας εἴκοσι ἔπλεον ἐς Μίλητον 2 ὡς ἀποστήσοντες. ἐβούλετο γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὢν ἐπιτήδειος τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν Μιλησίων, φθάσαι τάς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ναῦς προσαγαγόμενος αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς Χίοις καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ Χαλκιδεῖ καὶ τῷ ἀποστείλαντι Ἐνδίῳ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο, τὸ ἀγώνισμα προσθεῖναι, ὅτι πλείστας

[1] καὶ deleted by Bloomfield, followed by Hude.

[1] *cf.* ch. xii. 2.

ships arrived at Samos; then after taking on an additional Samian ship he sailed to Teos, whose inhabitants he begged to keep quiet. But at this moment Chalcideus bore down upon him, sailing from Chios to Teos with twenty-three ships, and at the same time the land-force of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans was moving along the shore. Strombichides, however, observed the enemy in time and promptly put out to sea, and when he was in the open sea and saw how numerous were the ships from Chios, he made flight toward Samos; and the enemy pursued him. As for the land-force, the Teïans would not at first admit them, but when the Athenians fled they brought them into the city. These troops waited for a while, expecting Chalcideus to join them after the pursuit; but when he tarried, they proceeded on their own account to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built on the mainland side of the city of Teos; and in this work they were assisted by a few of the Barbarian troops that had come up, their commander being Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

XVII. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after pursuing Strombichides to Samos, armed the sailors from the Peloponnesian ships and left them at Chios, and replacing the crews of these ships with substitutes from Chios and manning twenty additional ships, they sailed to Miletus, with the intention of causing it to revolt. For Alcibiades wished, since he was a friend of the leading men of Miletus, to win the Milesians over before the arrival of the Peloponnesian ships, and to fulfil his promise[1] to secure for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus and for Endius the author of the expedition the credit of

τῶν πόλεων μετὰ τῆς Χίων δυνάμεως καὶ Χαλκι-
3 δέως ἀποστήσας. λαθόντες οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ φθάσαντες οὐ πολὺ τόν τε Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὸν Θρασυκλέα, ὃς ἔτυχεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν δώδεκα ναυσὶν ἄρτι παρὼν καὶ ξυνδιώκων, ἀφιστᾶσι τὴν Μίλητον. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόδας μιᾶς δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσαντες, ὡς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Μιλήσιοι, ἐν Λάδῃ τῇ ἐπι-
4 κειμένῃ νήσῳ ἐφώρμουν. καὶ ἡ πρὸς βασιλέα ξυμμαχία Λακεδαιμονίοις ἡ πρώτη Μιλησίων εὐθὺς ἀποστάντων διὰ Τισσαφέρνους καὶ Χαλκιδέως ἐγένετο ἥδε.

XVIII. "Ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνη Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι·

"Ὁπόσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἔστω καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοίτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κωλυόντων κοινῇ βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν.
2 "Καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους κοινῇ πολεμούντων βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι· καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξέστω ποιεῖσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἀμφοτέροις δοκῇ, βασιλεῖ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις.
3 "Ἤν δέ τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ βασιλέως, πολέ-

having, in concert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus, brought to revolt the largest possible number of cities. Accordingly they made most of the voyage without being detected, barely anticipated the arrival of Strombichides and Thrasycles—who by chance had just come from Athens with twelve ships and joined in the pursuit—and induced Miletus to revolt. The Athenians followed at their heels with nineteen ships, and, when the Milesians would not admit them, took up their station at Lade, the island that lies off Miletus. And now, immediately after the revolt of Miletus, the first alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King was concluded through Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, on the following conditions:

XVIII. The Lacedaemonians and their allies have concluded an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms:

"1. Whatsoever territory and cities the King holds or the forefathers of the King held, shall belong to the King; and from these cities whatsoever money or anything else came in for the Athenians shall be stopped by the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies acting in common, to the end that the Athenians shall receive neither money nor anything else.

"2. And the war against the Athenians shall be waged in common by the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and an end of the war against the Athenians is not to be made except with the consent of both parties, the King as well as the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

"3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be

μιοι ἔστων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. καὶ ἢν τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, πολέμιοι ἔστων βασιλεῖ κατὰ ταὐτά."

XIX. Ἡ μὲν ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγένετο. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Χῖοι εὐθὺς δέκα ἑτέρας πληρώσαντες ναῦς ἔπλευσαν ἐς Ἄναια, βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν ἐν Μιλήτῳ πυθέσθαι καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἅμα ἀφιστάναι. 2 καὶ ἐλθούσης παρὰ Χαλκιδέως ἀγγελίας αὐτοῖς ἀποπλεῖν πάλιν,[1] ὅτι Ἀμόργης παρέσται κατὰ γῆν στρατιᾷ, ἔπλευσαν ἐς Διὸς ἱερόν· καὶ καθορῶσιν ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς, ἃς ὕστερον ἔτι Θρασυκλέους Διο- 3 μέδων ἔχων ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν προσέπλει. καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἔφευγον μιᾷ μὲν νηὶ ἐς Ἔφεσον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Τέω. καὶ τέσσαρας μὲν κενὰς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λαμβάνουσι, τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν φθασάντων· 4 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐς τὴν Τηίων πόλιν καταφεύγουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ταῖς λοιπαῖς ναυσὶν ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ὁ πεζὸς μετ' αὐτῶν Λέβεδον ἀπέστησαν καὶ αὖθις Αἰράς.[2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἕκαστοι ἐπ' οἶκου ἀπεκομίσθησαν, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς καὶ αἱ νῆες.

XX. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αἱ ἐν τῷ Πειραιῷ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων, καταδιωχθεῖσαι τότε καὶ ἐφορμούμεναι ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ἐπέκπλουν ποιησάμεναι αἰφνίδιον καὶ κρατήσασαι ναυμαχίᾳ τέσσαράς τε ναῦς λαμβάνουσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀποπλεύσασαι ἐς Κεγ-

[1] καί, before ὅτι, deleted by Poppo (with Valla).
[2] With Meisterhans, *Att. Ins.* 17. 11; MSS. Ἐράς.

[1] On the mainland opposite.

enemies to both the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be enemies to the King in like manner."

XIX. Such was the alliance. And immediately after this the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea,[1] wishing to learn about the situation in Miletus and at the same time to induce the cities to revolt. But a message came from Chalcideus ordering them to sail back again, since Amorges would soon arrive by land with an army, and so they sailed to the temple of Zeus; there they descried sixteen ships approaching with which Diomedon had left Athens even after the departure of Thrasycles. When they saw these ships, they fled to Ephesus with one ship, while the rest made for Teos. Four empty ships were captured by the Athenians, their crews having escaped to the land; the other five took refuge at the city of Teos. The Athenians then sailed for Samos; and the Chians, putting out to sea with the rest of their ships and acting in concert with the army on land, induced Lebedos to revolt and then Haerae.[2] After this each contingent returned home, both the army on land and the fleet.

XX. About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships at Peiraeum, which had been chased to shore at the time above mentioned[3] and were being blockaded by an equal number of Athenian ships, made a sudden sally, and winning the victory in an engagement captured four of the Athenian ships; they then sailed back to Cenchreiae, where

[1] A small town of the Teians (Strabo, p. 644).
[3] Ch. x. 3.

χρειὰς τὸν ἐς τὴν Χίον καὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν πλοῦν αὖθις παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ ναύαρχος αὐτοῖς ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος Ἀστύοχος ἐπῆλθεν, ᾧπερ ἐγίγνετο ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ ναυαρχία.

2 Ἀναχωρήσαντος δὲ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς Τέω πεζοῦ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτὸς στρατιᾷ παραγενόμενος καὶ ἐπικαθελὼν τὸ ἐν τῇ Τέῳ τεῖχος, εἴ τι ὑπελείφθη, ἀνεχώρησεν. καὶ Διομέδων ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικόμενος ἐσπείσατο Τηίοις ὥστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς. καὶ παραπλεύσας ἐπὶ Αἰρὰς καὶ προσβαλών, ὡς οὐκ ἐλάμβανε τὴν πόλιν, ἀπέπλευσεν.

XXI. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ[1] τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγέσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

XXII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Χῖοι, ὥσπερ ἤρξαντο, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντες προθυμίας ἄνευ τε Πελοποννησίων πλήθει παρόντες ἀποστῆσαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ βουλόμενοι ἅμα ὡς πλείστους

[1] ὑπό, omitted by Hude with F.

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[1] *cf.* ch. xix. 1.

they proceeded again to prepare for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. And Astyochus came to them from Lacedaemon and on him now devolved, as admiral, the command of the entire fleet.

Now when the land-forces withdrew from Teos, Tissaphernes came there in person with an army, demolished whatever was left of the fortification at Teos, and then withdrew. After his departure Diomedon, who arrived a little later with ten Athenian ships, made an agreement with the Teïans to receive them also. He then sailed along the coast to Haerae, and after making an assault upon the city without success sailed away.

XXI. There also occurred at this time the uprising at Samos which was made against the nobles by the common people in conjunction with some Athenians, who happened to be present on board three ships. And the common people of Samos slew some two hundred in all of the nobles, and having condemned to exile four hundred others, distributed among themselves their land and houses; and when the Athenians, after these events, granted them autonomy on the ground that they were now assured of their fidelity, they administered the affairs of the city thenceforth; and they neither gave to the landowners any other privilege nor permitted any one of the common people from that time on either to give his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them.

XXII. After this, during the same summer, the Chians showed no abatement of the zeal which they had displayed from the beginning,[1] in approaching the various cities in force, even without the Peloponnesians, and inducing them to revolt; and wishing at

σφίσι ξυγκινδυνεύειν, στρατεύονται αὐτοί τε τρισὶ καὶ δέκα ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Λέσβον, ὥσπερ εἴρητο ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δεύτερον ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παρῆν ἐπὶ Κλαζομενῶν τε καὶ Κύμης· ἦρχε δ' αὐτοῦ Εὐάλας Σπαρτιάτης, τῶν δὲ νεῶν Δεινιάδας περίοικος. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες καταπλεύσασαι Μήθυμναν πρῶτον ἀφιστᾶσι, καὶ καταλείπονται τέσσαρες νῆες ἐν αὐτῇ· καὶ αὖθις αἱ λοιπαὶ Μυτιλήνην ἀφιστᾶσιν.

XXIII. Ἀστύοχος δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ναύαρχος τέσσαρσι ναυσίν, ὥσπερ ὥρμητο, πλέων ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Χίον. καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ ἥκοντος αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ἔπλεον ἐς Λέσβον, ὧν ἦρχε Λέων καὶ Διομέδων· Λέων γὰρ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶ προσε-
2 βοήθησεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν. ἀναγαγόμενος δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐς ὀψέ, καὶ προσλαβὼν Χίαν ναῦν μίαν, ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, ὅπως ὠφελοίη, εἴ τι δύναιτο. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Πύρραν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐς Ἔρεσον· ἔνθα πυνθάνεται ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
3 αὐτοβοεὶ ἑάλωκεν· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἔπλεον ἀπροσδόκητοι κατασχόντες ἐς τὸν λιμένα τῶν τε Χίων νεῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἀποβάντες τοὺς ἀντιστάντας μάχῃ νικήσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἔσχον.
4 ἃ πυνθανόμενος ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῶν τε Ἐρεσίων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Μηθύμνης μετ' Εὐβούλου Χίων

[1] *cf.* ch. viii. 2.

the same time that as many as possible should share the danger with them, they made an expedition on their own account with thirteen ships against Lesbos. For they had been ordered by the Lacedaemonians to go against it next, and afterwards to proceed to the Hellespont.[1] At the same time the land-force, consisting both of the Peloponnesians who were present and of the allies from that region, moved along the shore toward Clazomenae and Cyme, being under the command of Eualas, a Spartan, while the fleet was in charge of Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci. The fleet put in at Methymna and induced it to revolt first, and four ships were left there; the rest then effected the revolt of Mytilene.

XXIII. Meanwhile Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sailed with four ships from Cenchreiae, as he had purposed, and arrived at Chios. And on the third day after his coming the twenty-five Athenian ships sailed to Lesbos, being under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had arrived afterwards with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. On the same day, but at a later hour, Astyochus put to sea, and taking besides his own one Chian ship sailed to Lesbos, in order to give what aid he could. On that day he reached Pyrrha, and thence on the next day Eresus, where he learned that Mytilene had been taken by the Athenians at the first assault. For the Athenians, arriving unexpectedly, had immediately sailed into the harbour and got the better of the Chian ships; they then landed and after defeating in battle those that resisted them took possession of the city. Now when Astyochus learned of this from the inhabitants of Eresus and from the Chian ships that came from Methymna

νεῶν, αἳ τότε καταλειφθεῖσαι καί, ὡς ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλω, φεύγουσαι περιέτυχον αὐτῷ τρεῖς (μία γὰρ ἑάλω ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων), οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην ὥρμησεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἀποστήσας καὶ ὁπλίσας, καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ νεῶν ὁπλίτας πεζῇ παραπέμπει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄντισσαν καὶ Μήθυμναν ἄρχοντα Ἐτεόνικον προστάξας. καὶ αὐτὸς ταῖς τε μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ ναυσὶ καὶ ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς Χίαις παρέπλει, ἐλπίζων τοὺς Μηθυμναίους θαρσήσειν τε ἰδόντας σφᾶς καὶ ἐμμενεῖν
5 τῇ ἀποστάσει. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάντα ἠναντιοῦτο, ἀπέπλευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν ἀναλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Χίον. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ ξυμμαχίδων Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς ἓξ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐς τὴν
6 Χίον. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τά τ' ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάλιν κατεστήσαντο καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐξ αὐτῆς Κλαζομενίων τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πολίχνην τειχιζομένην ἑλόντες διεκόμισαν πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πόλιν πλὴν τῶν αἰτίων τῆς ἀποστάσεως· οὗτοι δὲ ἐς Δαφνοῦντα ἀπῆλθον. καὶ αὖθις Κλαζομεναὶ προσεχώρησαν Ἀθηναίοις.

XXIV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους οἵ τ' ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐν τῇ Λάδῃ

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[1] *cf.* ch. xxii. 2.

[2] The text is most probably corrupt. These facts practically all commentators agree upon: Astyochus leaves first, taking with him his own force (*τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατόν*), *i. e.* the hoplites whom he had sent against Antissa and Methymna (§ 4). The force here designated must be *ὁ πεζὸς Πελοπον-*

with Eubulus—the ships which had been left behind on the occasion above mentioned,[1] and now fell in with him in their flight after the capture of Mytilene, being three in number, for one had been captured by the Athenians—he no longer advanced against Mytilene, but instead induced Eresus to revolt, supplied it with arms, and then sent the hoplites on his own ships by land along the coast to Antissa and Methymna, placing Eteonicus in command of them. He himself, meanwhile, took his own and the three Chian ships and sailed along the coast, hoping that the Methymnaeans would be encouraged by the sight of his fleet and would persevere in their revolt. But since everything at Lesbos was going against him, he took his hoplites aboard and sailed back to Chios. And the forces which had been landed from the ships[2] and were intending to proceed to the Hellespont were conveyed again to their several cities. After this, six of the allied ships from the Peloponnesus that were at Cenchreia joined them at Chios. As for the Athenians, they restored conditions at Lesbos, and sailing from there captured Polichne,[3] the Clazomenian settlement on the mainland which was being fortified, and carried all the inhabitants back to the city on the island, except the authors of the revolt; for these had got away to Daphnus. And so Clazomenae again came back to the Athenian alliance.

XXIV. During the same summer the Athenians, who were at Lade with their twenty ships keeping

νησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν συμμάχων (ch. xxii. 1). But no satisfactory explanation has been given of *ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν* in this connection.

[3] *cf.* ch. xiv. 3.

ἐφορμοῦντες ἀπόβασιν ποιησάμενοι ἐς Πάνορμον
τῆς Μιλησίας Χαλκιδέα τε τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον
ἄρχοντα μετ' ὀλίγων παραβοηθήσαντα ἀποκτεί-
νουσι, καὶ τροπαῖον τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον δια-
πλεύσαντες ἔστησαν, ὃ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ὡς οὐ μετὰ
2 κράτους τῆς γῆς σταθὲν ἀνεῖλον· καὶ Λέων καὶ
Διομέδων ἔχοντες τὰς ἐκ Λέσβου Ἀθηναίων ναῦς,
ἔκ τε Οἰνουσσῶν τῶν πρὸ Χίου νήσων καὶ ἐκ
Σιδούσσης καὶ ἐκ Πτελεοῦ, ἃ ἐν τῇ Ἐρυθραίᾳ
εἶχον τείχη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου ὁρμώμενοι τὸν
πρὸς τοὺς Χίους πόλεμον ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐποιοῦντο·
εἶχον δ' ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου
3 ἀναγκαστούς. καὶ ἔν τε Καρδαμύλῃ ἀποβάντες
καὶ ἐν Βολίσκῳ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν Χίων
μάχῃ νικήσαντες καὶ πολλοὺς διαφθείραντες
ἀνάστατα ἐποίησαν τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, καὶ ἐν
Φάναις αὖθις ἄλλῃ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν καὶ τρίτῃ ἐν
Λευκωνίῳ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη
οὐκέτι ἐπεξῆσαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλῶς κατε-
σκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν
4 μέχρι τότε διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ
Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν
τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ
πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο
5 ἐχυρώτερον. καὶ οὐδ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, εἰ
τοῦτο δοκοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἀσφαλέστερον πρᾶξαι,
πρότερον ἐτόλμησαν ποιήσασθαι ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν
τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἔμελλον κινδυνεύσειν καὶ
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠσθάνοντο οὐδ' αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγον-

[1] A register kept by the taxiarch of each tribe in which the name of every Athenian was entered at the age of eighteen. The liability for service extended from 18 to 60.

watch upon Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in Milesian territory and slew Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come to the rescue with a few men; and two days later they sailed across and set up a trophy, which, however, the Milesians tore down on the ground that the Athenians did not have control of the country when they set it up. And now Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, began to make war upon the Chians by sea from the Oenussae islands, which lie off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which they held in Erythraean territory, as well as from Lesbos; and they had on board as marines some hoplites from the muster-roll[1] who had been pressed into the service. And landing at Cardamyle and Boliscus, they defeated in battle those of the Chians who came out to oppose them and slew many, and devastated the settlements in that region; and again at Phanae in another battle they were victorious, and also in a third battle at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out against them, but the Athenians ravaged their country, which was well stocked and had been unharmed from the Persian wars down to that time. For next to the Lacedaemonians the Chians alone, of all the peoples that I have known, have been at once prosperous and prudent, and the greater their city grew the more securely they ordered their government. And even as regards this revolt, if men think that they did not consult their safety in undertaking it, they did not venture to make it until they were sure of incurring the danger in concert with many brave allies and perceived that not even the Athenians themselves, after the Sicilian

τας ἔτι μετὰ τὴν Σικελικὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡς οὐ πάνυ πόνηρα σφῶν βεβαίως τὰ πράγματα εἴη· εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις ἐσφάλησαν, μετὰ πολλῶν οἷς τὰ αὐτὰ ἔδοξε, τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ ξυναιρεθήσεσθαι, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν
6 ξυνέγνωσαν. εἰργομένοις δ' οὖν αὐτοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ κατὰ γῆν πορθουμένοις ἐνεχείρησάν τινες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἀγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν· οὗ αἰσθόμενοι οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτοὶ μὲν ἡσύχασαν, Ἀστύοχον δὲ ἐξ Ἐρυθρῶν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ τεσσάρων νεῶν, αἳ παρῆσαν αὐτῷ, κομίσαντες ἐσκόπουν ὅπως μετριώτατα ἢ ὁμήρων λήψει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ καταπαύσουσι τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

XXV. Ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος χίλιοι ὁπλῖται Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι Ἀργείων (τοὺς γὰρ πεντακοσίους τῶν Ἀργείων ψιλοὺς ὄντας ὥπλισαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) καὶ χίλιοι τῶν ξυμμάχων ναυσὶ δυοῖν δεούσαις πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ὁπλιταγωγοί, Φρυνίχου καὶ Ὀνομακλέους καὶ Σκιρωνίδου στρατηγούντων κατέπλευσαν ἐς Σάμον, καὶ διαβάντες ἐς Μίλητον
2 ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. Μιλήσιοι δὲ ἐξελθόντες αὐτοί τε, ὀκτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνους τι[1] ἐπικουρικὸν καὶ αὐτὸς Τισσαφέρνης παρὼν καὶ ἡ ἵππος αὐτοῦ ξυνέβαλον τοῖς
3 Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι

[1] ξενικὸν of the MSS. deleted by Schaefer.

disaster, could any longer deny that their circumstances were beyond a doubt exceedingly bad. And if in the unexpected turns that belong to human life they were somewhat deceived, they made their misjudgment in common with many others who were of the same opinion—that the power of the Athenians would speedily be utterly overthrown. Now, however, that they were shut off from the sea and were being despoiled by land, some of them attempted to bring the city over to the Athenians. Their rulers perceived this, but themselves kept quiet; however, they fetched from Erythrae the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus with the four ships which were with him there, and considered what were the mildest measures, either the seizing of hostages or some other plan, by which they could put an end to the plot. They, then, were thus occupied.

XXV. At the end of the same summer there sailed from Athens to Samos one thousand Athenian and fifteen hundred Argive hoplites—for the five hundred of the Argives that were light-armed the Athenians had provided with heavy arms—together with one thousand from the allies. These troops were carried by forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, and were under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. From Samos they crossed over to Miletus and encamped there. But the enemy marched out against them—the Milesians themselves, to the number of eight hundred hoplites, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of mercenaries belonging to Tissaphernes, together with Tissaphernes himself, who was present with his cavalry—and attacked the Athenians and their allies. Now the Argives with their wing rushed

τῷ σφετέρῳ αὐτῶν κέρᾳ προεξάξαντες καὶ καταφρονήσαντες ὡς ἐπ' Ἴωνάς τε καὶ οὐ δεξομένους ἀτακτότερον χωροῦντες, νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ διαφθείρονται αὐτῶν ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους
4 τριακοσίων ἀνδρῶν· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε Πελοποννησίους πρώτους νικήσαντες καὶ τοὺς Βαρβάρους καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ὄχλον ὡσάμενοι, τοῖς Μιλησίοις οὐ ξυμμείξαντες, ἀλλ' ὑποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀργείων τροπῆς ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ὡς ἑώρων τὸ ἄλλο σφῶν ἡσσώμενον, πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Μιλησίων κρατοῦντες ἤδη τὰ ὅπλα
5 τίθενται. καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἀμφοτέρων τῶν Δωριῶν κρατῆσαι· τούς τε γὰρ κατὰ σφᾶς Πελοποννησίους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνίκων καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οἱ Μιλήσιοι. στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον τὸν περιτειχισμὸν ἰσθμώδους ὄντος τοῦ χωρίου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο, νομίζοντες, εἰ προσαγάγοιντο Μίλητον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σφίσι καὶ τἆλλα προσχωρῆσαι.

XXVI. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ περὶ δείλην ἤδη ὀψίαν ἀγγέλλεται αὐτοῖς τὰς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Σικελίας πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα ναῦς ὅσον οὐ παρεῖναι. τῶν τε γὰρ Σικελιωτῶν, Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ Συρακοσίου μάλιστα ἐνάγοντος ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι καὶ τῆς ὑπολοίπου Ἀθηναίων καταλύσεως, εἴκοσι νῆες Συρακοσίων ἦλθον καὶ Σελινούντιαι δύο, αἵ τε ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, ἃς παρεσκευάζοντο, ἑτοῖμαι ἤδη οὖσαι· καὶ Θηριμένει τῷ Λακεδαιμονίῳ ξυναμφότεραι ὡς Ἀστύοχον τὸν ναύαρχον προσταχθεῖσαι κομίσαι, κατέπλευσαν ἐς Λέρον[1]

[1] Λέρον, Hude reads Ἐλεόν with most MSS. But *cf.* xxvii. 31.

out ahead of the rest and advanced in some disorder, feeling contempt of the enemy as being Ionians and men who would not await their attack, and so were defeated by the Milesians and not fewer than three hundred of them destroyed. But the Athenians, after defeating the Peloponnesians first and then driving back the barbarians and the miscellaneous crowd—yet without engaging the Milesians, who after their rout of the Argives had withdrawn into the city, when they saw that the rest of their army was being worsted—finally halted, as being already victorious, close to the city itself. And it so happened in this battle that on both sides the Ionians were victorious over the Dorians; for the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians opposed to themselves, and the Milesians the Argives. But the Athenians, after setting up a trophy, made preparations for shutting off the place, which had the shape of an isthmus, with a wall, thinking that, if they should bring Miletus over to their side, the other places would readily come over also.

XXVI. In the meantime, when it was already approaching dusk, word was brought to them that the fifty-five ships from the Peloponnesus and from Sicily were all but there. For from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan took the lead in urging the Siceliots to take part in what remained to be done for the complete destruction of the Athenians, there had come twenty Syracusan and two Selinuntian ships, besides those from the Peloponnesus, which they had been equipping and which were at last ready; and both squadrons were put in charge of Therimenes the Lacedaemonian with orders to take them to Astyochus the admiral. They first put in

2 πρῶτον τὴν πρὸ Μιλήτου νῆσον. ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν αἰσθόμενοι ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ ὄντας Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὸν Ἰασικὸν κόλπον πρότερον πλεύσαντες ἐβούλοντο 3 εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τῆς Μιλήτου. ἐλθόντος δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἵππῳ ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν τῆς Μιλησίας, οἵπερ τοῦ κόλπου πλεύσαντες ηὐλίσαντο, πυνθάνονται τὰ περὶ τῆς μάχης (παρῆν γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ξυνεμάχετο τοῖς Μιλησίοις καὶ Τισσαφέρνει), καὶ αὐτοῖς παρῄνει, εἰ μὴ βούλονται τά τε ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα πράγματα διολέσαι, ὡς τάχιστα βοηθεῖν Μιλήτῳ καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν ἀποτειχισθεῖσαν.

XXVII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἔμελλον βοηθήσειν· Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου ἐπύθετο τὰ τῶν νεῶν σαφῶς, βουλομένων τῶν ξυναρχόντων ὑπομείναντας διαναυμαχεῖν, οὐκ ἔφη οὔτ' αὐτὸς ποιήσειν τοῦτο οὔτ' ἐκείνοις οὐδ' ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἐς δύναμιν 2 ἐπιτρέψειν. ὅπου γὰρ[1] ἐν ὑστέρῳ, σαφῶς εἰδότας πρὸς ὁπόσας τε ναῦς πολεμίας καὶ ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις, ἱκανῶς καὶ καθ' ἡσυχίαν παρασκευασαμένους ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι, οὐδέποτε τῷ αἰσχρῷ[2] εὖξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύ- 3 σειν. οὐ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ναυτικῷ μετὰ καιροῦ ὑποχωρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ ὁτουοῦν τρόπου αἴσχιον ξυμβήσεσθαι ἢν ἡσσηθῶσιν. καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἂν[3] οὐ μόνον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ περιπίπτειν· ᾗ μόλις

[1] ἔξεστιν, after ὅπου γάρ, deleted by Dobree.
[2] ὀνείδει, after αἰσχρῷ, deleted by Krüger.
[3] ἄν, added by Dobree.

to harbour at Leros, the island off Miletus; and from there, on finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed into the Iasic Gulf, wishing to know the state of affairs at Miletus. And when Alcibiades came by horse to Teichiussa, a town in Milesian territory on that part of the gulf to which they had sailed and where they had bivouacked, they learned the story of the battle; for Alcibiades had been present and had fought with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes. And he urged them, if they did not wish to ruin matters in Ionia and their whole cause, to aid Miletus as quickly as possible, and not to suffer it to be invested.

XXVII. Accordingly they were proposing to go to its aid at daybreak; but Phrynichus, the Athenian general, when he received from Leros accurate information about the enemy's fleet, though his colleagues wished to wait and fight a decisive battle, refused either to do this himself or to permit them or anybody else to do it, so far as he had power to prevent it. For in a case where it would be possible to fight at a later time, after leisurely and adequate preparation and possessing full information as to the number of the enemy's ships they must meet and how many of their own they would have, he would never, he declared, yielding to the consideration of disgrace, hazard a decisive battle unreasonably. It was not disgraceful, he said, for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion, but it would be more disgraceful if under any circumstances whatever they should be defeated and have to make terms. The state would incur, not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger; for, after their past misfortunes, it was

ἐπὶ ταῖς γεγενημέναις ξυμφοραῖς ἐνδέχεσθαι μετὰ βεβαίου παρασκευῆς καθ' ἑκουσίαν,[1] ἢ πάνυ γε ἀνάγκῃ, προτέρᾳ ποι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ που[2] δὴ μὴ βιαζομένῃ γε πρὸς αὐθαιρέτους κινδύνους ἰέναι. 4 ὡς τάχιστα δὲ ἐκέλευε τούς τε τραυματίας ἀναλαβόντας καὶ τὸν πεζὸν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν ὅσα ἦλθον ἔχοντες, ἃ δ' ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας εἰλήφασι καταλιπόντας, ὅπως κοῦφαι ὦσιν αἱ νῆες, ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Σάμον, κἀκεῖθεν ἤδη ξυναγαγόντας πάσας τὰς ναῦς τοὺς ἐπίπλους, ἢν που καιρὸς ᾖ, ποιεῖσθαι. 5 ὡς δὲ ἔπεισε, καὶ ἔδρασε ταῦτα· καὶ ἔδοξεν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα μᾶλλον ἢ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς ὅσα ἄλλα Φρύνιχος κατέστη, 6 οὐκ ἀξύνετος εἶναι. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀφ' ἑσπέρας εὐθὺς τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀτελεῖ τῇ νίκῃ ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀνέστησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τάχος καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἀπέπλευσαν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐπ' οἴκου.

XXVIII. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἐκ τῆς Τειχιούσσης ἄραντες ἐπικατάγονται, καὶ μείναντες ἡμέραν μίαν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καὶ τὰς Χίας ναῦς προσλαβόντες τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τὸ πρῶτον ξυγκαταδιωχθείσας ἐβούλοντο πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, ἃ ἐξείλοντο, ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν πάλιν. 2 καὶ ὡς ἦλθον, Τισσαφέρνης τῷ πεζῷ παρελθὼν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Ἴασον, ἐν ᾗ Ἀμόργης πολέμιος

[1] καθ' ἑκουσίαν, Hude omits with Cod. C, which simplifies the sentence.

[2] ἢ που, from ποῦ of the MSS., Lindau. ποῦ δή, κτέ., would mean *how then could they when there was no pressure go into self-chosen dangers?*

[1] *i.e.* when not fully prepared.

scarcely permissible for it when securely prepared of free will, or[1] through absolute necessity, to take the offensive in any direction, much less was it permissible, when there was no pressure, to rush into self-chosen dangers. He urged them, therefore, as speedily as possible to take up their wounded and their forces on land and whatever stores they had brought with them, leaving behind, however, the spoils they had taken from the enemy's country, in order that the ships might be light, and sail back to Samos; then, making that their base, after bringing all their ships together, they might sally forth for attacks if opportunity should offer anywhere. As he advised, so he also acted; and consequently, though not on the present occasion more than afterwards, nor as regards this decision only, but in general in whatever circumstances he found himself, Phrynichus won the reputation of being a man of sagacity. Thus the Athenians, their victory incomplete, retired from Miletus immediately after nightfall; and the Argives, in all haste and indignant at what had happened, sailed home from Samos.

XXVIII. At daybreak the Peloponnesians weighed anchor from Teichiussa and put to shore, and then, after waiting one day, took into their fleet on the next day the Chian ships that under the command of Chalcideus had been pursued to port.[2] They now wished to sail back to Teichiussa after the stores which they had put ashore there. On their arrival Tissaphernes, who had come up with his land-forces, persuaded them to sail against Iasus, where Amorges,

[2] *cf.* ch. xvii. 3.

ὧν κατεῖχε, πλεῦσαι. καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ
Ἰάσῳ αἰφνίδιοι καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ἄλλ' ἢ
Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι αἱροῦσιν· καὶ μάλιστα
3 ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπῃνέθησαν. καὶ τόν
τε Ἀμόργην ζῶντα λαβόντες[1] παραδιδόασιν οἱ
Πελοποννήσιοι Τισσαφέρνει ἀπαγαγεῖν, εἰ βού-
λεται, βασιλεῖ, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε, καὶ τὴν
Ἴασον διεπόρθησαν καὶ χρήματα πάνυ πολλὰ ἡ
στρατιὰ ἔλαβεν· παλαιόπλουτον γὰρ ἦν τὸ
4 χωρίον. τούς τ' ἐπικούρους τοὺς περὶ τὸν
Ἀμόργην παρὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κομίσαντες καὶ οὐκ
ἀδικήσαντες ξυνέταξαν, ὅτι ἦσαν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ
Πελοποννήσου· τό τε πόλισμα Τισσαφέρνει παρα-
δόντες καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα πάντα, καὶ δοῦλα καὶ
ἐλεύθερα, ὧν καθ' ἕκαστον στατῆρα δαρεικὸν
παρ' αὐτοῦ ξυνέβησαν λαβεῖν, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν
5 ἐς τὴν Μίλητον. καὶ Πεδάριτόν τε τὸν Λέοντος
ἐς τὴν Χίον ἄρχοντα Λακεδαιμονίων πεμψάντων
ἀποστέλλουσι πεζῇ μέχρι Ἐρυθρῶν ἔχοντα τὸ
παρὰ Ἀμόργου ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον
αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστᾶσιν. καὶ τὸ θέρος
ἐτελεύτα.

XXIX. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος, ἐπειδὴ
τὴν Ἴασον κατεστήσατο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἐς[2]
φυλακήν, παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ μηνὸς
μὲν τροφήν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι,
ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ
διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώ-

[1] After λαβόντες the MSS. give Πισσούθνου νόθον υἱόν, ἀφεστῶτα δὲ βασιλέως, which van Herwerden deletes. *cf.* ch. v. 5.

[2] ἐς, deleted by Hude, following van Herwerden.

an enemy, was in occupation. So they made a sudden attack upon Iasus and took it, as the inhabitants had no thought but that the ships were Athenian; and in the action the Syracusans won most praise. Amorges was taken alive by the Peloponnesians and delivered over to Tissaphernes to lead home to the King, if he so wished, according to his orders[1]; and they sacked Iasus, the army taking very much treasure, for the place was one of ancient wealth. As for the mercenaries who served with Amorges, they took them into their own camp, and without doing them any harm put them into their ranks, because most of them were from the Peloponnesus. The town they delivered to Tissaphernes, together with all the captives, both bond and free, agreeing to accept from him a Daric stater[2] for each one of them. They then withdrew to Miletus. Pedaritus son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to be governor at Chios, they dispatched by land as far as Erythrae in command of the mercenary force of Amorges, and there in Miletus they appointed Philippus governor. So the summer ended.

XXIX. During the following winter, after he had placed Iasus in charge of a garrison, Tissaphernes came to Miletus, where he distributed to all the ships a month's pay, as he had promised at Lacedaemon to do, to the amount of an Attic drachma a day for each man; for the future, however, he proposed to give only three obols[3] until he should

[1] *cf.* ch. v. 5.

[2] Equivalent to twenty Attic drachmae, about 13*s.* 4*d.*; $3.25. It was named after Darius the Great who first coined it.

[3] *i.e.*, one half of a drachma.

βολον διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρηται· ἢν δὲ
2 κελεύῃ, ἔφη δώσειν ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχμήν. Ἑρμοκράτους δὲ ἀντειπόντος τοῦ Συρακοσίου στρατηγοῦ (ὁ γὰρ Θηριμένης οὐ ναύαρχος ὤν, ἀλλ' Ἀστυόχῳ παραδοῦναι τὰς ναῦς ξυμπλέων, μαλακὸς ἦν περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ), ὅμως δὲ παρὰ πέντε ναῦς πλέον ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ ἢ τρεῖς ὀβολοὶ ὡμολογήθησαν. ἐς γὰρ πέντε ναῦς καὶ πεντήκοντα τριάκοντα τάλαντα ἐδίδου τοῦ μηνός· καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσῳ πλείους νῆες ἦσαν τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐδίδοτο.

XXX. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίοις προσαφιγμέναι γὰρ ἦσαν καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄλλαι νῆες πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ στρατηγοὶ Χαρμῖνος καὶ Στρομβιχίδης καὶ Εὐκτήμων, καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ Χίου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας ξυναγαγόντες ἐβούλοντο διακληρωσάμενοι ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐφορμεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν Χίον καὶ
2 ναυτικὸν καὶ πεζὸν πέμψαι. καὶ ἐποίησαν οὕτως· Στρομβιχίδης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ὀνομακλῆς καὶ Εὐκτήμων τριάκοντα ναῦς ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν ἐς Μίλητον ἐλθόντων χιλίων ὁπλιτῶν μέρος ἄγοντες ἐν ναυσὶν ὁπλιταγωγοῖς ἐπὶ Χίον λαχόντες ἔπλεον, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐν Σάμῳ μένοντες τέσσαρσι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐθαλασσοκράτουν, καὶ ἐπίπλους τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐποιοῦντο.

XXXI. Ὁ δ' Ἀστύοχος ὡς τότε ἐν τῇ Χίῳ

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[1] *cf.* ch. v. 5.

[2] *i.e.* fifty-five ships got the pay of sixty. Thirty talents (1,080,000 obols) would be the pay of sixty ships a month at the rate of three obols a man a day (3 obols × 200 men × 60 ships). This sum being given to fifty-five ships instead of

ask the King; if the King should so order, he would give the full drachma. But when Hermocrates the Syracusan general remonstrated—for Therimenes, not being admiral, but sailing with the fleet only to turn it over to Astyochus, was complaisant about the pay—a sum was agreed upon notwithstanding that was larger by five ships than three obols for each man.[1] For he gave for fifty-five ships thirty talents a month[2]; and to the others, according as there were more ships than this number, pay was given in the same proportion.[3]

XXX. The same winter, when the Athenians in Samos had received from home a reinforcement of thirty-five ships under the command of Charminus, Strombichides and Euctemon, after bringing together their ships which were at Chios and all their other ships, they proposed to blockade Miletus with the fleet and to send a force of ships and infantry against Chios, assigning the commands by lot. And this they did. Strombichides, Onomacles and Euctemon, with thirty ships and a portion of the thousand hoplites that had come to Miletus, whom they took on transports, sailed against Chios according to their lot, while the others, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, controlled the sea and made descents upon Miletus.

XXXI. But Astyochus, who chanced to be at

sixty, Thucydides calls it παρὰ πέντε ναῦς πλέον, *more by five ships* than the ordinary rate. The payment of three obols per man was calculated on sixty ships instead of fifty-five and the whole divided between the fifty-five crews.

[3] Fifty ships is the original number which came over (ch. xxvi. 1), and for these a definite sum (30 talents) is agreed upon. The "others" were ships that came later, or possibly the Chian ships (ch. xxviii. 1).

ἔτυχε διὰ τὴν προδοσίαν τοὺς ὁμήρους κατα-
λεγόμενος, τούτου μὲν ἐπέσχεν, ἐπειδὴ ἤσθετο
τάς τε μετὰ Θηριμένους ναῦς ἡκούσας καὶ τὰ
περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν βελτίω ὄντα, λαβὼν δὲ ναῦς
τάς τε Πελοποννησίων δέκα καὶ Χίας δέκα
2 ἀνάγεται, καὶ προσβαλὼν Πτελεῷ καὶ οὐχ
ἑλὼν παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ Κλαζομενάς, καὶ ἐκέλευεν
αὐτῶν τοὺς τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονοῦντας ἀνοικίζε-
σθαι ἐς τὸν Δαφνοῦντα καὶ προσχωρεῖν σφίσιν.
ξυνεκέλευε δὲ καὶ Τάμως Ἰωνίας ὕπαρχος ὤν.
3 ὡς δ' οὐκ ἐσήκουον, προσβολὴν ποιησάμενος τῇ
πόλει οὔσῃ ἀτειχίστῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος ἑλεῖν,
ἀπέπλευσεν ἀνέμῳ μεγάλῳ, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐς Φώκαιαν
καὶ Κύμην, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι νῆες κατῆραν ἐς τὰς
ἐπικειμένας ταῖς Κλαζομεναῖς νήσους Μαρα-
4 θοῦσσαν καὶ Πήλην καὶ Δρυμοῦσσαν. καὶ ὅσα
ὑπεξέκειτο αὐτόθι τῶν Κλαζομενίων ἡμέρας
ἐμμείναντες διὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους ὀκτὼ τὰ μὲν δι-
ήρπασαν καὶ ἀνήλωσαν, τὰ δὲ ἐσβαλόμενοι
ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Φώκαιαν καὶ Κύμην ὡς
Ἀστύοχον.

XXXII. Ὄντος δ' αὐτοῦ ἐνταῦθα Λεσβίων
ἀφικνοῦνται πρέσβεις βουλόμενοι αὖθις ἀπο-
στῆναι· καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν πείθουσιν, ὡς δ' οἵ τε
Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀπρόθυμοι ἦσαν
διὰ τὸ πρότερον σφάλμα, ἄρας ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς
Χίου. καὶ χειμασθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ὕστερον

[1] *cf.* ch. xxiv. 6.
[2] *i.e.* the four under himself from Erythrae (ch. xxiv. 6) and the six which had come from Cenchreiae to Chios (ch. xxiii. 5).
[3] *cf.* ch. xxii.

Chios at this time, engaged in collecting hostages as a precaution against the treachery above mentioned,[1] desisted from this work, when he observed that the ships under the command of Therimenes had come and that the affairs of the Peloponnesian alliance were improved, and taking the ten Peloponnesian ships[2] and ten Chian he put to sea, and after attacking Pteleum without success proceeded along the coast to Clazomenae. There he ordered those who favoured the Athenian cause to remove inland to Daphnus and come over to the Peloponnesian side. In this order Tamos, who was lieutenant-governor of Ionia, also concurred. When the inhabitants of Clazomenae would not obey, he made an assault upon the city, which was unwalled, but being unable to capture it, he took advantage of a strong wind to sail away, he himself going to Phocaea and Cyme, while the rest of the fleet made harbour among the islands which lie off Clazomenae—Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. There they remained eight days on account of the winds, and meanwhile either plundered and consumed the property of the Clazomenians that had secretly been stored on the islands or else put it aboard their ships; they then sailed to Phocaea and Cyme to join Astyochus.

XXXII. While Astyochus was still at Phocaea and Cyme, envoys of the Lesbians arrived, proposing to renew their revolt.[3] And in fact Astyochus was persuaded, but as the Corinthians and the other allies were without zeal, in consequence of their former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios. There his ships, which had been scattered by a storm, arrived at length, some

2 ἀφικνοῦνται ἄλλαι ἄλλοθεν ἐς τὴν Χίον. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο Πεδάριτος, τότε παριὼν πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου, γενόμενος ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς διαπεραιοῦται αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ ἐς Χίον· ὑπῆρχον δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῶν πέντε νεῶν στρατιῶται ὑπὸ Χαλκιδέως ἐς πεντακοσίους ξὺν ὅπλοις κατα-
3 λειφθέντες. ἐπαγγελλομένων δέ τινων Λεσβίων τὴν ἀπόστασιν, προσφέρει τῷ τε Πεδαρίτῳ καὶ τοῖς Χίοις Ἀστύοχος λόγον ὡς χρὴ παραγενομένους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποστῆσαι τὴν Λέσβον· ἢ γὰρ ξυμμάχους πλείους σφᾶς ἕξειν ἢ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἤν τι σφάλλωνται, κακώσειν. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἐσήκουον, οὐδὲ τὰς ναῦς ὁ Πεδάριτος ἔφη τῶν Χίων αὐτῷ προήσειν.

XXXIII. Κἀκεῖνος λαβὼν τάς τε τῶν Κορινθίων πέντε καὶ ἕκτην Μεγαρίδα καὶ μίαν Ἑρμιονίδα καὶ ἃς αὐτὸς Λακωνικὰς ἦλθεν ἔχων, ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου πρὸς τὴν ναυαρχίαν, πολλὰ ἀπειλήσας τοῖς Χίοις ἢ μὴν μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, ἤν
2 τι δέωνται. καὶ προσβαλὼν Κωρύκῳ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἐνηυλίσατο. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Σάμου Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον πλέοντες τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα, λόφου διειργοντος,[1] καθωρμί-
3 σαντο, καὶ ἐλελήθεσαν ἀλλήλους. ἐλθούσης δὲ παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐπιστολῆς ὡς Ἐρυθραίων ἄνδρες αἰχμάλωτοι ἐκ Σάμου ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἥκουσιν ἀφειμένοι, ἀνάγεται ὁ Αστύ-

[1] διείργοντος, for διείργοντο καί of the MSS., Krüger.

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[1] *cf.* ch. xxviii. 5. [2] *cf.* ch. xvii. 1.
[3] Four in number; *cf.* ch. xxiii. 1.

coming from one quarter and some from another. After this Pedaritus, who at the time mentioned above[1] was moving along the shore from Miletus with a body of infantry, arrived at Erythrae and then crossed over with his army to Chios; and Astyochus also had ready to his hand soldiers from the five ships, to the number of five hundred, who had been left, together with their arms, by Chalcideus.[2] Since, now, certain Lesbians were renewing their proposals to revolt, Astyochus suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they ought to take their fleet to Lesbos and bring about the revolt of the island; for thus, he urged, they would either increase the number of their allies or, if they met with failure, would injure the Athenians. But they would not listen to the suggestion, and, furthermore, Pedaritus refused to deliver to him the ships of the Chians.

XXXIII. Astyochus therefore took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and those which he himself had brought with him from Laconia,[3] and sailed for Miletus in order to take over the office of admiral, with many threats against the Chians, and pledging himself not to aid them if they should have any need of him. Touching at Corycus in the territory of Erythrae, he spent the night there. And the Athenian fleet from Samos, which was on its way to Chios with the troops, also came to anchor there at the other side of the town, a hill intervening, so that neither fleet had seen the other. But Astyochus received during the night a letter from Pedaritus saying that some Erythraean prisoners that had been set at liberty had arrived at Erythrae from Samos for the purpose of

οχος εὐθὺς ἐς τὰς Ἐρυθρὰς πάλιν, καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἀθη-
4 ναίοις. διαπλεύσας δὲ καὶ ὁ Πεδάριτος παρ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναζητήσαντες τὰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων προδιδόναι, ὡς ηὗρον ἅπαν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς Σάμου προφασισθέν, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς αἰτίας ἀπέπλευσαν, ὁ μὲν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐκομίσθη, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο.

XXXIV. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατιὰ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τοῦ Κωρύκου περιπλέουσα κατ' Ἀργῖνον ἐπιτυγχάνει τρισὶ ναυσὶ τῶν Χίων μακραῖς, καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἐδίωκον.[1] καὶ χειμών τε μέγας ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Χίων μόλις καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν λιμένα, αἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱ μὲν μάλιστα ὁρμήσασαι τρεῖς διαφθείρονται καὶ ἐκπίπτουσι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Χίων, καὶ ἄνδρες οἱ μὲν ἁλίσκονται οἱ δ' ἀποθνήσκουσιν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν ὑπὸ τῷ Μίμαντι λιμένα Φοινικοῦντα καλούμενον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καθορμισάμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς τὸν τειχισμόν.

XXXV. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐκπλεύσας δέκα μὲν Θουρίαις ναυσίν, ὧν ἦρχε Δωριεὺς ὁ Διαγόρου τρίτος αὐτός, μιᾷ δὲ Λακωνικῇ, μιᾷ δὲ Συρακοσίᾳ, καταπλεῖ ἐς Κνίδον· ἡ δ' ἀφειστήκει
2 ἤδη ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ὡς ἤσθοντο, ἐκέλευον ταῖς μὲν ἡμισείαις τῶν νεῶν Κνίδον φυλάσσειν, ταῖς δὲ περὶ Τόρι-

[1] ὡς εἶδον, ἐδίωκον, Krüger and Boehme with B; Hude reads ὥσπερ εἶδον, ἐπεδίωκον; Stahl and Classen ὥσπερ εἶχον ἰδόντες ἐδίωκον.

betraying it; he therefore immediately set sail again for Erythrae, and thus narrowly escaped falling in with the Athenians. Pedaritus also crossed over and joined him at Erythrae; and they, having investigated the charges against those who were supposed to be intending to betray the town, when they found that the whole story had been given out only to effect the men's escape from Samos, acquitted them and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios, and Astyochus to Miletus, as he had originally intended.

XXXIV. In the meantime the Athenian armament also left Corycus, and as it was rounding the point of Arginum met with three Chian ships of war; and no sooner did they see them than they made pursuit. Now a great storm came on, and the Chian ships with great difficulty escaped to the harbour; but of the Athenian ships the three that had pursued most hotly were wrecked and cast ashore at the city of Chios, where the men aboard were either taken captive or put to death; the rest of the fleet escaped to the harbour called Phoenicus that lies at the foot of Mt. Mimas. Sailing thence they afterwards came to anchor at Lesbos and began preparing to build their fortifications.[1]

XXXV. During the same winter Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnesus with ten Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras and two colleagues, and one Laconian and one Syracusan ship, and put in at Cnidos, which had at length revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. And when those in authority at Miletus heard of their coming, they gave orders that one half of the newly arrived ships should guard Cnidos and

[1] At Delphinium (ch. lxxxviii. 2).

πιον οὖσαις τὰς ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου ὁλκάδας προσ-
3 βαλλούσας ξυλλαμβάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸ Τριόπιον
ἄκρα τῆς Κνιδίας προύχουσα, Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν.
πυθόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐκ τῆς
Σάμου λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἐπὶ Τριοπίῳ φρουρούσας
ἓξ ναῦς· οἱ δ' ἄνδρες ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καταπλεύσαντες
καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ πόλει ἀτειχίστῳ οὔσῃ
4 ὀλίγου εἷλον. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ αὖθις προσέβαλλον,
καὶ ὡς ἄμεινον φαρξαμένων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ νύκτα καὶ
ἐπεσελθόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τριοπίου ἐκ
τῶν νεῶν διαφυγόντων οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἔβλαπτον,
ἀπελθόντες καὶ δηώσαντες τὴν τῶν Κνιδίων γῆν
ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἀπέπλευσαν.

XXXVI. Ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀστυόχου
ἥκοντος ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, οἱ Πελο-
ποννήσιοι εὐπόρως ἔτι εἶχον ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὸ
στρατόπεδον. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως,
καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἰάσου μεγάλα χρήματα διαρ-
πασθέντα ὑπῆν τοῖς στρατιώταις, οἵ τε Μιλήσιοι
2 προθύμως τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἔφερον. πρὸς δὲ τὸν
Τισσαφέρνη ἐδόκουν ὅμως τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις
αἱ πρῶται ξυνθῆκαι, αἱ πρὸς Χαλκιδέα γενόμεναι,
ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρὸς σφῶν μᾶλλον, καὶ
ἄλλας ἐπὶ Θηριμένους παρόντος ἐποίουν· καὶ
εἰσὶν αἵδε.

XXXVII. "Ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν
ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας
τοὺς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνη· σπονδὰς εἶναι
καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε.

that the other half should cruise around Triopium and seize the merchantmen that touched there on the way from Egypt. Now this Triopium is a headland projecting from the territory of Cnidos and sacred to Apollo. The Athenians, being informed of their intentions, also sailed from Samos and captured the six ships that were on guard at Triopium, though their crews escaped. After this they sailed to Cnidos, and attacking the city, which was without walls, almost captured it. The next day they made a second assault, but as the inhabitants had strengthened their defences during the night and had been reinforced by the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium, the Athenians could not do so much damage as before, and so they withdrew and, after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to Samos.

XXXVI. At about the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus to take command of the fleet. The Peloponnesians were still well provided with all that their camp required, for sufficient pay was being given, the large amount of property plundered from Iasus was in the possession of the soldiers, and the Milesians were zealously prosecuting the war. Nevertheless, the Peloponnesians felt that the first compact with Tissaphernes, which had been concluded between him and Chalcideus, was defective and not so much to their interest as to his, and so they drew up another while Therimenes was there. And its terms were as follows:

XXXVII. "Compact of the Lacedaemonians and their allies with King Darius and the King's sons and Tissaphernes. There shall be a treaty and friendship on the following terms:

2 "'Οπόση χώρα καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ Δαρείου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς ἦσαν ἢ τῶν προγόνων, ἐπὶ ταύτας μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενὶ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων, μηδὲ φόρους πράσσεσθαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τούτων μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων· μηδὲ Δαρεῖον βασιλέα μηδὲ ὃν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενί.

3 "'Ην δέ τι δέωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι βασιλέως, ἢ βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅ τι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους, τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν.

4 "Τὸν δὲ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς 'Αθηναίους [1] καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους πολεμεῖν. ἢν δὲ κατάλυσιν ποιῶνται, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ποιεῖσθαι.

"'Οπόση δ' ἂν στρατιὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ βασιλέως ᾖ μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως, τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα παρέχειν.

5 "'Ην δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως ἴῃ χώραν, τοὺς ἄλλους κωλύειν καὶ ἀμύνειν βασιλεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν."

XXXVIII. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ξυνθήκας Θηριμένης παραδοὺς 'Αστυόχῳ τὰς ναῦς ἀπο-
2 πλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου

[1] Hude inserts here *βασιλέα καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους*, following Kirchhoff.

"1. Whatsoever territory and cities belong to King Darius or belonged to his father or their ancestors, against these shall neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies go either for war or to do any harm; nor shall either the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute from these cities. Nor shall King Darius or those over whom the King rules go against the Lacedaemonians or their allies for war or to do any harm.

"2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they shall persuade one another to do, this shall be right for them to do.

"3. The war against the Athenians and their allies both parties shall wage in common; and if they make peace, both shall make it in common.

"4. Whatsoever forces shall be in the territory of the King, on the summons of the King, shall be maintained at the expense of the King.

"5. If any of the cities that have entered into this compact with the King shall go against the country of the King, the rest shall strive to prevent this and aid the King to the extent of their power; and if any of those who inhabit the King's territory or any territory over which the King has dominion shall go against the territory of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall strive to prevent this and give aid to the extent of his power."

XXXVIII. After making this compact Therimenes turned over the command of the fleet to Astyochus and sailing away in a skiff was never seen again.[1] But

[1] He was doubtless lost at sea. The word is used of unexplained disappearance in IV. lxxx. 4. *Cf.* also Xen. *Hell.*, I. vi. 38.

Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη διαβεβηκότες ἐς τὴν Χίον τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ κρατοῦντες καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης Δελφίνιον ἐτείχιζον, χωρίον ἄλλως τε ἐκ γῆς καρτερὸν καὶ λιμένας ἔχον καὶ τῆς τῶν Χίων
3 πόλεως οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον. οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ἐν πολλαῖς ταῖς πρὶν μάχαις πεπληγμένοι, καὶ ἄλλως ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐ πάνυ εὖ διακείμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μετὰ Τυδέως τοῦ Ἴωνος ἤδη ὑπὸ Πεδαρίτου ἐπ' ἀττικισμῷ τεθνεώτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐς ὀλίγους [1] κατεχομένης ὑπόπτως διακείμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἡσύχαζον, καὶ οὔτ' αὐτοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε οἱ μετὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐπίκουροι
4 ἀξιόμαχοι αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνοντο. ἐς μέντοι τὴν Μίλητον ἔπεμπον, κελεύοντες σφίσι τὸν Ἀστύοχον βοηθεῖν· ὡς δ' οὐκ ἐσήκουεν, ἐπιστέλλει περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ὁ Πεδάριτος ὡς ἀδικοῦντος.
5 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Χίῳ ἐς τοῦτο καθειστήκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· αἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Σάμου νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπίπλους μὲν ἐποιοῦντο ταῖς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἀντανάγοιεν, ἀναχωροῦντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἡσύχαζον.

XXXIX. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι αἱ τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ Καλλιγείτου [2] τοῦ Μεγαρέως καὶ Τιμαγόρου τοῦ Κυζικηνοῦ πρασσόντων παρασκευασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες ἄρασαι ἔπλεον ἐπὶ Ἰωνίας περὶ ἡλίου τροπάς, καὶ ἄρχων ἐπέπλει αὐτῶν
2 Ἀντισθένης Σπαρτιάτης. ξυνέπεμψαν δὲ οἱ Λακε-

[1] ὀλίγους, for ὀλίγον of the MSS., Dobree's correction.
[2] ὑπό, before Καλλιγείτου, deleted by Poppo.

the Athenians at Lesbos, who had already crossed over with their army to Chios and exercised control over both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place which in any case was strong on the landward side and also possessed harbours and was not far distant from the city of Chios. As for the Chians, since they had been beaten in many battles already, and, besides, were not on very good terms among themselves—nay, now that Tydeus son of Ion and his adherents had already been put to death on the charge of Atticism by Pedaritus and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to the rule of an oligarchy, they were now filled with suspicion of one another—they kept quiet; and it was thought that neither they themselves, for these reasons, nor the auxiliaries under the command of Pedaritus were a match for the enemy. However, they sent to Miletus urging Astyochus to help them; but when he would not hearken, Pedaritus sent a letter about him to Lacedaemon, accusing him of wrong-doing. Such was the condition into which the Athenians found that affairs had got in Chios; and their fleet at Samos made a number of descents upon the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus; but when the latter did not come out to meet them, they retired again to Samos and kept quiet.

XXXIX. During the same winter the twenty-seven ships that had been equipped by the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus,[1] through the influence of Kalligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, set sail from the Peloponnesus for Ionia about the time of the solstice; and Antisthenes, a Spartan, sailed with the fleet as its commander. And the

[1] *cf.* ch. viii. 1.

δαιμόνιοι καὶ ἕνδεκα ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν ξυμβούλους Ἀστυόχῳ, ὧν εἷς ἦν Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου. καὶ εἵρητο αὐτοῖς ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμέλεσθαι ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ταύτας ἢ αὐτὰς ἢ πλείους ἢ καὶ ἐλάσσους ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς Φαρνάβαζον, ἣν δοκῇ, ἀποπέμπειν, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου, ὃς ξυνέπλει, ἄρχοντα προστάξαντας, καὶ Ἀστύοχον, ἣν δοκῇ [1] παύειν τῆς ναυαρχίας, Ἀντισθένη δὲ καθιστάναι· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς τοῦ Πεδαρίτου
3 ἐπιστολὰς ὑπώπτευον αὐτόν. πλέουσαι οὖν αἱ νῆες ἀπὸ Μαλέας πελάγιαι Μήλῳ προσέβαλον, καὶ περιτυχόντες ναυσὶ δέκα Ἀθηναίων τὰς τρεῖς λαμβάνουσι κενὰς καὶ κατακαίουσιν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δεδιότες μὴ αἱ διαφυγοῦσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τῆς Μήλου νῆες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μηνύσωσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, πρὸς τὴν Κρήτην πλεύσαντες καὶ πλείω τὸν πλοῦν διὰ φυλακῆς ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Καῦνον τῆς Ἀσίας
4 κατῆραν. ἐντεῦθεν δή, ὡς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ ὄντες, ἀγγελίαν ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναῦς τοῦ ξυμπαρακομισθῆναι.

XL. Οἱ δὲ Χῖοι καὶ Πεδάριτος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν ἧσσον, καίπερ διαμέλλοντα, τὸν Ἀστύοχον πέμποντες ἀγγέλους ἠξίουν σφίσι πολιορκουμένοις βοηθῆσαι ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ μὴ περιδεῖν τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ ξυμμαχίδων πόλεων ἔκ τε θαλάσσης εἰργομένην
2 καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουμένην. οἱ γὰρ

[1] τοῖς ἕνδεκα ἀνδράσι, of the MSS., deleted by van Herwerden.

Lacedaemonians also sent with him eleven Spartans to act as advisers to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas son of Arcesilaus. Their orders were, on arriving at Miletus, to share with Astyochus the general oversight of affairs in whatever way would be for the best, and also to send this fleet, with either the same number of ships or more or fewer, to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont, should this course seem expedient, appointing as its commander Clearchus[1] son of Ramphias, who was sailing with them; also, if it should seem best, to depose Astyochus from his office as admiral and put Antisthenes in his stead; for in view of the letter of Pedaritus they were suspicious of him. Accordingly these ships, sailing from Malea across the open sea, touched at Melos, and falling in with ten Athenian ships captured three of them, but without their crews, and burned them. After this, fearing that the Athenian ships that had escaped from Melos might, as actually happened, inform the Athenians at Samos of their approach, they sailed toward Crete, making the voyage longer as a measure of precaution, and put in at Caunus in Asia. From there, feeling that they were now in security, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus with a view to being convoyed along the coast.

XL. At this time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messages to Astyochus, notwithstanding his continuing to hold back, urging him, since they were being blockaded, to come to their aid with all his ships and not to look on and see the largest of the allied cities in Ionia shut off from the sea and devastated by forays on land. For the slaves of

[1] *cf.* ch. viii. 2.

οἰκέται τοῖς Χίοις πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ μιᾷ γε πόλει πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πλεῖστοι γενόμενοι καὶ ἅμα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος χαλεπωτέρως ἐν ταῖς ἀδικίαις κολαζόμενοι, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαίως ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἱδρῦσθαι, εὐθὺς αὐτομολίᾳ τε ἐχρήσαντο πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κακὰ ἐπιστάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὗτοι ἔδρασαν.
3 ἔφασαν οὖν χρῆναι οἱ Χῖοι, ἕως ἔτι ἐλπὶς καὶ δυνατὸν κωλῦσαι, τειχιζομένου τοῦ Δελφινίου καὶ ἀτελοῦς ὄντος, καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ ναυσὶν ἐρύματος μείζονος προσπεριβαλλομένου, βοηθῆσαι σφίσιν. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος καίπερ οὐ διανοούμενος διὰ τὴν τότε ἀπειλήν, ὡς ἑώρα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους προθύμους ὄντας, ὥρμητο ἐς τὸ βοηθεῖν.

XLI. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Καύνου παραγίγνεται ἀγγελία ὅτι αἱ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες καὶ οἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμβουλοι πάρεισι, καὶ νομίσας πάντα ὕστερα εἶναι τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ναῦς τε, ὅπως θαλασσοκρατοῖεν μᾶλλον, τοσαύτας ξυμπαρακομίσαι καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, οἳ ἦκον κατάσκοποι αὐτοῦ, ἀσφαλῶς περαιωθῆναι, εὐθὺς
2 ἀφεὶς τὸ ἐς τὴν Χίον ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Καῦνον. καὶ ἐς Κῶν τὴν Μεροπίδα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἀποβὰς τήν τε πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν καὶ ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ, ὃς αὐτοῖς ἔτυχε μέγιστός γε δὴ ὧν μεμνήμεθα γενόμενος, ξυμπεπτωκυῖαν ἐκπορθεῖ, τῶν ἀνθρώ-

[1] *cf.* ch. xxxiii. 1.

the Chians, who were numerous—and indeed the most numerous in any single city except that of the Lacedaemonians—and at the same time, on account of their multitude, were punished more severely for every misdeed, now that the Athenian army seemed, with the advantage of a fortified position, to be firmly established, immediately began to desert to them in large numbers; and these, because of their knowledge of the country, wrought the greatest damage to it. So the Chians said that he ought to come to their aid now, while there was still hope and a possibility of checking the enemy, and while the fortification of Delphinium was still in progress and not yet completed, a stronger line of breastworks being now in process of construction round the camp and ships. And Astyochus, although he had not intended to do so, on account of his threat some time before,[1] when he saw that the allies also were eager for the undertaking, was disposed to give the desired aid.

XLI. Meanwhile tidings came from Caunus that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived; whereupon Astyochus, thinking that everything else was of secondary importance compared with convoying so large a reinforcement of the fleet, so that they might be more completely masters of the sea, and with getting the Lacedaemonians, who had come to observe his conduct, safely across, immediately gave up the expedition to Chios and sailed to Caunus. As he proceeded along the coast he landed at Cos Meropis and sacked the town, which was without walls and by reason of an earthquake that had befallen it—the most violent of all within our memory—was now in ruins,

πων ἐς τὰ ὄρη πεφευγότων, καὶ τὴν χώραν καταδρομαῖς λείαν ἐποιεῖτο, πλὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων·
3 τούτους δὲ ἀφίει. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Κῶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Κνίδον νυκτὸς ἀναγκάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν Κνιδίων παραινούντων μὴ ἐκβιβάσαι τοὺς ναύτας, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἶχε πλεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς εἴκοσι, ἃς ἔχων Χαρμῖνος, εἷς τῶν ἐκ Σάμου στρατηγῶν, ἐφύλασσε ταύτας τὰς ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου προσπλεούσας, ἐφ'
4 ἅσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος παρέπλει. ἐπύθοντο δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἐκ τῆς Μήλου τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ τῷ Χαρμίνῳ περὶ τὴν Σύμην καὶ Χάλκην καὶ Ῥόδον καὶ περὶ τὴν Λυκίαν ἦν· ἤδη γὰρ ᾐσθάνετο καὶ ἐν τῇ Καύνῳ οὖσας αὐτάς.

XLII. Ἐπέπλει οὖν ὥσπερ εἶχε πρὸς τὴν Σύμην ὁ Ἀστύοχος πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, εἴ πως περιλάβοι που μετεώρους τὰς ναῦς. καὶ αὐτῷ ὑετός τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ξυννέφελα ὄντα πλάνησιν τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ ταραχὴν
2 παρέσχεν. καὶ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ, διεσπασμένου τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν φανεροῦ ἤδη ὄντος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τοῦ εὐωνύμου κέρως, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου περὶ τὴν νῆσον ἔτι πλανωμένου, ἐπανάγονται κατὰ τάχος ὁ Χαρμῖνος καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάσσοσιν ἢ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσί, νομίσαντες ἅσπερ ἐφύλασσον ναῦς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου[1] ταύτας
3 εἶναι. καὶ προσπεσόντες εὐθὺς κατέδυσάν τε τρεῖς καὶ κατετραυμάτισαν ἄλλας, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπεκράτουν, μέχρι οὗ ἐπεφάνησαν αὐτοῖς παρὰ δόξαν αἱ πλείους τῶν νεῶν καὶ πανταχόθεν

[1] τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου, deleted by Hude.

the inhabitants having fled to the mountains; and by forays he despoiled the country of everything, except the free population, which he let go. Coming then from Cos to Cnidos by night, he was forced by the importunity of the Cnidians not to permit his sailors to land, but, just as he was, to sail straight against the twenty Athenian ships, with which Charminus, one of the generals from Samos, was on the look-out for the twenty-seven ships that were approaching from the Peloponnesus—the ships which Astyochus was sailing along the coast to meet. For the Athenians at Samos had received word from Melos of their approach, and the outposts of Charminus were on the look-out for them in the neighbourhood of Syme, Chalce, Rhodes and the coast of Lycia; for he was already aware of their being at Caunus.

XLII. Astyochus, therefore, sailed directly to Syme before his arrival was reported, on the chance that he might find the Peloponnesian ships somewhere on the high seas. But rain and the foggy state of the atmosphere caused his ships to lose their way in the darkness and confusion. At daybreak, when his fleet was still scattered and one part of it, the left wing, was already visible to the Athenians, while the rest of it was still wandering round the island, Charminus and the Athenians hastily put to sea against them with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the ships from Caunus which they were watching for. And falling upon them at once they sank three and damaged others, and in the general action were having the advantage until, to their surprise, the larger body of ships came in sight and they found

4 ἀπεκλήοντο. ἔπειτα δὲ ἐς φυγὴν καταστάντες ἓξ μὲν ναῦς ἀπολλύασι, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὴν Τευτλοῦσσαν νῆσον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ
5 ἐς Ἁλικαρνασσόν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς Κνίδον κατάραντες καὶ ξυμμιγεισῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καύνου ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν αὐτοῖς ξυμπάσαις πλεύσαντες καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ στήσαντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καθωρμίσαντο.

XLIII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶ πάσαις, ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας, πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Σύμην καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ ναυτικὸν οὐχ ὁρμήσαντες, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι ἐπ' ἐκείνους, λαβόντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ σκεύη τῶν νεῶν καὶ Λωρύμοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ προσβαλόντες, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

2 Ἅπασαι δ' ἤδη οὖσαι ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ αἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπεσκευάζοντό τε εἴ τι ἔδει, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνη (παρεγένετο γάρ) λόγους ἐποιοῦντο οἱ ἕνδεκα ἄνδρες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων περί τε τῶν ἤδη πεπραγμένων, εἴ τι μὴ ἤρεσκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πολέμου, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα καὶ ξυμφορώτατα ἀμφοτέροις πολε-
3 μήσεται. μάλιστα δὲ ὁ Λίχας ἐσκόπει τὰ ποιούμενα, καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐδετέρας, οὔτε τὰς Χαλκιδέως οὔτε τὰς Θηριμένους, ἔφη καλῶς ξυγκεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ χώρας ὅσης βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι ἦρξαν πρότερον, ταύτης καὶ νῦν ἀξιώσει κρατεῖν (ἐνῆν γὰρ καὶ νήσους ἁπάσας πάλιν δουλεύειν καὶ Θεσσαλίαν καὶ Λοκροὺς καὶ τὰ μέχρι Βοιωτῶν), καὶ ἀντ' ἐλευ-

themselves being hemmed in on all sides. Thereupon they took to flight, losing six ships, but with the rest they fled for refuge to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put in at Cnidos, where they were joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, whereupon they sailed out with the whole fleet, set up a trophy at Syme, and finally came to anchor again at Cnidos.

XLIII. When the Athenians heard about the sea-fight, they sailed to Syme with all the ships they had at Samos. They did not, however, make an attack upon the fleet at Cnidos, nor the Peloponnesians upon them, but took aboard the naval stores that were at Syme and, after touching at Lorymi on the mainland, sailed back to Samos.

All the Peloponnesian ships were now at Cnidos and were engaged in making the necessary repairs; and as Tissaphernes had arrived, the eleven Lacedaemonian advisers were holding conferences with him touching matters that had already been negotiated, if any point in the agreements was unsatisfactory to them, as well as concerning future hostilities, in what way the war might be waged best and most advantageously for both parties. And it was Lichas who examined most closely what was being done, saying that neither of the treaties, neither that of Chalcideus nor that of Therimenes, was wisely framed; nay, he said that it was monstrous that the King should even now claim authority over all the territory which he and his ancestors had formerly ruled—for that would mean that all the islands should again be in slavery, as well as Thessaly, Locri and everything as far as Boeotia—and that

θερίας ἂν Μηδικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοὺς
4 Λακεδαιμονίους περιθεῖναι. ἑτέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἢ ταύταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδέν. ἀγανακτῶν δὲ ὁ μὲν Τισσαφέρνης ἀπεχώρησεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν δι' ὀργῆς καὶ ἄπρακτος.

XLIV. Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, ἐλπίζοντες νῆσόν τε οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ ναυβατῶν πλήθει καὶ πεζῶν προσάξεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἡγούμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ξυμμαχίας δυνατοὶ ἔσεσθαι, Τισσαφέρνη μὴ αἰτοῦντες
2 χρήματα, τρέφειν τὰς ναῦς. πλεύσαντες οὖν εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἐκ τῆς Κνίδου, καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμίρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρασσόμενα, καὶ ἔφευγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς πόλεως· εἶτα ξυγκαλέσαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν πόλεοιν, Λίνδου τε καὶ Ἰηλύσου, Ῥοδίους ἔπεισαν ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων.
3 καὶ προσεχώρησε Ῥόδος Πελοποννησίοις. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶν αἰσθόμενοι ἔπλευσαν μὲν βουλόμενοι φθάσαι καὶ ἐφάνησαν πελάγιοι, ὑστερήσαντες δὲ οὐ πολλῷ τὸ μὲν παραχρῆμα ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Χάλκην, ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐς Σάμον, ὕστερον δὲ

instead of bringing freedom the Lacedaemonians would place the Persian yoke upon the Hellenes. Accordingly he urged that another and better treaty be concluded; at any rate, the Lacedaemonians would not abide by this, nor did they want his support at all upon such terms. Tissaphernes was offended at this and went away from the conference in a rage without having settled anything.

XLIV. The Lacedaemonians, however, were minded to sail to Rhodes, since overtures were coming to them from the most influential men there; for they hoped that they could bring over to their side an island that was no mean power because of the large number of seamen and soldiers which it could furnish, and at the same time they thought that they would be able by themselves to maintain their fleet, on the basis of the existing alliance, without asking Tissaphernes for money. They therefore sailed at once that same winter from Cnidos, and touching first at Camirus in Rhodian territory with ninety-four ships, they so terrified most of the inhabitants, who knew nothing of the plan that was being negotiated, that they fled, especially since the city had no walls. Afterwards the Lacedaemonians called them together as well as the inhabitants of the two cities Lindus and Ialysus, and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. So Rhodes came over to the Peloponnesian side. But the Athenians at this juncture, getting notice of their designs, sailed with the fleet they had at Samos, wishing to forestall them, and made their appearance out at sea; but finding that they were a little too late, they sailed back for the moment to Chalce, and thence returned

ἐκ τῆς Χάλκης καὶ ἐκ τῆς Κῶ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου τοὺς ἐπίπλους ποιούμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥόδον ἐπο-
4 λέμουν. οἱ δὲ χρήματα μὲν ἐξέλεξαν ἐς δύο καὶ τριάκοντα τάλαντα, οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, παρὰ τῶν Ῥοδίων, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον ἡμέρας ὀγδοήκοντα ἀνελκύσαντες τὰς ναῦς.

XLV. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον αὐτοὺς ἀναστῆναι, τάδε ἐπράσσετο. Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τὸν Χαλκιδέως θάνατον καὶ τὴν ἐν Μιλήτῳ μάχην τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ὕποπτος ὢν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστύοχον ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι (ἦν γὰρ τῷ Ἀγιδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος ἐφαίνετο), πρῶτον μὲν ὑποχωρεῖ δείσας παρὰ Τισσαφέρνη, ἔπειτα ἐκάκου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅσον ἐδύνατο μάλιστα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγ-
2 ματα, καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόμενος τήν τε μισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεμεν, ἀντὶ δραχμῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ξυνεχῶς, δίδοσθαι, λέγειν κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου[1] ἐπιστήμονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον[2] τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες, οἱ μὲν τὰ σώματα χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ' ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυμβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν

[1] χρόνου, deleted by Hude, following Krüger's suggestion.
[2] Hude follows Stahl in assuming a lacuna here, καὶ τοῦτ' οὐ ξυνεχῶς, or words of this purport, being lost.

to Samos. Afterwards, however, making raids from Chalce and Cos and Samos, they carried on hostilities against Rhodes. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of thirty-two talents,[1] but otherwise they remained inactive for eighty days, drawing their ships up on shore.

XLV. But in the meantime, and even before the Peloponnesians removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were going on. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades, finding himself under suspicion with the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having received a letter from Lacedaemon ordering him to be put to death—for he was a personal enemy of Agis and in general appeared untrustworthy—at first withdrew in alarm to Tissaphernes and then proceeded to damage the Peloponnesian cause with him as much as he possibly could. Becoming his adviser in all matters, he cut down the pay of the troops, so that instead of an Attic drachma [2] only three obols were given, and that not regularly, and he urged Tissaphernes to tell them that the Athenians, who had had experience in naval matters for a longer time, gave only three obols to their men,[3] not so much through lack of money as with the purpose of keeping their sailors from growing insolent by reason of abundance; for some would injure their health by spending their money on things which bring on sickness, while others would desert their ships without leaving

[1] £64,000; $305,900.

[2] *cf.* ch. xxix. 1.

[3] The part of the sentence that follows would seem to be Thucydides' explanation of the reasons of the Athenians.

οὐχ[1] ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμηρείαν τὸν προσοφει-
3 λόμενον μισθόν· καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς
στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκε δόντα[2] χρή-
ματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα
ἑαυτῷ πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ Ἑρμο-
κράτης ἠναντιοῦτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος
4 ξυμμαχικοῦ. τάς τε πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων
ἀπήλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρ-
νους ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώ-
τατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ ὅμως
σῳζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς
χρήμασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας
5 κινδυνεύειν· τὰς δ' ἄλλας πόλεις ἔφη ἀδικεῖν, αἳ
ἐς Ἀθηναίους πρότερον ἢ ἀποστῆναι ἀνήλουν, εἰ
μὴ καὶ νῦν τοσαῦτα καὶ ἔτι πλείω ὑπὲρ σφῶν
6 αὐτῶν ἐθελήσουσιν ἐσφέρειν. τόν τε Τισσαφέρνη
ἀπέφαινε νῦν μέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήμασι πολεμοῦντα,
εἰκότως φειδόμενον, ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῇ
παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν
μισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὠφελήσειν.

XLVI. Παρῄνει δὲ καὶ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει μὴ
ἄγαν ἐπείγεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον διαλῦσαι, μηδὲ
βουληθῆναι ἢ κομίσαντα ναῦς Φοινίσσας ἅσπερ
παρεσκευάζετο ἢ Ἕλλησι πλείοσι μισθὸν πορί-
ζοντα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς τε γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης
τὸ κράτος δοῦναι, ἔχειν δ' ἀμφοτέρους ἐᾶν δίχα

[1] So B only, most MSS. ἀπολιπόντες.
[2] ὥστε, before δόντα, deleted by Reiske.

[1] Or, reading ἀπολείπωσιν ὑπολιπόντες, "desert their ships, leaving behind," etc. The guarantee would be an inducement to the captain to grant leave of absence to the detriment of

behind [1] as a guarantee the part of their pay that was still due. He also taught him how by the use of money to persuade the trierarchs and generals to agree with him in these matters—all except the Syracusans, and of them Hermocrates alone opposed him, doing so on behalf of the alliance as a whole. Furthermore, when the several cities asked for money he dismissed them, taking it upon himself to answer on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians were shameless people, for though they were the wealthiest of the Hellenes and owed their salvation to outside help, nevertheless they expected others to risk their lives and their money also for the defence of their liberty. And as for the other states, which before they revolted used to lavish money upon the Athenians, he said that they were doing wrong unless they were willing at this time also to contribute as much or even more for their own protection. And he further explained that, though Tissaphernes, now that he was waging war on his own resources, was quite properly frugal, yet if ever supplies should come down from the King he would give the men their full pay and would render to the states all reasonable aid.

XLVI. Alcibiades also urged Tissaphernes not to be too eager to bring the war to an end, nor to take such a course, either by bringing there the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping or by providing pay for a larger number of Hellenes, as would give the command of both the land and the sea to the same people, but to let the dominion be divided between the two sides, so that it would be possible

the service. On the smaller pay the sailors would have no balance in the hands of their captains.

τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλεῖ ἐξεῖναι ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ
2 λυπηροὺς τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐπάγειν. γενομένης δ' ἂν
καθ' ἓν τῆς ἐς γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀρχῆς, ἀπορεῖν
ἂν αὐτὸν οἷς τοὺς κρατοῦντας ξυγκαθαιρήσει, ἢν
μὴ αὐτὸς βούληται μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ καὶ κινδύνῳ
ἀναστάς ποτε διαγωνίσασθαι. εὐτελέστερα δὲ
τάδ' εἶναι, βραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ ἅμα
μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς
3 τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατατρῖψαι. ἐπιτηδειοτέρους τε
ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶναι κοινωνοὺς αὐτῷ τῆς
ἀρχῆς· ἧσσον γὰρ τῶν κατὰ γῆν ἐφίεσθαι[1] τὸν
λόγον τε ξυμφορώτατον καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἔχοντας
πολεμεῖν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ξυγκαταδουλοῦν ἂν
σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης μέρος καὶ
ἐκείνῳ ὅσοι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσι,
τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐλευθερώσοντας ἥκειν. καὶ
οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπὸ μὲν σφῶν
τῶν Ἑλλήνων[2] ἐλευθεροῦν νῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας,
ἀπὸ δ' ἐκείνων τῶν βαρβάρων,[3] ἢν μή ποτε
4 αὐτοὺς ἐξέλωσι,[4] μὴ ἐλευθερῶσαι. τρίβειν οὖν
ἐκέλευε πρῶτον ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ἀποτεμόμενον
ὡς μέγιστα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπειτ' ἤδη τοὺς
5 Πελοποννησίους ἀπαλλάξαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας. καὶ

[1] *καί*, after *ἐφίεσθαι*, added by Gertz, followed by Hude.
[2] *τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, bracketed by Hude and most editors, after Valckenaer.
[3] *τῶν βαρβάρων*, deleted by Hude, with B.
[4] *μή*, before *ἐξέλωσι*, deleted by Madvig.

for the King to lead the one party or the other against those that were troublesome to him. But if the dominion of both land and sea were united, the King himself would have no one with whom he could co-operate in destroying the stronger, and would have no alternative but sooner or later to rise up himself[1] and, at great expense and risk, fight a decisive struggle. The cheaper course was this—at a small fraction of the expense and at the same time with security to himself to wear the Hellenes out one upon the other. The more suitable partners, he said, with whom to share the sovereignty were the Athenians; for they were less desirous of possessions on land and both their principles and practice in carrying on war were most consistent with his interests; for whereas the Athenians would co-operate with him in making subject to themselves the department of the sea and to him such of the Hellenes as lived in the King's country, the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, had come to liberate these. It was not reasonable, he added, to suppose that the Lacedaemonians would now be liberating the Hellenes from men who, like themselves, were Hellenes, and would not liberate them from the Persians who were Barbarians, unless these sooner or later got them out of the way. He therefore urged him, first to wear out both sides, then to curtail the power of the Athenians as much as possible, and finally to get the Peloponnesians out of his country.

[1] The word *ἀναστὰς* seems to be used because Alcibiades has in mind the *ἔφεδρος* or third combatant in the games, who sits by to fight the victor. The policy he urges is that the King should sit by while the Athenians and Lacedaemonians fight and weaken each other, as otherwise he may have to "enter the ring" against a strong opponent.

διενοεῖτο τὸ πλέον οὕτως ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν[1] εἰκάσαι. τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς εὖ περὶ τούτων παραινοῦντι, προσθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐς πίστιν τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας φάσκων ναῦς ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυράν, τά τε ἄλλα καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.

XLVII. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν τῷ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ βασιλεῖ, ὧν παρ' ἐκείνοις, ἄριστα εἶναι νομίζων παρῄνει, ἅμα δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάθοδον ἐς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπιθεραπεύων, εἰδώς, εἰ μὴ διαφθερεῖ αὐτήν, ὅτι ἔσται ποτὲ αὐτῷ πείσαντι κατελθεῖν· πεῖσαι δ' ἂν ἐνόμιζε μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, εἰ Τισσαφέρνης φαίνοιτο αὐτῷ ἐπιτήδειος
2 ὤν· ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ᾔσθοντο αὐτὸν ἰσχύοντα παρ' αὐτῷ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων στρατιῶται, τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν ἄνδρας ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι ἐπ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται καὶ οὐ πονηρίᾳ[2] τῇ ἑαυτὸν ἐκβαλούσῃ κατελθὼν καὶ παρασχὼν Τισσαφέρνη φίλον αὐτοῖς ξυμπο-

[1] ἦν, deleted by Krüger, followed by Hude.
[2] οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ, in the MSS. after πονηρίᾳ, deleted by van Herwerden.

And Tissaphernes was more inclined to this course, so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he was doing. For he consequently gave his support and confidence to Alcibiades, as though he thought his advice in the matter good, and not only furnished wretched maintenance to the Peloponnesians, but also would not allow them to fight at sea; instead, he kept telling them that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then contend with superabundant strength; and thus he injured their cause and diminished the vigour of their fleet, which had been very strong; and in general it was too evident to escape notice that he was not zealously co-operating in the war.

XLVII. This advice Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the King while he was under their protection, not only because he believed it to be best, but also because he was at the same time working for his own restoration to his fatherland, knowing that, if he did not ruin that prospect, it would some day be possible for him to gain the consent of his countrymen and be restored. And the means by which he thought he could best persuade them was this—to make it appear that Tissaphernes was on intimate terms with him; and that, in fact, is what happened. For the Athenian soldiers at Samos perceived that he had great influence with Tissaphernes, partly because Alcibiades sent word to the most influential men among them to make mention of him to the best people and say that he wished to come home on condition of there being an oligarchy and not the villainous mob-rule that had banished him, and after securing the friendship of Tissaphernes to be a fellow-citizen

λιτεύειν, τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τριήραρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι ὥρμηντο ἐς τὸ καταλῦσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

XLVIII. Καὶ ἐκινήθη πρότερον ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐντεῦθεν ὕστερον. τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαβάντες τινὲς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, καὶ ὑποτείνοντος αὐτοῦ Τισσαφέρνη μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέα φίλον ποιήσειν, εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῖντο (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πιστεῦσαι μᾶλλον βασιλέα), πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοί τε ἑαυτοῖς οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἵπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἑαυτοὺς περιποιήσειν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπι-
2 κρατήσειν. ἔς τε τὴν Σάμον ἐλθόντες ξυνίστασάν τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἐς ξυνωμοσίαν καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς φανερῶς ἔλεγον ὅτι βασιλεὺς σφίσι φίλος ἔσοιτο καὶ χρήματα παρέξοι Ἀλκιβιάδου τε κατελθόντος καὶ μὴ δημοκρατουμένων.
3 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὅχλος, εἰ καί τι παραυτίκα ἤχθετο τοῖς πρασσομένοις, διὰ τὸ εὔπορον τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ παρὰ βασιλέως μισθοῦ ἡσύχαζεν· οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ πλήθει ἐκοίνωσαν, αὖθις κἀν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέονι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκόπουν.
4 καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐφαίνετο εὔπορα καὶ πιστά, Φρυνίχῳ δὲ στρατηγῷ ἔτι ὄντι οὐδὲν ἤρεσκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τε Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὅπερ καὶ ἦν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δεῖσθαι ἐδόκει αὐτῷ

with them; but of still greater moment was the fact that even on their own initiative the Athenian trierarchs at Samos and the most influential men were bent upon overthrowing the democracy.

XLVIII. This movement began first in the camp and from there spread to the city of Athens. Then certain men crossed over from Samos and had a conference with Alcibiades, and when he held out to them that he would first make Tissaphernes a friend and then the King also, if there were not a democracy —for so the King would have more confidence in them—the influential citizens, who are apt to bear the heaviest burdens, had great hopes for themselves personally that they would get the government into their own hands and prevail over the enemy as well. So they went to Samos and set about combining in a conspiracy such men as were suitable, at the same time saying openly to the people that the King would be a friend to them and would furnish money if Alcibiades were restored and they were not ruled by a democracy. The multitude, even if at the moment it was somewhat dissatisfied with the scheme, none the less kept quiet because the prospect of pay from the King seemed easy of attainment; while those who were trying to establish the oligarchy, as soon as they had made their designs known to the people, once more took up the proposals of Alcibiades for consideration among themselves and the majority of the members of the political clubs. And to most of these the proposals appeared practicable and trustworthy; Phrynichus, however, who was still general, did not find them at all satisfactory, but was of opinion that Alcibiades had really no more desire for an oligarchy han for a democracy, and had no other object in

οὐδ' ἄλλο[1] τι σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου τὴν πόλιν μεταστήσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἑταίρων[2] παρακληθεὶς κάτεισι, σφίσι δὲ περιοπτέον εἶναι τοῦτο μάλιστα ὅπως μὴ στασιάσωσιν· τῷ βασιλεῖ τε οὐκ εὔπορον εἶναι, καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἤδη ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὄντων καὶ πόλεις ἐχόντων ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρχῇ οὐκ ἐλαχίστας, Ἀθηναίοις προσθέμενον, οἷς οὐ πιστεύει, πράγματα ἔχειν, ἐξὸν Πελοποννησίους, ὑφ' ὧν κακὸν οὐδὲν πέπονθε, φίλους ποιήσασθαι. 5 τάς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑποσχήσεσθαι[3] δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὔθ' αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται οὔθ' αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ' ὁποτέρου 6 ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι· τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, πορισταὶ ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ

[1] οὐδ' ἄλλο, Vat., Hude reads ἢ ἄλλο with the other MSS.
[2] ἑταίρων, with M, Hude retains ἑτέρων, with most of the MSS.
[3] ὑποσχήσεσθαι, Boehme, for ὑπεσχῆσθαι of the MSS.

[1] *i. e.* the aristocrats.
[2] The πορισταὶ at Athens were a board appointed in times

view than in some manner, by bringing about in the state a change from its present order, to secure his own return at the invitation of his party associates. The Athenians, however, in the opinion of Phrynichus, must make it their chief concern to avoid being rent with factions. Neither was it in the interest of the King, he said, now that the Peloponnesians were at home on the sea quite as much as the Athenians and held possession of cities in his empire which were not the smallest, to attach himself to the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and thus involve himself in trouble, when it was possible to make friends of the Peloponnesians, from whom he had suffered no harm. As for the allied cities, to which forsooth they would promise an oligarchical form of government for the reason that they themselves would not be under a democracy, he said that he knew well that neither those which had revolted from the Athenians would be any more likely to come back into the alliance nor would those which still remained allies be more staunch; for they would not want to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy in preference to being free with whichever form they might perchance have such freedom. And as to those who were called "the good and true" men,[1] he said that the allies believed that they would bring them no less trouble than the popular party, being as they were providers[2] and proposers to the people of evil projects from which they themselves got the most benefit. Indeed, so far as it rested with these men, they, the allies, would be put to death not only without trial but by methods

of financial difficulty to devise and propose (ἐσηγεῖσθαι) new sources of revenue.

βιαιότερον ἀποθνῄσκειν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον σφῶν τε
7 καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. καὶ
ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς
πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν.
οὔκουν ἑαυτῷ γε τῶν ἀπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ[1] ἐν
τῷ παρόντι πρασσομένων ἀρέσκειν οὐδέν.

XLIX. Οἱ δὲ ξυλλεγέντες τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ,
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει, τά τε παρόντα
ἐδέχοντο καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις Πείσανδρον
καὶ ἄλλους παρεσκευάζοντο πέμπειν, ὅπως περί
τε τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου πράσσοιεν καὶ
τῆς τοῦ ἐκεῖ δήμου καταλύσεως καὶ τὸν Τισσα-
φέρνη φίλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ποιήσειαν.

L. Γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ὅτι ἔσοιτο περὶ τῆς
τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου λόγος καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι
ἐνδέξονται αὐτήν, δείσας πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν
λεχθέντων ὑφ' αὑτοῦ μή, ἢν κατέλθῃ, ὡς κωλυτὴν
2 ὄντα κακῶς δρᾷ, τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε τι. πέμπει
ὡς τὸν Ἀστύοχον, τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων ναύαρχον,
ἔτι ὄντα τότε περὶ τὴν Μίλητον, κρύφα ἐπιστείλας
ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα φθείρει
Τισσαφέρνη Ἀθηναίοις φίλον ποιῶν, καὶ τἆλλα
σαφῶς ἐγγράψας· ξυγγνώμην δὲ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ περὶ
ἀνδρὸς πολεμίου καὶ μετὰ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀξυμ-
3 φόρου κακόν τι βουλεύειν. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος τὸν
μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐς
χεῖρας ἰόντα, οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀνελθὼν
δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐς Μαγνησίαν καὶ παρὰ Τισσα-

[1] καί, in MSS. before ἐν, bracketed by Hude, following Valla.

[1] *cf.* VI. xcii. 2 for similar excuse.

even more violent, whereas the people were a refuge to themselves and a check upon the oligarchs. This understanding of the matter, he asserted, the allied cities had gained from the facts themselves, and he was quite sure that this was their opinion. Therefore, to himself at least not one of the schemes that were being advocated by Alcibiades at the present time was satisfactory.

XLIX. But the members of the conspiracy who had assembled went on as they had originally determined and accepted the present proposals, and prepared to send Peisander and others as envoys to Athens, that they might negotiate both about the return of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy in that city and might make Tissaphernes a friend to the Athenians.

L. But Phrynichus, knowing that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would accept it, and also fearing, in view of the opposition he had shown in his own speech, that if Alcibiades came back he would do him injury as one who had been in his way, now had recourse to the following device. He sent to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was at this time still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, secret information by letter that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, and also wrote an explicit account of his other doings; he added that it was pardonable in himself to devise evil for an enemy, even though this involved detriment to his state.[1] But Astyochus did not even think of punishing Alcibiades, especially as he no longer came within his reach as formerly, but going up to Magnesia to visit him and

φέρνη ἅμα λέγει τε αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπισταλέντα ἐκ τῆς Σάμου καὶ γίγνεται αὐτὸς μηνυτής, προσέθηκέ τε, ὡς ἐλέγετο, ἐπὶ ἰδίοις κέρδεσι Τισσαφέρνει ἑαυτὸν καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· δι' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς μισθοφορᾶς οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης
4 μαλακωτέρως ἀνθήπτετο. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης πέμπει εὐθὺς κατὰ Φρυνίχου γράμματα ἐς τὴν Σάμον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας οἷα δέδρακε, καὶ ἀξιῶν
5 αὐτὸν ἀποθνῄσκειν. θορυβούμενος δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος καὶ πάνυ, ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ μήνυμα, ἐπιστέλλει αὖθις πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον, τά τε πρότερα μεμφόμενος ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐκρύφθη, καὶ νῦν ὅτι ὅλον τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑτοῖμος εἴη τὸ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ[1] παρασχεῖν αὐτοῖς διαφθεῖραι, γράψας καθ' ἕκαστα, ἀτειχίστου οὔσης Σάμου, ᾗ ἂν τρόπῳ αὐτὰ πράξειε, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίφθονόν οἱ ἤδη εἴη περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δι' ἐκείνους κινδυνεύοντι καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθίστων αὐτὸν διαφθαρῆναι. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος μηνύει καὶ ταῦτα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ.

LI. Καὶ ὡς προῄσθετο αὐτὸν ὁ Φρύνιχος ἀδικοῦντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παροῦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου περὶ τούτων ἐπιστολήν, αὐτὸς προφθάσας τῷ στρατεύματι ἐξάγγελος γίγνεται ὡς οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν, ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς Σάμου καὶ ἅμα τῶν νεῶν οὐ πασῶν ἔνδον ὁρμουσῶν, ἐπιθήσεσθαι τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς πεπυσμένος εἴη, καὶ χρῆναι τειχίζειν τε Σάμον ὡς τάχιστα

[1] τὸ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ, bracketed by Hude, following Stahl.

Tissaphernes he not only told them the contents of the letter he had received from Samos, himself becoming an informer, but also attached himself, as it was said, to Tissaphernes for his own private gain, both in this and in other matters; and it was for this reason that in dealing with the question of the pay, which was not being paid in full, his insistence was rather feeble. Alcibiades immediately wrote a letter against Phrynichus to the authorities at Samos, telling them what he had done and urging that he be put to death. Phrynichus was exceedingly disturbed, since he was in the very greatest danger on account of the information he had given; he accordingly wrote again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been concealed, as in honour it should have been, and adding that now he was ready to furnish the Lacedaemonians the opportunity to destroy the whole Athenian army at Samos, stating in detail how he could do this, since Samos was without walls; it was not culpable in himself, he concluded, now that he was in danger of his life through their actions, to do this or anything else rather than perish himself at the hands of his bitterest enemies. But Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.

LI. And when Phrynichus learned betimes that Astyochus was working to injure him and that a letter from Alcibiades about these matters had all but come, he anticipated it by himself informing the army that the enemy intended, seeing that Samos had no walls and that not all the ships were anchored inside the harbour, to attack the camp; he said that he had certain information of this, and that they ought to fortify Samos as quickly as possible and

καὶ τἆλλα ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν. ἐστρατήγει δὲ καὶ
2 κύριος ἦν αὐτὸς πράσσων ταῦτα. καὶ οἱ μὲν
τὸν τειχισμόν τε παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοι-
ούτου, καὶ ὡς μέλλουσα, Σάμος θᾶσσον ἐτειχίσθη·
αἱ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐπιστολαὶ οὐ πολὺ
ὕστερον ἦκον ὅτι παραδίδοταί τε τὸ στράτευμα
ὑπὸ Φρυνίχου καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν ἐπι-
3 θήσεσθαι. δόξας δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐ πιστὸς
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προειδὼς τῷ
Φρυνίχῳ ὡς ξυνειδότι κατ' ἔχθραν ἀνατιθέναι,
οὐδὲν ἔβλαψεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξυνεμαρτύρησε
μᾶλλον ταὐτὰ[1] ἐξαγγείλας.

LII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν Τισσα-
φέρνη παρεσκεύαζε καὶ ἀνέπειθεν ὅπως φίλος
ἔσται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, δεδιότα μὲν τοὺς Πελο-
ποννησίους, ὅτι πλείοσι ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
παρῆσαν, βουλόμενον δὲ ὅμως, εἰ δύναιτό πως,
πεισθῆναι,[2] ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ
διαφορὰν περὶ τῶν Θηριμένους σπονδῶν ᾔσθετο
τῶν Πελοποννησίων (ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
καιρὸν ἐν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ὄντων αὐτῷ ἐγεγένητο), ἐν ᾗ
τὸν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου λόγον πρότερον εἰρημένον
περὶ τοῦ ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς
ἁπάσας πόλεις ἐπηλήθευσεν ὁ Λίχας, οὐ φάσκων
ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι ξυγκεῖσθαι κρατεῖν βασιλέα τῶν
πόλεων, ὧν ποτε καὶ πρότερον ἦ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ πατέρες
ἦρχον. καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἅτε περὶ μεγά-

[1] Heilmann's correction for ταῦτα of the MSS.
[2] πεισθῆναι, Hude reads πιστευθῆναι with CG.

keep a watch upon everything. Now he was general, and was within his powers in acting thus on his own authority. So they set about preparing the fortifications, and in consequence of this Samos, which in any case would soon have been ready, was more quickly fortified. Not long afterward came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus and that the enemy would soon attack. But since Alcibiades was not regarded as a trustworthy man, but was believed, as he knew beforehand the plans of the enemy, to be actuated by personal enmity in attributing to Phrynichus a guilty knowledge of them, the accusation did Phrynichus no harm, but rather confirmed his statement by giving the same information.

LII. After this Alcibiades continued to work on Tissaphernes and to urge him to be a friend to the Athenians. Now though Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with a larger fleet than the Athenians, nevertheless he wanted to follow this advice if in any way he could do so, especially now that he had become aware of the disagreement that had arisen at Cnidos among the Peloponnesians[1] about the treaty of Therimenes—for by this time the Peloponnesians were at Rhodes, so that the dispute had already taken place —in the course of which disagreement Lichas had verified the statement made before by Alcibiades, that it was the Lacedaemonian policy to liberate all the cities, declaring that it was intolerable to agree that the King should be master of all the cities over which he himself or his fathers had ever before held sway. Alcibiades, then, as one that contended for

[1] *cf.* ch. xliii. 3.

λων ἀγωνιζόμενος, προθύμως τῷ Τισσαφέρνει θεραπεύων προσέκειτο.

LIII. Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου πρέσβεις[1] ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κεφαλαιοῦντες ἐκ πολλῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ὡς ἐξείη αὐτοῖς Ἀλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις βασιλέα τε ξύμμαχον ἔχειν
2 καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιγενέσθαι. ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων περὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἅμα ἐχθρῶν διαβοώντων ὡς δεινὸν εἴη εἰ τοὺς νόμους βιασάμενος κάτεισι, καὶ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ Κηρύκων περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν, δι' ἅπερ ἔφυγε, μαρτυρομένων καὶ ἐπιθειαζόντων μὴ κατάγειν, ὁ Πείσανδρος παρελθὼν πρὸς πολλὴν ἀντιλογίαν καὶ σχετλιασμὸν ἠρώτα ἕνα ἕκαστον παράγων τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων, ἥντινα ἐλπίδα ἔχει σωτηρίας τῇ πόλει, Πελοποννησίων ναῦς τε οὐκ ἐλάσσους σφῶν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀντιπρῴρους ἐχόντων καὶ πόλεις ξυμμαχίδας πλείους, βασιλέως τε αὐτοῖς καὶ Τισσαφέρνους χρήματα παρεχόντων, σφίσι δὲ οὐκέτι ὄντων, εἰ μή τις πείσει βασιλέα
3 μεταστῆναι παρὰ σφᾶς. ὁπότε δὲ δὴ μὴ φαῖεν ἐρωτώμενοι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ σαφῶς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι "Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομέν τε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐς ὀλίγους

[1] τῶν Ἀθηναίων, after πρέσβεις, deleted by Dobree.

[1] The priestly clan which provided the hierophants of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the interpreters of laws touching impiety.

[2] The other great priestly house, who actually slew the

a great prize, was assiduously paying court to Tissaphernes.

LIII. Meanwhile the envoys that had been sent from Samos with Peisander arrived at Athens and made a statement before a meeting of the people, offering a summary of many arguments but urging with special emphasis that it was possible for them, by recalling Alcibiades and adopting a different form of democratic government, both to have the King as their ally and to prevail over the Peloponnesians. But as to the democracy, many others spoke against the scheme, and at the same time the enemies of Alcibiades loudly protested that it would be an outrage if, after defying the laws, he should be restored; the Eumolpidae[1] also and the Ceryces[2] bore witness against him on the score of the mysteries, for whose violation he had been banished, and protested in the name of the gods against bringing him back. Whereupon Peisander came forward and in the face of much protest and abuse took each one of the objectors aside and asked him what hope he had of the salvation of the state, now that the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than they confronting them at sea and a larger number of allied cities, with the King and Tissaphernes furnishing the enemy with money, while they themselves no longer had money, unless someone should persuade the King to change over to the Athenian side. And when, in answer to this question, they all admitted there was no other hope, he thereupon told them plainly: "Well, this cannot be attained by us unless we form a wiser government and put the offices to a greater

victims; they are generally mentioned in association with the Eumolpidae.

μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν,[1] ἵνα πιστεύῃ ἡμῖν βασιλεύς, καὶ μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλέον βουλεύσομεν[2] ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας (ὕστερον γὰρ ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καὶ μεταθέσθαι, ἢν μή τι ἀρέσκῃ), Ἀλκιβιάδην τε κατάξομεν, ὃς μόνος τῶν νῦν οἷός τε τοῦτο κατεργάσασθαι."

LIV. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων[3] ὡς καὶ
2 μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν. καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο πλεύσαντα τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ δέκα ἄνδρας μετ' αὐτοῦ πράσσειν ὅπῃ αὐτοῖς δοκοίη ἄριστα ἔξειν τά τε
3 πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνη καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. ἅμα τε διαβαλόντος καὶ Φρύνιχον τοῦ Πεισάνδρου παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τὸν ξυνάρχοντα Σκιρωνίδην, ἀντέπεμψαν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα. τὸν δὲ Φρύνιχον ὁ Πείσανδρος φάσκων Ἴασον προδοῦναι καὶ Ἀμόργην διέβαλεν, οὐ νομίζων ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι τοῖς πρὸς
4 τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην πρασσομένοις. καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύ-
5 σουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ὥστε μηκέτι διαμέλλεσθαι, αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν δέκα ἀνδρῶν τὸν πλοῦν ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ποιεῖται.

[1] *τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν*, omitted by Hude with C.
[2] *βουλεύσομεν*, B; Hude adopts *βουλεύωμεν* of C, and begins the parenthesis at *καί*.

extent into the hands of a few, in order that the King may trust us, and unless in our deliberations we take less heed at present about the form of our government than about our salvation (for afterwards it will be possible for us to make a change if there is anything we do not like), and recall Alcibiades, who is the only man in the world to-day who is able to bring this result to pass."

LIV. The assembly was at first displeased when they heard the proposal concerning an oligarchy; but when they had been plainly shown by Peisander that there was no other salvation, through fear and at the same time because they expected to make a change later, they yielded. So they voted that Peisander and ten others should sail and conduct the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades in whatever way might seem best to them. At the same time, when Peisander brought a false accusation against Phrynichus, they deposed him and his colleague Scironides from command and sent in their stead Diomedon and Leon to take charge of the fleet. For Peisander alleged that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, and slandered him, because he did not believe him to be friendly to the negotiations with Alcibiades. And Peisander also visited all the clubs which chanced previously to exist in the city for the control of courts and officials and exhorted them to unite, and by taking common counsel to overthrow the democracy. Then, after he had made whatever other arrangements the circumstances demanded, so that there might be no further delay, he himself and the ten other men made their voyage to Tissaphernes.

[3] ἐπελπίζων, Hude ἐλπίζων with CG.

LV. Ὁ δὲ Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἀφιγμένοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπίπλουν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ τὰς μὲν ναῦς καταλαμβάνουσιν ἀνειλκυσμένας τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἐς δὲ τὴν γῆν ἀπόβασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι καὶ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Ῥοδίων νικήσαντες μάχῃ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Χάλκην, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον ἢ[1] ἐκ τῆς Κῶ ἐποιοῦντο· εὐφυλακτότερα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, εἴ ποι ἀπαίροι τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικόν.

2 Ἦλθε δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον καὶ Ξενοφαντίδας Λάκων παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐκ Χίου, λέγων ὅτι τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ἐπιτετέλεσται καί, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσουσι πάσαις ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπολεῖται τὰ ἐν Χίῳ πράγματα. οἱ δὲ διενοοῦντο βοηθήσειν.

3 ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Πεδάριτος αὐτός τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπικουρικὸν ἔχων καὶ τοὺς Χίους πανστρατιᾷ προσβαλὼν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῷ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρύματι αἱρεῖ τέ τι αὐτοῦ καὶ νεῶν τινων ἀνειλκυσμένων ἐκράτησεν. ἐπεκβοηθησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τρεψαμένων τοὺς Χίους πρώτους νικᾶται καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τὸ περὶ τὸν Πεδάριτον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποθνήσκει καὶ τῶν Χίων πολλοὶ καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη πολλά.

LVI. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐπολιορκοῦντο καὶ ὁ λιμὸς αὐτόθι ἦν μέγας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνη λόγους ποιοῦνται περὶ τῆς ὁμολογίας.

[1] With M.

LV. In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by now reached the Athenian fleet, made an advance upon Rhodes. They found the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled up on the shore, and having effected a landing and having defeated in battle the Rhodians who rallied to the defence, they retired to Chalce and continued to carry on the war from there rather than from Cos; for it was easier for them to keep watch there in case the Peloponnesian fleet should put to sea in any direction.

Meanwhile Xenophantidas, a Laconian, had come to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, bringing word that the Athenian fortification [1] was now completed and that, unless they came to their aid with all their ships, the Peloponnesian cause at Chios would be lost. And they intended to go to their aid; but meanwhile Pedaritus himself, together with the mercenaries under his command [2] and the Chians in full force, attacked that part of the Athenian fortification which protected the ships, capturing a portion of it and getting possession of some ships that had been hauled up on shore. But when the Athenians had come out to the rescue and turned the Chians to flight at the outset, the mercenary force that was with Pedaritus was also defeated, and he himself and many of the Chians were killed and arms were captured in great quantity.

LVI. After this the Chians were besieged by both land and sea more closely than ever and there was a great famine in the place. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys led by Peisander had reached Tissaphernes and were holding conferences regard-

[1] *cf.* ch. xxxviii. 2; xl. 3.
[2] *cf.* ch. xxviii. 5; xxxviii. 3.

2 Ἀλκιβιάδης δέ (οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσα-
φέρνους βέβαια ἦν, φοβουμένου τοὺς Πελοπον-
νησίους μᾶλλον καὶ ἔτι βουλομένου, καθάπερ
καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐδιδάσκετο, τρίβειν ἀμφοτέρους)
τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος ὥστε τὸν Τισσαφέρνη
ὡς μέγιστα αἰτοῦντα παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὴ
3 ξυμβῆναι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ
αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι, αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δὲ
Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὡς οὐ ξυμ-
βησείοντα, δοκεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβούλετο μὴ
ἀδύνατος εἶναι πεῖσαι, ἀλλ' ὡς πεπεισμένῳ Τισσα-
φέρνει καὶ βουλομένῳ προσχωρῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθη-
4 ναίους μὴ ἱκανὰ διδόναι. ᾔτει γὰρ τοσαῦτα
ὑπερβάλλων ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, λέγων αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ
παρόντος τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὥστε τὸ[1] τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων, καίπερ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὅ τι αἰτοίη ξυγχωρούντων,
ὅμως αἴτιον γενέσθαι· Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν
ἠξίου δίδοσθαι καὶ αὖθις νήσους τε τὰς ἐπικει-
μένας καὶ ἄλλα· οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων τέλος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἤδη ξυνόδῳ, δείσας μὴ
πάνυ φωραθῇ ἀδύνατος ὤν, ναῦς ἠξίου ἐᾶν βασι-
λέα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν
5 ὅποι ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται. ἐνταῦθα δὴ
οὐκέτι τι, ἀλλ'[2] ἄπορα νομίσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐξηπατῆσθαι, δι' ὀργῆς
ἀπελθόντες κομίζονται ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

[1] With B, the other MSS. omit *τό*.

[2] *οὐκέτι τι, ἀλλ'*, Hude omits *τι* with C and adopts *ἢ* after *ἀλλ'* with Lindau.

ing the agreement. But Alcibiades (for his relations with Tissaphernes were not altogether firm, he being now more afraid of the Peloponnesians and still wishing to follow the policy inculcated by Alcibiades and wear out both parties) now had recourse to this device—that Tissaphernes should make as great demands as possible upon the Athenians and in this way come to no agreement with them. And Tissaphernes also, as it seems to me, wished the same thing, fear being the motive in his case; but Alcibiades, as soon as he saw that even on his own terms he did not want to reach an agreement, wished it to appear to the Athenians, not that he was unable to persuade him, but that the Athenians, after Tissaphernes had been persuaded and in spite of his wishing to come to terms, were not conceding enough. For Alcibiades made such excessive demands, speaking himself on behalf of Tissaphernes and in his presence, that although for a long time the Athenians yielded whatever he demanded, the blame for the failure must nevertheless fall upon them; for he insisted that all Ionia should be given up, after that the adjacent islands, and so on. When the Athenians did not oppose these demands, finally, at the third conference, fearing that his utter lack of influence would be openly exposed, he insisted that the King be permitted to build ships and sail along the Athenian coasts wherever he wished and with as many ships as he pleased. At that point the Athenians yielded no further, but believing that there was no way out of the matter and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, departed in anger and made their way back to Samos.

LVII. Τισσαφέρνης δὲ εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι παρέρχεται ἐς τὴν Καῦνον, βουλόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους πάλιν τε κομίσαι ἐς τὴν Μίλητον καὶ ξυνθήκας ἔτι ἄλλας ποιησάμενος, ἃς ἂν δύνηται, τροφήν τε παρέχειν καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι, δεδιὼς μή, ἢν ἀπορῶσι πολλαῖς ναυσὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀναγκασθέντες ναυμαχεῖν ἡσσηθῶσιν ἢ κενωθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ἄνευ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἃ βούλονται· ἔτι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα μὴ τῆς τροφῆς ζητήσει πορθήσωσι τὴν
2 ἤπειρον. πάντων οὖν τούτων λογισμῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο ἐπανισοῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μεταπεμψάμενος οὖν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τροφήν τε αὐτοῖς δίδωσι καὶ σπονδὰς τρίτας τάσδε σπένδεται.

LVIII. "Τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος, ἐφορεύοντος δὲ Ἀλεξιππίδα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, ξυνθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρνη καὶ Ἱεραμένη καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων.

2 "Χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί, βασιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

3 "Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ χώραν τὴν βασιλέως ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί, μηδὲ βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μηδὲ τῶν
4 ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί. ἢν δέ τις Λακε-

LVII. Immediately after this, in the course of the same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after concluding with them such other agreements as he found practicable, to supply them with maintenance, and not be in a state of complete hostility; for he was afraid that, if they should be in difficulty about the maintenance of a large fleet, they might either be forced to fight the Athenians and suffer defeat, or that, their ships being emptied of men by desertion, the Athenians might get what they wanted without his help; and he was afraid, furthermore and chiefly, that in searching for supplies they might ravage the mainland. Taking all these possibilities into consideration, therefore, and as a precaution against them, and acting consistently with his policy to reduce the Hellenes to an equality with each other, he sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them supplies, and concluded with them a a third treaty to the following effect:

LVIII. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces respecting the King's affairs and those of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

1. "The King's country, as much of it as is in Asia, shall be the King's; and concerning his own country the King shall determine as he pleases.

2. "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the country of the King to do any harm, nor the King against that of the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do any harm. If any of

δαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως χώραν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κωλύειν· καὶ ἤν τις ἐκ τῆς βασιλέως ἴῃ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἢ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω.

5 "Τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα μέχρι ἂν αἱ
6 νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν· Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἐπὴν αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἣν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι. ἢν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαμβάνειν ἐθέλωσι τὴν τροφήν, Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὁπόσα ἂν λάβωσιν.

7 "'Επὴν δὲ αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, αἵ τε Λακεδαιμονίων νῆες καὶ αἱ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αἱ βασιλέως κοινῇ τὸν πόλεμον πολεμούντων καθ' ὅ τι ἂν Τισσαφέρνει δοκῇ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. ἢν δὲ καταλύειν βούλωνται πρὸς 'Αθηναίους, ἐν ὁμοίῳ καταλύεσθαι."

LIX. Αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ αὗται ἐγένοντο. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παρεσκευάζετο Τισσαφέρνης τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἄξων, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσαπερ ὑπέσχετο, καὶ ἐβούλετο παρασκευαζόμενος γοῦν δῆλος εἶναι.

LX. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τελευτῶντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος 'Ωρωπὸν εἷλον προδοσίᾳ 'Αθηναίων ἐμφρουρούντων. ξυνέπραξαν δὲ 'Ερετριῶν τε ἄνδρες καὶ αὐτῶν 'Ωρωπίων ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἀπόστασιν τῆς

the Lacedaemonians or their allies shall go with harmful intent against the country of the King, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it; and if any from the King's country shall go with harmful intent against the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it.

3. "Maintenance for the ships now present shall be provided by Tissaphernes according to the compact until the King's ships shall come; and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, after the King's ships arrive, shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships if they so wish. If, however, they desire to receive maintenance from Tissaphernes, he shall furnish it; but the Lacedaemonians and their allies, when the war ends, shall pay back to Tissaphernes whatever money they have received.

4. "And when the ships of the King arrive, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and those of the King shall wage war in common, according as it may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if they wish to end the war with the Athenians, it shall be ended on the same footing for both."

LIX. Such was the treaty they made. After this Tissaphernes set about preparing to bring the Phœnician ships, as had been agreed, and to carry out all the other things he had promised; and he wished it to be evident that at all events he was making preparations.

LX. When the winter was now ending the Boeotians took Oropus, where the Athenians had a garrison, by treachery. And they had the co-operation of some men of Eretria and of Oropus itself who were plotting for the revolt of Euboea.

Εὐβοίας· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ τὸ χωρίον ὃν ἀδύνατα ἦν Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων μὴ οὐ μεγάλα βλάπτειν καὶ Ἐρέτριαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Εὔβοιαν.
2 ἔχοντες οὖν ἤδη τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥόδον οἱ Ἐρετριῆς, ἐπικαλούμενοι ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς Χίου κακουμένης βοήθειαν μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ ἄραντες πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Ῥόδου ἔπλεον.
3 καὶ γενόμενοι περὶ τὸ Τριόπιον καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς πελαγίας ἀπὸ τῆς Χάλκης πλεούσας· καὶ ὡς οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις ἐπέπλεον, ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον καὶ ἑώρων οὐκέτι ἄνευ ναυμαχίας οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐς τὴν Χίον βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

LXI. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ Δερκυλίδας τε, ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης, στρατιὰν ἔχων οὐ πολλὴν παρεπέμφθη πεζῇ ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντου Ἄβυδον ἀποστήσων (εἰσὶ δὲ Μιλησίων ἄποικοι), καὶ οἱ Χῖοι, ἐν ὅσῳ αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀστύοχος ἠπόρει ὅπως βοηθήσοι ναυμαχῆσαι πιεζόμενοι τῇ πολιορκίᾳ ἠναγκάσθησαν.
2 ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντά τε, ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνεξῆλθε, κεκομισμένοι[1] μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον ἄρχοντα καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα, αἳ ἔτυχον φύλακες Μιλήτου οὖσαι, ὧν ἦσαν Θούριαι πέντε καὶ Συρακόσιαι τέσσαρες καὶ μία Ἀναιῖτις καὶ μία Μιλησία καὶ Λέοντος

[1] τοῦτον, before κεκομισμένοι, omitted by Hude, with C.

For since the place is opposite Eretria, it was impossible, while the Athenians held it, that it should not injure greatly both Eretria and Euboea in general. Now, therefore, that they had Oropus in their possession, the Eretrians came to Rhodes and invited the Peloponnesians to Euboea. They, however, were more intent upon relieving Chios, which was in distress; so they put off from Rhodes and sailed with all their ships. When they had arrived in the neighbourhood of Triopium they saw the Athenian fleet on the high seas as they were sailing from Chalce;[1] as neither fleet, however, advanced to attack the other, the Athenians arrived at Samos, and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, when they saw that it was no longer possible to bring succour to Chios without a fight. So this winter ended, and with it the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LXI. During the following summer season, at the very opening of spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent overland with no small army to the Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydus, a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while Astyochus was still at a loss as to how he should bring relief to them, were so hard pressed by the siege that they were compelled to risk a fight at sea. Now it so happened that while Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had brought from Miletus as commander, after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes as a marine, and also twelve ships which chanced to be on guard at Miletus, of which five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one Anaean, one Milesian, and one Leon's own. After, there-

March, 411 B.C.

[1] *cf.* ch. lv. 1.

3 μία. ἐπεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν Χίων πανδημεὶ καὶ καταλαβόντων τι ἐρυμνὸν χωρίον καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἅμα ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἀναγαγομένων ἐναυμάχησαν· καὶ καρτερᾶς γενομένης ναυμαχίας οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Χῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὀψὲ ἦν) ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

LXII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εὐθὺς τοῦ Δερκυλίδου πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου παρελθόντος, Ἄβυδος ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἀφίσταται πρὸς Δερκυλίδαν καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, καὶ Λάμψακος δυοῖν ἡμέραιν
2 ὕστερον. Στρομβιχίδης δὲ ἐκ τῆς Χίου πυθόμενος κατὰ τάχος βοηθήσας ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων τέσσαρσι καὶ εἴκοσι, ὧν καὶ στρατιώτιδες ἦσαν ὁπλίτας ἄγουσαι, ἐπεξελθόντων τῶν Λαμψακηνῶν μάχῃ κρατήσας καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ Λάμψακον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν ἑλών, καὶ σκεύη μὲν καὶ ἀνδράποδα ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάμενος, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους πάλιν κατοικίσας, ἐπ' Ἄβυδον ἦλθεν.
3 καὶ ὡς οὔτε προσεχώρουν οὔτε προσβαλὼν ἐδύνατο ἑλεῖν, ἐς τὸ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀποπλεύσας Σηστὸν πόλιν τῆς Χερσονήσου, ἣν ποτε[1] Μῆδοι εἶχον, καθίστατο φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου.

LXIII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Χῖοί τε θαλασσοκράτορες μᾶλλον ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος πυθόμενος τὰ περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀπελη-
2 λυθότα ἐθάρσησεν. καὶ παραπλεύσας δυοῖν νεοῖν Ἀστύοχος ἐς Χίον κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς

[1] ποτε, with B; Hude reads τότε with the other MSS.

fore, the Chians had sailed forth in full force and seized a strong position, and their ships at the same time to the number of thirty-six had put to sea against the thirty-two of the Athenians, they came to battle. It proved to be a stubborn fight, and the Chians and their allies did not have the worst of it in the action, but since it was by this time late they withdrew to the city.

LXII. Immediately after this, when Dercylidas had completed his march overland from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont revolted to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus, as did Lampsacus also two days afterwards. But Strombichides, learning of this, came from Chios with all speed to the rescue with twenty-four Athenian ships, of which some were transports and carried hoplites; and having defeated in battle the Lampsacenes who came out against him and taken at the first assault the city of Lampsacus, which was without walls, he made booty of goods and slaves but restored the free men to their homes, and then went against Abydus. And when its inhabitants would not yield and he was unable to take the city by assault, he sailed back to the coast opposite Abydus and made Sestus, a city of the Chersonese which the Persians once held, a fortress and watch-station for the control of the whole Hellespont.

LXIII. In the meantime not only had the Chians strengthened their command of the sea, but Astyochus also and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, learning the result of the sea-fight and about the departure of Strombichides and his fleet, took courage. So Astyochus sailed along the coast to Chios with two ships, took on the ships which were there, and with

ναῦς, καὶ ξυμπάσαις ἤδη ἐπίπλουν ποιεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν Σάμον· καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ὑπόπτως ἔχειν οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον.

3 Ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πρότερον ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις δημοκρατία κατελύετο. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον πρέσβεις παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἦλθον, τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προυτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλ-

4 λήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται. καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο Ἀλκιβιάδην μέν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται, ἐᾶν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐλθεῖν), αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὁρᾶν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο δέῃ, ὡς οὐκέτι ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

LXIV. Παρακελευσάμενοι οὖν τοιαῦτα τὸν μὲν Πείσανδρον εὐθὺς τότε καὶ τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἀπέστελλον ἐπ' οἴκου πράξοντας τἀκεῖ, καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων πόλεων αἷς ἂν

2 ἴσχωσιν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι· τοὺς δ' ἡμίσεις ἐς τἆλλα τὰ ὑπήκοα χωρία ἄλλους ἄλλῃ

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[1] *cf.* ch. xlviii. 1.

what was now the entire fleet advanced against Samos; but when the Athenians, because their two factions entertained suspicions of one another, would not come out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus.

For it was about this time, or somewhat earlier, that the democracy at Athens was being overthrown. When the envoys led by Peisander had come to Samos from Tissaphernes, they had got matters in the army itself still more firmly under their control and had instigated the influential men among the Samians also to attempt in concert with them to establish an oligarchy, although the Samians had risen in revolt against their own countrymen in order to avoid being governed by an oligarchy. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after conferring among themselves, had determined, since Alcibiades would not agree with them, to let him alone—for he was not a suitable person, they thought, to come into an oligarchy—but by themselves, as being already actually in peril, to see to it that the movement should not be abandoned, and at the same time to hold out so far as the war was concerned; they had also resolved zealously to contribute from their own private resources either money or whatever else should be necessary, feeling that from now on the burdens they would bear would be for no others than themselves.[1]

LXIV. Having thus encouraged one another, they at once proceeded to send Peisander and half of the envoys home in order to arrange matters there, but also with instructions to establish oligarchies in any of the subject cities at which they should stop; the other half they sent to the rest of the subject

διέπεμπον καὶ Διειτρέφη, ὄντα περὶ Χίον, ἠρημένον δὲ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἄρχειν, ἀπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Θάσον τὸν
3 δῆμον κατέλυσεν. καὶ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ Θάσιοι δευτέρῳ μηνὶ μάλιστα τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχιζον, ὡς τῆς μὲν μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἀριστοκρατίας οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεόμενοι, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλευθερίαν ὁσημέραι[1] προσδεχόμε-
4 νοι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυγὴ αὐτῶν ἔξω ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρὰ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις, καὶ αὕτη μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιτηδείων κατὰ κράτος ἔπρασσε ναῦς τε κομίσαι καὶ τὴν Θάσον ἀποστῆσαι. ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι καὶ τὸν
5 ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν Θάσον τἀναντία τοῖς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστᾶσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, δοκεῖν δέ μοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων· σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβούσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν, τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας[2] οὐ προτιμήσαντες.

LXV. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντές τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους
2 ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀνδροκλέα τέ τινα τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προ-

[1] ὁσημέραι, B; Hude reads ὅσαι ἡμέραι with C.
[2] The reading of Dion. Hal. and the Schol. for τὴν . . ὕπουλον αὐτονομίαν of most MSS.

countries, some to one and some to another; and Dieitrephes, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios but had been elected to have command on the coast of Thrace, they sent to his post. When he reached Thasos he abolished the democracy there. About two months, however, after his departure the Thasians fortified their city, feeling that they no longer had any need of an aristocracy attached to Athens and daily looking for freedom to be given them by the Lacedaemonians. For there were Thasian fugitives, who had been expelled by the Athenians, now present with the Peloponnesians, and these, in concert with their friends in the city, were working with might and main to bring ships and effect the revolt of Thasos. They found, therefore, that the things they most desired had happened—the city had been brought to order and the democracy that would have opposed them had been abolished. In Thasos, then, the result was the opposite of what the Athenians who were establishing the oligarchy there desired, and it was the same, as it seems to me, in many others of the subject states; for the cities, having acquired soberness of spirit and immunity in carrying out their designs, aimed at downright freedom, caring nothing for the hollow sham of law and order offered by the Athenians.

LXV. Peisander, then, and his companions proceeded along the coast abolishing the democracies in the cities, as had been determined upon, and came to Athens, bringing with them from some places hoplites as supporters. There they found that most of the business had already been accomplished by their associates. For some of the younger men had combined and secretly put to death a certain

ἑστῶτα ξυστάντες τινὲς τῶν νεωτέρων κρύφα ἀποκτείνουσιν, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐξήλασε, καὶ αὐτὸν κατ' ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε δημαγωγίας ἕνεκα καὶ οἰόμενοι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὡς κατιόντι καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνη φίλον ποιήσοντι χαριεῖσθαι, μᾶλλόν τι διέφθειραν· καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ κρύφα
3 ἀνήλωσαν. λόγος τε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ προείργαστο αὐτοῖς ὡς οὔτε μισθοφορητέον εἴη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους, οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλείοσιν ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις, καὶ τούτοις οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὠφελεῖν οἷοί τε ὦσιν.

LXVI. Ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν[1] ἔμελλον. δῆμος μέντοι ὅμως ἔτι καὶ βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου ξυνελέγετο· ἐβούλευον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες ἐκ τούτων ἦσαν καὶ τὰ
2 ῥηθησόμενα πρότερον αὐτοῖς προύσκεπτο. ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ[2] ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ' εἰ ὑπο-

[1] μεθίστασαν, B and Valla, Hude μεθιστάναι with other MSS.

[2] καί, Hude reads δεδιὼς ὁρῶν with C, the other MSS. have δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν.

[1] *cf.* VI. lxxxix. 5. Androcles, according to Plutarch (*Alcib.* 19), was the demagogue who produced slaves and metics as witnesses to prove Alcibiades guilty of mutilating the Hermae

Androcles, the most prominent leader of the popular party, the man who had done most to bring about the banishment of Alcibiades.[1] And him they destroyed for two reasons—on account of his being a popular leader, and somewhat the more because they thought it would gratify Alcibiades, who was likely to be recalled and to make Tissaphernes a friend; and some others that were inconvenient they secretly made away with in the same manner. Moreover, a proposal had already been openly made by them that no others ought to receive pay except those who were serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand should share in the government, and they only so far as they were especially competent to serve the state with both property and person.

LXVI. Now this was only a specious pretext intended for the masses, for the very same men who were endeavouring to change the government were going to have control of the state. The people, however, and the council chosen by the bean[2] were none the less still convened; but they discussed nothing that was not approved by the conspirators; nay, not only were the speakers from this party, but what should be said had been previously considered by them. And no one of the others any longer spoke against them, through fear and because it was seen that the conspiracy was widespread; and if any one did oppose, at once in some convenient way he was a dead man. And no search was made for those who did the deed, nor if they were suspected was

and profaning the Mysteries (Thuc. VI. xxviii. 1). See also Andocides, *Myst.* 27.

[2] *i.e.* by lot, the bean being used in drawing lots. This definition distinguishes the popular council, or *βουλὴ* of 500, from the Areopagus, *ἡ βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου.*

πτεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν. 3 καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλέον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ ἐτύγχανεν ὂν ἠσσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτό,[1] ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν, οὐκ εἶχον. 4 κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν· ἢ γὰρ ἀγνῶτα ἂν ηὗρεν ᾧ 5 ἐρεῖ ἠγνώριμον ἄπιστον. ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῇσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνῆσαν γὰρ καὶ οὓς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλεῖστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.

LXVII. Ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ καιρῷ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον ἐλθόντες εὐθὺς τῶν λοιπῶν εἴχοντο. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην δέκα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν καθ᾽ ὅ 2 τι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται. ἔπειτα ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, ξυνέκλησαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν

[1] αὐτό, C, the other MSS. αὐτοί.

[1] Or, "so as to defend himself against one who was plotting against him."

any legal prosecution held; on the contrary, the populace kept quiet and were in such consternation that he who did not suffer any violence, even though he never said a word, counted that a gain. Imagining the conspiracy to be much more widespread than it actually was, they were cowed in mind, and owing to the size of the city and their lack of knowledge of one another they were unable to find out the facts. For the same reason it was also impossible for any man that was offended to pour out his grievances to another and thus plot to avenge himself,[1] for he would discover any person to whom he might speak to be either a stranger or, if an acquaintance, faithless. For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, as though every one had a hand in what was going on. And, indeed, there were among them men whom one would never have expected to change over and favour an oligarchy; and it was these who caused the greatest distrust among the masses and rendered the most valuable service toward the few in securing their safety by confirming in the populace this distrust of their own people.

LXVII. It was at this crisis that Peisander and his colleagues arrived and immediately applied themselves to the work that still remained to be done. First they called the popular assembly together and proposed a resolution that ten men should be chosen as commissioners, with full powers, for the drafting of laws, and that these men, after drafting such laws, should bring before the assembly on an appointed day a proposal embodying provisions for the best administration of the state. In the second place, when the day came they convened the

Κολωνόν (ἔστι δὲ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα), καὶ ἐσήνεγκαν οἱ ξυγγραφῆς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξεῖναι μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἀνατεὶ εἰπεῖν[1] γνώμην ἣν ἄν τις βούληται· ἢν δέ τις τὸν εἰπόντα ἢ γράψηται παρανόμων ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βλάψῃ, μεγά-
3 λας ζημίας ἐπέθεσαν. ἐνταῦθα δὴ λαμπρῶς ἐλέγετο ἤδη μήτε ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κόσμου μήτε μισθοφορεῖν, προέδρους τε ἑλέσθαι πέντε ἄνδρας, τούτους δὲ ἑλέσθαι ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας, καὶ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἕκαστον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τρεῖς· ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ξυλλέγειν ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

LXVIII. Ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς προθυμότατα ξυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον· ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθεὶς ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐπιμεληθεὶς Ἀντιφῶν ἦν,

[1] ἀνατεὶ εἰπεῖν, Sauppe's correction for ἀνατρέπειν or ἀνειπεῖν of the MSS.

[1] The γραφὴ παρανόμων, regarded as the great safeguard of the Attic constitution, was provided for annulling an illegal decree or law, and also for punishing the proposer. The latter could be held personally responsible only for a year from the time of the proposal of a decree or the enactment of a law; after a year the decree or law could be attacked and annulled by the same process as that against the proposer. Whoever brought a γραφὴ παρανόμων bound himself by oath to prosecute the case: after the oath was taken a decree or law was suspended if already enacted, and a προβούλευμα could not be brought before the assembly until the suit had been tried and settled. The proposer, if the court decided against

assembly at Colonus, which is a precinct sacred to Poseidon lying at a distance of about ten stadia outside the city, and the commissioners brought in no other measure except the bare proposal that any Athenian should be permitted with impunity to offer any motion he pleased; and if anyone should move to indict the speaker for making an illegal proposal,[1] or should in any other manner seek to do him harm, they imposed severe penalties upon him. After that, the proposal was at length offered without concealment that no one should any longer hold office under the constitution as at present established or receive a salary, and that they should choose five men as presidents, and these should choose one hundred, and each of the hundred three others in addition to himself; then these, being four hundred, should enter the senate-chamber and govern as they should judge best, being clothed with full powers, and they should convene the Five Thousand whenever it seemed to them advisable.[2]

LXVIII. It was Peisander who proposed this resolution and in other respects assisted most zealously, to all appearances, in overthrowing the democracy. The man, however, who devised the method by which the whole matter was brought to this issue and who had for the longest time devoted himself to the problem was Antiphon, a man inferior

him, was punished by death or fine. See Schoemann, *Gr. Alt.* i, 497 ff. (2nd ed.).

[2] *cf.* ch. lxv. 3. There had been talk of limiting the franchise to 5000, and it was resolved at this same assembly to appoint 100 men to draw up a list of the 5000 (Aristot. Ἀθ. πολ., ch. xxix. *ad fin.*). But the list was never published. See ch. xcii. 11 and Ἀθ. πολ. ch. xxxii. For the somewhat divergent account of Aristotle, see Aristot. Ἀθ. πολ. xxix.–xxxii.

ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ'[1] ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνήρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσαιτό τι, 2 δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. καὶ αὐτός τε,[2] ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐν ὑστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκακοῦτο,[3] ἄριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων, αἰτιαθεὶς ὡς ξυγκατέ- 3 στησε, θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος. παρέσχε δὲ καὶ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δεδιὼς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἐπιστάμενος εἰδότα αὐτὸν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον ἔπραξε, νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ' ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν· πολύ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινά, ἐπειδήπερ 4 ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἐφάνη. καὶ Θηραμένης ὁ τοῦ Ἀγνωνος ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον πρῶτος ἦν, ἀνὴρ οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος. ὥστε ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν πολλῶν καὶ ξυνετῶν πραχθὲν τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἀπεικότως καίπερ μέγα ὂν προυχώ-

[1] ἀλλ', deleted by Hude, after Gertz.

[2] τε, Hude adopts γε, after Goeller.

[3] ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐν ὑστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκακοῦτο, the Vulgate with C and the Schol. Most of the best MSS. give ἐπειδὴ μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία καὶ ἐς ἀγῶνας κατέστη μετὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων κ.τ.λ.

[1] Antiphon, of Rhamnus, was the earliest of the ten orators of the 'canon,' and the first λογογράφος. Thucydides was said to have been a pupil of his, but the tradition is of doubtful authority, *e. g.* a second-hand remark of Pseudo-

to none of the Athenians of his own day in force of character and one who had proved himself most able both to formulate a plan and to set forth his conclusions in speech; and although he did not come before the assembly or willingly take part in any public contest, but was under suspicion with the people on account of his reputation for cleverness, yet he was the one man most able to help any who were involved in contests, either in court or before the assembly, in case they sought his advice. And in his own case, when at a later time the acts of the Four Hundred had been reversed and were being severely dealt with by the popular assembly, and he was under charge of having assisted in setting up that government, he manifestly made the ablest plea for his life of all men up to my time in defending these very acts.[1] Phrynichus also showed himself beyond all others most zealous for the oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades and the certainty that Alcibiades was aware of all the intrigues[2] he had carried on at Samos with Astyochus; for he thought that in all probability Alcibiades would never be recalled by an oligarchical government; and when face to face with dangers, after he had once set to work, he proved himself a man who could quite be depended upon. Theramenes also, the son of Hagnon, was foremost among those who attempted to overthrow the democracy, being a man of no small capacity either in speech or in judgment. Consequently, conducted as it was by many able men, the plot not unnaturally succeeded, even

Plutarch (*Vit. X. Orat.*). Fifteen orations are extant under his name. See Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I. i.

[2] *cf.* chs. l. and li.

ρησεν· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἔτει ἑκατοστῷ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν ἐλευθερίας παῦσαι, καὶ οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα.

LXIX. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος ἅμα[1] κυρώσασα ταῦτα διελύθη, τοὺς τετρακοσίους τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ὕστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἐσήγαγον. ἦσαν δ' Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες αἰεί, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τείχει οἱ δ' ἐν τάξει, τῶν ἐν
2 Δεκελείᾳ πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἐφ' ὅπλοις. τῇ οὖν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τοὺς μὲν μὴ ξυνειδότας εἴασαν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἀπελθεῖν, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ εἴρητο ἡσυχῇ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀλλ' ἄπωθεν περιμένειν, καὶ ἤν τις ἐνίστηται τοῖς ποιουμένοις, λαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.
3 ἦσαν δὲ καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι καὶ Καρυστίων τριακόσιοι καὶ Αἰγινητῶν τῶν ἐποίκων, οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπεμψαν οἰκήσοντας, ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἥκοντες ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὅπλοις, οἷς ταὐτὰ προ-
4 εἴρητο. τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων οὕτως ἐλθόντες οἱ τετρακόσιοι μετὰ ξιφιδίου ἀφανοῦς ἕκαστος, καὶ οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ' αὐτῶν νεανίσκοι,[2] οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἴ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν, ἐπέστησαν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου βουλευταῖς οὖσιν ἐν τῷ

[1] Wilamowitz's correction for ἀλλὰ of the MSS. ἀλλὰ will construe, but there is no real opposition here.
[2] With BC; Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι, AEF.

[1] Really 99 years: from 510 to 411.

though it was an arduous task; for it was difficult, after the lapse of almost one hundred years [1] since the tyrants had been overthrown, to deprive of their liberty the Athenian people, who had been, not only not subject to anyone else, but for more than half of that period had themselves been accustomed to rule over others.

LXIX. When the assembly had been dissolved, with no opposition from anyone and immediately after sanctioning these measures, the leaders of the oligarchy then introduced the Four Hundred into the senate-chamber in the following manner: all the Athenians were at all times under arms, as a precaution against the enemy at Deceleia, some on the walls and some in the ranks. On that day, then, they let those who were not privy to their design go away as usual, but those who were in the conspiracy had been quietly told to remain, not close by their arms, but at some distance from them, and if anybody tried to oppose what was going on, to take their arms and permit no interference. And there were at hand some Andrians and Tenians and three hundred Carystians and some of their colonists from Aegina,[2] whither they had been sent by the Athenians to inhabit the island, who had come for this very purpose in their own armour, and to these the same order had already been given. When these forces had been thus disposed, the Four Hundred, each carrying a concealed dagger and accompanied by the one hundred and twenty young men whom they made use of wherever there was any need of their handiwork, broke in upon the regular senators who were in the senate-chamber,

[2] In 431 B.C.; *cf.* ii. 27.

βουλευτηρίῳ, καὶ εἶπον αὐτοῖς ἐξιέναι λαβοῦσι τὸν μισθόν· ἔφερον δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου παντὸς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐξιοῦσιν ἐδίδοσαν.

LXX. Ὡς δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥ τε βουλὴ οὐδὲν ἀντειποῦσα ὑπεξῆλθε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον ἀλλ' ἡσύχαζον, οἱ τετρακόσιοι [1] ἐσελθόντες ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον τότε μὲν πρυτάνεις τε σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπεκλήρωσαν, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις καθιστάμενοι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχρήσαντο, ὕστερον δὲ πολὺ μεταλλάξαντες τῆς τοῦ δήμου διοικήσεως, πλὴν τοὺς φεύγοντας οὐ κατῆγον τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἕνεκα, τὰ δὲ
2 ἄλλα ἔνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἄνδρας τέ τινας ἀκέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς, οἳ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ὑπεξαιρεθῆναι, καὶ ἄλλους ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ μετέστησαν· πρός τε Ἄγιν τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα ὄντα ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, λέγοντες διαλλαγῆναι βούλεσθαι καὶ εἰκὸς εἶναι αὐτὸν σφίσι καὶ οὐκέτι τῷ ἀπίστῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον ξυγχωρεῖν.

LXXI. Ὁ δὲ νομίζων [2] οὔτ' εὐθὺς οὕτω τὸν δῆμον τὴν παλαιὰν ἐλευθερίαν παραδώσειν, εἴ τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἴδοι σφῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἡσυχάζειν, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάνυ τι πιστεύων μὴ οὐκέτι

[1] The MSS. have οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι, Haacke deletes δέ.

[2] τὴν πόλιν οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν, in the MSS. after νομίζων, deleted by Dobree, who also changes οὐδ' to οὔτ'.

[1] A drachma each day; see Boeckh, *Pub. Econ. Ath.*, i. 327. For that day they took their pay from the regular official; for the rest of the month the 400 paid it to them.

[2] They were proceeding in the constitutional way. In the regular βουλή, the ten tribes took in turn the πρυτανεία or executive control of public affairs for one-tenth of the year

and told them to get their pay[1] and go out; and they themselves brought them their pay for all the remainder of their term, and as they went out gave it to them.

LXX. When in this manner the senate had quietly withdrawn without making any opposition, and the citizens at large raised no disturbance but kept quiet, the Four Hundred entered the senate-chamber and for the present chose by lot prytanes[2] from their own number, and with respect to the gods observed all the usual rites of prayers and sacrifices as they assumed office. Afterwards, however, they departed widely from the democratic manner of administration —except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades—and in general governed the city in a high-handed way. A certain number of men, though not many, they put to death, for they thought it convenient to have them out of their way, while others they imprisoned, and also removed others from the city. Moreover, they made overtures to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was at Deceleia, saying that they wished to make peace and that it was only reasonable that he should be more ready to come to terms with them, having no longer to deal with the faithless democracy.

LXXI. But Agis, thinking that the people would not in this way immediately surrender their ancient liberties, and that if they saw a large army of Lacedaemonians they would not remain quiet, and also not being quite sure at present that the Athenians were no longer in a state of disturbance, did not

(about thirty-five days). The prytanes would have been now forty in number instead of fifty as usual, as the new council consisted of forty from each tribe (Aristot. Ἀθ. πολ., ch. xxxi.).

ταράσσεσθαι αὐτούς, τοῖς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐλθοῦσιν οὐδὲν ξυμβατικὸν ἀπεκρίνατο, προσμεταπεμψάμενος δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου στρατιὰν πολλὴν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας φρουρᾷ μετὰ τῶν ἐλθόντων κατέβη πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐλπίσας ἢ ταραχθέντας αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθῆναι σφίσιν ἢ βούλονται, ἢ καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν διὰ τὸν ἔνδοθέν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γενησόμενον θόρυβον τῶν γοῦν μακρῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν κατ' αὐτὰ ἐρη-
2 μίαν λήψεως οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτεῖν. ὡς δὲ προσέμειξέ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μὲν ἔνδοθεν οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκίνησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐκπέμψαντες καὶ μέρος τι τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ψιλῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἄνδρας τε κατέβαλον αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν καὶ ὅπλων τινῶν καὶ νεκρῶν ἐκράτησαν, οὕτω δὴ γνοὺς ἀπήγαγε πάλιν τὴν στρατιάν.
3 καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ χώραν ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἔμενον, τοὺς δ' ἐπελθόντας ὀλίγας τινὰς ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ γῇ μείναντας ἀπέπεμψεν ἐπ' οἴκου. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρά τε τὸν Ἄγιν ἐπρεσβεύοντο οἱ τετρακόσιοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον, κἀκείνου μᾶλλον ἤδη προσδεχομένου καὶ παραινοῦντος ἐκπέμπουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα περὶ ξυμβάσεως πρέσβεις, βουλόμενοι διαλλαγῆναι.

LXXII. Πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας, παραμυθησομένους τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ διδάξοντας ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ ὀλιγαρχία κατέστη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ

make a conciliatory response to those who had come as envoys from the Four Hundred. He sent instead for a large additional force from the Peloponnesus, and not long afterwards himself took the garrison at Deceleia together with the new arrivals and came down to the very walls of Athens, hoping either that the Athenians, being now in confusion, would more readily submit on terms pleasing to the Lacedaemonians, or else that, in consequence of the turmoil that would in all probability prevail both inside and outside the city, he would not fail at the first assault to capture the long walls at any rate owing to the absence of troops to defend them. But when he came close and the Athenians made no move whatever from within the walls, but sending out the cavalry and a portion of the hoplites, light-armed troops and bowmen, shot down some of his men in consequence of their approaching too near and got possession of a number of arms and dead bodies, he at length recognized his mistake and led back his army. He himself, then, and his own troops remained at their post in Deceleia, but the reinforcements that had come he sent back home after they had remained a few days in Attica. After this the Four Hundred, notwithstanding their earlier experience, kept sending envoys to Agis, and as he now received them more readily and advised them to do so, they sent envoys also to Lacedaemon to negotiate an agreement, since they were now desirous of making peace.

LXXII. They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army there and to explain that the oligarchy had been set up, not for the injury of the city or the citizens, but for the salvation of the

σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ξυμπάντων πραγμά των, πεντακισχίλιοί τε ὅτι εἶεν καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον οἱ πράσσοντες· καίτοι οὐ πώποτε Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀσχολίαν ἐς οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα οὕτω μέγα ἐλθεῖν βουλεύσοντας, 2 ἐν ᾧ πεντακισχιλίους ξυνελθεῖν. καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιστείλαντες τὰ πρέποντα εἰπεῖν ἀπέπεμψαν αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν αὐτῶν κατάστασιν, δείσαντες μή, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, ναυτικὸς ὄχλος οὔτε αὐτὸς μένειν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ κόσμῳ ἐθέλῃ, σφᾶς τε μὴ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξαμένου τοῦ κακοῦ μεταστήσωσιν.

LXXIII. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ Σάμῳ ἐνεωτερίζετο ἤδη τὰ περὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ ξυνέβη τοιάδε γενέσθαι ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὅπερ οἱ τετρα- 2 κόσιοι ξυνίσταντο. οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπό τε τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, ὅτε ἦλθε, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ξυνεστώτων Ἀθηναίων, ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι 3 ἐπιθήσεσθαι. καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε, ἑνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν, καί τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ' αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν,

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[1] *cf.* ch. xxi. [2] *cf.* ch. lxiii. 3.

[3] Probably in 418 B.C. He was the constant butt of the jokes of Aristophanes. See also Plutarch, *Nicias* 11; *Aristides* 7; *Alcibiades* 13.

[4] *cf.* ch. xxx. 1; xli. 3; xlii. 2.

whole Athenian cause; and also to explain that there were five thousand, not four hundred only, who were participating in the government, although, because of their military expeditions and their activities abroad, the Athenians had never yet come to consult upon any matter so important that five thousand had assembled. So after giving them these and other instructions as to the proper explanations to offer, they sent them off immediately after their own assumption of office, fearing lest—as actually happened—a crowd of sailors might of itself not be willing to abide by the oligarchical form of government, and so, the mischief having once begun at Samos, bring about their own overthrow.

LXXIII. For in Samos a reaction had already set in against the oligarchical movement, and the following events took place at about the very time when the Four Hundred were organizing. Those of the Samians who at the earlier time[1] rose up against the aristocrats and were of the popular party changed sides again, being persuaded both by Peisander, on his arrival,[2] and by his Athenian accomplices at Samos, and became conspirators; they were fully three hundred in number, and were intending to attack the others, as being of the democratic party. And Hyperbolus, one of the Athenians, a depraved fellow who had been ostracized,[3] not through any fear of his power and consequence, but because he was a villain and a disgrace to the city, they put to death, herein acting in concert with Charminus,[4] one of the generals, and a group of the Athenians at Samos, thus giving them a pledge of good faith. And in other like deeds they co-operated with them

4 τοῖς τε πλείοσιν ὥρμηντο ἐπιτίθεσθαι. οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τῶν τε στρατηγῶν Λέοντι καὶ Διομέδοντι (οὗτοι γὰρ οὐχ ἑκόντες διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἕφερον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν) τὸ μέλλον σημαίνουσι καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ καὶ Θρασύλλῳ, τῷ μὲν τριηραρχοῦντι, τῷ δὲ ὁπλιτεύοντι, καὶ ἄλλοις οἳ ἐδόκουν αἰεὶ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι, καὶ οὐκ ἠξίουν περιδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, δι' ἣν μόνην ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῖς ἐς τοῦτο ξυνέ-
5 μεινεν. οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν ἕνα ἕκαστον μετῆσαν μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλέοντας[1] καὶ αἰεὶ δή ποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους· ὅ τε Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων αὐτοῖς ναῦς τινας,
6 ὁπότε ποι πλέοιεν, κατέλειπον φύλακας. ὥστε ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπετίθεντο οἱ τριακόσιοι, βοηθησάντων πάντων τούτων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Παράλων, περιεγένοντο οἱ τῶν Σαμίων πλείονες. καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους[2] ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

LXXIV. Τὴν δὲ Πάραλον ναῦν καὶ Χαιρέαν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀρχεστράτου, ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, γενόμενον ἐς τὴν μετάστασιν πρόθυμον, ἀποπέμ-

[1] *ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλέοντας*, apparently not read by Schol.; deleted by Velsen, followed by Hude.

[2] *αἰτιωτάτους*, in the MSS. before *φυγῇ*, transposed by van Herwerden

and were eager to attack the populace. But the people, becoming aware of their design, disclosed it to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals—for these submitted to the oligarchy unwillingly, because they held their office by the choice of the popular party—and also to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former of whom was a trierarch and the latter a hoplite, as well as to others who were reputed to be always foremost in opposition to the conspirators; and they begged these not to look on and see them destroyed and Samos alienated from the Athenians, the island to which alone it was due that the empire had held together up to this point. These men, on hearing their plea, went to the soldiers one by one and besought them not to permit this thing, and especially to the men of the Paralus,[1] those who sailed on the Paralus being Athenians and free men one and all and always opposed to an oligarchy even before it came; and Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, used to leave the Samians some ships as a guard. Consequently, when the three hundred attacked them, all these, and especially the crew of the Paralus, joined in the defence, so that the popular party in Samos prevailed. And they put to death of the three hundred some thirty who were chiefly responsible for the plot, and three they punished with banishment; as for the rest, they declared an amnesty, and enjoying a democratic government lived together henceforth as fellow-citizens.

LXXIV. The ship Paralus, having on board Chaereas son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had zealously worked for the change in government,

[1] For this state ship, see note at III. XXXIII. 1.

πουσιν οἵ τε Σάμιοι καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται κατὰ τάχος ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπαγγελοῦντα τὰ γεγενημένα· οὐ γὰρ ἤδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχον-
2 τας. καὶ καταπλευσάντων αὐτῶν εὐθέως τῶν μὲν Παράλων τινὰς οἱ τετρακόσιοι δὺ ἢ τρεῖς ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀφελόμενοι τὴν ναῦν καὶ μετεκβιβάσαντες ἐς ἄλλην στρατιῶτιν ναῦν ἔταξαν
3 φρουρεῖν περὶ Εὔβοιαν. ὁ δὲ Χαιρέας εὐθὺς διαλαθών πως, ὡς εἶδε τὰ παρόντα, πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἐλθὼν ἀγγέλλει τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον πάντα δεινώσας τὰ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, ὡς πληγαῖς τε πάντας ζημιοῦσι καὶ ἀντειπεῖν ἔστιν οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῶν καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες ὑβρίζονται, καὶ διανοοῦνται, ὁπόσοι ἐν Σάμῳ στρατεύονται μὴ ὄντες τῆς σφετέρας γνώμης, τούτων πάντων τοὺς προσήκοντας λαβόντες εἴρξειν, ἵνα, ἢν μὴ ὑπακούσωσι, τεθνήκωσιν· καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐπικαταψευδόμενος ἔλεγεν.

LXXV. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μάλιστα ποιήσαντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μετασχόντας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥρμησαν βάλλειν· ἔπειτα μέντοι ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ μέσου κωλυθέντες καὶ διδαχθέντες, μὴ τῶν πολεμίων ἀντιπρῴρων ἐγγὺς ἐφορμούντων ἀπολέσωσι τὰ
2 πράγματα, ἐπαύσαντο. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος ὁ τοῦ Λύκου καὶ Θράσυλλος (οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα προειστήκεσαν

was sent by the Samians and the Athenian soldiers with all speed to Athens to announce what had been done; for they did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power. As soon as they came to port the Four Hundred at once threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and depriving the rest of their ship and transferring them to another vessel, a troop-ship, they assigned them to guard duty in the neighbourhood of Euboea. But Chaereas, on seeing the present state of affairs, immediately managed in some way to get off unobserved and returned to Samos, where he gave the soldiers an account of the situation in Athens, going beyond the facts in making them worse than they were. He said that they were scourging everybody by way of punishment, that it was not permitted to say a word against those who controlled the government, that the wives and children of citizens were being insulted, and that the oligarchy intended to seize and keep in confinement the relatives of all the men serving in the army at Samos who were not of their way of thinking, in order that, if they did not submit to their authority, these might be put to death; and he added many other false statements.

LXXV. On hearing these things the soldiers at first rushed upon those who had been the chief promoters of the oligarchy, and such of the others as had had a hand in it, to stone them; afterwards, however, when restrained by those who took a neutral position and admonished by them not to ruin their cause when the enemy's ships were lying so near in hostile array, they desisted. After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus, who had been the chief leaders in the revolution, being now

τῆς μεταβολῆς) ὤρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαί τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπι-
3 κηρυκεύσεσθαι. ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσωσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

LXXVI. Ἐς φιλονικίαν τε καθέστασαν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἀναγκάζοντες δημοκρατεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὀλιγαρ-
2 χεῖσθαι. ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν εὐθὺς οἱ στρατιῶται, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς μὲν προτέρους στρατηγοὺς καὶ εἴ τινα τῶν τριηράρχων ὑπώπτευον, ἔπαυσαν, ἄλλους δὲ ἀνθείλοντο καὶ τριηράρχους καὶ στρατηγούς, ὧν Θρασύβουλός τε καὶ Θράσυλλος
3 ὑπῆρχον. καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκεν· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς
4 πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεστάναι. ἐχόντων γὰρ σφῶν τὸ πᾶν ναυτικὸν τάς τε ἄλλας πόλεις ὧν

[1] *i.e.* Athens.

openly in favour of changing the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most solemn oaths, and particularly those who were of the oligarchical faction, that they would in very truth maintain a democracy and live in harmony, would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians, and would be foes to the Four Hundred and would make to them no overtures for peace. The same oath was also taken by all the Samians who were of military age, and in all they did and in whatever might result from the risks they ran the soldiers made common cause with the Samians, being convinced that neither for these nor for themselves was there any haven of safety, but that, should either the Four Hundred prevail or the enemy stationed at Miletus, they were doomed to utter destruction.

LXXVI. So during this period they had come to a state of bitter contention in Samos, the one party attempting to compel the city to accept a democracy, the other to impose an oligarchy upon the army. But the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals and such of the trierarchs as they suspected, and chose others in their stead, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Moreover, they rose in their places and made various recommendations for their own guidance, in particular urging that there was no need to be discouraged because the city[1] had revolted from them; for it was the minority who had abandoned them, who were the majority, and also were in every way better provided with resources. For since they themselves possessed the entire fleet, they would compel the other cities under Athenian

ἄρχουσιν ἀναγκάσειν τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως διδόναι καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖθεν ὡρμῶντο (πόλιν τε γὰρ σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν Σάμον οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, ἀλλ' ἥ παρ' ἐλάχιστον δὴ ἦλθε τὸ Ἀθηναίων κράτος τῆς θαλάσσης, ὅτε ἐπολέμησεν, ἀφελέσθαι, τούς τε πολεμίους ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωρίου ἀμυνεῖσθαι[1] οὕπερ καὶ πρότερον), καὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι σφεῖς ἔχοντες τὰς ναῦς πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῶν
5 ἐν τῇ πόλει. καὶ δι' ἑαυτούς τε ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ προκαθημένους καὶ πρότερον αὐτοὺς κρατεῖν τοῦ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔσπλου, καὶ[2] ὅτι νῦν ἐς τοιοῦτο καταστήσονται μὴ βουλόμενοι σφίσι πάλιν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε αὐτοὶ καὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι εἴργειν ἐκείνους τῆς θαλάσσης ἢ ὑπ'
6 ἐκείνων εἴργεσθαι. βραχύ τέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ᾧ[3] πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις σφίσι χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεκέναι, οἵ γε μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν, οὕπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῴζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. ὥστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλεύοιέν τι χρηστόν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι.

[1] ἀμυνεῖσθαι, with B; Hude reads ἀμύνεσθαι with the rest of the MSS.

[2] καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐς τοιοῦτο καταστήσονται, Hude inserts ὅτι, because καταστήσονται in the midst of infinitives is intolerable. Stahl assumes, with Haase, a lacuna after καὶ νῦν.

[3] ᾧ, with most MSS.; Hude reads ὃ with CG.

[1] In 440 B.C. (I. cxv.).

sway to make their regular contributions precisely as if their headquarters were at Athens. And they had, in Samos, a state that was not weak; on the contrary, it had come within a very little of wresting from Athens the control of the sea when it waged war with her;[1] and as for the enemy, they would defend themselves against them from the same strong base as before. Furthermore, they were better able, since they possessed the fleet, to provide themselves with supplies than were the people of Athens. Indeed it was because they themselves had been stationed at Samos as an advanced guard that the Athenians at home had even before this commanded the entrance to the Peiraeus; and now, they added, the others would be brought to such a strait, in case they should not consent to give them back their constitution, that they themselves would actually be better able to exclude them from the sea than the others to exclude them. Trifling and indeed insignificant was the help which the city was able to give them in overcoming the enemy, and they had lost nothing, seeing that the people at home were able neither to send them money any longer—the soldiers now providing it for themselves—nor to give them good counsel, which is the object for which a state exercises control over armies in the field. Nay, even in this respect[2] the other party had erred in abolishing the laws of their fathers, whereas they themselves were trying to preserve them and would endeavour to compel the oligarchs also to do so. Thus the men in the army who could give good counsel were at least as good as those

[2] *i. e.* in giving them good counsel (ἐν τῷ βούλευμα χρηστὸν παρέχειν).

7 Ἀλκιβιάδην τε, ἢν αὐτῷ ἄδειάν τε καὶ κάθοδον ποιήσωσιν, ἄσμενον τὴν παρὰ βασιλέως ξυμμαχίαν παρέξειν. τό τε μέγιστον, ἢν ἁπάντων σφάλλωνται, εἶναι αὐτοῖς τοσοῦτον ἔχουσι ναυτικὸν πολλὰς τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἐν αἷς καὶ πόλεις καὶ γῆν εὑρήσουσιν.

LXXVII. Τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐκκλησιάσαντες καὶ παραθαρσύναντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου παρεσκευάζοντο οὐδὲν ἧσσον. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες ἐς τὴν Σάμον[1] ὡς ταῦτα ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ ἤδη ὄντες ᾐσθάνοντο, ἡσύχαζον.

LXXVIII. Ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ στρατιῶται κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διεβόων ὡς ὑπό τε Ἀστυόχου καὶ Τισσαφέρνους φθείρεται τὰ πράγματα, τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντος οὔτε πρότερον ναυμαχεῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐτοί τε ἔρρωντο μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγον ἦν, οὔτε νῦν, ὅτε στασιάζειν τε λέγονται καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτῶν οὐδέπω ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους Φοινίσσας ναῦς μένοντες, ἄλλως ὄνομα καὶ οὐκ ἔργον, κινδυνεύειν διατριβῆναι· τὸν δ' αὖ Τισσαφέρνη τάς τε ναῦς ταύτας οὐ κομίζειν, καὶ τροφὴν ὅτι οὐ ξυνεχῶς οὐδ' ἐντελῆ διδοὺς κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν. οὔκουν ἔφασαν χρῆναι μέλλειν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ διαναυμαχεῖν. καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνῆγον.

[1] οἱ δέκα πρεσβευταί, after Σάμον, deleted by van Herwerden.

in the city. Alcibiades, furthermore, if they would merely secure for him immunity from punishment and restoration from exile, would gladly procure for them the alliance of the King. Finally, and most important of all, if they should wholly fail to attain their ends, so long as they possessed so large a fleet there were many places of refuge where they could find both cities and territory.

LXXVII. Having thus deliberated together in public assembly and encouraged one another, they went on with their preparations for war no less than before. And the envoys who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood after they had already reached Delos, remained there inactive.

LXXVIII. About this time the Peloponnesian soldiers in the fleet at Miletus were clamouring among themselves, saying that their cause was being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; by the former because he was unwilling to fight, either before this while they themselves were still the stronger and the Athenian fleet was small, or now when the enemy were said to be rent with factions and their ships had not yet been brought together; nay, they kept waiting for the Phoenician ships which Tissaphernes was to furnish—a mere pretence and not a fact—and thus ran the risk of being worn out by delay; as for Tissaphernes, on the other hand, he was not only not producing these ships, but he was even doing harm to the fleet by not giving it maintenance regularly or in full. Therefore, they said, they ought to wait no longer but should fight to an issue. In all this it was the Syracusans who were most insistent.

LXXIX. Αἰσθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ ξυνόδου ὥστε διαναυμαχεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ταραχή, ἄραντες ταῖς ναυσὶ πάσαις οὔσαις δώδεκα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ τοὺς Μιλησίους πεζῇ κελεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης παριέναι ἔπλεον ὡς πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην. 2 οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ Σάμου ναυσὶ δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα, αἳ ἔτυχον ἐν Γλαύκῃ τῆς Μυκάλης ὁρμοῦσαι (διέχει δὲ ὀλίγον ταύτῃ ἡ Σάμος τῆς ἠπείρου πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην), ὡς εἶδον τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς ἐπιπλεούσας, ὑπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οὐ νομίσαντες τῷ πλήθει διακινδυ- 3 νεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἱκανοὶ εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα (προῄσθοντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυμαχησείοντας) προσεδέχοντο καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου σφίσι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Χίου ναυσὶν ἐπ' Ἀβύδου ἀφικομέναις προσβο- 4 θήσειν· προυπέπεμπτο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἄγγελος. καὶ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀπεχώρησαν, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καταπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο καὶ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ τῶν 5 πλησιοχώρων ὁ πεζός. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μελλόντων αὐτῶν ἐπιπλεῖν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀγγέλλεται ὁ Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ναυσὶν ἀφιγμένος· καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπέπλεον πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς 6 Μιλήτου. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι προσγενομένων σφίσι τῶν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν αὐτοὶ ποιοῦνται τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατόν, βουλόμενοι διαναυ-

LXXIX. Astyochus and the allies were aware of their murmuring, and it was determined after a council to fight a decisive battle; so when the disturbance at Samos was also reported to them, they put to sea with their entire fleet, one hundred and twelve in all, and bidding the Milesians proceed by land towards Mycale they sailed in the direction of Mycale themselves. But the Athenians, with the eighty-two ships whose base was at Samos and which happened then to be lying at Glauce on the promontory of Mycale—where Samos is only a short distance from the mainland, in the direction of Mycale—when they saw the Peloponnesian ships sailing against them, retreated to Samos, not thinking themselves strong enough in point of numbers to hazard their all on a battle. Besides, they had learned beforehand from Miletus that the enemy desired to fight, and they were expecting Strombichides to come to their aid from the Hellespont with the ships from Chios that had gone to Abydus;[1] for a messenger had previously been sent to him. So they retired to Samos; but the Peloponnesians sailed on to Mycale and encamped there, together with the Milesians and the troops of the neighbouring peoples that constituted the army on land. The next day, when they were about to advance against Samos, word was brought to them that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont; so they sailed back at once to Miletus. The Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving these reinforcements, themselves made an advance upon Miletus with one hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when

[1] *cf.* ch. lxii. 2.

μαχῆσαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἀντανήγετο, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

LXXX. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀθρόαις ταῖς ναυσὶν οὐκ ἀξιόμαχοι νομίσαντες εἶναι οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπορήσαντες ὁπόθεν τοσαύταις ναυσὶ χρήματα ἔξουσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ Τισσαφέρνους κακῶς διδόντος, ἀποστέλλουσιν ὡς τὸν Φαρνάβαζον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου προσετάχθη, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου ἔχοντα ναῦς
2 τεσσαράκοντα. ἐπεκαλεῖτό τε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὁ Φαρνάβαζος καὶ τροφὴν ἑτοῖμος ἦν παρέχειν, καὶ ἅμα καὶ τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπεκηρυκεύετο αὐτοῖς
3 ἀποστῆναι. καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὗται νῆες ἀπάρασαι ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, ὅπως λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ πλῷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, χειμασθεῖσαι, αἱ μὲν[1] Δήλου λαβόμεναι αἱ πλείους μετὰ Κλεάρχου καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν ἐλθοῦσαι ἐς Μίλητον (Κλέαρχος δὲ κατὰ γῆν αὖθις ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον κομισθεὶς ἦρχεν), αἱ δὲ μετὰ Ἐλίξου τοῦ Μεγαρέως στρατηγοῦ δέκα ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον διασωθεῖσαι Βυζάντιον ἀφιστᾶσιν.
4 καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέμπουσιν αἰσθόμενοι νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καί τις καὶ ναυμαχία βραχεῖα γίγνεται πρὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ πρὸς ὀκτώ.

LXXXI. Οἱ δὲ προεστῶτες ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ καὶ

[1] καί, before αἱ μέν, deleted by Stahl.

[1] *cf.* ch. viii. 2; xxxix. 2.

nobody came out against them they sailed back again to Samos.

LXXX. During the same summer, immediately after this, when the Peloponnesians, though their whole fleet had come together, failed to come out to meet the enemy, thinking themselves unequal to the contest, they were perplexed, not knowing from what source they should get money to maintain so many ships, especially since Tissaphernes provided it wretchedly; so they sent Clearchus son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, according to the orders with which he had originally set out from the Peloponnesus.[1] For Pharnabazus was inviting them to come to him and was ready to furnish maintenance; moreover at the same time overtures were made to them for the revolt of Byzantium. So these forty Peloponnesian ships put out into the open sea, in order that they might escape detection by the Athenians as they made the voyage. Meeting with a storm, the greater number, under Clearchus, took refuge at Delos and afterwards came back to Miletus [2] (though Clearchus afterwards went by land to the Hellespont and assumed command); the rest, to the number of ten, got safely into the Hellespont with their commander, Helixus of Megara, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. Afterwards, when the Athenians at Samos heard of this, they sent some ships to the Hellespont as a reinforcement and guard, and an insignificant sea-fight occurred off Byzantium, eight ships opposing eight.

LXXXI. Now among those who held control at

[2] The finite verb is omitted; either there is anacoluthon or the text is corrupt.

μάλιστα Θρασύβουλος, αἰεί γε τῆς αὐτοῦ γνώμης ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ τέλος ἀπ' ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, καὶ ψηφισαμένων αὐτῶν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ κάθοδον καὶ ἄδειαν πλεύσας ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνη κατῆγεν ἐς τὴν Σάμον τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, νομίζων μόνην σωτηρίαν, εἰ Τισσαφέρνη αὐτοῖς μεταστήσειεν ἀπὸ
2 Πελοποννησίων. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας, τήν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς[1] ἐπητιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, καὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἐς ἐλπίδας τε αὐτοὺς οὐ σμικρὰς τῶν μελλόντων καθίστη καὶ ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν παρὰ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει, ἵνα οἵ τε οἴκοι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔχοντες φοβοῖντο αὐτὸν καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ ξυνωμοσίαι διαλυθεῖεν, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τιμιώτερόν τε αὐτὸν ἄγοιεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ πλέον θαρσοῖεν, οἵ τε πολέμιοι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλοιντο
3 καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐλπίδων ἐκπίπτοιεν. ὑπισχνεῖτο δ' οὖν τάδε μέγιστα ἐπικομπῶν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡς Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ ὑπεδέξατο ἢ μήν, ἕως ἄν τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λείπηται, ἣν Ἀθηναίοις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ ἀπορήσειν αὐτοὺς τροφῆς, οὐδ' ἢν δέῃ τελευτῶντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρωμνὴν ἐξαργυρῶσαι, τάς τε ἐν Ἀσπένδῳ ἤδη οὔσας Φοινίκων ναῦς κομιεῖν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐ Πελοποννησίοις·

[1] *τῆς φυγῆς*, with Vat. ; Hude brackets, after van Herwerden.

[1] Those elected leaders in ch. lxxvi.

Samos,[1] Thrasybulus, after he had effected the revolution, always held very strongly to the same opinion, that they should recall Alcibiades, and finally in a meeting of the assembly he won the majority of the soldiers to his view. And when these had passed a resolution recalling Alcibiades and granting him immunity, he sailed across to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos, thinking that their only salvation was to convert Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesian side to their own. Accordingly, an assembly was held, in which Alcibiades complained with much lamentation of his personal misfortune in being exiled; he also spoke at length on matters of state, inspiring in them no slight hopes regarding the future, and went on to magnify to excess his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object was that those who were in control of the oligarchy at home should fear him and that the political clubs which conspired against him should more surely be broken up; also that the army at Samos should hold him in greater honour and feel a greater degree of confidence themselves; and finally that the enemy should be filled with all possible suspicions of Tissaphernes and so deprived of their present hopes. Accordingly, Alcibiades in a spirit of boasting went on and made these great promises: that Tissaphernes had solemnly pledged to him that, if he could but trust the Athenians, so long as he had anything left of his own they should not lack subsistence, no, not even if in the end he had to sell his own bed; and that he would bring the Phoenician ships, which were already at Aspendus, and deliver them to the Athenians and not to the Peloponnesians; but, he had added, he could

πιστεῦσαι δ' ἂν μόνως Ἀθηναίοις, εἰ σῶς αὐτὸς κατελθὼν αὐτῷ ἀναδέξαιτο.

LXXXII. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ στρατηγόν τε αὐτὸν εὐθὺς εἵλοντο μετὰ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα ἀνετίθεσαν, τήν τε παραυτίκα ἐλπίδα ἕκαστος τῆς τε σωτηρίας καὶ τῆς τῶν τετρακοσίων τιμωρίας οὐδενὸς ἂν ἠλλάξαντο, καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἤδη ἦσαν[1] τούς τε[2] παρόντας πολεμίους ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων
2 καταφρονεῖν καὶ πλεῖν[3] ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν τοὺς ἐγγυτέρω πολεμίους ὑπολιπόντας καὶ πάνυ διεκώλυσε πολλῶν ἐπειγομένων, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου πρῶτον ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ καὶ στρατηγὸς ᾑρητο, πλεύσας ὡς Τισσαφέρνη πράξειν. καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐκκλησίας εὐθὺς ᾤχετο, ἵνα δὴ δοκῇ πάντα μετ' ἐκείνου κοινοῦσθαι, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος αὐτῷ τιμιώτερός τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι καὶ στρατηγὸς ἤδη ἥρηται καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς οἷός τε ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. ξυνέβαινε δὲ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν Τισσαφέρνει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνη.

LXXXIII. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ πυνθανόμενοι τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον, καὶ πρότερον τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ἀπιστοῦντες, πολλῷ δὴ

[1] διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα, after ἦσαν: MSS. vary between διὰ and κατά. As an expression of time κατὰ τὸ αὐτίκα is not found, and διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα in this sense is impossible. The simplest remedy is, with Classen, to omit the phrase as a gloss on παραυτίκα above. Hude reads διὰ τὸ <τοὺς> αὐτίκα τότε παρόντας . . .

[2] τούς τε, C reads τότε, all other MSS. τούς τε.

place confidence in the Athenians only on condition that he, Alcibiades, should be restored in safety and become surety to him.

LXXXII. As they heard these and many other promises, they not only elected Alcibiades general without delay, to act with the generals already in office, but also entrusted to him all their affairs; and there was not a man of them that would have exchanged for anything his present hopes both of his own safety and of having revenge upon the Four Hundred, and they were ready at that moment both to despise their present enemies on the strength of the words they had heard and to sail to the attack of Peiraeus. But Alcibiades roundly objected to their leaving behind them their nearer enemies and sailing against the Peiraeus, though many insisted upon that course; his first business, he said, since he had been elected general, would be to sail to Tissaphernes and arrange with him the conduct of the war. So after this assembly he at once went away to Tissaphernes, in order that he might be thought to be in communication with him about everything; at the same time he wished to be held in greater honour by him and to show him that he had now been elected general and was therefore in a position to do him either good or evil. And thus it fell out that Alcibiades was merely using Tissaphernes to frighten the Athenians and the Athenians to frighten Tissaphernes.

LXXXIII. When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, although they were before this distrustful of Tissaphernes, they

[3] καὶ πλεῖν, so B, the other MSS. πλεῖν τε. Hude omits both καὶ and τε.

2 μᾶλλον ἔτι διεβέβληντο. ξυνηνέχθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς, κατὰ[1] τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Μίλητον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν ὡς οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἀνταναγαγόντες ναυμαχῆσαι, πολλῷ ἐς τὴν μισθοδοσίαν τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ἀρρωστότερον γενόμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ μισεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν πρότερον ἔτι τούτων διὰ τὸν Ἀλκι-
3 βιάδην ἐπιδεδωκέναι. καὶ ξυνιστάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἵαπερ καὶ πρότερον οἱ στρατιῶται ἀνελογίζοντο καί τινες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ στρατιωτικόν,[2] ὡς οὔτε μισθὸν ἐντελῆ πώποτε λάβοιεν τό τε διδόμενον βραχὺ καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς· καὶ εἰ μή τις ἢ διαναυμαχήσει ἢ ἀπαλλάξεται ὅθεν τροφὴν ἕξει, ἀπολείψειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰς ναῦς· πάντων τε Ἀστύοχον εἶναι αἴτιον, ἐπιφέροντα ὀργὰς Τισσαφέρνει διὰ ἴδια κέρδη.

LXXXIV. Ὄντων δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀναλογισμῷ ξυνηνέχθη καὶ τοιόσδε τις θόρυβος
2 περὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον. τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι[3] ἦν τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ναῦται, τοσούτῳ καὶ θρασύτατα προσπεσόντες τὸν μισθὸν ἀπῄτουν. ὁ δὲ αὐθαδέστερόν τέ τι ἀπεκρίνατο καὶ ἠπείλησε καὶ τῷ γε Δωριεῖ ξυναγορεύοντι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ναύταις καὶ ἐπανήρατο
3 τὴν βακτηρίαν. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν

[1] κατά, Duker's correction for καὶ of the MSS.

[2] καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ στρατιωτικόν, deleted by Krüger, as pleonastic, followed by Hude.

[3] ἐλεύθεροι, so most MSS. Hude reads ἐλεύθερον with C, and brackets οἱ ναῦται.

were now filled with a still greater suspicion of him. For they had had this experience of him, that after they had refused to go out against the Athenians and fight when these made their advance against Miletus, Tissaphernes became far more slack in the matter of giving them their pay and thus intensified the hatred in which even before these events he was held by them on account of Alcibiades. So the soldiers would gather in groups, as had been their wont—and not the soldiery only, but also some of the others, who were men of consideration—and would cast up their accounts with one another, proving that they had never yet received their pay in full, but that what was given was short and even that not paid regularly; and they declared that unless they were either to have a decisive battle or get away to some place where they could get subsistence the crews would desert the ships; and for all this, they held, Astyochus was to blame, because he bore with Tissaphernes' whims for the sake of his private gain.

LXXXIV. While they were thus reckoning up their grievances the following disturbance occurred in connection with Astyochus. It seems that the Syracusan and Thurian sailors, in proportion as the majority of them were allowed most freedom, were to that degree also the most bold and importunate in demanding their pay from him. But he answered them somewhat haughtily and made threats; and against Dorieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, he even raised his stick.[1] When the mass of the troops saw this, in sailor fashion they

[1] Which he carried according to the custom of Spartan generals.

ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὴ ναῦται, ὥρμησαν ἐγκραγόντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον ὥστε βάλλειν· ὁ δὲ προϊδὼν καταφεύγει ἐπὶ βωμόν τινα. οὐ μέντοι ἐβλήθη γε, ἀλλὰ διελύθησαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐνῳκοδομημένον τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους φρούριον οἱ Μιλήσιοι, λάθρᾳ ἐπιπεσόντες, καὶ τοὺς ἐνόντας φύλακας αὐτοῦ ἐκβάλλουσιν. ξυνεδόκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα, καὶ νόσῳ ὕστερον ἀποθανόντα αὐτὸν οὐκ εἴασαν θάψαι οὗ ἐβούλοντο οἱ παρόντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

LXXXV. Κατὰ δὴ τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ὄντων αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων πρός τε τὸν Ἀστύοχον καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνη Μίνδαρος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀστυόχου ναυαρχίας ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ἐπῆλθε καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὴν ἀρχήν· ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος ἀπέπλει. ξυνέπεμψε δὲ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ πρεσβευτὴν τῶν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, Γαυλίτην ὄνομα, Κᾶρα δίγλωσσον, κατηγορήσοντα τῶν τε Μιλησίων περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀπολογησόμενον, εἰδὼς τούς τε Μιλησίους πορευομένους ἐπὶ καταβοῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα καὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη μετ' αὐτῶν, ὃς ἔμελλε τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ἀποφαίνειν φθείροντα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα μετὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐπαμφοτερί-

cried out in rage and rushed at Astyochus with the intention of stoning him; he, however, saw this in time and took refuge at an altar. But he was not actually stoned, and they were separated. The Milesians, furthermore, took the fort of Tissaphernes that had been built in Miletus, falling upon it unawares, and drove out the garrison that was in it. These doings were approved by the allies in general, and especially by the Syracusans. Lichas,[1] however, was not pleased with them and said that the Milesians and other inhabitants of the King's country ought even to slave for Tissaphernes in a reasonable way and to court his favour until they should bring the war to a successful conclusion. But the Milesians were angry with him for these and similar sayings; and when he afterwards fell sick and died they did not suffer him to be buried where the Lacedaemonians who were present wished to lay him.

LXXXV. While the relations between the soldiers and Astyochus and Tissaphernes were in such discord, Mindarus came from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral and took over the command; and Astyochus sailed home. But Tissaphernes sent with him as envoy one of his retinue, Gaulites, a bilingual Carian, to lay accusation against the Milesians for taking his fort and at the same time to make a defence of himself, since he knew that the Milesians were on their way to Sparta chiefly to denounce him, and that with them went Hermocrates, who was intending to show that Tissaphernes, together with Alcibiades, was ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians and pursuing a two-faced policy.

[1] Who had been so firm before in his demands (ch. xliii. 3) and his protests (ch. lii.).

3 ζοντα. ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦν αὐτῷ αἰεί ποτε περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως· καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα φυγόντος ἐκ Συρακουσῶν τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἑτέρων ἡκόντων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν Μίλητον στρατηγῶν, Ποτάμιδος καὶ Μύσκωνος καὶ Δημάρχου, ἐνέκειτο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης φυγάδι ὄντι ἤδη τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ κατηγόρει ἄλλα τε καὶ ὡς χρήματά ποτε αἰτήσας ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὐ τυχὼν τὴν ἔχθραν
4 οἱ πρόθοιτο. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀστύοχος καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα· ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης διεβεβήκει πάλιν ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

LXXXVI. Καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Δήλου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων[1] οὓς τότε ἔπεμψαν παραμυθησομένους καὶ ἀναδιδάξοντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ, ἀφικνοῦνται παρόντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομέ-
2 νης λέγειν ἐπεχείρουν. οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐκ ἤθελον ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ἀποκτείνειν ἐβόων τοὺς τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντας· ἔπειτα
3 μέντοι μόλις ἡσυχάσαντες ἤκουσαν. οἱ δ' ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὔθ' ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ (ἐξεῖναι γάρ, ὅτε ἐσέβαλον ἤδη σφῶν ἀρχόντων, τοῦτο ποιῆσαι), τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέ-

[1] *πρεσβευταί*, after *τῶν τετρακοσίων*, deleted by van Herwerden. *cf.* ch. lxxvii., note.

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[1] *cf.* ch. lxxv. 3. [2] *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* I. i. 27 ff.
[3] *cf.* ch. lxxii. 1.

Tissaphernes had always been at enmity with Hermocrates in connection with the payment of the wages;[1] and more recently, when Hermocrates had been banished from Syracuse and another set of generals had come to Miletus to take command of the Syracusan fleet[2]—and they were Potamis, Myscon and Demarchus—Tissaphernes set upon Hermocrates, now that he was an exile, much more violently than ever, charging against him, among other things, that he had once asked him for money, and because he did not obtain it had shown him enmity. Astyochus, then, together with the Milesians and Hermocrates, sailed away to Lacedaemon; Alcibiades, on the other hand, had already left Tissaphernes and crossed over again to Samos.

LXXXVI. And the envoys who had been sent by the Four Hundred, at the time above mentioned,[3] to appease the soldiers at Samos and explain matters, now arrived from Delos when Alcibiades was already there; and at a meeting of the assembly they attempted to speak. But the soldiers were at first unwilling to hear them, and with shouts threatened to kill the subverters of the democracy; afterwards, however, when with difficulty they had quieted down, they heard them. The envoys announced that the revolution had been made, not for the destruction of the state, but for its preservation, not in order that Athens might be betrayed to the enemy (for that could have been done at the time of the Lacedaemonian invasion, when the revolutionists were already in power); they stated, moreover, that all the Five Thousand would participate in the government in their turn; furthermore,

ξουσιν, οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι αὐτῶν οὔθ' ὑβρίζονται, ὥσπερ Χαιρέας διαβάλλων ἀπήγγελλεν, οὔτε κακὸν ἔχουσιν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς σφετέροις
4 αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κατὰ χώραν μένουσιν. ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἰπόντων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐσήκουον, ἀλλ' ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ γνώμας ἄλλοι ἄλλας ἔλεγον, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν. καὶ δοκεῖ[1] Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτος[2] τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι, ὡρμημένων γὰρ τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐν ᾧ σαφέστατ' ἂν Ἰωνίαν καὶ
Ἑλλήσποντον εὐθὺς εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, κωλυτὴς
5 γενέσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε ἄλλος μὲν οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο κατασχεῖν τὸν ὅχλον, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦ τ' ἐπίπλου ἔπαυσε καὶ τοὺς ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πρέ-
6 σβεσιν ὀργιζομένους λοιδορῶν ἀπέτρεπεν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος αὐτοῖς ἀπέπεμπεν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους οὐ κωλύοι ἄρχειν, τοὺς μέντοι τετρακοσίους ἐκέλευεν ἀπαλλάσσειν αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστάναι τὴν βουλὴν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τοὺς πεντακοσίους· εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέτμηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατευομένους μᾶλλον
7 ἔχειν τροφήν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν. καὶ τἆλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σῳζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλήσεται, ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ διαλλαγήσεταί τις ἔτι ἔσεσθαι.

8 Παρῆσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, ἐπαγγελ-

[1] δοκεῖ, Classen's correction for ἐδόκει of the MSS.
[2] πρῶτος, many editors accept πρῶτον of B.

their relatives were neither being insulted, as Chaereas was slanderously saying, nor suffering any ill, but remained in their homes, each in possession of his own property. But though they said all this and more, the soldiers were none the more inclined to give heed to them, but were angry, and one after another offered various suggestions, but particularly that they should sail against the Peiraeus. And Alcibiades seems then in an eminent degree, and more than anyone else, to have benefited the state; for when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their own people—and if they had the enemy would most certainly have been masters of Ionia and the Hellespont—it was he who prevented it. And in that critical moment no other man would have been able to restrain the crowd, but he stopped them from sailing, and reproaching those who were on their own private account angry at the envoys, he caused them to desist. And he sent the envoys away with this answer from himself: he did not object to the Five Thousand ruling, but bade them depose the Four Hundred and set up the senate as it had been before—the body of Five Hundred; and if there had been any curtailment with a view to economy, so that the soldiers in the field might have better maintenance, he quite approved of that. As for the rest, he bade them not yield a step to the enemy; for so long as the city was saved there was great hope of a reconciliation among themselves, but if once one party or the other should go to the ground, whether the one at Samos or that at Athens, there would be no one left to be reconciled with.

Envoys from the Argives also came to Samos with

λόμενοι τῷ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ ὥστε βοηθεῖν· ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰπών, ὅταν τις καλῇ, παρεῖναι,
9 οὕτως ἀπέπεμπεν. ἀφίκοντο δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Παράλων, οἳ τότε ἐτάχθησαν ἐν τῇ στρατιώτιδι νηὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων περιπλεῖν Εὔβοιαν καὶ ἄγειν[1] Ἀθηναίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πρέσβεις[2] Λαισποδίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶντα καὶ Μελησίαν· οἳ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατ' Ἄργος, τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις ξυλλαβόντες τοῖς Ἀργείοις παρέδοσαν ὡς τῶν οὐχ ἥκιστα καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον ὄντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκοντο, ἀλλ' ἄγοντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ἐς τὴν Σάμον τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀφικνοῦνται ᾗπερ εἶχον τριήρει.

LXXXVII. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους Τισσαφέρνης, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα διά τε τἆλλα καὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον ᾔχθοντο αὐτῷ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς φανερῶς ἤδη ἀττικίζοντι, βουλόμενος, ὡς ἐδόκει δή, ἀπολύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὰς διαβολάς, παρεσκευάζετο πορεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἐς Ἄσπενδον, καὶ τὸν Λίχαν ξυμπορεύεσθαι ἐκέλευεν· τῇ δὲ στρατιᾷ προστάξειν ἔφη Τάμων ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρχον, ὥστε τροφὴν ἐν ὅσῳ ἂν αὐτὸς
2 ἀπῇ διδόναι· λέγεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό, οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι τίνι γνώμῃ παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν

[1] ἄγειν, Portus' correction for ἄγοντες of the MSS.

offers of assistance to the Athenian democracy there; but Alcibiades dismissed them with words of commendation, telling them to come when summoned. Now the Argives had come with the crew of the Paralus, who at the time above mentioned [1] had been sent out in the troop-ship with instructions to cruise round Euboea and to convey to Lacedaemon the three Athenian envoys from the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon and Melesias. But when they had got as far as Argos on their voyage, the crew had seized the envoys and delivered them to the Argives, on the ground that they were among those who had been chiefly instrumental in overthrowing the democracy. They themselves, however, did not go back to Athens thereafter, but came from Argos to Samos, bringing with them the envoys in their trireme.

LXXXVII. During the same summer, at the very moment when, for various other reasons and especially because of the recall of Alcibiades, the Peloponnesians were vexed with Tissaphernes, feeling that he was now openly favouring the Athenians, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself in their eyes of these calumnies, prepared to go to Aspendus after the Phoenician ships, and bade Lichas accompany him; but as regards the army he would appoint Tamos in his place, so as to ensure supplies during his own absence. But the story is told in different ways, and it is not easy to be certain what motive he had for going to Aspendus,

[1] *cf.* ch. lxxiv. 2.

[2] πεμπτούς, before πρέσβεις, M—other MSS. πέμπουσι—generally deleted by editors.

Ἄσπενδον καὶ παρελθὼν οὐκ ἤγαγε τὰς ναῦς.
3 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἑπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μέχρι Ἀσπένδου ἀφίκοντο σαφές ἐστιν. δι' ὅ τι δὲ οὐκ ἦλθον πολλαχῇ εἰκάζεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἵνα διατρίβῃ ἀπελθών, ὥσπερ καὶ διενοήθη, τὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων (τροφὴν γοῦν οὐδὲν βέλτιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χεῖρον ὁ Τάμως, ᾧ προσετάχθη, παρεῖχεν), οἱ δὲ ἵνα τοὺς Φοίνικας προαγαγὼν ἐς τὴν Ἄσπενδον ἐκχρηματίσαιτο ἀφείς (καὶ γὰρ ὧς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔμελλε χρήσεσθαι), ἄλλοι δ' ὡς καταβοῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, τοῦ λέγεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σαφῶς οἴχεται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀληθῶς πε-
4 πληρωμένας. ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον εἶναι τριβῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οὐκ ἀγαγεῖν, φθορᾶς μέν, ἐν ὅσῳ παρῇει ἐκεῖσε καὶ διέμελλεν, ἀνισώσεως δέ, ὅπως μηδετέρους προσθέμενος ἰσχυροτέρους ποιήσῃ, ἐπεί, εἴ γε ἐβουλήθη, διαπολεμῆσαι ἂν[1] ἐπιφανεὶς[2] δήπου οὐκ ἐνδοιαστῶς· κομίσας γὰρ ἂν Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν νίκην κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔδωκεν, οἵ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀντιπάλως μᾶλλον ἢ ὑποδεεστέρως τῷ ναυτικῷ ἀνθώρμουν.
5 καταφωρᾷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ἦν εἶπε πρόφασιν οὐ

[1] ἄν, added by Dobree.
[2] ἐπιφανεῖς, Reiske's conjecture for ἐπιφανὲς of MSS.

and why, after going, he did not bring back the ships. For that the Phoenician ships, one hundred and forty-seven in number, came as far as Aspendus is certain; but the reason why they did not finish the journey is variously conjectured. Some say that his purpose was to accomplish by his absence what he actually designed—to exhaust by delay the resources of the Peloponnesians (at any rate supplies were furnished no better, but even worse than before, by Tamos, to whom this duty had been assigned); others say that it was with the idea of bringing the Phoenician ships as far as Aspendus and then exacting money from them for their discharge (for in any case he was not intending to make any use of them); and still others say that it was because he was being denounced at Lacedaemon, and wanted the report to go out that he was not acting wrongly but, as everybody could see, had gone for the ships and these were really manned for service. To me, however, it seems perfectly clear that it was with the purpose of wearing out the resources of the Hellenes and keeping matters in suspense that he did not bring the fleet—of exhausting them while he was making the journey to Aspendus and delaying there, and also of equalizing them, that he might make neither side stronger by joining it. For if he had indeed wished it, he could, it seems plain, by appearing on the scene have brought the war to a definite conclusion; for by bringing his fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, who, in fact, even as it was were confronting the Athenians with a fleet that fully matched theirs and was not inferior to it. But that which convicted him most

κομίσας τὰς ναῦς. ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐλάσσους ἢ ὅσας βασιλεὺς ἔταξε ξυλλεγῆναι· ὁ δὲ χάριν ἂν δήπου ἐν τούτῳ μείζω ἔτι ἔσχεν, οὔτε ἀναλώσας πολλὰ τῶν βασιλέως, τά τε αὐτὰ ἀπ' 6 ἐλασσόνων πράξας. ἐς δ' οὖν τὴν Ἄσπενδον ᾗτινι δὴ γνώμῃ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τοῖς Φοίνιξι ξυγγίγνεται· καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπεμψαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον δύο τριήρεσιν.

LXXXVIII. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ᾔσθετο παριόντα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς λαβὼν τρεῖς καὶ δέκα ναῦς, ὑποσχόμενος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ μεγάλην χάριν (ἦ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄξειν Ἀθηναίοις τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἢ Πελοποννησίοις γε κωλύσειν ἐλθεῖν), εἰδώς, ὡς εἰκός, ἐκ πλείονος τὴν Τισσαφέρνους γνώμην ὅτι οὐκ ἄξειν ἔμελλε, καὶ βουλόμενος αὐτὸν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ Ἀθηναίων φιλίαν ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλειν, ὅπως μᾶλλον δι' αὐτὸ σφίσιν ἀναγκάζοιτο προσχωρεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρας εὐθὺ τῆς Φασήλιδος καὶ Καύνου ἄνω τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιεῖτο.

LXXXIX. Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες πρέσβεις ἐπειδὴ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπήγγειλαν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς κελεύει τε ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐλπίδας τε ὅτι πολλὰς ἔχει κἀκείνοις τὸ στράτευμα διαλλάξειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιέσεσθαι, ἀχθομένους καὶ πρότερον τοὺς πολ-

[1] Referring, not only to the Four Hundred, but especially to the rest of the citizens who, in ch. lxix. 2, are designated as *οἱ ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ*.

clearly was the excuse he gave for not bringing the ships, when he said that they were not so many as the King had ordered to be collected; but he, on the contrary, would surely have won all the more gratitude in such a case, by saving a great deal of the King's money and obtaining the same results with smaller outlay. At any rate, whatever his intentions, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians by his orders sent Philippus, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to bring the ships back.

LXXXVIII. But Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes as well was on his way to Aspendus, sailed thither himself with thirteen ships, promising the army at Samos a sure and great benefit; for he would either secure the ships himself for the Athenians, or else at any rate prevent their joining the Peloponnesians. It is likely that he had long been aware of the purpose of Tissaphernes —that he had no intention of bringing the ships— and wished to prejudice him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians on the score of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be under greater compulsion to join the Athenian side. So he put to sea, laying his course eastward, straight toward Phaselis and Caunus.

LXXXIX. When the envoys sent by the Four Hundred arrived at Athens on their return from Samos and reported what Alcibiades had said— urging them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes both of reconciling the army to the people at home and of prevailing over the Peloponnesians—most of those who shared in the oligarchy,[1] who were even

λοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἡδέως
ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας πῃ ἀσφαλῶς τοῦ πράγματος
2 πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν. καὶ ξυνίσταντό
τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο, ἔχοντες
ἡγεμόνας τῶν πάνυ[1] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ
ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, οἷον Θηραμένη τε τὸν Ἀγνωνος
καὶ Ἀριστοκράτη τὸν Σκελίου καὶ ἄλλους, οἳ
μετέσχον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι[2] τῶν πραγμάτων,
φοβούμενοι δέ, ὡς ἔφασαν, τό τε ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ
στράτευμα καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδῇ πάνυ,[3]
τούς τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβευομένους[4] μή
τι ἄνευ τῶν πλειόνων κακὸν δράσωσι τὴν πόλιν,
οὗτοι ἀπαλλαξείειν[5] τοῦ ἄγαν ἐς ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι
χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν
3 καθιστάναι. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν
τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ' ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ
πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ
καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη
ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ
ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος
εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης
ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων

[1] *στρατηγῶν*, after *τῶν πάνυ*, deleted by Classen. For *τῶν πάνυ* *cf.* ch. i. 1.

[2] *ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι*, Bekker's correction; *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* B, *ἐν πρώτοις*, the other MSS.

[3] *σπουδῇ πάνυ*, Hude omits with CM and Schol.

[4] *πρεσβευομένους*, CM and Schol., *πρεσβευομένους ἔπεμπον*, ABEFG and Thom. Mag. It is possible to construe the latter reading by changing *οὓς* to *τούς*, with Goeller.

[5] *οὗτοι ἀπαλλαξείειν* for *οὐ τὸ ἀπαλλάξειν* of the MSS. *οὗτοι*

before this in distress, and would have been glad to be safely rid of the business in any way, were far more encouraged. And they were already beginning to form groups and criticize the state of affairs, having as their leaders some of the very men who were members of the oligarchy and held office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scelias, and others. These had been among the foremost of those who had taken an active part in the revolution, but being afraid in real earnest, as they said, of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades, as well as of those who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, who they thought might, by acting without the sanction of the greater number, work some harm to the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they wanted to avoid reducing the government to an extreme oligarchy, but maintained that they ought to appoint the Five Thousand in fact and not merely in name, and to establish the government on the basis of a greater equality. Now this phrase of theirs was a mere political catchword, and in their personal ambitions most of them eagerly pursued the sort of methods by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to come to ruin; for all demand forthwith, not equality, but each that he shall be quite the first himself; whereas under a democracy an election is held and every man acquiesces more readily in the result because he feels that those to whom he owes

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is Stahl's correction, ἀπαλλαξείειν, Abresch's (*cf.* Schol. ἀπαλλακτικῶς ἔχουσι). Some verb like ἔλεγον has dropped out or is understood.

ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει. σαφέστατα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι· ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι.

XC. Οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει καὶ προεστῶτες, Φρύνιχός τε, ὃς καὶ στρατηγήσας ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τότε διενέχθη, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ Ἀντιφῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δυνατώτατοι, πρότερόν τε, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα κατέστησαν καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ σφῶν ἐς δημοκρατίαν ἀπέστη, πρέσβεις τε ἀπέστελλον σφῶν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν προυθυμοῦντο καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἡετιωνείᾳ καλουμένῃ τεῖχος ἐποιοῦντο, πολλῷ τε μᾶλλον ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πρέσβεις σφῶν ἦλθον, ὁρῶντες τούς τε πολλοὺς καὶ σφῶν τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρό-
2 τερον πιστοὺς εἶναι μεταβαλλομένους. καὶ ἀπέστειλαν μὲν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ἄλλους δέκα κατὰ τάχος, φοβούμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπιστείλαντες παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἀνεκτὸς ξυναλλαγῆναι
3 πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. ᾠκοδόμουν δὲ ἔτι προθυμότερον τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἡετιωνείᾳ τεῖχος. ἦν δὲ

[1] *i. e.* the majority.

[2] *i. e.* in an oligarchy all are of the same class, and the promotion of one is a slight upon the rest; but in a democracy the defeated candidate may claim that the electors were ignorant or prejudiced, that he was not beaten on his merits, and so pass the matter over.

[3] *cf.* chs. xlviii., l. [4] *cf.* chs. xlix., liii. [5] *cf.* ch. lxviii. 1.

his defeat[1] are not his equals.[2] But what most evidently encouraged these men was the fact that Alcibiades' position at Samos was so strong, and their opinion that the power of the oligarchy would not last long. Each one, therefore, strove to become the foremost leader of the people himself.

XC. But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a course—the leading spirits like Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and had then quarrelled with Alcibiades,[3] and Aristarchus, a man who had been conspicuously and for the longest time opposed to the democracy, and Peisander,[4] Antiphon,[5] and other men of the greatest influence—before this time, that is, as soon as they were established in power and then when the army at Samos had revolted from them in favour of a democratic form of government, had been sending ambassadors of their own to Lacedaemon [6] and making earnest efforts to come to an understanding, and had also been constructing their fort in the place called Eetioneia; and now far more than ever, when their ambassadors returned from Samos, did they bestir themselves, seeing that not only the majority of the people but also men of their own party who had before been esteemed trustworthy were changing their views. So they despatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others in all haste, since they were alarmed by the situation both at home and at Samos, enjoining upon them to effect a reconciliation with the Lacedaemonians on any terms that would be at all tolerable. And they set to work with greater zeal than ever building their fort at Eetioneia.[7] And the purpose of

[6] *cf.* ch. lxxi. 3; lxxxvi. 9. [7] See map at end.

τοῦ τείχους ἡ γνώμη αὕτη, ὡς ἔφη Θηραμένης καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἵνα τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἢν βίᾳ ἐπιπλέωσι, μὴ δέξωνται ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὅταν βούλωνται, 4 καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ δέξωνται. χηλὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἡ Ἑτιώνεια, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν εὐθὺς ὁ ἔσπλους ἐστίν. ἐτειχίζετο οὖν οὕτω ξὺν τῷ πρότερον πρὸς ἤπειρον ὑπάρχοντι τείχει, ὥστε καθεζομένων ἐς αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων ἄρχειν τοῦ ἔσπλου·[1] ἐς αὐτὸν γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος στενοῦ ὄντος τὸν ἕτερον πύργον ἐτελεύτα τό τε παλαιὸν τὸ πρὸς ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ καινὸν τὸ 5 ἐντὸς τεῖχος τειχιζόμενον πρὸς θάλασσαν. διῳκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοάν, ἥπερ ἦν μεγίστη καὶ ἐγγύτατα[2] τούτου εὐθὺς ἐχομένη ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ, καὶ ἦρχον αὐτοὶ αὐτῆς, ἐς ἣν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἠνάγκαζον πάντας τὸν ὑπάρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν ἐπεσπλέοντα ἐξαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν προαιροῦντας πωλεῖν.

XCI. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐκ πλέονός τε ὁ Θηραμένης διεθρόει καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν, φάσκων κινδυνεύσειν τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο 2 καὶ τὴν πόλιν διαφθεῖραι. ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐτύγχανον Εὐβοέων ἐπικαλουμένων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ἐκ Τάραντος καὶ ἐκ Λοκρῶν Ἰταλιώτιδες καὶ Σικελικαί τινες, ὁρμοῦσαι ἤδη ἐπὶ Λᾷ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ παρα-

[1] τοῦ ἔσπλου, BM; Hude follows Classen in changing to τοῦ τε ἔσπλου καὶ ἔκπλου.

[2] ἐγγύτατα, bracketed by Hude following van Herwerden.

this fort was, as Theramenes and his adherents said, not that they might prevent the Samian fleet from entering the Peiraeus in case they should attempt to force their way in, but rather that they might admit the enemy whenever they wished with both his army and fleet. For Eetioneia is a mole extending out from the Peiraeus, and immediately beside it is the entrance to the harbour. It was therefore being connected by a wall with the wall which already existed somewhat inland, and in such a way that if only a few men were stationed inside it would control the entrance; for both the old wall running inland and the new inner wall that was being built facing the sea came to an end in the second of the two towers, the one that lay exactly at the mouth of the harbour, which was narrow. They also cut off with a wall inside the harbour a portico which was very large and immediately adjoined this inland wall; and this they controlled themselves, and compelled everybody to deposit in it the corn that was already on hand as well as to discharge there that which came in by sea, and to take it from there if they wished to sell it.

XCI. Now Theramenes had been freely talking about these proceedings for some time, and after the ambassadors came back from Lacedaemon without having accomplished anything toward an agreement for the people as a whole, he kept saying that this fort would in all probability bring ruin upon the city. For at this very time it so happened that, on the invitation of the Euboeans, ships from the Peloponnesus to the number of forty-two, among which were Italian vessels from Tarentum and Locri and some from Sicily, were already lying off Las in

σκευαζόμεναι τὸν ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν πλοῦν (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἡγησανδρίδας Ἡγησάνδρου Σπαρτιάτης)· ἃς ἔφη Θηραμένης οὐκ Εὐβοίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τειχίζουσι τὴν Ἠετιώνειαν προσπλεῖν, καὶ εἰ μή τις ἤδη φυλάξεται, λήσειν διαφθαρέντας.
3 ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ μάλιστα μὲν ἐβούλοντο ὀλιγαρχούμενοι ἄρχειν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, εἰ δὲ μή, τάς γε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τείχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἐξειργόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου μὴ οὖν ὑπὸ δήμου γε αὖθις γενομένου αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα διαφθαρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

XCII. Δι' ὅπερ καὶ τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον καὶ ἐσόδους καὶ[1] ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, ἐτείχιζόν τε προθύμως καὶ φθῆναι
2 ἐβούλοντο ἐξεργασάμενοι. πρότερον μὲν οὖν κατ' ὀλίγους τε καὶ κρύφα μᾶλλον τὰ λεγόμενα ἦν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἥκων ἐκ τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβείας πληγεὶς ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς τῶν περιπόλων τινὸς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ καὶ οὐ πολὺ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου ἀπελθὼν ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα, καὶ ὁ μὲν πατάξας διέφυγεν, ὁ δὲ ξυνεργός, Ἀργεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ληφθεὶς καὶ βασανιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων οὐδενὸς

[1] καί, omitted by Hude with C.

Laconia and preparing for their passage to Euboea, under the command of Hegesandridas son of Hegesander, a Spartan; and Theramenes declared that these were on their way, not to Euboea, but to Eetioneia to help the men who were fortifying it, adding that unless they immediately took precautions their cause would be lost before they knew it. And in fact there was something of the kind afoot on the part of those whom he thus accused, and what he said was not altogether mere calumny. For the persons in question wished above all, preserving their oligarchy, to rule both Athens and the allies, but, failing in that, to keep their ships at least and their fortifications and be independent; and if they were debarred from this course also, at any rate not to be themselves the first to meet with destruction at the hands of the restored democracy, but actually to bring in the enemy and, giving up walls and ships, make any sort of terms as to the fate of the city, if only they might have immunity for their own persons.

XCII. It was with this object in view that they were now diligently building this fort, which was furnished with posterns and entrances and ways for letting the enemy in, and they wished to have it finished in time. Now hitherto the talk had been confined to small groups and indulged in with some attempt at secrecy; but finally Phrynichus, after his return from his mission to Lacedaemon, was stabbed in full market as the result of a plot by a man of the frontier-patrol, and before he had gone far from the senate-chamber suddenly died. The assassin escaped, while his accomplice, an Argive fellow, was seized and put to the torture by the Four Hundred, but

ὄνομα τοῦ κελεύσαντος εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰδείη πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐς τοῦ περιπολάρχου καὶ ἄλλοσε κατ' οἰκίας ξυνίοντας, τότε δὴ οὐδενὸς γεγενημένου ἀπ' αὐτοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ὁ Θηραμένης ἤδη θρασύτερον καὶ Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν τετρακοσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἦσαν ὁμογνώμονες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα.
3 ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λᾶς αἱ νῆες ἤδη περιπεπλευκυῖαι καὶ ὁρμισάμεναι ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Αἰγιναν κατεδεδραμήκεσαν· καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ὁ Θηραμένης εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐπ' Εὔβοιαν πλεούσας αὐτὰς ἐς Αἴγιναν κατακολπίσαι καὶ πάλιν ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ὁρμεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρακληθεῖσαι ἥκοιεν ἐφ' οἵσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ κατηγόρει· οὐκέτι οὖν
4 οἷόν τε εἶναι ἡσυχάζειν. τέλος δὲ πολλῶν καὶ στασιωτικῶν λόγων καὶ ὑποψιῶν προσγενομένων καὶ ἔργῳ ἤδη ἥπτοντο τῶν πραγμάτων· οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τὸ τῆς Ἑτιωνείας τεῖχος ὁπλῖται οἰκοδομοῦντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀριστοκράτης ἦν ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φυλὴν ἔχων, ξυλλαμβάνουσιν Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, καὶ ἐς οἰκίαν ἀγαγόντες εἶρξαν.
5 ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ ἅμα αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἕρμων τῶν περιπόλων τις, τῶν Μουνιχίασι τεταγμένων ἄρχων· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν
6 τὸ στῖφος ταὐτὰ ἐβούλετο. ὡς δὲ ἐσηγγέλθη τοῖς τετρακοσίοις (ἔτυχον δὲ ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ

did not reveal the name of anyone who instigated the deed nor anything else, except that he knew many who were wont to come together in the house of the commander of the frontier-patrol and at other houses. So now at length, when no signal action had been taken in consequence of this, Theramenes and Aristocrates and all the rest of the Four Hundred and those outside that body who were of the same way of thinking, went to work more boldly. For at this same time the Peloponnesian ships had already sailed round from Las, and after taking station at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes said it was not likely, if their destination were Euboea, that they would have run up the gulf as far as Aegina and then put in to Epidaurus to anchor, unless they had come on invitation for the purposes which he himself had always been denouncing; it was therefore impossible, he concluded, to keep quiet any longer. Finally, when there had been many other seditious speeches and insinuations, they at last took hold of the situation in earnest. The hoplites in the Peiraeus who were engaged in building the fort at Eetioneia—one of their number being Aristocrates, a taxiarch who commanded the contingent of his own tribe—arrested Alexicles, who was a general of the oligarchical faction and very favourably inclined toward the members of the political clubs, took him into a house and confined him there. Among those who took part with them in this exploit was Hermon, one of the frontier-patrol and commander of the detachment stationed at Munichia; and, most important of all, the mass of the hoplites were in sympathy with all this. But when the act was announced to the Four Hundred,

ξυγκαθήμενοι); εὐθὺς πλὴν[1] ὅσοις μὴ βουλομένοις ταῦτα ἦν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰ ὅπλα ἰέναι καὶ τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ ἠπείλουν. ὁ δὲ ἀπολογούμενος ἑτοῖμος ἔφη εἶναι ξυναφαιρησόμενος ἰέναι ἤδη. καὶ παραλαβὼν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅστις ἦν αὐτῷ ὁμογνώμων ἐχώρει ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· ἐβοήθει δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ
7 τῶν ἱππέων νεανίσκοι. ἦν δὲ θόρυβος πολὺς καὶ ἐκπληκτικός· οἵ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἤδη ὤοντο τόν τε Πειραιᾶ κατειλῆφθαι καὶ τὸν ξυνειλημμένον τεθνάναι, οἵ τε ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὅσον οὔπω ἐπὶ σφᾶς παρεῖναι.
8 μόλις δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων διακωλυόντων τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει διαθέοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα φερομένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος καὶ προθύμως ἐμποδών τε ἑκάστοις γιγνομένου καὶ ἐπιβοωμένου μὴ ἐφεδρευόντων ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα, ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέ-
9 σχοντο. καὶ ὁ μὲν Θηραμένης ἐλθὼν ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ (ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγός), ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα, ὠργίζετο τοῖς ὁπλίταις· ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἱ ἐναντίοι τῷ πλήθει ἐχαλέπαινον.
10 οἱ δὲ ὁπλῖται ὁμόσε τε ἐχώρουν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ μετεμέλοντο, καὶ τὸν Θηραμένη ἠρώτων εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τὸ τεῖχος οἰκοδομεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ ἄμεινον εἶναι καθαιρεθέν. ὁ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ ἐκείνοις δοκεῖ καθαιρεῖν, καὶ

[1] πλήν, deleted by Hude, following Haase.

[1] *i.e.* the present conduct of the Four Hundred.

who happened to be in session in the senate-chamber, immediately all except those who disapproved of this state of things [1] were ready to rush to arms and began to threaten Theramenes and his followers. But he, justifying himself, said that he was ready to go immediately and assist in the rescue of Alexicles. So he took one of the generals who was in accord with him and proceeded to the Peiraeus; and Aristarchus and some young men of the Knights also went to the rescue. There ensued a tumult that was widespread and alarming; for the people in the city thought that the Peiraeus had been taken and that the man under arrest had been put to death, while the people in the Peiraeus thought that the men of the city were all but upon them. But owing to the efforts of the older men to stop those in the city who were running hither and thither and flying to their arms and also of Thucydides, the Athenian proxenus at Pharsalus, who was then in Athens and zealously threw himself in everybody's way and loudly called upon them not to ruin the state when the enemy was near at hand awaiting his turn, the people were with difficulty quieted and refrained from attacking one another. As for Theramenes, he went to the Peiraeus (he was himself one of the generals) and, so far as shouting was concerned, showed anger at the hoplites; but Aristarchus and those who were opposed to the populace were really displeased. Most of the hoplites, however, grappled with the task in hand and showed no change of purpose, and they asked Theramenes whether he thought that the fort was being built with any good end in view, and whether it were not better demolished. He answered that if it seemed good to them

ἑαυτῷ ἔφη ξυνδοκεῖν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν εὐθὺς ἀναβάντες οἵ τε ὁπλῖται καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀνθρώπων κατέσκαπτον τὸ τείχισμα.
11 ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὡς χρή, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν, φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι καὶ πρός τινα εἰπών τίς τι ἀγνοίᾳ σφαλῇ. καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους ἄντικρυς[1] δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ' αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

XCIII. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν τετρακόσιοι ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ὅμως καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ξυνελέγοντο· οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ὁπλῖται τόν τε Ἀλεξικλέα ὃν ξυνέλαβον ἀφέντες καὶ τὸ τείχισμα καθελόντες, ἐς τὸ πρὸς τῇ Μουνιχίᾳ Διονυσιακὸν θέατρον ἐλθόντες καὶ θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἐξεκλησίασάν τε καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἔθεντο αὖ ἐν τῷ Ἀνακίῳ τὰ ὅπλα.
2 ἐλθόντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὲς ῥηθέντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ διελέγοντό τε καὶ ἔπειθον οὓς ἴδοιεν ἀνθρώπους ἐπιεικεῖς αὐτούς

[1] ἂν after ἄντικρυς, deleted by Hude, following Krüger.

[1] *i. e.* that the man to whom he suggested a democratic revolution might himself be one of the Five Thousand.

[2] The precinct of the Dioscuri, to whom the title of ἄνακτες was applied.

to demolish it, so it seemed to him also. Thereupon the hoplites and many of the people of Peiraeus at once mounted the fortification and began to tear it down. And the exhortation addressed to the crowd was, "Whoever wants the Five Thousand to rule in place of the Four Hundred, let him set to work." For in spite of everything they were still concealing their purpose under the name of the "Five Thousand," so as not to say outright, "Whoever wants the *people* to rule"; for they were afraid that the Five Thousand did in reality exist and that one man in speaking to another might without knowing it get into trouble.[1] And in fact this was the reason why the Four Hundred did not wish either that the Five Thousand should actually exist or that it should become known that they did not exist—because they thought, on the one hand, that to make so many men partners in the government was outright democracy, and, on the other hand, that the uncertainty would inspire fear in each against his neighbour.

XCIII. On the next day the Four Hundred, though much disturbed, assembled nevertheless in the senate-chamber. But the hoplites in the Peiraeus, after they had released Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolished the fortification, went to the theatre of Dionysus in Munichia, and grounding arms held a meeting of the assembly; then, a vote to that effect having been passed, they proceeded straightway to the city and again halted in the Anacium.[2] But certain men came to them from the Four Hundred, who had been chosen as their delegates, and talked with them, man with man, and tried to persuade any that they saw were

τε ἡσυχάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακατέχειν, λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν μηδ' ἐς τοὺς
3 πολεμίους ἀνῶσαι. τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ. ξυνεχώρησάν τε ὥστε ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου περὶ ὁμονοίας.

XCIV. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπῆλθεν ἡ ἐν Διονύσου ἐκκλησία καὶ ὅσον οὐ ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, ἀγγέλλονται αἱ δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες καὶ ὁ Ἡγησανδρίδας ἀπὸ τῶν Μεγάρων τὴν Σαλαμῖνα παραπλεῖν· καὶ πᾶς τις τῶν ὁπλιτῶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ὑπὸ Θηραμένους καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐς τὸ τείχισμα ἔπλεον αἱ νῆες, καὶ χρησίμως ἐδόκει κατα-
2 πεπτωκέναι. ὁ δὲ Ἡγησανδρίδας τάχα μέν τι καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου περί τε τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ ταύτῃ ἀνεστρέφετο, εἰκὸς δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα στασιασμὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, δι' ἐλπίδος ὡς κἂν ἐς δέον παραγένοιτο, ταύτῃ
3 ἀνέχειν. οἱ δ' οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς,

[1] *cf.* ch. xci. 2; xciii. 2.

reasonable both to keep quiet themselves and to help to keep the rest in restraint, saying that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from these should be constituted in turn the Four Hundred in whatever way should seem best to the Five Thousand; meanwhile, they urged, they should by all means not ruin the city or drive it into the arms of the enemy. Finally, the whole body of hoplites, as speeches were made by many and to many, was more calm than before, and was now alarmed chiefly about the general safety of the state. So they came to an agreement to hold, on an appointed day, a meeting of the assembly in the precinct of Dionysus and consider the question of concord.

XCIV. When the time had come for the meeting of the assembly in the precinct of Dionysus and they had all but gathered there, it was announced that Hegesandridas with his forty-two ships had left Megara and was sailing along the coast of Salamis; and the hoplites to a man believed that this was precisely the move that had long since been predicted by Theramenes and his party[1] and that the ships were coming in to occupy the fort; and they felt that its demolition had served a useful purpose. Now it may well be that Hegesandridas was acting in accordance with some prearranged understanding when he hovered about Epidaurus and that neighbourhood, but it is probable that in tarrying there he also had regard to the dissension prevailing among the Athenians, and was hopeful that possibly he might arrive in the very nick of time. However this may be, when his movements were reported to the Athenians they immediately advanced at a run

εὐθὺς δρόμῳ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ πανδημεὶ ἐχώρουν, ὡς τοῦ ἰδίου πολέμου μείζονος[1] ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὐχ ἑκὰς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι ὄντος. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὰς παρούσας ναῦς ἐσέβαινον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλας καθεῖλκον, οἱ δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος παρεβοήθουν.

XCV. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες παραπλεύσασαι καὶ περιβαλοῦσαι Σούνιον ὁρμίζονται μεταξὺ Θορικοῦ τε καὶ Πρασιῶν, ὕστερον δὲ
2 ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ὠρωπόν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τάχος καὶ ἀξυγκροτήτοις πληρώμασιν ἀναγκασθέντες χρήσασθαι, οἷα πόλεώς τε στασιαζούσης καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἐν τάχει βουλόμενοι βοηθῆσαι (Εὔβοια γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκλημένης τῆς Ἀττικῆς πάντα ἦν), πέμπουσι Θυμοχάρη στρατη-
3 γὸν καὶ ναῦς ἐς Ἐρέτριαν. ὧν ἀφικομένων ξὺν ταῖς πρότερον ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐγένοντο. καὶ εὐθὺς ναυμαχεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο· ὁ γὰρ Ἡγησανδρίδας ἀριστοποιησάμενος ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ ἀνήγαγε τὰς ναῦς, διέχει δὲ μάλιστα ὁ Ὠρωπὸς τῆς τῶν Ἐρετριῶν πόλεως θαλάσσης
4 μέτρον ἑξήκοντα σταδίους. ὡς οὖν ἐπέπλει, εὐθὺς ἐπλήρουν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς ναῦς, οἰόμενοι σφίσι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας εἶναι· οἱ δὲ ἔτυχον οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἄριστον ἐπισιτιζόμενοι (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο ἀπὸ προνοίας τῶν Ἐρετριῶν), ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄστεως οἰκιῶν, ὅπως σχολῇ πληρουμένων φθάσειαν οἱ

[1] ἤ, after μείζονος, deleted by Hude, following the Scholiast.

[1] *i. e.* through the occupation of Deceleia by the enemy; *cf.* vii. 27, 28.

with all their forces to the Peiraeus, thinking that a new war, launched by the enemy and more serious than their own domestic feud, was not far away, nay, was actually at their port. Some went aboard the ships that were lying ready, others began launching additional ships, while others still hastened to the defence of the walls and the entrance of the harbour.

XCV. But the Peloponnesians' ships, after sailing along the coast and doubling Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae, but afterwards went on to Oropus. And the Athenians, in all haste and making use of unpractised crews under stress of necessity, inasmuch as the city was in a state of sedition and they were eager with the least delay to rally to the defence of their chief possession—for Euboea now meant everything to them, since they were debarred from Attica[1]—sent Thymochares and some ships to Eretria. When they arrived and were joined by those already at Euboea the fleet numbered thirty-six ships. And they were forced to fight immediately; for Hegesander had no sooner breakfasted than he led out his ships from Oropus, and Oropus is only about sixty stadia distant from the city of Eretria by sea. When, therefore, he began his advance, the Athenians on their part began at once to man their ships, supposing that the crews were beside their vessels. But they chanced to be providing themselves with food for their breakfast, not in the market-place—for by design on the part of the Eretrians nothing was being offered for sale there—but from the houses in the furthest parts of the town; and this had been so arranged in order that while they were manning at their leisure the enemy

πολέμιοι προσπεσόντες καὶ ἐξαναγκάσειαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὕτως ὅπως τύχοιεν ἀνάγεσθαι. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἐρε-
5 τρίας, ὁπότε χρὴ ἀνάγεσθαι, ἤρθη. διὰ τοιαύτης δὴ παρασκευῆς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχήσαντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὅμως καὶ ἀντέσχον, ἔπειτα ἐς φυγὴν τραπόμενοι καταδιώκονται ἐς
6 τὴν γῆν. καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὡς φιλίαν καταφεύγουσι, χαλεπώτατα ἔπραξαν φονευόμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν· οἳ δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτείχισμα τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ, ὃ εἶχον αὐτοί, περιγίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐς Χαλκίδα ἀφικνοῦνται
7 τῶν νεῶν. λαβόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι δύο καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἄνδρας τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείναντες τοὺς δὲ ζωγρήσαντες τροπαῖον ἔστησαν. καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ Εὔβοιάν τε, ἅπασαν ἀποστήσαντες πλὴν Ὠρεοῦ (ταύτην δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον), καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν καθίσταντο.

XCVI. Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ὡς ἦλθε τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν γεγενημένα, ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὶν παρέστη. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφορά, καίπερ μεγάλη τότε δόξασα εἶναι, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν
2 πω οὕτως ἐφόβησεν. ὅπου γὰρ στρατοπέδου τε τοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ ἀφεστηκότος, ἄλλων τε νεῶν οὐκ οὐσῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐσβησομένων, αὐτῶν τε στασιαζόντων καὶ ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυρράξουσι, τοσαύτη ἡ ξυμφορὰ ἐπεγεγένητο, ἐν

might surprise them by their attack and force them to put to sea in haphazard fashion. Besides, a signal had been hoisted at Eretria to apprise the Peloponnesian fleet at Oropus when to put to sea. So the Athenians put to sea under such disadvantage as regards preparation and engaged in battle off the harbour of Eretria; for some little time, however, they nevertheless did hold their own, but afterwards turned to flight and were pursued to shore. And such of them as took refuge in the city of Eretria, assuming that it was friendly, suffered a most cruel fate, being butchered by the inhabitants; but those who escaped to the fort in Eretrian territory which the Athenians themselves held were saved, as also all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, having captured twenty-two Athenian ships and having either slain or taken prisoner their crews, set up a trophy. And not long afterwards they succeeded in persuading all Euboea to revolt except Oreus, which the Athenians themselves held, and proceeded to set in order the general affairs of the island.

XCVI. When the report of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, there was greater consternation than ever before. For neither the disaster in Sicily, great though it seemed at the time, nor any other event had ever yet so frightened them. At a time when their army at Samos was in revolt, when there were no more ships to be had nor men to man them, when they were in a state of sedition at home and there was no telling when a conflict might break out among themselves, when, to crown all, a disaster had now come upon them of this magnitude, in which they had lost both their fleet

ἢ ναῦς τε καὶ τὸ μέγιστον Εὔβοιαν ἀπολωλέκεσαν, ἐξ ἧς πλείω ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελοῦντο, πῶς οὐκ
3 εἰκότως ἠθύμουν; μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ δι' ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺ[1] σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐρῆμον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς
4 παρεῖναι. ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν, καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες ἤ, εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες,[2] καὶ τὰς ἀπ' Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν καίπερ πολεμίας οὔσας τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς σφετέροις οἰκείοις καὶ τῇ ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βοηθῆσαι· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Ἑλλήσποντός τε ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἰωνία καὶ αἱ νῆσοι καὶ τὰ μέχρι Εὐβοίας καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν
5 ἡ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχὴ πᾶσα. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς. διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταὶ οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε κἂν ναυτικῇ ἀρχῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.

XCVII. Ἐπὶ δ' οὖν τοῖς ἠγγελμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναῦς τε εἴκοσι ὅμως ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν

[1] εὐθύ, Lobeck's conjecture for εὐθὺς of the MSS.

[2] Hude reads with C, against the rest of the MSS., καὶ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες κ.τ.λ.

[1] *cf.* VII. lv. 2, where the same reason for the success of the Syracusans is given.

and, worst of all, Euboea, from which they derived more benefit than from Attica—had they not every reason to be despondent? But what alarmed them most and touched them most nearly was the possibility that the enemy, now victorious, might dare to make straight for Athens and attack the Peiraeus, which was now without ships to defend it; and they believed that they were all but there already. And indeed, if they had been more bold, the enemy could readily have done this very thing, and they would either, by setting up a blockade, have caused the city to be still more torn by factions, or else, if they had remained and laid siege to it, would have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though hostile to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and of the city as a whole; and thereby the Hellespont would have been theirs, and Ionia, and the islands, and everything as far as Euboea—indeed almost the whole empire of the Athenians. But it was not on this occasion only that the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to make war upon, but on many others also. For being widely different in character—the one people being quick, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous—it was especially in the case of a naval power that they were most helpful. And the Syracusans proved this; for it was because they were most similar in character to the Athenians[1] that they made war upon them most successfully.

XCVII. However this may be, after the announcement of their defeat the Athenians, in spite of their difficulties, manned twenty ships, and also called meetings of the assembly—one immediately, which

Πύκνα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται· καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιᾶς 2 ἀρχῆς, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ[1] ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονήρων τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν 3 πόλιν. ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἄλλους μετ' αὐτοῦ κατιέναι, καὶ παρά τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ στρατόπεδον πέμψαντες διεκελεύοντο ἀνθάπτεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

XCVIII. Ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ὑπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν· Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ αὐτῶν μόνος (ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ στρατηγῶν) λαβὼν κατὰ τάχος τοξότας τινὰς τοὺς βαρβαρωτάτους ἐχώρει πρὸς τὴν 2 Οἰνόην. ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Βοιω-

[1] πυκναί, for this reading of the MSS. Hude adopts ἐν Πυκνί, the conjecture of van Herwerden and Wecklein.

[1] *i. e.* this was the first recognition of the Pnyx as once more the true seat of the assembly. The last assembly which had formally met had been held at Colonus (ch. lxvii. 2); one appointed, but not held, was to have met at the theatre of Dionysus (ch. xciii. 3).

was called to meet on that occasion for the first time in the place called Pnyx, where at other times also they had been wont to meet.[1] At this meeting they deposed the Four Hundred, voted to deliver the management of affairs to the Five Thousand (and all who could furnish themselves with a hoplite's outfit were to belong to this number), and decided that no one was to receive pay for any office, the offender to be accounted accursed. Other meetings also were held later, at frequent intervals, as a result of which they appointed supervisors of the laws [2] and voted the other measures pertaining to their form of government. And during the first period the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government they ever had, at least in my time; for there was a moderate blending of the few and the many, and this it was that first caused the state to recover from the wretched plight into which it had fallen. And they also voted to recall Alcibiades and others with him; and sending envoys both to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to take a hand in their affairs.

XCVIII. At this change the party of Peisander and Alexicles and all the leading supporters of the oligarchy at once secretly left the city and went to Deceleia; but Aristarchus, alone of these, since he chanced to be a general, hastily took some bowmen of the most barbarous sort [3] and proceeded to Oenoe. It was an Athenian fortress on the borders of Boeotia,

[2] The *νομοθέται* were a committee of jurors (*ἡλιασταί*) to whom ambiguities and contradictions in the laws, as well as proposed changes in them, were referred by the Senate.

[3] The *τοξόται* in question are the police or city-guard of slaves, mostly drawn from Scythia (hence *βάρβαροι*). See Boeckh, *Oecon.* i. 276–278.

τίας τεῖχος, ἐπολιόρκουν δ' αὐτὸ διὰ ξυμφορὰν σφίσιν ἐκ τῆς Οἰνόης γενομένην ἀνδρῶν ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀναχωρούντων διαφθορᾶς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐθελοντηδόν, προσπαρακαλέσαντες τοὺς Βοιωτούς. 3 κοινολογησάμενος οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ἀπατᾷ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ, λέγων ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τἆλλα ξυμβεβήκασι Λακεδαιμονίοις, κἀκείνους δεῖ Βοιωτοῖς τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι· ἐπὶ τούτοις γὰρ ξυμβεβάσθαι. οἱ δὲ πιστεύσαντες ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατηγῷ καὶ οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ πολιορκεῖ- 4 σθαι, ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξέρχονται. τούτῳ μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ Οἰνόην τε ληφθεῖσαν[1] Βοιωτοὶ κατέλαβον καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὀλιγαρχία καὶ στάσις ἐπαύσατο.

XCIX. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς τροφήν τε οὐδεὶς ἐδίδου τῶν ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους τότε ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρῆει[2] προσταχθέντων, καὶ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες οὐδὲ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης πω ἦκον, ὅ τε Φίλιππος ὁ ξυμπεμφθεὶς αὐτῷ ἐπεστάλκει Μινδάρῳ τῷ ναυάρχῳ καὶ ἄλλος, Ἱπποκράτης, ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης καὶ ὢν ἐν Φασήλιδι, ὅτι οὔτε αἱ νῆες παρέσοιντο πάντα τε ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους, Φαρνάβαζός τε ἐπεκαλεῖτο αὐτοὺς καὶ ἦν πρόθυμος κομίσας τὰς

[1] ληφθεῖσαν, with MSS., Hude emends to λειφθεῖσαν.
[2] ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρῆει, deleted by Hude as not read by the Scholiast.

[1] The general purport; there is no verb in the text for the subject οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ Πελοποννήσιοι. After the long parenthesis the subject is resumed in οὕτω δὴ ὁ Μίνδαρος, "In these circumstances, then, Mindarus."

and the Corinthians, having called to their aid the Boeotians, were besieging it on their own account, because of a misfortune they had suffered at the hands of the garrison at Oenoe when they lost some men as they were returning from Deceleia. So Aristarchus, after first making his plans known to the besiegers, deceived the garrison at Oenoe by telling them that their partisans in the city had made terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that, among other things, this garrison must surrender the place to the Boeotians; for the agreement had been made on these conditions. The garrison trusted him because he was a general, being in complete ignorance because they were in a state of siege, and evacuated the fort under a truce. In this manner Oenoe was taken and occupied by the Boeotians, and thus the oligarchy at Athens and the struggle between the factions came to an end.

XCIX. During this summer, about the same time as these events, the situation of the Peloponnesians in Miletus was as follows:[1] None of the officers appointed by Tissaphernes at the time when he went to Aspendus would give them maintenance, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet come; Philippus, who had been sent with him,[2] and also another person, a Spartan named Hippocrates who was at Phaselis, had written letters to Mindarus, the admiral, saying that the ships would never come and that they were being wronged in all things by Tissaphernes; moreover, Pharnabazus was inviting them to come and was eager, when he should have got the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet, to do just what Tissaphernes

[2] *cf.* ch. lxxxvii. 6.

ναῦς καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς λοιπὰς ἔτι πόλεις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἀποστῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ἐλπίζων πλέον τι σχήσειν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὕτω δὴ ὁ Μίνδαρος πολλῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἀπὸ παραγγέλματος αἰφνιδίου, ὅπως λάθοι τούς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἅρας ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυσὶ τρισὶ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔπλει ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον (πρότερον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τῷδε ἑκκαίδεκα ἐς αὐτὸν νῆες ἐπέπλευσαν, αἳ καὶ τῆς Χερσονήσου τι μέρος κατέδραμον)· χειμασθεὶς δὲ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀναγκασθεὶς καταίρει ἐς τὴν Ἴκαρον, καὶ μείνας ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας πέντε ἢ ἓξ ἡμέρας ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Χίον.

C. Ὁ δὲ Θράσυλλος ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπειδὴ ἐπύθετο αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀπηρκότα, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς ναυσὶν εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα, ἐπειγόμενος μὴ φθάσῃ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐσ-
2 πλεύσας. αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἴη καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτοῦ, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ ἀλθοιεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς τὴν Μήθυμναν παραπλεύσας ἄλφιτά τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν ἐκέλευεν ὡς, ἢν πλείων χρόνος ἐγγίγνηται,[1] ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου τοὺς ἐπίπλους τῇ Χίῳ ποιησόμενος.
3 ἅμα δέ (Ἔρεσος γὰρ τῆς Λέσβου ἀφειστήκει) ἐβούλετο ἐπ' αὐτὴν πλεύσας, εἰ δύναιτο, ἐξελεῖν. Μηθυμναίων γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀδυνατώτατοι φυγάδες, διακομίσαντες ἔκ τε τῆς Κύμης προσεταιριστοὺς ὁπλίτας ὡς πεντήκοντα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου

[1] ἐγγίγνηται, Krüger's correction for γίγνηται of the MSS.

was to have done and to cause the rest of the cities within his province to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby. In these circumstances, then, Mindarus put off from Miletus, in good order and, giving his fleet the command without previous notice that his move might not become known to the Athenians at Samos, he sailed for the Hellespont with seventy-three ships; for earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had sailed thither and had overrun a portion of the Chersonesus. Mindarus, however, was caught by a storm and forced to make harbour at Icarus; there he remained five or six days by reason of bad weather and then went on to Chios.

C. When Thrasyllus heard that Mindarus had put to sea from Miletus, he also sailed at once from Samos with fifty-five ships, making all haste that the enemy might not enter the Hellespont before him. But learning that Mindarus was at Chios and believing that he could keep him there, he posted scouts both at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, in order that, if the enemy's ships should make a move in any direction, he should have knowledge of it; as for himself, he sailed along the coast to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare barley-meal and general provisions, with the idea that, if a considerable time elapsed, he would use Lesbos as a base for attacks upon Chios. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against it and take it if possible. For some exiles who had been driven out of Methymna, and those the most influential citizens, had brought over from Cyme about fifty hoplites that had been taken into their clubs, had hired still others from the mainland, and

μισθωσάμενοι, ξύμπασιν ὡς τριακοσίοις, Ἀναξάρχου Θηβαίου κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἡγουμένου, προσέβαλον πρώτῃ Μηθύμνῃ· καὶ ἀποκρουσθέντες τῆς πείρας διὰ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μυτιλήνης Ἀθηναίων φρουροὺς προελθόντας, αὖθις ἔξω μάχῃ ἀπωσθέντες καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὄρους κομισθέντες ἀφίστασι τὴν
4 Ἔρεσον. πλεύσας οὖν ὁ Θράσυλλος ἐπ' αὐτὴν πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διενοεῖτο προσβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι. προαφιγμένος δὲ αὐτόσε ἦν καὶ ὁ Θρασύβουλος πέντε ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς
5 ἡ τῶν φυγάδων αὖτη διάβασις· ὑστερίσας δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἐλθνὼν ἐφώρμει. ποσεγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου τινὲς δύο νῆες ἐπ' οἴκου ἀνακομιζόμεναι καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι[1] πέντε·[2] καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι νῆες παρῆσαν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑξήκοντα, ἀφ' ὧν τῷ στρατεύματι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς κατὰ κράτος μηχαναῖς τε καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἢν δύνωνται, αἱρήσοντες τὴν Ἔρεσον.

CI. Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες, ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυοῖν ἡμέραιν καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας, τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ[3] πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν
2 ἤπειρον. καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν

[1] αἱ μηθυμναῖαι B. [2] πέντε, added by Dobree.
[3] οὐ, added by Haacke.

[1] *cf.* ch. v. 2, where the Boeotians support the Lesbians in their application to Agis for assistance; also iii. 2, where the Boeotians are said to be kinsmen of the Mytilenaeans.

now with these troops, about three hundred in all, commanded by Anaxarchus a Theban on the strength of kinship,[1] had made an attack upon Methymna first; and when they had been foiled in this attempt by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison in Mytilene, and had been again repulsed in a battle fought outside the walls, they had made their way over the mountain and had brought about the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus therefore now sailed thither with all his fleet, intending to assault the town. Thrasybulus also had already arrived there from Samos with five ships, after word had been brought to him of the crossing of the exiles; but being too late to save Eresus, he had merely anchored there on his arrival. The Athenian fleet was likewise reinforced by two vessels that were returning home from the Hellespont and by five[2] Methymnaean ships, so that there were present in all sixty-five ships. It was with the troops from these ships that they were preparing to take Eresus by assault, with the aid of engines or in any way they could.

CI. Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, having spent only two days in provisioning and having received from the Chians three Chian tessaracosts[3] for each man, on the third day set sail in all haste from Chios, avoiding the open sea that they might not fall in with the Athenian fleet at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on their left, and making for the mainland. They first touched at the harbour of Cartereia in the territory of

[2] Or, reading *αἱ Μηθυμναῖαι*, with B, "(all) the Methymnaean ships."

[3] Literally "fortieths" of some local coin, possibly the golden stater; about 4*d.*; 8 cents.

ἐν Καρτερείοις λιμένα καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργινούσσαις[1] τῆς ἠπείρου[2] ἐν τῷ ἀντι-
3 πέρας τῆς Μυτιλήνης. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἔτι πολλῆς νυκτὸς παραπλεύσαντες καὶ ἀφικόμενοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐς Ἁρματοῦντα καταντικρὺ Μηθύμνης, ἀριστοποιησάμενοι διὰ ταχέων παραπλεύσαντες Λεκτὸν καὶ Λάρισαν καὶ Ἁμαξιτὸν καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥοίτειον ἤδη τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πρώτερον μέσων νυκτῶν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἐς Σίγειον κατῆραν καὶ ἄλλοσε τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων.

CII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ δυοῖν δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ὄντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς ὡς εἶχον τάχους ὑπομείξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ' Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων
2 ναῦς.[3] καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσιν· τὰς

[1] καί, added by Gertz after Ἀργινούσσαις, is adopted by Hude.

[2] Krüger deletes τῆς ἠπείρου.

[3] τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς, deleted by Hude, following Dobree.

[1] If τῆς ἠπείρου is genuine, there must have been a town Arginussae on the mainland opposite the islands of that name. The Schol. on Ar. *Frags.* 33 mentions a town Arginusa. Deleting τῆς ἠπείρου, as Krüger suggests, we should have, "at the Arginussae, opposite Mytilene." With Hude's

Phocaea, where they dined, and then, sailing along the Cymaean coast, supped at Arginussae,[1] on the mainland opposite Mytilene. Thence they proceeded long before dawn along the coast until they came to Harmatus, on the mainland opposite Methymna; there they breakfasted in haste and then sailed along the coast past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus and the other places in that region, arriving at Rhoeteum before midnight. Some of the ships even made harbour at Sigeium and other places in that neighbourhood.

CII. But the Athenians who were at Sestus with eighteen ships, when their signallers gave them notice and they observed the sudden blaze of numerous fires on the hostile shore, realized that the Peloponnesians were entering the straits. So that same night, making what speed they could and keeping close to the shore of the Chersonesus, they sailed toward Elaeus, wishing to get by the enemy's ships and out into the open water. And they did elude the sixteen ships at Abydos,[2] although these had been cautioned by a friendly boat that sailed[3] up to be on the alert in case the Athenians should try to leave the straits; but the ships commanded

text (adding *καί*) the meaning would be that they supped, some at the islands, others on the mainland.

[2] *cf.* ch. xcix. (end).

[3] The passage was so understood by the Scholiast (*τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλίου ἐπίπλου, τουτέστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ στόλου τοῦ μετὰ Μινδάρου*). But commentators find the construction harsh and unexampled in Thucydides with *προειρῆσθαι*. Tucker explains: "They escaped the notice of the ships at Abydos, who had given warning to their approaching friends (Mindarus) to keep a watch for them in case of their trying to sail out." So also Goodhart.

δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ κατιδόντες[1] τὴν δίωξιν εὐθὺς ποιουμένας[2] οὐ φθάνουσι πάσαις,[3] ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς Ἴμβρου καὶ Λήμνου διέφυγον, τέσσαρες δὲ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ὕσταται πλέουσαι καταλαμβάνονται περὶ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα. 3 καὶ μίαν μὲν ἐποκείλασαν κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι λαμβάνουσι, δύο δὲ ἑτέρας ἄνευ τῶν ἀνδρῶν· τὴν δὲ μίαν πρὸς τῇ Ἴμβρῳ κενὴν κατακαίουσιν.

CIII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ταῖς τε ἐξ Ἀβύδου ξυμμιγείσαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, ξυμπάσαις ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα, πολιορκήσαντες Ἐλαιοῦντα ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν, ὡς οὐ προσεχώρει, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Ἄβυδον.

2 Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ψευσθέντες τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλουν τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τειχομαχοῦντες, ὡς ᾔσθοντο, εὐθὺς ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Ἔρεσον κατὰ τάχος ἐβοήθουν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον· καὶ δύο τε ναῦς τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱροῦσιν, αἳ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τότε θρασύτερον ἐν τῇ διώξει ἀπάρασαι περιέπεσον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενοι ὁρμίζονται ἐς τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἴμβρου ὅσαι κατέφυγον κομίζονται καὶ ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν πέντε ἡμέρας παρεσκευάζοντο.

CIV. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐναυμάχουν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρέπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως τεταγμένοι παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ τῆς Σηστοῦ, οἱ δὲ Πελοπον-

[1] κατιδόντες, Hude reads κατιδόντος, with Gertz.

[2] ποιουμένας, Classen's correction for ποιούμενοι of the MSS.; Hude ποιουμένου with Krüger.

by Mindarus, which they descried at dawn—and these immediately gave chase—they could not outstrip with their entire fleet, but though most of their ships made good their escape to Imbros and Lemnos, four of them that brought up the rear were overtaken near Elaeus. One of these, which was stranded at the sanctuary of Protesilaus, was captured with all on board, and two others without their crews; the fourth, which had been deserted by its crew, the enemy burned close to Imbros.

CIII. After this Mindarus took all his ships, including those which had been at Abydus and were now united with his fleet, eighty-six vessels in all, and for that day invested Elaeus; but when it would not yield they all sailed back to Abydus.

The Athenians at Eresus, on the other hand, misled by their scouts and never imagining that the enemy could sail past them unobserved, were assaulting the walls at their leisure; but when they learned the truth they abandoned Eresus at once and hastened with all speed to the defence of the Hellespont. And they captured two of the Peloponnesian ships, which fell in with them at that moment, having put out into the open sea too boldly in their pursuit. A day later they reached Elaeus and cast anchor; then they brought thither the ships at Imbros that had taken refuge there and spent the next five days preparing for the battle.

CIV. When that time had elapsed they began the battle in the following manner. The Athenians, arrayed in single column, were sailing close in to shore in the direction of Sestus, when the Pelo-

[8] πάσαις, Reiske's conjecture for πᾶσαι of most MSS.

νήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀντανῆγον καὶ
2 αὐτοί. καὶ ὡς ἔγνωσαν ναυμαχήσοντες, παρέτεινον τὸ κέρας οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τὴν Χερσόνησον, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ Ἰδάκου μέχρι Ἀρριανῶν, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, οἱ δ' αὖ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀπὸ Ἀβυδου μέχρι Δαρδάνου, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. κέρας δὲ τοῖς μὲν Πελοποννησίοις εἶχον
3 τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν Συρακόσιοι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον αὐτὸς Μίνδαρος καὶ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ἄριστα πλέουσαι, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀριστερὸν Θράσυλλος, ὁ δὲ Θρασύβουλος τὸ δεξιόν· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ
4 ὡς ἕκαστοι διετάξαντο. ἐπειγομένων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρότερόν τε ξυμμεῖξαι, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπερσχόντες αὐτοὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ ἀποκλῆσαι τοῦ ἔξω αὐτοὺς ἔκπλου, εἰ δύναιντο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον ἐξῶσαι πρὸς τὴν γῆν οὐχ ἑκὰς οὖσαν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες, ἢ μὲν ἐβούλοντο ἀποφάρξασθαι αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐναντίοι,
5 ἀντεπεξῆγον καὶ περιεγίγνοντο τῷ πλῷ· τὸ δ' εὐώνυμον αὐτοῖς ὑπερεβεβλήκει ἤδη τὴν ἄκραν ἣ Κυνὸς σῆμα καλεῖται. τῷ δὲ μέσῳ, τοιούτου ξυμβαίνοντος, ἀσθενέσι καὶ διεσπασμέναις ταῖς ναυσὶ καθίσταντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι χρώμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τοῦ περὶ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα ὀξεῖαν καὶ γωνιώδη τὴν περιβολὴν ἔχοντος, ὥστε τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα μὴ κάτοπτα εἶναι.

CV. Προσπεσόντες οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἐξέωσάν τε ἐς τὸ ξηρὸν τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπεξέβησαν, τῷ ἔργῳ
2 πολὺ περισχόντες. ἀμῦναι δὲ τῷ μέσῳ οὔθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὑπὸ πλή-

ponnesians, observing their movements from Abydus, went out to meet them. When they both realised that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, with seventy-six ships, extended their line parallel with the shore of the Chersonesus, from Idacus to Arrhiana, while the Peloponnesians, with eighty-six ships, extended theirs from Abydus to Dardanus. The right wing of the Peloponnesians was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself, who had there his fastest ships; on the Athenian side, Thrasyllus had the left wing and Thrasybulus the right, the other generals being stationed at intervals throughout the line. The Peloponnesians were eager to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenian right with their own left wing to cut them off from the exit to the straits, if possible, meanwhile in the centre driving them to the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians perceived their intention, and at the point where their opponents wished to bar their way they proceeded to extend their line to prevent it, and were succeeding in this manœuvre; indeed, their left had already passed the headland called Cynossema. But in the centre, as the result of this movement, their line of ships became weak and straggling; and especially since the number of their ships was smaller and the turn of the coast at Cynossema is sharp and angular, so that what was happening on the other side of it was not visible.

CV. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, falling upon their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore and landed to follow up their victory, having had a decided advantage in the action. To assist their centre was in the power neither of Thrasybulus and

θους τῶν ἐπικειμένων νεῶν ἐδύναντο οὔθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν Θράσυλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου (ἀφανές τε γὰρ ἦν διὰ τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα[1] καὶ ἅμα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἐπιτεταγμένοι εἶργον αὐτούς), πρὶν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι διὰ τὸ κρατήσαντες ἀδεῶς ἄλλοι ἄλλην ναῦν διώκειν[2] ἤρξαντο μέρει τινὶ σφῶν ἀτακτότεροι
3 γενέσθαι. γνόντες δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον, τὰς ἐπὶ σφίσι ναῦς ἐπεχούσας, παυσάμενοι τῆς ἐπεξαγωγῆς ἤδη τοῦ κέρως καὶ ἐπαναστρέψαντες εὐθύς, ἠμύναντό τε καὶ τρέπουσι, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸ νικῆσαν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μέρος ὑπολαβόντες πεπλανημένας ἔκοπτόν τε καὶ ἐς φόβον τὰς πλείους ἀμαχεὶ καθίστασαν. οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤδη τοῖς περὶ τὸν Θράσυλλον ἐνδεδωκότες καὶ μᾶλλον ἐς φυγὴν ὁρμήσαντες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑώρων.

CVI. Γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς καὶ καταφυγόντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρὸς τὸν Πύδιον[3] μάλιστα ποταμὸν τὸ πρῶτον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐς Ἄβυδον, ναῦς μὲν ὀλίγας ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (στενὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος βραχείας τὰς ἀποφυγὰς τοῖς ἐναντίοις παρεῖχε), τὴν μέντοι νίκην ταύτης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐπικαιροτάτην δὴ
2 ἔσχον. φοβούμενοι γὰρ τέως τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διά τε τὰ κατὰ βραχὺ σφάλματα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφοράν, ἀπηλλάγησαν

[1] τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

[2] διώκειν, Vulgate, though a majority of the better MSS. have διώκοντες.

[3] So C, Μείδιον ABEF.

his men on the right, by reason of the multitude of the ships that were pressing hard upon them, nor of the followers of Thrasyllus on the left; for that part of the field was concealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and at the same time the Syracusans and the rest who were arrayed against him, being not inferior in number, hemmed him in. But finally the Peloponnesians, pursuing fearlessly in the flush of victory, some chasing one vessel, some another, began to fall into disorder in a part of their own line. The Athenians under Thrasybulus, realizing this, now ceased extending their flank, and immediately facing about began to fight the ships that were bearing down upon them, and put them to rout; then intercepting the ships in the victorious part of the Peloponnesian line that had strayed out of line, they smote them and drove most of them into headlong flight without resistance. It so chanced that the Syracusans on their part had already given ground to Thrasyllus and his division, and they took to flight still more when they saw the rest fleeing.

CVI. After the rout was thus effected, the Peloponnesians fled for refuge for the most part to the river Pydius at first, but afterwards to Abydus. The Athenians took only a few ships—for the Hellespont is narrow and afforded their opponents places of refuge near at hand—yet the victory which they won in this battle was indeed most opportune. Hitherto they had been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, on account not only of the gradual losses[1] they had suffered, but especially of their disaster in Sicily; but now they ceased either to reproach

[1] *cf.* ch. xlii. 4; xcv. 7; cii. 2.

τοῦ σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καταμέμφεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔτι ἀξίους του ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ νομίζειν.
3 ναῦς μέντοι τῶν ἐναντίων λαμβάνουσι Χίας μὲν ὀκτώ, Κορινθίας δὲ πέντε, Ἀμπρακιώτιδας δὲ δύο καὶ Βοιωτίας δύο, Λευκαδίων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων καὶ Πελληνέων μίαν ἑκάστων· αὐτοὶ δὲ πέντε καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἀπολ-
4 λύασιν. στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον ἐπὶ τῇ ἄκρᾳ οὗ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα καὶ τὰ ναύαγια προσαγαγόμενοι καὶ νεκροὺς τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες ἀπέστειλαν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τριήρη ἄγγελον
5 τῆς νίκης. οἱ δὲ ἀφικομένης τῆς νεὼς καὶ ἀνέλπιστον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀκούσαντες ἐπί τε ταῖς περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἄρτι ξυμφοραῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν στάσιν γεγενημέναις πολὺ ἐπερρώσθησαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν σφίσιν ἔτι δυνατὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἢν προθύμως ἀντιλαμβάνωνται, περιγενέσθαι.

CVII. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἡμέρᾳ τετάρτῃ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐπισκευάσαντες τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἐν Σηστῷ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπέπλεον ἐπὶ Κύζικον ἀφεστηκυῖαν· καὶ κατιδόντες κατὰ Ἀρπάγιον καὶ Πρίαπον τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ὀκτὼ ναῦς ὁρμούσας, ἐπιπλεύσαντες καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ γῇ ἔλαβον τὰς ναῦς. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Κύζικον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν προσηγά-
2 γοντο πάλιν καὶ χρήματα ἀνέπραξαν. ἔπλευσαν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ὅσαι ἦσαν ὑγιεῖς ἐκομίσαντο (τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἐλαιούσιοι κατέκαυσαν), καὶ ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀπέπεμψαν Ἱπποκράτη καὶ Ἐπικλέα κομιοῦντας τὰς ἐκεῖθεν ναῦς.

themselves or to consider their enemy any longer of any account in naval matters. However, they did capture of the enemy's fleet eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one each belonging to the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians; and they lost fifteen themselves. So they set up a trophy on the headland where the Cynossema stands, brought in the wreckage, restored to the enemy their dead under a truce, and sent a trireme to Athens to announce their victory. When the ship arrived and the Athenians heard the news of the good fortune that was beyond their hopes, coming as it did on the heels of the disasters that had recently befallen them in Euboea and in the course of their factional dissensions, they were greatly encouraged, and believed that their cause might still prevail if they should zealously lay their hands to the work.

CVII. On the fourth day after the battle, after they had hastily refitted their ships, the Athenians at Sestos sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted; and descrying the eight ships from Byzantium[1] lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they sailed against them, defeated in battle the forces which on shore aided them, and captured the ships. Then going on to Cyzicus, they brought it back into the Athenian alliance, since it had no walls, and levied upon it a fine of money. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians on their part left Abydus and sailed to Elaeus, where they recovered such of their captured ships as were sound—the Elaeusians had burned the rest—and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the ships that were there.

[1] *cf.* ch. lxxx. 4.

CVIII. Κατέπλευσε δὲ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῖς τρισὶ καὶ δέκα ναυσὶν ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου καὶ Φασήλιδος ἐς τὴν Σάμον, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἀποτρέψειε Πελοποννησίοις ὥστε μὴ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ὅτι φίλον πεποιήκοι μᾶλλον
2 Ἀθηναίοις ἢ πρότερον. καὶ πληρώσας ναῦς ἐννέα πρὸς αἷς εἶχεν Ἀλικαρνασσέας τε πολλὰ χρήματα ἐξέπραξε καὶ Κῶν ἐτείχισεν. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας ἄρχοντα[1] ἐν τῇ Κῷ καταστήσας πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον ἤδη ἐς τὴν Σάμον κατέπλευσεν.
3 Καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ὡς ἐπύθετο τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πεπλευκυίας,
4 ἀναζεύξας ἤλαυνεν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας. ὄντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ, Ἀνταύδριοι (εἰσὶ δὲ Αἰολῆς) παρακομισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου πεζῇ διὰ τῆς Ἴδης τοῦ ὄρους ὁπλίτας ἐσηγάγοντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὸ Ἀρσάκου τοῦ Πέρσου, Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχου, ἀδικούμενοι, ὅσπερ καὶ Δηλίους τοὺς Ἀτραμύττειον κατοικήσαντας, ὅτε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων Δήλου καθάρσεως ἕνεκα ἀνέστησαν, ἔχθραν προσποιησάμενος ἄδηλον καὶ ἐπαγγείλας στρατείαν αὐτῶν τοῖς βελτίστοις, ἐξαγαγὼν ὡς ἐπὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμμαχίᾳ, τηρήσας ἀριστοποιουμένους καὶ περιστήσας τοὺς
5 ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισεν. φοβούμενοι οὖν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον μή ποτε καὶ περὶ σφᾶς τι παρανομήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλα[2] ἐπιβάλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἃ φέρειν

[1] ἄρχοντα, B, Hude ἄρχοντας with most MSS.
[2] ἄλλα, Hude reads ἅμα with Poppo-Stahl.

CVIII. At about this same time Alcibiades sailed back to Samos with the thirteen ships [1] from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had prevented the coming of the Phoenician ships to join the Peloponnesians and that he had made Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. He then manned nine ships in addition to those he had, and exacted much money of the Halicarnassians, and also fortified Cos. Having done these things and appointed a governor at Cos, when it was already nearing autumn he returned to Samos.

As for Tissaphernes, on hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus and set out for Ionia. For while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had brought some hoplites from Abydus overland by way of Mount Ida and introduced them into their city, since they were being unjustly treated by Arsaces the Persian, lieutenant of Tissaphernes. Now this was the man who, when the Delians settled at Atramytteium,[2] at the time when they were removed from Delos by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying that island, professing a quarrel which he did not openly declare and proffering opportunity of military service to their leading men, had led them out on an expedition on a pretence of friendship and alliance, and then, waiting until they were at their midday meal, had surrounded them with his own troops and shot them down. The Antandrians, therefore, fearing that on account of this act of his he might some day commit some outrage upon them also, and because, furthermore, he was imposing upon them

[1] *cf.* ch. lxxxviii. 1. [2] *cf.* v. 1.

οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἐκβάλλουσι τοὺς φρουροὺς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως.

CIX. Ὁ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης αἰσθόμενος καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὸ ἔργον καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ Κνίδῳ (καὶ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐξεπεπτώκεσαν οἱ φρουροί), διαβεβλῆσθαί τε νομίσας αὐτοῖς σφόδρα καὶ δείσας μὴ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἔτι βλάπτωσι, καὶ ἅμα ἀχθόμενος εἰ Φαρνάβαζος ἐξ ἐλάσσονος χρόνου καὶ δαπάνης δεξάμενος αὐτοὺς κατορθώσει τι μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πορεύεσθαι διενοεῖτο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, ὅπως μέμψηταί τε τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἄνταν δρον γεγενημένων καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς καὶ περὶ τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα ἀπολογήσηται. καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον ἐς Ἔφεσον θυσίαν ἐποιήσατο τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι.

burdens which they were not able to bear, had driven his garrison out of their acropolis.

CIX. When Tissaphernes heard of this further act on the part of the Peloponnesians, in addition to what they had done at Miletus[1] and Cnidos,[2]—for there also his garrisons had been expelled—thinking that he had got into exceeding disrepute with them and fearing that they might do him some further mischief still, and at the same time because he was vexed that Pharnabazus should accept their services, and in less time and at less expense than himself be more successful in coping with the Athenians—for all these reasons he determined to go to the Hellespont and see the Peloponnesians, that he might complain of what had been done at Antandros and might also defend himself as plausibly as he could against the slanderous charges they made against him in connection with the Phoenician ships and other matters. And so he came first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.

[1] *cf.* ch. lxxxiv. 4. [2] *cf.* ch. xxxv. 1.

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Aristeus, son of Pellichus, a Corinthian commander, i. xxix. 2.

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Byzantium, captured by Pausanias, I. xciv. 2; revolts from Athens, I. cxv. 5; capitulates, cxvii. 3; Pausanias' intrigues from there with Xerxes, I. cxxviii.–cxxxi.; Pausanias expelled from there, I. cxxxi. 2; revolts again, VIII. lxxx. 2, 3.

Cacyparis, a river in Sicily, VII. lxxx. 5.
Cadmeis, ancient name of Boeotia, I. xii. 3.
Caeadas, a chasm into which malefactors were flung at Sparta, I. xxxiv. 4.
Caecinus, a river at Locris in Italy, III. ciii. 3.
Cales, a river near Heracleia on the Pontus, IV. lxxv. 2.
Callias, Athenian name: (1) father-in-law of Hippias the tyrant, VI. lv. 1; (2) father of Hipponicus,

III. xci. 4; (3) son of Calliades, an Athenian commander, I. lxi. 1; lxii. 4; slain at Potidaea, I. lxv. 3.
Callicrates, a Corinthian commander, I. xxix. 2.
Callieans, an Aetolian tribe, III. xcvi. 3.
Calligeitus, a Megarian exile at the court of Pharnabazus, sent as emissary to Sparta, VIII. vi. 1; viii. 1.
Calirrhoe, ancient name of the fountain Enneacrunus at Athens, II. xv. 5.
Calydon, name given to ancient Aeolis, III. cii. 5.
Camarina, in Sicily, ally of the Leontines, III. lxxxvi. 2; plan to betray it to Syracuse, IV. xxv. 7; makes truce with Gela, IV. lviii. 1; assigned Morgantina by the Syracusans, IV. lxv. 1; colonized by the Syracusans, VI. v. 3; re-colonized by Hippocrates, and again by Gela, *ibi*; refuse to receive the Athenians, VI. lii.; send a small force to the Syracusans, VI. lxvii. 2; receive and hear envoys from Syracuse and from Athens, VI. lxxv.–lxxxvii.; resolve on neutrality, VI. lxxxviii. 1; send aid to Syracuse, VII. xxxiii. 1; allies of the Syracusans, VII. lviii. 1.
Cambyses, son of Cyrus, King of Persia, I. xiii. 6; xiv. 2.
Camirus, a port in Rhodes, revolts from Athens, VIII. xliv. 2.
Canal, "King's" (Xerxes'), cut by the Persians across the isthmus of Athos, IV. cix. 2.
Canastraeum, a promontory in Pallene, IV. cx. 2.
Carcinus, an Athenian commander, II. xxiii. 2.
Cardamyle, in Chios, VIII. xxiv. 3.
Caria: the Carians expelled by Minos from the Cyclades, I. iv.; addicted to piracy; mode of burial, I. viii.; Athenians send lookout ships to the Carian coast in the Samian insurrection, I. cxvi. 1; maritime Caria subject to Athens, II. ix. 4; Athenians send a squadron of ships to the Carian coast to protect their Phoenician trade, II. lxix. 1; destroy an Athenian expedition, III. xix. 2; Amorges in Caria revolts from the King, VIII. v. 5.
Carneia, festival at Lacedaemon, V. lxxv. 2, 5.
Carneus, sacred month among the Dorians, V. liv. 2.
Carteria, an island in Phocaean territory, VIII. ci. 2.
Carthage: the Carthaginians defeated at sea by the Phocaeans, I. xiii. 6; Alcibiades' ambitious plans for attacking Carthage, VI. xv. 2; xc. 2; always in fear of an Athenian invasion, VI. xxxiv. 2.
Caryae, in Laconia, V. lv. 3.
Carystus, in Euboea, of Dryopian origin (VII. lvii. 4), subjected by the Athenians, I. xcviii. 2; the Carystians become allies of the Athenians, IV. xlii. 1; xliii. 3; subject allies of the Athenians, VII. lvii. 4.
Casmenae, in Sicily, colonized by the Syracusans, VI. v. 2.
Catana: territory devastated by eruption of Aetna, III. cxvi. 1; founded by Chalcidians under Thucles, VI. iii. 3; declines to receive the Athenians, VI. l. 3; alliance with Athens voted, VI. li. 2; VII. lvii. 11; Syracusan army eager to be led against Catana, VI. lxiii.; the Athenians by a false message draw the Syracusans to Catana while they sail to Syracuse, VI. lxiv., lxv.; the Athenians retire to Catana as winter comes on, VI. lxxiv. 1; their encampment at Catana destroyed by the Syracusans, VI. lxxv. 2; they rebuild it, VI. lxxxviii. 5; start on various expeditions from Catana, VI. xciv.; abandon Catana, VI. xcvii. 1; are supplied with horses from Catana, VI. xcviii. 1; Nicias informs the Athenians that Naxos and Catana are unable to support the Athenian army, VII. xiv. 2; Demosthenes thinks the winter spent at Catana a mistake, VII. xlii. 3; after defeat on Epipolae wishes to retire to Catana, VII. xlix.; the Athenian army

supplied from Catana, VII. lx. 1; Athenians at first retreat not towards Catana, VIII. lxxx. 2; Athenian fugitives find refuge at Catana, VII. lxxxv. 4.
Caulonia, in Italy, VII. xxv. 2.
Caunus, in Caria, Athenian fleet, in the Samian revolt, sails toward, I. cxvi. 3; the Lacedaemonian commissioners put in there, VIII. xxxix. 3; Astyochus sails for Caunus, VIII. xli. 1; Tissaphernes comes to Caunus, VIII. lvii. 1; Alcibiades sails for Caunus, VIII. lxxxviii.
Ceans, subject allies of Athens, VII. lvii. 4.
Cecrops, state of Attica in time of, II. xv. 1.
Cecryphaleia, victory of the Athenians off, I. cv. 1.
Cenaeum in Euboea, III. xciii. 1.
Cenchreiae, eastern port of Corinth, IV. xlii. 4; xliv. 4; a Lacedaemonian fleet starting thence is driven into Peiraeum, VIII. x. 1; escapes and returns to Cenchreiae, VIII. xx.; Astyochus starts from Cenchreiae, VIII. xxiii. 1.
Centoripa, a Sicel town, captured by the Athenians, VI. xciv. 3; allied to Athens, VII. xxxii. 1.
Cephallenia, furnish convoy to Athenians, I. xxvii. 2; Athenian envoys sent thither, II. vii. 3; xxx. 2; xciv. 1; xcv. 2; VII. xxxi. 2; lvii. 7; descent of Corinthian fleet upon the coast of, II. xxxiii.; with Demosthenes against the Leucadians, III. xciv. 1; xcv. 2; Messenians from Pylos settled at Cranii, V. xxxv. 7; withdrawn, V. lvi. 3.
Cerameicus, in Athens, public funeral of the fallen, II. xxxiv. 5; street of, VI. lvii. 1; lviii. 1.
Cercine, Mt., in Macedonia, II. xcviii. 1.
Cerdylium, Mt., near Amphipolis, V. vi. 3, 5; viii. 1.
Ceryces, at Athens, protest against recall of Alcibiades, VIII. liii. 2.
Cestrine, in Epirus, I. xlvi. 4.
Chaereas, an Athenian, sent from the army at Samos to Athens, VIII. lxxiv.; brings back exaggerated report, *ibi.*
Chaeroneia, in Boeotia, tributary to Boeotian Orchomenus, its inhabitants sold into slavery, I. cxiii. 1.; plot for its betrayal to the Athenians, IV. lxxvi. 3; the plot fails, IV. lxxxix.
Chalaeans, a tribe of Ozolian Locrians, III. ci. 2.
Chalce, island near Rhodes, VIII. xli. 4; xliv. 3; lv. 1.
Chalcedon, a Megarian colony, IV. lxxv. 2.
Chalcideus, a Spartan admiral, VIII. vi. 5; viii. 2; sent to Ionia with Alcibiades, VIII. xi. 3; induces the revolt of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, VIII. xiv. 2, 3; pursued by the Athenians, VIII. xv. 1; operations at Samos and Teos, VIII. xvi.; sails with Alcibiades to Miletus and induces it to revolt, VIII. xvii.; negotiates treaty between the King and Sparta, VIII. xviii., xxxvi., xliii.; slain, VIII. xxiv. 1.
Chalcidian cities of Sicily, allies of the Leontines, III. lxxxvi. 2; founded from Chalcis in Euboea, VI. iii.–v.; share in treaty of Zancle, VI. iv. 5.
Chalcidice, revolts from Athens, I. lvi.–lviii.; pull down their cities and retire to Olynthus, I. lviii. 2; devastated by Phormio, I. lxv. 3; the Chalcidians defeat the Athenians, II. lxxix.; invaded by Sitalces, II. xcv. 1; ci.; retake Eion from the Athenians, IV. vii.; invite Brasidas, IV. lxxix., lxxx.; Chalcidian ambassadors with Brasidas on his Macedonian campaign, IV. lxxxiii.; Chalcidians instigate revolt of Amphipolis, IV. ciii.; Thucydides in command there, IV. civ. 4; aid in garrisoning Mende and Scione, IV. cxxiii. 4; furnish troops to Brasidas against Arrhabaeus, IV. cxxiv. 1; Cleon's expedition against Chalcidice, V. ii.–xl.; Chalcidian prisoners taken in Torone sent to Athens, but afterwards exchanged, V. iii. 4; Chalcidian targeteers with Brasidas,

v. vi. 4; x. 9; provisions respecting the Chalcidian cities in the treaty, v. xviii. 5–7, 9, 10; refuse to accept the treaty, v. xxi. 2; join the Argive alliance, v. xxxi. 6; renew alliance with the Lacedaemonians and Argives, v. lxxx. 2; receive the Dians, who had revolted from the Athenians, v. lxxxii. 1; maintain a ten-days' truce with the Athenians, vi. vii. 4; allies of Athens, viii. lvii. 4.

Chalcis, in Aetolia, taken by the Athenians, i. cviii. 5; ii. lxxxiii. 3.

Chalcis, in Euboea, war with Eretria, i. xv. 3; mother-city of the Chalcidian cities in Sicily, vi. iii.–v.; subject to the Athenians, vi. lxxvi. 2; vii. lvii. 4; the Athenians retreat to Chalcis after the sea-fight off Eretria, viii. xcv. 6.

Chaonians, a barbarian people of Epirus, ii. lxviii. 9; with the Ambraciots induce the Lacedaemonians to invade Acarnania, ii. lxxx. 1; have no king, ii. lxxx. 5; esteemed excellent fighters, ii. lxxxi. 4; defeated by the Stratians, *ibi*.

Charadrus, place of military trials at Argos, v. lx. 6.

Charicles, an Athenian commander, vii. xx. 1; xxvi. 1, 3.

Charminus, an Athenian commander, viii. xxx. 1; xli. 2; defeated by the Lacedaemonians, viii. xlii.; abets the murder of Hyperbolus, viii. lxxiii. 3.

Charoeades, an Athenian commander in Sicily, iii. lxxxvi. 1; slain, iii. xc. 2.

Charybdis, the whirlpool, iv. xxiv. 4.

Cheimerium promontory in Thesprotia, i. xxx. 3; xlvi. 4.

Chersonesus, in Corinthian territory, iv. xlii. 2; xliii. 2.

Chersonese, in Thrace, cultivated by the Greeks at Troy, i. xi. 1; ravaged by the Lacedaemonians, viii. xcix.; cii.–cv.

Chionis, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the treaty, v. xxiv. 1.

Chios, independent ally of Athens, i. xix.; assists Athens against Samos, i. cxvi., cxvii.; ally of Athens, ii. ix. 4; lvi. 2; furnishes ships in the siege of Potidaea, ii. lvi. 2; free allies, iii. x. 5; vi. lxxxv. 2; vii. lvii. 4; Alcidas puts some Chian prisoners to death, iii. xxxii.; releases the rest, *ibi*; Homer at Chios, iii. civ. 5, 6; the Chians aid the Athenians at Pylos, iv. xiii. 2; ordered by the Athenians to dismantle their walls, iv. li.; furnish ships against Mende and Scione, iv. cxxix. 2; against Melos, v. lxxxiv. 1; aid the Athenians at Syracuse, vi. xliii. 1; lxxxv. 2; vii. xx. 2; lvii. 4; negotiate with the Lacedaemonians about revolting, viii. v. 4; received into the Lacedaemonian alliance, viii. 6; Chian intrigues, viii. ix. 2, 3; revolt, viii. xiv.; Chian ships withdrawn from Peiraeum, in distrust, viii. xv.; employed by Alcibiades to foment revolt in Ionia, viii. xvii.; four Chian ships taken by the Athenians, viii. xix. 3; induce Lebedus and Haerae to revolt, viii. xix. 4; then Methymna and Mytilene, viii. xxii.; defeated in three battles by the Athenians, viii. xxiv.; aid in the capture of Iasus, viii. xxviii. 1; about to be attacked by the Athenians, viii. xxx.; refuse to assist Astyochus about the revolt of Lesbos, viii. xxxii. 3; xxxiv. 1; government changed by the Lacedaemonians, viii. xxxviii. 3; xl. 1; completely blockaded, viii. xl.; defeated by the Athenians and closely blockaded, viii. lv. 3; lvi. 1; indecisive sea-fight with the Athenians, viii. lxi. 2; regain command of the sea, viii. lxiii. 1; Athenians plan fresh attack on Chios, viii. c.; the Lacedaemonians slip away, viii. ci.; the Chians lose eight ships at Cynossema, viii. cvi. 3.

Choenix, an Athenian measure, iv. xvi. 1.

Choerades, Iapygian islands, vii. xxxiii. 3.

Chromon, a Messenian guide of Demosthenes in Aetolia, iii. xcviii. 2.

Chrysippus, murdered by Atreus, i. ix. 3.

Chrysis, priestess of Hera, at Argos, II. ii.; causes conflagration of the temple; flees to Philus, IV. cxxxiii.
Cilicians defeated at Salamis in Cyprus, I. cxii. 4.
Cimon, son of Miltiades, captures Eion, I. xcviii. 1; conquers the Persians at the Eurymedon, I. c. 1; brings aid to the Lacedaemonians at the siege of Ithome, I. cii. 2; dies in Cyprus, I. cxii. 4.
Cithaeron, Mt., II. lxxv. 1; III. xxiv. 1.
Citinium, in Doris, I. cvii. 2.
Citium, in Cyprus, I. cxii. 3.
Clarus, in Ionia, III. xxxiii. 1.
Clazomenae revolts from Athens, VIII. xiv. 3; Clazomenians fortify Polichne, *ibi*; aid in the revolt of Teos, VIII. xvi.; subdued by the Athenians, VIII. xxiii. 6; repulse a Peloponnesian attack, VIII. xxxi. 3.
Clearchus, son of Rhamphias, a Lacedaemonian commander, VIII. viii. 3; appointed to the Hellespont, VIII. xxxix. 2; sent to Pharnabazus with 40 ships, VIII. lxxx. 2, 3.
Clearidas, a Lacedaemonian, governor of Amphipolis, IV. cxxxii. 3; colleague of Brasidas in battle of Amphipolis, V. vi.–xi.; sets in order matters at Amphipolis after Brasidas' death, V. xi. 3; refuses to give up Amphipolis, V. xxi.; brings home troops of Brasidas, V. xxxiv. 1.
Cleïppides, an Athenian commander, III. iii. 2.
Cleobulus, ephor at Sparta, V. xxxvi. 1; favours the war party, *ibi*; negotiates with the Boeotians and Corinthians, V. xxxvi.–xxxviii.
Cleomedes, Athenian commander in attack on Melos, V. lxxxiv. 3.
Cleomenes, king of Sparta, expels the "accursed persons" from Athens, I. cxxvi. 12.
Cleomenes, uncle and regent for Pausanias at Sparta, III. xxvi. 2.
Cleon, influential demagogue at Athens, III. xxxvi. 6; IV. xxi. 3; carries the decree condemning the Mytilenaeans to death, III. xxxvi.; speech against repeal of the decree, III. xxxvii.–xl.; moves and carries decree for slaughter of 1000 Mytilenaean captives at Athens, III. l. 1; causes breaking off of negotiations with Sparta, IV. xxi., xxii.; boast of what he would do at Pylos if he were general, IV. xxvii. 5; is offered his place by Nicias and forced to accept, IV. xxviii.; chooses Demosthenes as colleague, IV. xxix.; arrives at Pylos, IV. xxx. 4; with Demosthenes attacks Sphacteria, IV. xxxi.–xxxvii.; surrender of the Lacedaemonians, IV. xxxvi.; Cleon's mad promise fulfilled, IV. xxxix.; carries decree for the destruction of Scione, IV. cxxii. 6; leads expedition to Thrace, V. 2 ff.; captures Torone, V. ii. 3; takes Galepsus and attempts Stageirus, V. vi. 1; operations against Brasidas, V. vi.–xi.; slain, V. x. 9.
Cleonae, in Acte, IV. cix. 3.
Cleonae, in Argolis, in alliance with Argos, V. lxvii. 2; sends troops to Mantineia, V. lxxii. 4; lxxiv. 2; a Lacedaemonian army invading Argos turns back at Cleonae in consequence of an earthquake, VI. xcv. 1.
Cleopompus, an Athenian commander, II. xxvi. 2; colleague of Hagnon against Potidaea, II. lviii.
Cnemus, a Spartan commander, ravages Zacynthus, II. lxvi. 2; invades Acarnania, II. lxxx.–lxxxii.; defeated by Phormio, II. lxxxiii., lxxxiv.; second defeat, II. lxxxvi.–xcii.; exhortation to his fleet, II. lxxxvi.; concerts with Brasidas an attack upon the Peiraeus, II. xciii., xciv.
Cnidos: the Liparaeans colonists of, III. lxxxviii. 2; revolts from Athens, VIII. xxxv. 1; attacked by the Athenians, VIII. xxxv. 3; persuades Astyochus to attack the Athenians under Charminus, VIII. xli. 3; Lacedaemonian fleet assembles at Cnidos, VIII. xlii. 5; Lacedaemonian commissioners confer at Cnidos with Tissaphernes, VIII. xliii. 2–4; Tissaphernes' garrison expelled from Cnidos, VIII. cix.

Colonae, in the Troad, I. cxxxi. 1.
Colonus, near, temple of Poseidon there, VIII. lxvii. 2
Colophon, taken by Paches and made an Athenian colony, III. xxxiv.
Conon, an Athenian governor of Naupactus, VII. xxxi. 4.
Copaeans, from Copae on Lake Copais in Boeotia, in the battle at Delium, IV. xciii. 4.
Cophus, port near Torone, V. ii. 2.
Corcyra, earliest sea-fight known, fought between the Corcyraeans and the Corinthians, I. xiii. 4; mother-city of Epidamnus, I. xxiv. 2; refuses aid to the Epidamnians, I. xxiv. 7; neglect of the mother-city (Corinth), I. xxv. 3; wealth, power and glory of; once occupied by the Phaeacians, I. xxv. 4; besieges Epidamnus, I. xxvi.; sends embassy to Corinth, I. xxviii.; victory over the Corinthians, I. xxix. 4; slaughters prisoners after the battle, I. xxx. 1; sends embassy to Athens, I. xxxi. 2; speech, of Corcyraeans, I. xxxii.–xxxvi.; importance of Corcyra, I. xxxvi.; xliv. 3; lxviii. 4; obtains alliance of the Athenians, I. xliv.; sea-fight against the Corinthians, I. xlviii.–li.; offer the Corinthians battle, I. lii.; want to kill the Corinthian messengers, I. liii. 3; set up trophy on Sybota, I. liv. 1; driven from Anactorium by the Corinthians, I. lv. 1; Corinthians intrigue with their Corcyraean prisoners, *ibi;* under obligation to Themistocles, but afraid to shelter him, I. cxxxvi. 1; receive an embassy from Athens, II. vii. 3; furnish ships to the Athenians, II. ix. 6; xxv. 1; fall into sedition, III. lxix. 2; lxx. 1; oligarchs, worsted in a law-suit by Peithias, murder him and his partisans, III. lxx.; seek to win over the people, III. lxxi.; attack and defeat the people, III. lxxii.; fail to win over the slaves, III. lxxiii.; the people defeat the oligarchs, III. lxxiv.; Nicostratus, the Athenian commander, tries to effect a reconciliation, III. lxxv.; negotiations and plots; the people disarm and remove the oligarchs from the temple of Hera to an island, *ibi;* the Corcyraeans and Athenians defeated by the Lacedaemonians, III. xxvii, lxxviii.; prisoners replaced in the temple of Hera, III. lxxix. 1; people persuade some of the aristocratic party to help man a fleet, III. lxxx.; the Lacedaemonian fleet retires on the approach of the Athenians, and the people massacre their opponents, III. lxxxi.; reflections on the Corcyraean atrocities, III. lxxxii.–lxxxiv.; this massacre the first example of the horrors of revolutionary warfare in Hellas, III. lxxxv. 1; the surviving oligarchs occupy Mt. Istone, III. lxxxv.; IV. ii. 3; xlvi. 2; the people capture Mt. Istone and treacherously massacre their prisoners, III. xlvi.–xlviii.; the Sicilian expedition musters at Corcyra, VI. xxx. 1; xxxii. 2; xxxiv. 6; xlii.; xliii. 1; Demosthenes sails to Corcyra with reinforcements for Sicily, VII. xxvi. 3; the Corcyraeans send aid to the Athenians at Syracuse, VII. xxxi. 5; xliv. 6; lvii. 7; alarm the Athenians in the night-battle on Epipolae by their Doric paean, VII. xliv. 6.
Corinth: triremes first built there, I. xiii. 2; earliest naval engagement between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans, *ibi.* an early centre of commerce; ἀφνειόν, *ibi;* take the Epidamnians under their protection; hatred toward the Corcyraeans, I. xxv.; send aid to Epidamnus, I. xxvi. 1; send also a colony, I. xxvii. 1; receive an embassy from Corcyra, I. xxviii.; beaten at sea by the Corcyraeans, I. xxix.; send embassy to Athens, I. xxxi. 3; speech of, I. xxxvii.–xliii.; the Corinthians have the aid of many barbarian tribes of Epirus, I. xlvii. 3; sea-fight with the Corcyraeans, I. xlviii.–l.; retire before the Athenian reinforcements, I. li.; parley with the Athenians, I. liii.; set up ■ trophy at Sybota, claim

the victory, I. liv.; capture Anactorium, I. lv. 1; their alliance sought by Perdiccas, II. lvii.; send troops to Potidaea, I. lx.; bitter hatred of the Athenians, I. lxvi.; cf. I. ciii. 4; summon the allies to Sparta, I. lxvii.; speech of their delegates, I. lxviii.–lxxi.; make war on the Megarians, I. ciii. 4; defeat the Athenians at Halieis, I. cv. 1; invade Megara, *ibi*; are defeated, *ibi*; suffer great loss, I. cvi.; assist the Megarians to revolt, I. cxiv. 1; urge on the war, I. cxix. 3; second speech of the Corinthians, I. cxx.–cxxiv.; furnish ships to the Lacedaemonians, II. ix. 3; lose Sollium, II. xxx. 1; restore Evarchus, I. xxxiii. 1, 2; defeated in Cephallenia, *ibi*; prepare to assist the Lacedaemonian invasion of Acarnania, II. lxxx. 3; attacked and defeated by Phormio, II. lxxxiii., lxxxiv.; second defeat, II. xc.–xcii.; share in the projected surprise of the Peiraeus, II. xciii.–xcv.; induce their Corcyraean prisoners to attempt an oligarchical revolution at Corcyra, III. lxx.; refuse to aid the oligarchs at Istone, III. lxxxv. 3; garrison Ambracia, III. cxiv. 4; IV. xlii. 3; repulse an Athenian invasion, IV. xliii., xliv.; driven out of Anactorium by the Athenians, IV. xlix.; aid Brasidas, IV. lxx. 1; lxxiv. 1; join in one year's truce, IV. cxix. 2; dissatisfied with the treaty between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, V. xvii. 2; xxv. 1; xxxv. 1; send envoys to Argos, V. xxvii.; remonstrated with by the Lacedaemonians, V. xxx.; join the Argive alliance, V. xxxi. 6; apply to the Boeotians, V. xxxii. 5; the new Spartan ephors wish them to bring the Argives into the Lacedaemonian alliance, V. xxxvi.; the negotiation fails, V. xxxviii.; refuse to join the Athenian and Argive alliance, V. xlviii; l. 4; prevent construction of a fort at Rhium by Alcibiades, V. lii. 2; Corinthian envoy at Mantineia, V. lv. 1; send a contingent with the Lacedaemonians against the Argives, V. lvii. 2; engage the Argives, V. lix. 2; too late for Mantineia, V. lxiv. 4; lxxv. 2; do not join the Lacedaemonians against Argos, V. lxxxiii. 1; declare war against the Athenians, V. cxv. 3; withhold support from a Lacedaemonian attack on Argos, VI. vii. 1; receive an embassy from Syracuse, VI. lxxiii.; lxxxviii. 7; vote to send the Syracusans aid, VI. lxxxviii. 8; send envoys with them to Sparta, *ibi*; send ships and troops to Sicily, VI. xciii. 2, 3; civ. 1; VII. ii. 1; iv. 7; vii. 1; xvii. 3; xix. 4; xxxi. 1; encouraged by reports from Sicily and man 25 ships against the Athenian fleet at Naupactus, VII. xvii. 4; Corinthian envoys go from Syracuse to the Sicilian states, VII. xxv. 9; fight Athenian fleet off Naupactus, VII. xxxvii.; claim victory, *ibi*; their forces before Syracuse, VII. lviii. 3; Agis deposits Phthiote Achaean hostages at Corinth, VIII. iii. 1; contribute ships to the Lacedaemonian fleet, *ibi*; allies in conference at Corinth, VIII. viii.; refuse to join the Chian expedition till after the Isthmian Games, VIII. ix. 1; the fleet is chased into Peiraeum by the Athenians, VIII. x.; Corinthians come to its aid, VIII. xi. 2; the fleet breaks the blockade, VIII. xx. 1; the Corinthians discourage a second Lesbian revolt, VIII. xxxii. 1; send five ships to Astyochus, VIII. xxxiii. 1; besiege Oenoe, VIII. xcviii.; lose five ships at Cynossema, VIII. cviii.

Coronaeans in battle at Delium, IV. xcii. 4.

Coronea, in Boeotia, defeat of Athenians there, I. cxiii. 2; III. lxii. 5; lxvii. 3; IV. xcii. 6.

Coronta, in Acarnania, II. cii. 1.

Corycus, a port on the Erythraean peninsula, VIII. xiv. 1; xxxiii. 2; xxxiv.

Coryphasium, Lacedaemonian name of Pylos, IV. iii. 2; cxviii. 3;

ordered to be restored under the treaty, v. xviii. 7.
Cos Meropis sacked by Astyochus, viii. xli. 2; *cf.* xliv. 3; lv. 1; fortified by the Athenians, viii. cviii. 2.
Cotyle, a measure, solid or liquid, iv. xvi. 1; vii. lxxxvii. 2.
Cotyrta, in Laconia, iv. lvi. 1.
Cranii in Cephallenia, settlement of the Helots there by the Athenians, v. xxxv. 7; removal of these Helots, v. lvi. 3; the Cranians, ii. xxx. 3; xxxiii. 3.
Crannonians, of Thessaly, ii. xxii. 3.
Crataemenes, from Chalcis, one of the founders of Zancle, vi. iv. 5.
Crenae, in Amphilochia, iii. cv. 2.
Crestonians, in Acte, iv. cix. 4.
Cretan Sea, iv. liii. 3; v. cx. 1.
Crete, campaign of Athenians in, ii. lxxxv. 6; Alcidas caught in storm off, vii. lxix. 1; Cretan and Rhodian origin of Gela, vi. iv. 3; vii. lvii. 9; Cretan archers, vi. xxv. 2; xliii.; Cretan mercenaries with the Athenians before Syracuse, vii. lvii. 9.
Crisaean Gulf, i. cvii. 3; ii. lxix 1; lxxxiii. 1; its mouth, ii. lxxxvi. 3; Siphae thereon, iv. lxxvi. 3.
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Megara Hyblaea, in Sicily, founded from Thapsus, mother-city of Selinus, VI. iv. 1; depopulated by Gelon, VI. iv. 2 (*cf.* xciv. 1); Lamachus wished to make it the Athenian naval station, VI. xlix. 4; garrisoned by the Syracusans, VI. lxxv. 1; ravaged by the Athenians, VI. xciv. 2; the Athenians capture a Syracusan ship off Megara, VII. xxv. 4.

Melanchridas, a Spartan admiral, VIII. vi. 5.

Melanthus, a Lacedaemonian commander, VIII. v. 1.

Meleas, a Lacedaemonian envoy to Mytilene, III. v. 4.

Melesander, an Athenian general sent to collect tribute in Lycia and Caria; slain in Lycia, II. lxix.

Melesias, envoy from the Four Hundred to Sparta, VIII. lxxxvi. 9.

Melesippus, a Lacedaemonian, sent to Athens with final demands, I. cxxxix. 3; sent by Archidamus to Athens, II. xii.; parting words, *ibi*.

Meliteia, in Achaea, IV. lxxviii. 1.

Melos, one of the Cyclades, hostile to the Athenians, II. ix. 6; ravaged, III. xci. 1; a colony of the Lacedaemonians; attacked by the Athenians, V. lxxxiv. 2; conference with the Athenians, V. lxxxv.–cxiii.; blockaded by the Athenians, V. cxiv., cxv., cxvi.; captured; fate of its citizens, V. cxvi.; capture of three Athenian ships near it, VIII. xxxix. 3.

Memphis, the "White Fortress" of, attacked by the Athenians, I. civ. 2; the city captured by the Persians, I. cix. 4.

Menander, an Athenian in Sicily, chosen colleague of Nicias, VII. xvi. 1; participates in the night attack on Epipolae, VII. xliii. 2; and in the last sea-fight, VII. lxix. 4.

Menas, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the treaty of peace, V. xix., xxiv.; envoy to Thrace, V. xxi. 1.

Mende, an Eretrian colony in Pallene, revolts from Athens, IV. cxxi. 2; cxxiii. 1; cxxiv. 4; repulses the Athenians, IV. cxxix.; taken by the Athenians, IV. cxxx.; the Peloponnesian garrison escapes, IV. cxxxi. 3.

Mendesian, mouth of the Nile, I. cx. 4.

Menecolus, joint founder with Dascon of Camarina, VI. v. 3.

Menecrates, a Megarian, swears to the one year truce, IV. cxix. 2.

Menedaïus, a Spartan commander with Eurylochus, III. c. 2; deserts his Ambraciot allies, III. cix., cxi.

Menon, a Thessalian commander, III. xxii. 3.

Mercenaries: Peloponnesian, I. lx. 1; IV. lii. 2; lxxvi. 3; VIII. xxviii. 4; Thracian, II. xcvi. 2; IV. cxxix. 2; V. vi. 2; VII. xxvii. 2;

xxix. 1; Arcadian, III. xxxiv.; VII. xix. 4; lviii. 3; Mantinean, III. cix. 2; VII. lvii. 9; Iapygian, VII. xxxiii. 4; lvii. 11; Aetolian, VII. lvii. 9; Cretan, VII. lvii. 9; under Tissaphernes, VIII. xxv. 2; foreign sailors in Athenian service, I. cxxi. 3; VII. xiii. 2.

Messapians, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, III. ci. 2.

Messene, in Sicily, submits to the Athenians, III. xc. 4; revolts from Athens, IV. i.; strategic position, *ibi*; VI. xlviii.; war base of the Syracusans against Rhegium, IV. xxiv.; defeated by the Naxians, IV. xxv. 7, 9; attacked by the Athenians and Leontines, IV. xxv. 10; originally named Zancle, VI. iv. 6; refuses to receive Alcibiades, VI. l. 1; attempt to betray Messene to the Athenians frustrated by Alcibiades, VI. lxxiv.

Messenians, in the Peloponnesus, old inhabitants of Laconia, I. c. (*cf.* IV. xli. 2); settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, I. ciii.; II. ix. 4; accompany the Athenians in cruise round the Peloponnesus, II. xxv. 5; aid Phormio at Naupactus, II. xc.; serve with Phormio in Acarnania, II. cii. 1; hoplites and ships with the Athenians at Corcyra, III. lxxv. 1; lxxxi. 2; persuade Demosthenes to attack the Aetolians, III. xciv. 2; xcv. 2; xcvii. 1; bore brunt of battle at Olpae, III. cvii.; cviii. 1; deceive by their speech the Ambraciots at Idomene, III. cxii. 4; Demosthenes wishes to settle them at Pylos, IV. iii. 3; a Messenian privateer joins Demosthenes there, IV. ix. 1; the Messenians assist in the capture of Sphacteria, IV. xxxii. 2; stratagem of their general, IV. xxxvi.; garrison at Pylos, IV. xli. 2; withdrawn, V. xxxv. 7; replaced, V. lvi.; with the Athenians before Syracuse, VII. lvii. 8 (*cf.* Helots).

Metagenes, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the fifty years peace, V. xix., xxiv.

Metapontum, in Italy, allied to the Athenians, VII. xxxiii. 5; lvii. 11.

Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen, IV. xlv.; to be restored to the Lacedaemonians under treaty, V. xviii. 7.

Methone, in Laconia, II. xxv. 2.

Methone, in Macedonia, a force of Methonaeans with Nicias at Mende, IV. cxxix. 4; from Methone Athenians ravage Macedonia, VI. vii. 3.

Methydrium, in Arcadia, V. lviii. 2.

Methymna, in Lesbos; the Methymnaeans do not join in the revolt of Lesbos, III. ii. 1; v. 1; attacks Antissa, III. xviii. 2; independent allies of Athens, III. l. 2; VI. lxxxv. 2; VII. lvii. 5; colonized from Boeotia, VII. lvii. 5; revolt from Athens, VIII. xxii. 2; recovered, VIII. xxiv. 6; exiles make attempt on the city, VIII. c. 3; induce Eresus to revolt, *ibi*.

Metics, or resident aliens, at Athens, serve in the fleet, I. cxliii. 1; III. xvi. 1; hoplites at Athens, II. xiii. 7; xxxi. 2.

Metropolis, in Acarnania, III. cvii. 1.

Miletus, war with the Samians, I. cxv. 1; the Athenians sailing from Miletus defeat the Samians, I. cxvi. 1; Milesians with the Athenians in expedition against Corinth, IV. xlii. 1; aid in the capture of Cythera, IV. liii., liv.; allies of Athens before Syracuse, VII. lvii. 4; the Milesians on Alcibiades' persuasion revolt from Athens, VIII. xvii.; defeated by the Athenians, VIII. xxiv. 1; conquer the Argive allies of the Athenians, but forced to retreat by the Athenians, VIII. xxv.; Alcibiades urges relief for Miletus, VIII. xxvi. 3; the Athenians retire from Miletus, VIII. xxvii. 6; Tissaphernes comes thither, VIII. xxix. 1; an Athenian division watches Miletus, VIII. xxx.; Astyochus assumes command of the fleet there, VIII. xxxiii.; the Peloponnesians at Miletus, VIII. xxxv., xxxvi., xxxix.; Astyochus leaves Miletus, VIII. xli.; Tissaphernes

invites the Peloponnesians to Miletus, VIII. lvii.; lx. 3; the fleet at Miletus offers battle to the Athenians, VIII. lxiii. 1; discontent of Peloponnesian sailors at Miletus, VIII. lxxviii.; the Milesians, acting in concert with the fleet, offer battle to the Athenians, VIII. lxxix.; the sailors at Miletus in open violence against Astyochus, VIII. lxxxiii.; lxxxiv. 1; the Milesians expel the Persian garrison, VIII. lxxxiv. 4; resent Lichas' reproof, *ibi;* send envoys to Sparta to complain of Astyochus, VIII. lxxxv. 2, 4; the Peloponnesian fleet leaves Miletus for the Hellespont, VIII. xcix.; c. 1; cviii. 3.

Mimas, Mt., VIII. xxxiv.

Mindarus, a Lacedaemonian, succeeds Astyochus, VIII. lxxxv. 1; sails to the Hellespont, VIII. xcix.; escapes the Athenian watch, VIII. ci.; captures four of the Athenian squadron, in the Hellespont, VIII. cii.; defeated off Cynossema, VIII. civ., cv.

Mines, gold, on the coast opposite Thasos, IV. c. 2; cv. 1; silver mines at Laurium, II. lv.; VI. xci. 7.

Minoa, island off Megara, captured by Nicias, III. li.; Athenian operations there, IV. lxvii.; retained by the Athenians under the truce, IV. cxviii. 4.

Minos, first lord of the sea, I. iv.; conquers the Cyclades; expels the Carians, *ibi;* puts down piracy, I. viii. 2.

Minyan, Orchomenus formerly called, IV. lxxvi. 3.

Molossians, Admetus, their king, shelters Themistocles, I. cxxxvi., cxxxvii.; they assist the Lacedaemonians against Acarnania, II. lxxx. 6.

Molycrium, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens, II. lxxxiv. 4; taken by the Peloponnesians, III. cii. 2; the Molycrian Rhium, II. lxxxvi. 2.

Morgantine, in Sicily, handed over to the Camarinaeans, IV. lxv. 1.

Motye, a Phoenician settlement in Sicily, VI. ii. 6.

Munichia, a harbour of Athens, II. xiii. 7; Peripoli stationed there, VIII. xcii. 5; a Dionysiac theatre near, VIII. xciii. 1.

Mycale, battle of, I. lxxxix. 2; Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets there, VIII. lxxix.

Mycalessus, in Boeotia, sacked by the Thracian Dii, VII. xxix., xxx.

Mycenae, I. ix.; the meagre remains do not disprove its former greatness, I. x.

Myconus, one of the Cyclades, III. xxix. 1.

Mygdonia, part of, assigned by Perdiccas to the Chalcidians, I. lviii. 2; once inhabited by the Edonians, II. xcix. 4; ravaged by Sitalces, II. c. 4.

Mylae, a town of the Messenians in Sicily, III. xc. 2; captured by the Athenians, *ibi.*

Myletidae, Syracusan exiles, take part in colonizing Himera, VI. v. 1.

Myoneans, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, III. ci. 2.

Myonnesus, near Teos, III. xxxii. 1.

Myrcinus, an Edonian town, goes over to Brasidas, IV. cvii. 3; Myrcinian targeteers at the battle of Amphipolis, V. vi. 4; Cleon killed by a Myrcinian targeteer, V. x. 9; Myrcinian cavalry there, *ibi.*

Myronides, an Athenian commander, defeats the Corinthians, I. cv. 4; defeats the Boeotians at Oenophyta, I. cviii. 3; *cf.* IV. xcv.

Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, wife of Hippias, VI. lv. 1.

Myrtilas, an Athenian, swears to the treaty of peace, V. xix., xxiv.

Myscon, a Syracusan naval commander, VIII. lxxxv. 3.

Mysteries, profanation of, at Athens, VI. xxviii.; Alcibiades accused; supposed to be part of a plot against the democracy, *ibi;* lx.; lxi.; Alcibiades called home for trial, VI. liii. 1; lxi. 4.

Mytilene, revolts from Athens, III. ii. 3, 4; concludes an armistice, III. iv. 4; sends envoys to Athens and Lacedaemon, III. iv. 4, 5; to Lacedaemon again, III. liv.;

Mytilene blockaded, III. vi.; their envoys attend the Olympic festival at the bidding of the Lacedaemonians, III. viii.; their speech, III. ix.–xiv.; admitted to the Lacedaemonian alliance, III. xv.; attack Methymna, III. xviii. 1; blocked by land, *ibi;* Salaethus from Lacedaemon encourages them to hold out, III. xxv.; they capitulate to Paches, III. xxvii., xxviii.; Teutiaplus advises an immediate attack on Mytilene, III. xxix., xxx.; Paches sends the most guilty to Athens, III. xxxv.; all grown up Mytilenaeans condemned to death, III. xxxvi. 2; revulsion of feeling at Athens, *ibi;* speech of Cleon against the repeal of the decree, VII. xxxvii.–xl.; Diodotus urges repealing it, III. xli.–xlviii.; repeal of the decree, III. xlix. 1; a second ship to Athens sent to stay the slaughter, arrives in time, *ibi;* the captives at Athens put to death, Mytilene razed, III. l.; Lesbian refugees take Rhoeteum and Antandrus, IV. lii.; driven out again from Antandrus by the Athenians, IV. lxxv. 1; Mytilene revolts again, VIII. xxii. 2; recaptured by the Athenians, VIII. xxiii. 2; garrisoned by the Athenians, VIII. c. 3.

Myus, a city in Caria (III. xix. 2), given to Themistocles for meat by the King, I. cxxxviii. 5.

Naucleides, a Plataean traitor, II. ii. 2.

Naupactus, settled by Helots from Ithome, I. ciii. 3; ally of Athens, II. ix. 4; headquarters of an Athenian fleet, II. lxix. 1; lxxxiv. 4; xcii. 7; III. cxiv. 2; IV. xiii. 2; the Peloponnesians hope to take it, II. lxxx. 1; victory of the Athenians off Naupactus, II. lxxxiii., lxxxiv.; feigned attack of Peloponnesians on Naupactus, II. xc. 1, 2; second victory of the Athenians, II. xci., xcii.; Phormio proceeds from Naupactus into Acarnania, II. cii., ciii.; Phormio's son, Asopius, succeeds him at Naupactus, III. vii.; the Messenians of Naupactus persuade Demosthenes to invade Aetolia, III. xciv. 3–5; xcviii.; Demosthenes remains at Naupactus after his defeat, III. xcviii. 5; the Aetolians persuade the Lacedaemonians to make an expedition against Naupactus, III. c.; Demosthenes, with the aid of the Acarnanians, saves the place, III. cii.; the Messenians of Naupactus send a force to Naupactus, IV. xli. 1, 2; the Athenian force at Naupactus captures Anactorium, IV. xlix.; Demosthenes comes to Naupactus to aid Hippocrates in the invasion of Boeotia, IV. lxxvi., lxxvii.; the Corinthians prepare to attack the Athenian fleet at Naupactus, VII. xvii. 4; xix. 5; Demosthenes and Eurymedon give Conon at Naupactus some ships, VII. xxxi. 5; indecisive action off Naupactus, VII. xxxiv.; the Messenians of Naupactus with the Athenians before Syracuse, VII. lvii. 8.

Naxos, the island, subjugated by the Athenians, I. xcviii. 4; Themistocles in his flight narrowly escapes the Athenians at Naxos, I. cxxxvii.

Naxos, in Sicily, defeats the Messenians, IV. xxv. 7; settled by Chalcidians from Euboea, VI. iii. 1; altar of Apollo the Founder there, *ibi;* kinsmen of the Leontines, VI. xx. 3; receive the Athenian expedition to Sicily, VI. l. 3; become allies of the Athenians, VII. xiv. 2; lvii. 11; winter-quarters of the Athenians, VI. lxxii. 1; lxxiv. 2; lxxv. 2; change to Catana, VI. lxxxviii. 5; furnish cavalry to the Athenians, VI. xcviii. 1.

Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory in Libya, VII. l. 2.

Nemea, in Locris, where Hesiod was killed, III. xcvi. 1; temple of Nemean Zeus there, *ibi.*

Neodamodes, class of new citizens made up of Helots emancipated for service in war: at Lepreum, V. xxxiv. 2; at Mantineia, V. lxvii. 1; sent to Syracuse, VII.

xix.; lviii. 3; sent to Agis, VIII. v. 1.
Nericus, in Leucas, III. vii.
Nestus, a river in Thrace, II. xcvi. 4.
Nicanor, a Chaonian leader, II. lxxx. 5.
Nicasus, a Megarian, swears to the one year truce, IV. cxix. 2.
Niciades, an Athenian, presiding officer of the assembly, IV. cxviii. 11.
Nicias, of Gortys, in Crete, II. lxxxv. 5.
Nicias, son of Niceratus, captures Minoa, III. li.; ravages Melos, III. xci. 1; defeats the Tanagraeans, *ibi*; ravages Locris, *ibi*; resigns command to Cleon, IV. xxvii., xxviii.; leads an expedition into Corinthian territory, IV. xlii.–xlv.; captures Cythera, IV. liii., liv.; swears to the treaty with the Lacedaemonians, IV. cxix. 2; leads an expedition against Mende and Scione, IV. cxxix.–cxxxi.; his anxiety for peace, V. xvi. 1; VII. lxxxvi. 3; swears to the treaty of peace, V. xix., xxiv.; against Alcibiades he urges alliance with the Lacedaemonians, V. xlvi. 1; envoy to Sparta, V. xlvi. 2; expedition to Chalcidice under Nicias frustrated by Perdiccas, V. lxxxiii. 4; elected one of the generals of the Sicilian expedition, VI. viii. 2; his speech, VI. ix.–xiv.; second speech, VI. xx.–xxiii.; gives estimate of forces required, VI. xxv.; argues in council of war for an attack on Selinus, VI. xlvii.; goes to Egesta, VI. lxii.; exhortation to his army, VI. lxviii.; defeats the Syracusans, VI. lxix., lxx.; saves Epipolae, VI. cii.; his ill-health, VI. cii. 2 (*cf.* VII. xv. 2; lxxvii. 2); sole commander after the death of Lamachus, VI. ciii.; treats with contempt Gylippus' force as privateers, VI. civ. 4; fails to prevent coming of Gylippus, VII. i, ii.; fortifies Plemmyrium, VII. iv. 4; sends twenty ships to waylay the Corinthian ships, VII. iv. 7; writes report to Athens of the situation at Syracuse, VII. viii.; report, xi.–xv.; by an ambush destroys some Syracusan reinforcements, VII. xxxii.; his dilatoriness, VII. xlii. 3; left in camp while Demosthenes attacks Epipolae, VII. xliii. 2; refuses to lead the army away, VII. xlviii., xlix.; superstition at eclipse of the moon causes him to decide to remain thrice nine days, VII. l. 4; addresses the troops to hearten them for the great sea-fight, VII. lxi.–lxiv.; exhorts the trierarchs, VII. lxix.; leads infantry down to the shore to encourage and support the fleet, VII. lxix. 4; Nicias' and Demosthenes' proposal to renew the contest frustrated by the army, VII. lxxii.; retreat begun, VII. lxxv.; final exhortation, VII. lxxvi., lxxvii.; Nicias leads the van, VII. lxxviii. 2; Nicias and Demosthenes fail to give the Syracusans the slip, VII. lxxx. 1; Nicias' division crosses the Evenus, VII. lxxxii. 3; overtaken and compelled to surrender, VII. lxxxiii.–lxxxv.; Nicias and Demosthenes put to the sword, VII. lxxxvi.
Nicolaus, a Lacedaemonian envoy to the King, put to death, II. lxvii.
Nicomachus, a Phocian, betrays Demosthenes' plan against the Boeotians, IV. lxxxix. 1.
Nicomedes, a Lacedaemonian, general in place of King Pleistoanax, I. cvii. 2.
Nicon, a Boeotian, a commander of reinforcements for Syracuse, VII. xix. 3.
Nicondas, a Thessalian, friend of Perdiccas, IV. lxxviii. 2.
Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Athenian commander in Corcyra, III. lxxv.; his humane conduct there, *ibi*; commands an expedition to Cythera, IV. liii., liv.; swears to the one year truce, IV. cxix. 2; with Nicias against Mende and Scione, IV. cxxix.–cxxxi.; with Laches brings an expedition to Argos, V. lxi. 1; falls at Mantineia, V. lxxiv. 2.

Nightingale, "Daulian Bird," II. xxix. 3.
Nile, I. civ. 2; cx. 4.
Nine Ways, Ennea Hodoi, old name of Amphipolis, I. c. 3; IV. cii. 3.
Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, connected with the city by the long walls, I. ciii.; occupied by the Athenians, I. cxiv. 1; restored under the thirty years peace, I. cxv.; Brasidas starts from Nisaea for dash against the Peiraeus, II. xciii. 1; Cleon demands its surrender after the blockade of Sphacteria, IV. xxi. 3; Lacedaemonian garrison there, IV. lxvi. 4; captured by the Athenians, IV. lxix.; Brasidas too late to save it, IV. lxx. 2; cavalry engagement before Nisaea, IV. lxxii. 4; the Athenians at Nisaea before battle with Brasidas, IV. lxxiii (*cf.* lxxxv. 7; cviii. 5.); not given up under the treaty, V. xvii. 2.
Nisus, temple of, at Nisaea, IV. cxviii. 4.
Nomothetae, appointed at Athens after the deposition of the Four Hundred, VIII. xcvii. 2.
Notium, port of Colophon, taken by Paches; recolonized by the Athenians, III. xxxiv.
Nymphodorus, of Abdera, proxenus of Athens, negotiates alliance between Sitalces and the Athenians and reconciles Perdiccas and the Athenians, II. xxix.

Obol, Aeginetan, V. xlvii. 6.
Odomantians, a people in Thrace, III. ci. 3.
Odrysians, a people in Thrace, II. xxix.; Sitalces, their king, becomes an ally of the Athenians, *ibi;* his campaign against Perdiccas, II. xcv., xcviii.–ci.; the greatness and wealth of his kingdom, II. xcvi., xcvii.
Odysseus, his passage of Charybdis, IV. xxiv. 4.
Oeantheans, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, III. ci. 2.
Oeneon, a town in Ozolian Locris, III. xcv. 2; xcviii. 3; cii. 1.
Oeniadae, in Acarnania, attacked by the Athenians, I. cxi. 2; hostile to the Athenians, II. lxxxii.; III. xciv. 1; its situation, II. cii.; refuses to yield to Asopius, III. vii. 4; fugitives from Olpae find refuge there, III. cxiv. 2; compelled to enter the Athenian alliance, IV. lxxvii. 2.
Oenoe, an Athenian fort on the Boeotian frontier, II. xviii. 1; unsuccessfully attacked by the Lacedaemonians, II. xix. 1; besieged by the Corinthians and Boeotians, VIII. xcviii. 2; betrayed to the Boeotians, VIII. xcviii. 3, 4.
Oenophyta, battle of, I. cviii. 3 (*cf.* IV. xcv. 3).
Oenussae, islands before Chios, VIII. xxiv. 2.
Oesyme, in Thrace, a Thasian colony, revolts from Athens, IV. cvii. 3.
Oetaeans, a people in Thessaly, III. xcii. 2; VIII. iii. 1.
Oligarchy: oligarchies everywhere favoured the Lacedaemonians, III. lxxxii. 1; their selfishness, VI. xxxix. 2; their cruelty and unscrupulousness, VIII. xlviii. 6; fall victims to private ambition, VIII. lxxxix. 3.
Olophyxus, in Acte, IV. cix. 3.
Olpae, a hill fort in Acarnania, III. cv. 1; battle of Olpae, III. cvi.–cix.; the Peloponnesians steal away from Olpae under truce with Demosthenes, III. cxi.; destruction of Ambraciot reinforcements on the way to Olpae, III. cx., cxii., cxiii.
Olpaeans, a tribe in Ozolian Locris, III. ci. 2.
Olympia, treasury at, I. cxxi. 3; cxliii. 1; meeting-place of the council of the Peloponnesians, III. viii.; treaties inscribed on pillars there, V. xviii. 11; exclusion of the Lacedaemonians from the games by the Eleans, V xlix.
Olympian victors: Cylon, I. cxxvi. 3; Dorians, III. viii.; Androsthenes, V. xlix. 1; Lichas, V. l. 4; the Olympic truce, V. xlix.
Olympian Zeus, V. xxxi. 2; l. 1.
Olympieum, temple near Syracuse,

VI. lxiv. 1; lxv. 3; lxx. 4; lxxv. 1; VII. iv. 7; xxxvii. 2, 3; xlii. 6.
Olympus, Mt., in Thessaly, IV. lxxviii. 6.
Olynthus, in Chalcidice, occupied by the Chalcidians, I. lviii. 2; situation, I. lxiii. 2; battle of, I. lxii., lxiii.; Olynthians decide engagement before Spartolus, II. lxxix.; receive Mendaean and Scionaean women and children sent by Brasidas, IV. cxxiii. 4; ransom prisoners taken by Cleon at Torone, V. iii. 4; provision respecting Olynthus in the treaty, V. xvi. 5; the Olynthians capture Mecyberna, V. xxxix. 1.
Onasimus, a Sicyonian, swears to the one year truce, IV. cxix. 2.
Oneum, Mt., in Corinthian territory, IV. xliv. 4.
Onomacles, an Athenian commander, VIII. xxv. 1; xxx. 2.
Ophioneans, an Aetolian tribe, III. xciv. 5; xcvi. 1; c. 1.
Opicans, drove the Sicels out of Italy, VI. ii. 4; Opicia, VI. iv. 5.
Opus, in Locris, II. xxxii.
Oracle, Delphian, consulted by the Epidamnians, I. xxv. 1; forbids to let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus, I. ciii. 2; consulted before beginning the war, I. cxviii. 3 (*cf.* I. cxxiii. 1); consulted by Cylon, I. cxxvi. 4; orders Pausanias to be buried in the temple of Athena, I. cxxxiv. 4; oracle about the Pelargicum, II. xvii. 1; about "pestilence" or "famine," II. liv. 3; consulted by Alcmaeon, II. cii. 5; about colonizing Heracleia, III. xcii. 5; about Hesiod, III. xcvi. 1; about the restoration of Pleistoanax, V. xvi. 2; about thrice nine years as duration of the war—only oracle verified, V. xxvi. 4; about the restoration of the Delians, V. xxxii. 1; oracles recited at the beginning of the war, II. viii. 2; xxi. 3; oracles helpless in the plague, II. xlvii. 4; often ruin those who trust them, V. ciii.; unpopularity of oracle-mongers after the Sicilian expedition, VIII. i.
Orchomenus, in Arcadia, besieged and taken by the Argives and Athenians, V. lxi. 3.
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Pegae, a harbour in Megaris, subject to the Athenians, I. ciii. 4; cvii. 3; cxi. 2; restored under the thirty years treaty, I. cxv.; demanded by the Athenians after Sphacteria, IV. xxi. 3; occupied by Megarian exiles, IV. lxvi. 1; these brought back therefrom, IV. lxxiv. 2.

Peiraeum, a harbour in Corinthian territory, where a Peloponnesian fleet was blockaded, VIII. x. 3; xi. 3; xiv. 2; xv. 2; blockade broken, VIII. xx. 1.

Peiraeus, port of Athens, fortified by Themistocles, I. xciii.; circuit of, II. xiii. 7; visited by the plague, II. xlviii. 2; Brasidas' scheme to attack Peiraeus, II. xciii., xciv.; final capture referred to, V. xxvi. 1; attack of the enemy on Peiraeus expected after the disaster in Sicily, VIII. i. 2; Peiraeus protected from attack by the army at Samos, VIII. lxxvi. 5; the army at Samos want to sail to the Peiraeus, VIII. lxxxii.; lxxxvi. 4; the oligarchs fortify Eetioneia to protect the Peiraeus, VIII. xc.; tumult, the fort destroyed, VIII. xcii.; the hoplites in the Peiraeus march to Athens, VIII. xciii. 1; citizens rush to Peiraeus when a Lacedaemonian fleet appears off Salamis, VIII. xciv.; attack on Peiraeus expected after defeat off Euboea, VIII. xcvi.

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Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens, I. xx.; VI. liii. 3; liv. 2; his purification of Delos, III. civ. 1.

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Peithias, a Corcyraean popular leader, murdered by the oligarchs, III. lxx.

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Pelasgians, most widely spread of ancient tribes in Greece, I. iii. 2; the Pelasgians of Acte, IV. cix. 4.

Pele, island off Clazomenae, VIII. xxxi. 3.

Pella, in Macedonia, II. xcix. 4; c. 4.

Pellene, in Achaea; the Pellenians were allies of the Lacedaemonians, II. ix. 1; Pellene was regarded as mother-city of the Scionaeans, IV. cxx. 1; join the Lacedaemonians in the invasion of Argos, V. lviii. 4; lix. 3; lx. 3; furnish ships to the Lacedaemonians, VIII. iii. 2; lose one ship in the battle of Cynossema, VIII. cvi. 3.

Peloponnesus, frequent changes of early inhabitants, I. ii. 3; name derived from Pelops, I. ix. 2; divided into five parts, I. x. 2;

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Pelops, gives his name to the Peloponnesus, I. ix. 2.

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